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Abstract 
 
The impact of air transport liberalisation suggested by economic theory and 
globalisation inspired Nigeria to adopt a more liberal policy towards its international 
Air Service Agreements (ASA). The policy involves implementing the Yamoussoukro 
Declaration with some African countries, an Open Skies Agreement with the US, and 
the easing of some market access regulations with several other countries. This study 
explores the extent to which international air transport liberalisation has impacted the 
Nigerian air transport market over the ten years (2001-10) since its commencement. 
The objectives of the study include, among others: to review the country’s ASAs and 
determine the level of liberalisation in those agreements, to study the performance of 
the ASA in terms of international air traffic demand in the market, to determine the 
impacts of liberalisation on passenger welfare in the market, and to evaluate the 
impact of further liberalising market access and carrier ownership. 
The study employed the use of secondary data relating to traffic volumes and socio-
economic variables from the market. These were subjected to analytical methods 
commonly used in the study of liberalisation, including descriptive statistics, entropy 
and econometric modelling in order to establish relationships among the variables. 
Also, primary data were collected from a field survey and analysed to complement 
some of the findings.  
The empirical findings were able to fulfil the objectives of the study. It was 
discovered that most countries’ ASAs were not fully liberalised, but have some level 
of liberalisation. For a country to attain market access liberalisation, the ASA should 
grant fifth freedom rights, free pricing, multiple designations, and free determination 
of capacity and frequency. Another salient discovery was that liberalisation of market 
access and carrier ownership could spur traffic demand in all route markets, which 
could substantially increase total annual international traffic flows. The impact on 
traffic could trigger changes in air fares that would enhance consumer welfare. 
Nigeria’s airport infrastructure is found to be capable of accommodating the expected 
traffic increases as a result of the liberalisation.  
Although there were some adverse effects from the policy which include capital flight 
and the possible liquidation of home carriers, the thesis concludes that liberalisation 
could stimulate traffic demand in the market significantly, which could enhance 
revenue to the industry for sustainable development. The study concludes with 
recommendations and areas of further research. 
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Chapter One: General Introduction 
1.1  Background of the research 
The air transport industry is an important service sector that supports other key 
economic sectors such as tourism, manufacturing, international trade and business, as 
well as contributing to national GDP (Ogunsanya, 2007). Furthermore, Reagan (1982) 
described it as strategic to the US economy and, as such, the government would bail it 
out when in crisis and tax it when necessary.  
Air transportation has grown tremendously in the last couple of decades due to the 
expansion of the world economy, technological advancement, globalization and 
deregulation. The International Air Transport Association (IATA, 2012) forecasted the 
total global traffic demand in air transport to increase from 2.8 billion passengers in 
2011 to 3.8 billion in 2016 at an average annual growth rate of 5.3 percent for both 
domestic and international services. International markets are expected to grow from 
1.11 billion to 1.45 billion passengers. Despite the impressive growth, the business of 
air transport is described as fragile, characterised by low profit margins, high 
uncertainty, a sensitivity to economic conditions, and is very competitive and capital 
intensive (Doganis, 2006).  
Because of the significance attached to the air transport system, most countries treat it 
as a public utility with high socio-economic and political values and regulated to avoid 
exposing the national interest (Kasarda & Green, 2005). Consequently, many countries 
govern the system through a host of national and international regulations that place 
severe limitations and guidelines on key players in the form of operators and service 
providers. However, for uniformity among regulations, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) was established as the apex body for global aviation regulation, 
setting of standards and recommended practice for worldwide application, and 
protection of member country interests. Accordingly, the economic and safety 
regulations of international air transport started in 1944 at the Chicago Convention 
where formal consent of the countries was recognized. The convention established that 
air transport services should be provided on the basis of equality of opportunity and 
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operated soundly and economically. It recognized the so-called five freedoms of air 
transport, to which four more have since been added (Vasigh, Tacker, & Fleming, 
2008). Although mutual agreement was reached on exchange of the first two freedoms 
of air traffic, the other freedoms were left to Bilateral Air Service Agreement (BASA) 
negotiation between governments (ICAO, 2004a). The BASA became the instrument 
for economic regulation for traffic between countries.  Many believe that the key 
principle of all international bilateral agreement is reciprocity and protection of national 
carriers, which involves the regulation of carrier ownership and control of market 
access, competition, consumer interests, and production distribution (Kasper, 1988). 
The control of market access (regarded as a traffic right) and of price (tariff control) are 
believed to conflict, however, with a modern free market economy (Barrett, 1994). 
The policy of deregulation pioneered by the US in 1978 relaxed some of the strict 
bilateral conditions of protectionism and allowed competition in domestic markets, 
which has led to traffic growth, fare reductions, higher profits, higher quality of service, 
and additional job opportunities, among other benefits, though with some social cost 
implications (Morrison & Winston, 1990). Moreover, in view of the US experience, the 
deregulation of domestic air transport gradually spread to almost every part of the 
world at different times – for example, in Canada (1984), New Zealand (1986), UK 
(1988), Taiwan (1987) Japan (1988), China (1988), Australia (1990) and Nigeria 
(1988).  
Furthermore, in view of developments in domestic markets, further reform was 
extended to the liberalisation of international routes. The USA started to pursue open 
skies agreements (OSA) with other countries in 1992 where carriers of two nations 
could operate any route between their two countries without significant restrictions on 
capacity, frequency or price, and have the right to operate the fifth and sixth freedom 
services, while still regulating carrier ownership (InterVISTAS-EU Consulting, 2009). 
In a similar manner the European Union adopted comprehensive liberalisation of its air 
transport market and formed a single market in which remarkable achievements were 
recorded (Bowen, 2010). In the same way, African countries adopted another form of 
international liberalisation policy called the Yamoussoukro Declaration which relaxed 
market access and carrier ownership among African countries including Nigeria.  
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There is empirical evidence that liberalisation of international transport has imparted 
considerable incentives for passengers and the economy. For instance, Morrell (1998) 
claimed that there was a significant increase in traffic demand on most of the routes in 
Europe after liberalisation. Button (2001) found that the EU single aviation market had 
greatly increased competition on many routes resulting in more new routes being 
operated, leading to a 34% decline in average air fare. Furthermore, Piermartini and 
Rousova (2008a) alleged that restrictions on airline ownership and control has been 
found to withhold certain benefits from passengers and the economy, with limited 
access to new and cheaper sources of capital and managerial talent. InterVISTAS-EU 
(2009) claimed that liberalising airline ownership and control could provide airlines 
with access to new and cheap capital sources through mergers and consolidation.   
In support of this policy, IATA and the World Trade Organization (WTO) canvassed 
for further liberalisation of international air transport based on the desirable benefits to 
the aviation industry, passengers and the global economy, although IATA was attentive 
to some of the possible challenges, including the over-stretching of critical 
infrastructure, the needs of developing countries, labour interest, fair play, remote 
island needs, and national pride/sovereignty (InterVISTAS-ga2, 2006). The aviation 
markets of developing countries can be a source of survival for some countries’ airlines 
with extensive competition. In most developed nations aviation markets are at 
saturation level while in many developing countries the market is in a growth phase; 
therefore, foreign investment can be a source of survival for some airlines (Vasigh, 
Fleming, & Tacker, 2008). Developing countries such as Nigeria, where carrier 
capacity is grossly inadequate for effectively implementing some of the bilateral 
agreements, may likely stand to benefit from further liberalisation, especially the 
ownership of carriers.  
Meanwhile, critical observation by Graham (1995) claimed that the absence of market 
opportunities, heavy indebtedness, competition, and restrictive bilateral agreements all 
combine to impede the development of Africa’s air transport industry, which may well 
be detrimental to wider concerns of economic development, particularly tourism, trade 
and other benefits stemming from air transport. This has motivated the need to 
scrutinise the arguments put forward by conducting an in-depth study of one African 
country. 
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For instance, Nigeria, with the highest population in Africa of about 150 million 
people, and with abundant economic resources (tenth largest oil/gas reserves), per 
capita income of $1,754 and a vast land area of 923,768 km sq. (32nd largest country), 
has the potential to make a significant contribution to the world’s international air 
transport industry (AFCAA, 2008). The country has 23 airports of which four operate 
internationally and Lagos is planned to be a major hub for West African countries. 
Total passenger traffic in 2008 was around 11 million, that is, an increase of about 34% 
from the previous year (NCAA, 2009).  
According to Akpoghomeh (1999), the first effort to deregulate Nigeria’s air transport 
sector was in 1988 when three private carriers commenced scheduled domestic air 
services under a form of regulated competition with the then national carrier.  
Prior to domestic deregulation, Nigerian air services were depicted as being erratic and 
ineffective, but soon after deregulation the airline services in the country witnessed a 
new paradigm of traffic growth and increased investment in the inactive aviation 
industry (Oluwakoya, 2011). In addition, the number of private carriers increased from 
three to 14, passenger volumes increased, as well as competition in frequency, fare, and 
quality of service.  
As a matter of concern, the Nigerian aviation sector has numerous challenges, which 
include a low level of traffic when compared with other peer group countries such as 
Egypt, Kenya, South Africa and Morocco. This was believed to have caused the 
underutilization of aviation infrastructure, with only about 2.7 million international 
passengers in 2010 (NCAA, 2011). Consequently, the revenue generated by the system 
was negatively affected, posing a threat to the sustainability of the country’s air 
transportation system. Moreover, although the country signed Bilateral Air Service 
Agreements (BASAs) with over 50 countries, granting international air traffic between 
them, these agreements are still mostly restricted in nature based on the principle of 
protectionism (FMOA, 2010). Therefore, going by the empirical evidence of the impact 
of liberalisation in other countries, it is possible these BASAs are denying the country 
more economic prospects from foreign investment, consumer welfare and a high 
quality of competitive services. In addition, the current regulations only protect private 
carriers that are only currently capable of handling around 20% of the international air 
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service market. As such, the limited number of foreign carriers are benefitting more, 
while passengers are being deprived of competitive benefits. 
The country has adopted some liberalisation reforms with a number of countries, 
including an Open Skies agreement with the US, and the Yamoussoukro Declaration 
(YD) with some African countries, but unfortunately, the country was undersupplied 
with carrier capacity to service most of the routes assigned to Nigerian carriers within 
these agreements. Despite this, there has been steady growth in traffic demand in the 
country in recent years, which may be attributed to numerous factors including the 
liberalisation policy. Also, it is observed that in Nigeria, after the demise of the then 
national carrier Nigerian Airways in 2003 due to heavy debt and poor management, 
different start-up airlines came on board and attempted to fill the vacuum (Bowen, 
2010). Consequently, foreign carriers dominated international traffic. There have been 
tremendous developments in the country’s international connectivity owing to the 
entrance of new foreign network carriers such as Emirates, Qatar and Kenya Airways.  
There were several studies carried out on the impact of air transport liberalisation in 
some countries, but mostly developed nations, and a few developing countries. 
Nevertheless, the Nigeria air transport market  seems to be distinctive in character from 
these countries in terms of the dominance of business travellers, low traffic demand, 
abundant infrastructure, the absence of a strong home carrier, and huge market 
potential (from the country’s economy, teeming population and political stability).  
In view of the above observations and empirical evidence, the question was raised 
whether liberalisation can solve the underutilization of the country’s airport 
infrastructure. Although various studies have been undertaken in evaluating domestic 
deregulation, little is known about the impact of international liberalisation on the 
market. Therefore, this research project seeks to examine the impact of the 
liberalisation of some aspects of international air transport services in Nigeria and, also, 
to determine the potential impacts of further liberalisation.  
The research will study the implications of an increase in market access and a removal 
of foreign carrier ownership/control (limited to air service agreements) of the country’s 
aviation industry to determine its impact on traffic levels and consumer welfare as 
exhibited in other markets.  
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The research project will also be mindful of some consequences of a liberal policy as 
observed by Graham and Guyer (1999), including capacity limitations of infrastructure, 
fuel hikes/scarcity, the global warming effect, and noise and pollution effects. Also,  
Vasigh, et al., 2008 added the issue of capacity dumping by large carriers which can 
strangle small indigenous carriers.  
1.2  Statement of the Research Problems 
This research examines the impact of air transport liberalisation on passenger traffic 
and other effects. Hence, it involves active challenges emanating from the argument of 
viability based on empirical evidence and theoretical foundation. For that reason, the 
research addresses some of the current and envisaged drawbacks observed by 
deregulation practice in the Nigerian international air transport industry or by 
theoretical assumptions. Although the drawbacks may be numerous, the research will 
focus on the following: -  
First, it is generally believed that the issue of economic regulation of international air 
transport between countries governed by a restricted BASA is meant to protect national 
carrier interests, while overlooking the interest of consumers. Despite the protection 
effort and government support, the airline industry is still fragile and financially 
unstable which has led to the collapse of a number of carriers (Doganis, 2002). In this 
regard, Nigeria’s case is no different from other country experiences, which implies 
that the regulatory policy of protecting the then national carrier’s interest to the 
detriment of the travelling public did not help home carriers survive the financial 
turbulence that led to their collapse. Consequently, the financial support offered by the 
taxpayer was wasted.   
Moreover, many small private carriers attempted to fill the gap created by the collapse 
of the national carriers, which combined only handled 17% of the international 
passengers in the market. Thus, the regulation principle in this case was only trying to 
protect home based private carriers to the detriment of passengers, deprived of 
competitive benefits from more foreign carriers that may have entered the market after 
liberalisation. It is against this background that this research will establish the impact of 
deregulation policy with a view to finding a feasible solution.  
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Secondly, a few studies have discovered the advantages which Nigeria derived from 
domestic deregulation. For instance, Akpoghomeh (1999) acknowledges the gains of 
deregulation, such as traffic growth, private airline competition, foreign investment, 
quality of service, and greater  accessibility to services. However, little or no 
investigation has been carried out on the issue of the impact of international 
liberalisation. 
Another issue is that government has made significant investments in air transport 
infrastructure, which includes 23 airports and other navigational aids, with four of these 
airports operating international services to different parts of the world. More over these 
facilities remain vastly under-utilised; passenger traffic volume was about 9 million and 
3 million passengers per annum for domestic and international flights respectively 
(NCAA, 2011). Meanwhile, empirical evidence from other countries suggests that 
liberalisation could inspire traffic growth. Therefore, there is a need to evaluate the 
impact of the current liberalisation so as to ascertain its impact on traffic growth, and 
determine whether further liberalisation could address the problem of underutilization 
of the infrastructure.  
Most of the country’s active bilateral agreements signed with over 50 other countries 
required a designated indigenous carrier from Nigeria but this has not occurred on most 
routes owing to the inadequate capacity of the carriers. In a similar manner, Nigeria 
recently attained US FAA certification for category 1 status in terms of safety standards 
giving its airlines direct access to the US market (NCAA, 2011). This was achieved 
after massive investment in modern navigational aid facilities that enhance the safety of 
Nigeria’s air space. However, without robust carriers the opportunity will be wasted. 
Therefore, a policy of further liberalisation could lead to investment in the carriers by 
foreign investors, capable of fully utilizing the opportunity. Another issue affecting the 
industry is the shortage of manpower skill development in both managerial and 
technical skills. Ore (2009) attributed some of the aviation accidents and incidents to 
indifference to manpower development and training by the private carriers, unlike the 
former Nigeria Airways. This is confirmed by the Accident Investigation Bureau in one 
of its reports involving Bellview Airline’s “flight β10” accident in β005 where 
inadequate training on a B737 Aircraft was among the reasons for the accident (The 
Accident Investigation Bureau). Full liberalisation of carrier ownership can attract 
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investment from foreign operators where the country can benefit from the sharing of 
best practice and the improvement of manpower skills in the industry. In addition, more 
jobs could be created therefore reducing unemployment problems. 
Another interesting development is the link between air transport development and 
growth in other sectors of the economy such as tourism and trade. O'Connell and 
Warnock-Smith (2012) argued that incoming tourism expenditure can be stimulated 
due to a change in aviation policy that influences the supply of services. Therefore, 
there is a strong indication that air liberalisation policy can affect the supply of airlines 
which in turn can stimulate investment in the tourism industry. In fact, tourism now is 
becoming a major contributor to GDP in many developing countries (World Tourism 
Organization, 2005) , but in Nigeria, despite its advantages of good terrain for tourism, 
the opportunity is yet be exploited due to an over-dependence on the oil sector, which 
is limited in the long term. Therefore, a sustainable industry such as tourism can be 
more reliable and guarantee future development, as practised in the UAE and 
Singapore.  
However, some empirical studies discuss the consequences of a liberalisation policy 
such as Graham and Guyer (1999), which highlighted the risk of exposing small 
carriers to international competition without any protection and consequently ruin the 
carriers’ business. This may be a challenge to policy makers to try to balance the 
positive prospects of a liberalisation policy against its side effects on the industry and 
the country. 
Also, there is the issue of critical infrastructure. The much anticipated traffic increase 
resulting from liberalisation could lead to overstretching the use of airports. This could 
cause congestion and delays as evidenced in some developed countries. Therefore, this 
research should quantify the anticipated benefits against the likely cost effects and 
possible drawbacks, especially regarding critical airport infrastructure that is not 
sufficiently flexible to the growing demand.  
 
This poses some questions, the answers to which will be detailed in the research 
findings. The research questions are as follows:  
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What is the nature of international air service agreements between Nigeria and other 
countries? 
Which airlines benefited most from the Nigeria ASAs in providing international air 
services in last ten years? 
How will future passenger air traffic demand develop in the country after full 
liberalisation of international air services? 
What will be the impact of full liberalisation on passenger welfare and airport capacity 
in the Nigerian air transport industry? 
1.3 Research Hypothesis  
The following hypothesis will be tested; 
Hi: The liberalisation of international air service agreements in areas of market access and 
carrier ownership and control is a driver for the substantial growth of passenger traffic in 
Nigeria, with potential consumer benefits.  
Ho: The liberalisation of market access and carrier ownership/control may not bring any 
meaningful increase in passenger traffic in Nigerian international air transport markets. 
  
1.4  Aim and objectives of the research  
1.4.1  Aim:  
The aim of the research is to study the impact of liberalisation of some aspects of 
international air transport services, specifically the issue of market access and carrier 
ownership/control on traffic demand in the Nigerian market.  
Accordingly, the research formulated the following key objectives as a strategy for 
achieving the research aim. 
 To review the country’s ASAs and to determine the level of 
liberalisation based on the World Trade Organization’s index of 
liberalisation.   To study how ASA changes affected international air traffic demand in 
the Nigerian market.  
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 To determine the socio-economic characteristics of international 
travellers in the market with a view to understanding the market 
implications of changing the liberalisation level.   To determine the impact of liberalisation on traffic demand, passenger 
welfare, and airport capacity in the market.   To evaluate the impact of fully liberalising market access and carrier 
ownership. 
 
1.5 Rationale of the Research 
1.5.1 Economic Justifications 
Statistics have shown that the turnover of the aviation industry globally per annum is 
into trillions of dollars, providing jobs for millions of people, with annual passenger 
volumes of 2.3 billion and a revenue of US$564 billion from passenger traffic in 2009 
(ATAG, 2010, Boeing 2010). Definitely, such an industry cannot be overlooked and 
needs to be properly monitored for development through research and development 
which can lead to improvements in efficiency. Even though the industry is only 
contributing less than 1% of Nigeria’s GDP, according to a CBN (β010) report, 
empirical evidence has shown that air transport is one of the key drivers for the 
development of other economic sectors such as tourism, trade and industry, which 
make a substantial contribution to the nation’s GDP. It is therefore pertinent to nurture 
its growth for the development of other sectors, which can be achieved through 
innovation and sustainable research development, as is being practised in other 
industries such as IT.  
Similarly, the airline industry is believed to be very fragile with a very low profit 
margins when compared to other business industries in many countries (Doganis, 
2010). Also, industry business policy is becoming more dynamic, from regulation to 
deregulation and so on. As a result, many airlines are collapsing, including the Nigerian 
national carrier in 2002. However, only sound and efficient management of the sector 
can sustain its growth and development, which is achievable through research that can 
project future market accurately.  
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The issue of deregulation and liberalisation is an innovative idea introduced in the 
sector for the purpose of improving the business of air transport throughout the world. 
The policy was started by the US in 1978 and later spread to Europe and other 
countries of the world, and almost all these countries are now counting the gains from 
this policy (Doganis, 2010). Even in Nigeria, the deregulation of domestic services 
brought about some reasonable gains (Daramola & Jaja, 2011). Therefore, in 
consolidation of the gains of domestic deregulation, some countries’ ASAs were 
liberalised with mixed outcomes, while some believe it is contributing to capital flight 
losses to the tune of about one billion US dollars annually. Therefore, research on the 
matter should be able to ascertain the actual benefits against the cost of the policy to the 
development of the sector and the nation in general. Also, research may be able to 
discover an antidote for the identified shortcomings of the policy and possibly mitigate 
some of the industry’s numerous challenges. 
Furthermore, the issue of liberalisation has become a global phenomenon where some 
international bodies such as IATA and WTO are the vanguard of its promotion 
worldwide (InterVISTAS-EU Consulting, 2009). Already these organizations are 
making commitments in terms of studies about the impact of the policy in some 
countries, by enhancing awareness of the policy benefits. Therefore, this research study 
will complement these other studies and inform the general public about the Nigerian 
experience. The research will confirm or otherwise some of the general findings of 
various empirical studies, since the Nigerian market is assumed to be unique in terms of 
its market attributes and consumer behaviour. 
Providing forecasts and recommendations about liberalisation policy in the country 
could provide the basis for future decision making by industry stakeholders such as 
business investors, airline operators, airport organizations and policy makers.  
Finally, the research will make an academic contribution by providing additional 
knowledge of a existing concept in a relatively unknown market, which could add to 
the pool of knowledge on liberalisation for reference by academics and professionals. 
1.5.2 Who Benefits from the research 
The thesis’ findings may be of interest and benefit to the following categories of user: 
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Policy makers: The research findings could provide assistance with information that 
could guide Nigerian policy makers on the issue of air service agreement with other 
countries or considering further air liberalisation policy. It may not be necessary to say 
the research findings should inform the decision but they could be of help to instigate 
further study or comparison with an existing research outcome on a similar issue.  
Air transport industry: the research findings may benefit to major players in the 
industry such as airlines, airports, airspace agencies and handling companies. Both 
national and international carriers should be concerned about possible or predicted 
market situations in the country as this will guide them in future investment decisions 
and prepare them for a more liberal market. It will also let them better understand the 
concept of liberalisation policy and its impacts.  
Also, potential entrants to international air services may benefit from having access to 
an in-depth study of the Nigerian market. The airport authorities, airspace agencies and 
handling companies can use the travel demand forecast (in case the market is fully 
liberalised) in determining the supply of their services for the purpose of investment 
planning. 
Academics; this research may be useful to the academic community in these areas: 
 Reinforcing the worldwide pool of knowledge on air transport 
liberalisation.  Providing an argument for a specific market experience.  New concept of using international trade as an exogenous variable in 
determining the Nigerian international traffic demand.  Contributing towards the health of the academic discipline in terms of 
reference material and citations. 
1.5.3 Originality 
 
The research conceives and identifies an emerging issue in a new environment, where 
such research by either academics or professionals is limited, while the policy impacts 
as revealed by empirical studies such as this are very extensive and worthy of 
investigation for public awareness. 
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Therefore, a conventional research instrument will be applied on air transport 
liberalisation to study its impact in Nigeria where such an impact has not been 
established scientifically, especially given the fact that the Nigerian air transport market 
exhibited unique attributes from the countries where research on liberalisation has been 
carried out. For instance, Nigeria has a large potential market from a teeming 
population (about one hundred and fifty million people) and a modest economy, but 
with a very low volume of international passenger traffic and no national carrier. Also, 
a significant proportion of the passengers are business travellers, while very few are 
leisure travellers. Therefore, what will be the impact in such a country’s market when 
international air transport is liberalised?  
Another original aspect of the study is the creation of new understanding for the use of 
international trade volumes between Nigeria and other countries as the exogenous 
variable in determining the traffic demand for the country.  
1.6 Scope and limitations 
A research thesis on the issue of liberalisation impacts on air transport in Nigeria has a 
very wide scope, and the limited resources and time constraints will make it impossible 
to achieve everything. In view of the constraints, the research will focus specifically on 
passenger traffic demand so as to achieve the research objectives.  
The research will focus on air passenger traffic demand which excludes international 
freight and mail traffic. The data on traffic demand is mainly for passengers measured 
annually as passenger volume. Also, the research would further limit the scope to 
international traffic, thus excluding domestic traffic from the analysis. However, the 
issue of domestic and freight traffic will be discussed in the literature review. 
Additionally, the research will focus mainly on scheduled traffic services in the market, 
and as such, any charter and ad hoc traffic is ruled out in the data analysis and findings. 
This constitutes more than 80% of international passengers in the Nigerian market 
based on NCAA figures in 2004. Also, it was difficult for the research to access 
comprehensive data on unscheduled traffic.  
Even though Nigeria has signed many bilateral air service agreements with over 50 
different countries, the study’s focus is only on countries with scheduled traffic and 
countries with significant traffic demand as shown by the in-depth country traffic 
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analysis. Though, in the development of the research model, all international traffic 
demand by country is used.  
1.7 Organisation of the thesis 
The thesis is structured into seven chapters and will be reinforced with diagrams, 
tabulations, graphs, charts and appendices so as to enhance readers’ understanding. 
Chapter 1: General Introduction:  
This chapter provides an introduction to the research by highlighting the background of 
the study, with a statement of the research problems/questions, as well as the research 
aim and objectives. It also explains the economic justification, research originality, 
scope and limitations, and the organization of the thesis. Finally, the chapter provides a 
summary of the research methodology. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review – Liberalisation Concept, and Impacts;  
This chapter discusses some relevant theories behind liberalisation from a conceptual 
context to applications which include; deregulation of air transport, international air 
transport agreements, competition between airlines, elasticity theory, consumer welfare 
and airport capacity. The chapter also explores the impact of the policy based on 
empirical studies covering traffic growth, competition, prices, cost/efficiency, and some 
undesirable effects of the policy. Also, the literature reviewed African liberalisation 
policy implementation and empirical evidence of its impact in Nigeria.  
Chapter 3: Research Methodology  
The chapter develops the methodology and methods underpinning the study, which 
covers philosophical assumptions guiding research design (epistemology, ontology and 
methodology).  The chapter explains the research approach of the study covering data 
required, data collection and its sources, and the various analysis techniques employed.  
Chapter 4: Market traffic Data Presentation and Discussion 
The chapter presents the data collected, runs an appropriate analysis and discusses the 
findings. The NCAA provides the data on annual passenger traffic by route for ten 
years. The chapter also classifies the data in tables/figures with logical categories for 
proper analysis using an Excel package. The presentation, analysis and discussion of 
the data in this chapter covered; a review of ASAs of all active country-pairs; level of 
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liberalisation in the ASA; traffic trends in the market; origin and destination traffic 
analysis and airline competition. This chapter’s content is used to achieve objectives 1 
and 2 of the research. 
Chapter 5: Analysis of the Primary Data Obtained from Field Survey 
This chapter analyses the data collected from the field survey, where the socio-
economic characteristics of the passenger market are found. The questionnaires 
contained 16 questions to the passengers covering their demographic profiles and 
journey profiles. The chapter provides a summary of the responses from a sample of 
502 responses on the 16 variables in tabular form with most of them in nominal scale 
and some in ordinal and continuous scale. Further, the data is analysed using 
descriptive and bivariate statistics such as cross-tabulation, central tendency and a one-
way Chi-squared test. This chapter is able to provide a basis for achieving objective 
number 3 of the study. 
Chapter 6: Analysis of Liberalisation Impacts 
This chapter analyses the secondary data of all countries’ traffic demand and estimates 
the impacts of liberalisation in the countries’ international traffic by developing a cross-
sectional model using a multiple regression technique. Furthermore, the chapter applies 
the model in forecasting the future traffic demand when the current regulations in the 
top 20 country destinations are liberalised. The estimated traffic demand is used in 
forecasting change in average air fare as well as consumer welfare. The expected traffic 
increase is finally contrasted against the designed capacity of the country’s airport. The 
chapter accomplishes objectives 4 and 5 of the research study. 
Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations  
This chapter summarizes the findings of the research from the analysis and discussion 
of the data that shape the findings of the research, based on empirical evidence. Also, 
the chapter reviews the extent to which the research objectives have been achieved, and 
provides answers to the research questions from the findings.  
Furthermore, the chapter highlights some useful contributions to policy, theory and 
practice in the form of recommendations. Also, the chapter discusses some of the 
research limitations and finally identifies opportunities for further research on 
liberalisation in Nigeria. 
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Chapter Two: Literature review: Liberalisation Theory and Impacts 
 
2.1  Introduction 
According to Bryman and Bell (2007), a literature review provides a basis for justifying 
research questions and research design, as well as informing the data required and the 
strategy for the research analysis. In this regard, a wide and systematic consultation of 
published books and journal articles guiding the research has been undertaken. 
This chapter discusses some of the relevant theories behind liberalisation from the 
conceptual context to applications such as the economics of air transport regulation, 
deregulation in air transport, international air transport agreements, elasticity theory, 
consumer welfare and airport capacity. The chapter also explores the impact of 
liberalisation policy based on empirical studies covering traffic growth, competition, 
prices and, cost/efficiency, as well as any undesirable effects of such a policy. 
2.2 Economic Regulation in Air Transport 
In response to the development of air transport in areas of technology, economics and 
politics in the early twentieth century, an institutional framework for regulation was 
developed and globally applied. In a similar fashion, countries also established 
regulation policies to curtail domestic air transport competition. For instance, economic 
regulation in the US domestic market started when the Civil Aviation Act of 1938 was 
passed. The aim was to promote public interest by enabling people to enjoy a safe and 
adequate transport service provided by financially sound and reliable carriers. In a 
similar manner, the regulatory policy established by European governments was aimed 
at protecting mostly publicly owned flag-carrier airlines from competition. By tightly 
controlling market entry on both domestic and international routes, the countries were 
able to provide their carriers with a virtual monopoly (Williams, 1993). 
According to the ICAO (2004b) air transport regulation insinuates the process of giving 
authoritative direction to bring about and maintain a desired degree of order for an 
expected result. This involves the regulatory structure and a legal framework in the 
form of licences, regulations and agreements. Also, all regulations contain some 
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content of the particular subjects being regulated such as market access, pricing and 
capacity. The document adds that the process and structure of international air transport 
regulation has three distinct venues – national, bilateral and multilateral. 
It is widely believed that the major instrument of international air transport regulation is 
the bilateral air service agreement (BASA) which Vasigh, Tacker, and Fleming (2008) 
believed was designed to protect national interests and provide support for national 
carriers. In general, the proponents of regulation believe that the rationale for regulation 
may not be more than national pride, trade and tourism promotion, foreign exchange 
earnings, and national security for the country (O’Connor, β001).  
The development of international air transport was guided by the ICAO Conventions of 
1919 and 1944 where member countries accepted sovereign rights over their territory 
and established international air transport agreements on three critical issues that 
shaped the commercial aspects of the industry, namely: the exchange of traffic rights or 
freedoms of the air (see Appendix1); control of fares and freight tariffs; and flight 
frequency and capacity (Doganis, 2002). These three issues determined the degree of 
pricing freedom and market access. Also, Doganis (2002) added that the convention 
established the international air service transit agreement (1st and 2nd freedom rights) 
and that commercial agreements (3rd and 4th traffic rights exchange) be resolved on 
mutual agreement between the countries concerned. Therefore, the exchange of traffic 
rights became a matter for air service negotiations in the form of a Bilateral Air Service 
Agreements (BASAs), or in some cases, multilateral agreements among countries. 
2.2.1 Air Service Agreements (ASAs) as instruments for air traffic regulation 
In general, before an airline operates international services to another country, the 
government must first negotiate a treaty level agreement with the destination country’s 
government in the form of a Bilaterl Air Service Agreement (BASA). A BASA is 
concluded between two contracting countries which permits commercial civil aviation 
services between the countries. The agreements allow the designated airlines of those 
countries to operate commercial flights that cover the transport of passengers and 
cargoes between the two countries. Also, they normally regulate the frequency and 
capacity of air services between the countries, pricing and other commercial aspects 
(ICAO, 2004b). 
19 
 
This agreement sets the legal framework for the bilateral air transport relationship 
between both countries. As a result of ICAO resolutions on commercial international 
traffic among member countries, the US and UK signed a mutual agreement called the 
Bermuda (I) agreement. This agreement, according to Doganis (2002), became a model 
for other countries including the agreements signed by Nigeria. 
A BASA involves only two countries, but an agreement comprising more than two 
countries or a group of countries is referred to as a multilateral air service agreement. 
The most common form of agreement is divided into four parts, which ICAO (2004b) 
outlines as;  
i) Preamble of the agreement 
ii) Main body of the agreement 
iii) Annexes to the agreement (Exchange of routes and some matters) 
iv) Sometimes exchange of letters or memorandums of understanding. 
Based on some Nigerian agreements revealed by FMOA, the body of the agreement 
and the annexes are the most significant parts of the agreement. For instance, the body 
of the agreement contains mainly the clauses/articles on grants of rights, preconditions 
on the exercise of the rights such as carrier airline designation, and ownership/control. 
However, Doganis (2002) highlighted other clauses/article contents of the agreement to 
include: tariffs, dispute settlement, effective date, termination, modification, statistics, 
security/safety, observing national laws and regulations, capacity, timetable and 
transfer of surplus receipts. Annexes of the agreement mainly deal with air service 
routes to be operated by the designated airlines. 
This research explores some of the key regulatory features identified by WTO (2007) 
as relevant indicators of openness for any scheduled air passenger services, namely 
granting of rights, designation, capacity, tariffs, withholding, and cooperative 
arrangements.  
Designation refers to the number and identity of carriers named by each country that 
could serve a route in the arrangement, which could range from being very restrictive 
(permitting a single designation of airline) to a fully liberal agreement, which allows 
multiple carriers (Kasper, 1988). But in between these extreme cases, ASAs can be 
found that call for multiple, but nevertheless limited, designations (Doganis, 2002). 
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Closely related with airline designation is the withholding regulation in the agreement 
that sets a limit for substantial ownership and control of the designated airlines, and a 
majority stake has to be owned by the country or its nation. Therefore, the regulation is 
limiting for foreign investment.  
The granting of rights or market access suggests an exchange of traffic rights as well as 
specifying access points. However, in respect of the nature of ASAs, most of the 
agreements permitted third and fourth freedom rights of international traffic (Doganis, 
2002). Therefore, this suggests that the strength of deregulation is assessed from the 
granting of fifth to the ninth freedom rights, and the number of entry airports. A 
reasonable, less restrictive ASA allows fifth freedom rights and/or multiple landing 
points in one or both respective countries, as in the case of the USA open skies 
agreement with other countries including Nigeria. The most liberal ASAs give airlines 
open access to all airports in both countries and do not only refrain from restricting fifth 
freedom traffic, but also grant the right of unrestricted cabotage to the airlines. 
Capacity/frequency control refers to the quantity of services that airlines can provide. 
Possible arrangements, according to WTO (2007), may include predetermination of 
capacity and frequency as the most restrictive agreement, or free determination of 
capacity and frequency (absence of any control). In between the two cases, there is a 
Bermuda type option which allows for an increase of capacity/frequency subject to 
regulatory approval; sometimes a country of origin rule is implemented, which restricts 
a government’s disapproval to traffic originating in its own country (Doganis, 2002). 
Before deregulation, tariff regulation in most ASAs delegated the task to the designated 
airlines, which used the International Air Transport Association (IATA) as a platform 
to negotiate air fares. The countries usually approve the resulting airlines agreements 
on air fares. However, the level of strictness depends on the type of state approval 
required – moderate ASAs require double disapproval of the governments. This means 
that an airfare proposal will be automatically accepted as long as both countries to not 
disapprove of it, while a very restrictive ASA ensure strict agreement on airfares by all 
carriers serving the routes. A liberal agreement does not require any government 
approval of fares. Sometimes airlines are also obliged to pool revenue (Doganis, 1994). 
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According to Doganis (2002), reciprocity is the basis for the complex process of 
negotiating the air freedoms in bilateral agreements. Each partner in such negotiations 
tries its best to affect a reasonable balance between the rights to be exchanged by the 
parties in order to safeguard their own interests and those of their national airlines. 
Nevertheless, reciprocity here does not mean that the rights granted by both parties 
should necessarily be identical. Furthermore, Doganis (2002) stressed that the results 
achieved by applying reciprocity differ from one agreement to another, and from one 
case to another, depending on the circumstances prevailing in each case. This research 
attested this heterogeneous arrangement from the various BASAs in Nigeria with other 
countries. For instance, some countries’ agreements are strict BASAs while others such 
as the USA have an open skies agreement (OSA). In general, the scope of rights and 
privileges exchanged is influenced by the bargaining power of each country, the air 
transport policy of each party (whether liberal, protectionist or in-between), the level of 
demand in each country’s market, and the strength of the national carrier of each 
country (Doganis, 2002). 
As a result of these regulations, international airlines face restrictions on their operation 
and efficiency which sometimes affect their effectiveness. This, according to many 
economists and practitioners, negates the principle of a free market economy, and 
works against the growth of the industry, discouraging competition. For instance, 
Morrison and Winston (1986) argued that the absence of competition leads to 
inefficiency, high fares, low load factors, poor profit, and poor service quality. In this 
regard, they acknowledged that restrictive BASAs inhibit a market-based solution to 
international air travel and replaces it with government regulation, which raises costs to 
both operators and customers and thus creates inefficiency in the market. Meanwhile, 
the drive to relax economic regulation for a competitive environment in air transport as 
a catalyst for its growth and expansion has increasingly witnessed heightened 
momentum worldwide (Graham, 1995). This is based on some scientific theories 
developed by various scholars and evidently justified by observations in practice. 
2.2.2 Bilateral Air Transport Policy in Africa  
The formulation and scope of African country regulation policies depends upon the 
objectives of the country concerned. However, according to the specialized African 
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Union in charge of aviation, the African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC), African 
countries, like other countries of the world, seek the realization of one or more 
objectives, which include: protection of national carrier interest, promotion of 
trade/tourism, providing affordable adequate air transport to the public, and avoidance 
of excessive capacity for wastage. 
These objectives do not necessarily coincide, and the relative degree of importance 
attached to each objective varies from one country to another and from one time frame 
to another. The policy of a given country reflects its national goals and objectives in 
international air transport. In fact, bilateral agreements, like other international 
agreements, show how far each party has succeeded in achieving its goals and 
objectives – in the end they should serve the interests of both negotiating parties to 
varying degrees.  
AFCAC (1999) further suggested that policy must be geared to overcoming the 
difficulties encountered in achieving a proper and healthy development of African air 
transport by improving the adverse conditions prevailing in the continent, which 
include: 
- The concern for protection of national airlines which may be at a competitive 
disadvantage in the absence of restrictions. 
- Most African country BASAs between themselves or with other non-African 
countries exchange only the third and fourth freedom rights whereas the exchange of 
the fifth freedom rights is very limited. 
- An inadequate air transport market, as traffic volumes are limited and thus the 
potential progress of tourism is limited too. 
- Insufficiency of direct air services within Africa, and an inadequacy of 
frequency of existing services.  
Many analysts believe that these regulations have not succeeded in helping African 
countries achieve their air transport objectives, but have rather contributed to the 
underdevelopment of the continent. According to Bofinger (2009), the consequence of 
the bilateral regulatory system as practised is a bottleneck in the overall development of 
the air transport network in Africa in which the quantity and quality of air services have 
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not increased or improved. In practical terms, the system has not served the interests of 
the consumer or that of the airlines or helped strengthen the operations of most African 
airlines, in particular for a continent of more than 53 independent countries including 
Nigeria. It has restrained the potential for growth. The current weakness of some 
African airlines is perhaps the result of this overtly protectionist policy. 
As the airlines have become weaker owing to the shift in national policies, the 
limitations of such restrictive bilateral air service agreements have become more and 
more apparent; it is becoming increasingly clear that they can no longer meet the 
rapidly changing needs of the African market and the globalization of the economy. 
The development of appropriate regulatory policies for African air transport is a key 
component for an efficient and competitive air transport network in Africa, which 
ensure the participation of the continent in economic globalization (AFRAA, 2000). In 
light of the limitations and shortcomings of the African bilateral system, compounded 
by the growing trend towards globalization, the United Nations Economic Commission 
–UNECA (2001) – believed that there is a general need for African countries to review 
the current bilateral framework and launch initiatives towards genuine liberalisation of 
air services. 
As a result of this, AFCAC and UNECA spearheaded the formulation of a new policy 
for African country air transport liberalisation, termed the Yamoussoukro Declaration, 
which is similar to European liberalisation.  
Nigeria, like other countries in Africa, has signed bilateral air service agreements with 
many countries of the world. This research discovered that agreements with some 
countries are liberal in nature. The liberal agreements differ from country to country – 
they may be partially liberal or moderately liberal. But the majority of such agreements 
do not contain liberal policies. 
2.3 Arguments for Regulatory Reform 
As stated earlier, after the establishment of ICAO in 1944 and the subsequent air 
transport development in to a commercial venture, the civil aviation system was 
systematically regulated to control competition so as to avoid chaotic economic 
conditions and to provide more security for investors. As Williams (1993) claimed, the 
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objective of economic regulation is to promote public interest by enabling people to 
enjoy a safe and adequate air transport service provided by financially viable and 
reliable carriers.  
However, in the late 1970s, according to Gillen and Hinsch (2001), the traditional 
system of regulating international air transport by means of a restrictive bilateral ASA 
came under growing pressure from a number of sources. These included new 
developments in domestic air transport policy in the US which spilled over to other 
countries, new competitive pressures by some Asian Airlines, and the formation of the 
European Single Market extending its free trade regime to air services. 
Also, in the same period many economists and industry professionals began to doubt 
the benefits of regulation and argued for more competition in the system based on 
economic theories and empirical analyses. For instance, Jordan (1970) argued that 
regulation in practice did not promote public interest but rather helped the producers in 
forming cartels that enjoyed monopoly profits, while entry and exit were effectively 
restricted and price levels were higher than they would have been if unregulated. In 
addition, Breyer (1982) argued that certain features of the airline industry make 
regulation inappropriate, such as individual markets and an industry that can support 
more airlines of an efficient size. Also, the demand for air transport is highly cyclical, 
where load factors drop and costs per passenger rises during recession, hence profits 
suffer; as such there is a need for airlines to reduce fares to attract more passengers 
during recession which can increase load factors (Breyer, 1982). Also, Graham (1995) 
further added that load factors tended to be low, profitability and service quality was 
poor and competition was almost eliminated by the regulatory failure to secure efficient 
economic performance. 
2.3.1 Economic Theory of Liberalisation 
Another possible rationale for reform in air transport regulation policy is the theoretical 
explanation of the deregulation concept that shows how restrictive bilateral ASAs 
dictate the institutional structure of international airline markets. Therefore, the thesis 
examines some of the theories that attempt to explain the concept scientifically. 
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Button and Drexler (2006) offered a general representation of the issue graphically as 
shown in Figure 2.1. It highlights the potential fare and output implications of the 
various types of regulatory regimes. The theory postulates that international traffic 
between countries A and B under a BASA regulatory regime is assumed to have a 
linear demand D1. As a result of international regulation, fares and capacity are 
restricted in the market to P1 and N1 respectively. 
 
Figure 2.1 Theory of liberalisation extracted from Button and Drexler (2006) 
However, Button and Drexler (2006) further added that removal of regulation due to a 
liberalisation policy such as an open skies agreement or an African type Yamoussoukro 
Declaration results in competition and a drop in price to P*. This affects both the 
demand and supply curves for international air travel between A and B due to 
downward pressure on costs from the privatized carriers that mitigate inefficiency in 
the industry and route expansion. The policy implementation provokes a more 
integrated quality of service such as hubbing, code sharing, interchangeable frequent 
flyer programmes, common lounges and baggage check-in, consequently pushing the 
demand for international service to D2. The drop in costs and the outward shift in 
demand leads to an increase in volume of travelling passengers to N2 and liberalisation 
allows price to fall to P2, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.  
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The diagram suggests that, by applying the ceteris paribus rule, liberalisation leads to 
lower costs of operation and a higher number of passengers. The relationship between 
the degree of liberalisation and traffic volumes appears to be robust, while the impacts 
on air fares are debatable, in which the direction of the change depends on the shapes of 
elasticity of supply and demand curves (Grancay, 2009). 
The theory seems to justify the liberal air transport system for the purpose of market 
growth, efficiency and possible low fares or consumer surplus, but it fails to provide 
remedies for protecting national carriers that have been previously protected by a 
regulatory regime; nor does the theory predict how smaller carriers from developing 
countries can compete effectively with bigger carriers from developed countries in a 
liberal arrangement. There are also other challenging issues that the theory needs to 
address in order to satisfy proponents of regulation.  
In addition to the above theory, there are numerous scientific hypotheses that advance 
the cause for reform in air transport from regulation to liberalisation policy in various 
countries. The reform as cited by many studies was pioneered in the USA in 1978 and 
gradually spread to many countries at different times over the last 35 years ago. 
Consequently, the air transport market witnessed a significant change in some of its 
parameters such as levels of competition, traffic demand, price, cost and frequency.  
According to InterVISTAS-EU (2009), there is considerable evidence that 
liberalisation of international markets has provided substantial benefits for air 
passengers and the wider economy. One study of the EU single aviation market found 
that it had greatly increased competition on many routes, had resulted in many new 
routes operating, and led to a 34 per cent decline in fares (UK CAA, 1998). Another 
study found that liberalisation of the EU market had doubled the rate of growth in air 
traffic in the EU (Graham, 1998). Furthermore, other studies have demonstrated a link 
between increased air traffic and growth in employment and Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). For example, a recent study estimated that each 10 per cent increase in 
international air services led to a 0.07 per cent increase in GDP, which can translate 
into millions (or even billions) of dollars of incremental GDP (Kincaid & Tretheway, 
2013). 
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2.4  Deregulation and Liberalisation – Concept and development 
As stated earlier, economic theory, technological development, globalisation and airline 
business concerns formed the basis for regulatory reform in air transport with the 
expectation that the sector would be transformed into a highly efficient, competitive 
and consumer-oriented market, where entry barriers would be relaxed while 
incumbents would be forced to be efficient; consequently and air fares would come 
down. As a result, two general policy models were established: a deregulation and 
liberalisation policy. 
According to Graham (1995), globalisation in general is partly explainable by 
economic paradigms that promote free trade and international competition, achieved 
through world-wide processes of deregulation and the removal of trade barriers. In this 
present context, deregulation involves the exposure of air transport to laissez-faire or 
free-market forces, achieved through the removal of most regulatory controls over 
pricing, while permitting carriers to enter and leave markets at will.  
However, the research study observed that deregulation and liberalisation mostly refer 
to the same issue and some literature used them interchangeably. Graham (1995), 
however, claims that deregulation refers to the exposure of air transport to competitive 
laissez-fare or free-market forces achieved through the removal of most regulatory 
controls over pricing, entry and exit barriers; while liberalisation recognizes that the 
structure of the transport industry may necessitate the retention of some form of 
regulatory protection, if consumers are to gain long-term benefits from the competition 
promoted by deregulation measures.  
Meanwhile, Grancay (2009), described air transport liberalisation as a process of the  
gradual abolition of regulation on designation, capacity, frequency and tariff setting 
within ASAs. It aims at creating an efficient air transport system based on free market 
mechanisms where market factors are determined by a demand and supply curve at the 
point of equilibrium, and the government would only be concerned with safety and 
security. 
Furthermore, regulatory reforms and privatisation policies are expected to be held 
concurrently. Proponents contend that privatisation without reforming economic 
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regulation would lead to private monopolies, and deregulation without privatisation 
merely promotes inefficient public monopolies (Button, 1991). 
Wang (2004), however, identified the air transport reform process to comprise five 
different stages: regulated market; process of deregulation; deregulated market; process 
of liberalisation and fully liberalised market.  
It is observed that there is generally a time lag between the implementation of domestic 
and international deregulation, the former being much easier to implement, either at the 
scale of the individual country or of a trading bloc such as the EU, where the Single 
Aviation Market was completed in 1997. By then, deregulation was creating a world air 
transport market in which fully or partially privatised major airlines sought, if not to 
eradicate, at least to control competition and capacities through consolidation into 
regional and ultimately global alliances. Their strategies were increasingly driven by 
the pursuit of high-yield traffic and lower costs rather than chasing market share 
(Graham, 1998). 
2.4.1 Deregulation in US and the Global Spread 
The regulation of the US government through the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in 
the 1970s covered routes, fares and schedules. The CAB’s main functions then 
included: allocation of routes to airlines; limiting the entry of airlines into new markets; 
and the regulation of fares for passengers (Morrison & Winston, 1986).  
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 removed many of these controls, thus changing 
the face of civil aviation in the US. Airlines required permission to serve any given 
route and incumbents could raise many obstacles to the granting of that permission. It 
also dismantled the notion of a flag carrier (Morrison & Winston, 1986).  
Furthermore, Moore (1986) added that the new air transport policy of the US rested on 
two closely related events. The first was the implementation of the US airline 
deregulation policy which led to productivity gains of US air carriers and fare 
reductions for travellers. The second event was the 1978 CAB order that proposed the 
withdrawal of antitrust immunity for the IATA air fare conference, which initially 
prevented all airlines from participating in air fare co-ordination meetings for routes to 
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and from the US. Subsequently, this was limited to only US air carriers in return for 
approval for some liberalisation on air fare setting for other countries.  
The implementation of reform in the US market, which lessened some stringent 
bilateral conditions on protectionism and allowed competition in the domestic market, 
led to growth in traffic, fare reductions, higher profits, good quality of service and more 
job opportunities, among other benefits, though with some social cost implications 
(Morrison & Winston, 1995). 
 In another testimony, Goetz & Vowles (2009) observed that from 1978 to 2000, there 
was, in general, a greater quantity of services, more people flying, and lower average 
fares, although widespread differences occurred across places based largely on the level 
of single carrier domination, size of market demand, and the presence or absence of 
LCCs such as Southwest Airlines. 
 In addition, it was found that airline ticket prices were almost 40 per cent lower 
(inflation adjusted) than they were in 1978 when the airlines were deregulated. 
Alongside growth in populations and workforce-mobility increases, these trends 
provided some of the stimuli for rapid expansion in domestic passenger traffic volumes 
which rose from 250 million passenger miles in 1978 to 750 million passenger miles in 
2005 (Moore, 1986).  
Meanwhile, after the success of domestic deregulation, the US pursued deregulation on 
the international front by adopting liberal ‘Open Skies’ bilateral air service agreements 
with other countries around the world. The agreements opened the aviation market to 
foreign access and removed barriers to competition which gave airlines the right to 
operate air services from any point in the US to any point in the other country, 
including the fifth freedom agreement (Button & Taylor, 2000).  
Another remarkable market that become a benchmark was the success of European 
country deregulation. The economic liberalisation of air travel was part of a series of 
deregulation moves based on the growing realization that a politically controlled 
economy served no continuing public interest. The effects of liberalisation in Europe 
are undoubtedly quite different in scope and magnitude than in the US (Button, 1991). 
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Meanwhile, Wang (2004) compared the liberalisation effects in different markets and 
found that Europe and the USA had a slower growth rate of 4 to 6 per cent per year, 
while the Asia and Pacific region witnessed the most dynamic growth rate of about 9 
per cent per year. This may be due to fast growing trade and investment coupled with 
rising domestic prosperity, and the region’s air traffic is forecasted to grow 
continuously (Wang, 2004).  
As a result of the US experience, deregulation gradually spread to almost every part of 
the world at different times, examples include: Canada (1984), New Zealand (1986), 
UK (1988), Taiwan (1987) Japan (1988), China (1988) and Australia (1990). In most of 
these countries, the early proliferation of competitors gave way to a sharp increase in 
market concentration (Graham, 1995). 
2.5 Economic Impacts of Liberalisation: Empirical evidence 
After several years of reform in air transport involving the implemented of deregulation 
and liberalisation policies in a number of markets, there have been some significant 
changes, which have had glaring economic and social impacts on the aviation market 
namely the stimulation of airline and airport services. Also, all other aviation service 
related industries such as tourism, and the economy in general have been stimulated. 
Even though there are some negative outcomes from such policies, the consensus in 
general is evident from the empirical analysis that the policies are generally beneficial 
to most aviation stakeholders. This section will examine the empirical evidence from 
previous studies of the impact on some key market variables such as traffic, 
competition, cost, and profit/consumer welfare. Also, the development of business 
models like hub & spoke networks, and Low cost carriers (LCC) are some of the 
benefits of liberalisation. In addition, it is acknowledged that liberalisation has had an 
effect on labour movements and cross-border cash flows due mainly to airline 
acquisitions and mergers.   
2.5.1 Impact on market competition 
 One of the primary purposes of liberalisation according to some of the theories is to 
make air transport services competitive with regards to efficiency and quality of 
service. Therefore, the first expectation from liberalisation is to have an increase in the 
31 
 
competition levels depending on market regulation, whether it is free entry, free 
capacity, free pricing or all the three.  
As stated earlier, the US market was the pacesetter in the reforms that triggered fare-
setting freedom and endorsed free market entry to prospective airlines, subject to safety 
requirements. The impact was immediate, with discount fares emerging, significant 
numbers of new carriers entering the market, and many more services being offered.  
According to the US Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2006), the effects of 
deregulation on airline competition in the US domestic market included the fact that the 
average number of competitors had increased to 3.5 per market in 2005 from 2.2 in 
1980. During the same period, fares declined almost 40 per cent. Similarly, Button 
(2001) found from a UKCAA analysis in 1994 that the reforms of the 1990s produced 
greater competition both on EU domestic routes and on international routes within the 
Union. Specifically, 30 per cent of EU routes were served by two operators and 6 per 
cent by three operators or more. Further analysis for 1997 showed that since 1992 the 
number of international city-pair routes within the EU with multiple carriers rose from 
500 to 566, many having three or more competitors. On the denser routes, the number 
of cities served by multiple carriers with three or more competitors doubled. Similarly, 
the number of domestic city-pair routes served by multiple carriers rose even more, 
with 20 per cent now served by three or more airlines. Consequently, fares fell on 
routes where there were at least three operators (Button, 2001).  
InterVISTAS-ga2 (2006) summarised the impact on competition as, between 1992 (the 
year before the EU air market was fully liberalised) and 2000, the number of intra-EU 
routes served by more than two carriers increased by 256 per cent while the number of 
domestic (within member country) routes with more than one carrier increased by 88 
per cent.  
Similarly, Warnock-Smith and Morrell (2008) examined whether liberalisation of air 
transport in Caribbean Island countries had affected levels of competition and enhanced 
traffic levels. The findings buttress the previous presumption that there is a positive 
correlation between liberal policy reform and entry as well as traffic/capacity growth, 
which enhances tourism in the region. The analysis focused on three busy city-pairs 
that link to the US, and discovered that carrier designation relaxation and granting of 
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the fifth freedoms permitted additional airlines from the USA and third countries 
(Argentina and Chile) to enter routes in 2000 and compete. This facilitated traffic 
growth of up to 130 per cent in these particular routes in three years, while capacity 
was observed to increase by about 110 per cent. However, one of the routes (US–
Dominican Republic) was discovered to have low traffic growth that differed 
significantly from the others, which may not be unconnected with the Dominican 
Republic’s strict regulations on designation of carriers making entry difficult 
(Warnock-Smith & Morrell, 2008). The regression and time series analysis study 
concluded with evidence from three US–Caribbean markets that there is a significant 
statistical relationship between air policy reform and traffic/capacity growth, leading to 
greater output and competition levels. 
This research envisaged that cases of EU and Caribbean liberalisation differ 
significantly from the Nigerian situation: while the former markets were dominated by 
leisure travellers and believed to be foreign nationals, the Nigerian market is 
substantially dominated by business travellers and mostly Nigerian passengers. 
Therefore, it is likely the two markets will respond to liberalisation differently. 
In a related development, it is generally understood that competition begins to be 
effective once there are three carriers present, thereby avoiding situations of monopoly 
or duopoly (Graham, 1998). Although the claim agreed that, a duopoly of a network 
carrier and a low-cost airline leading to a wider price gap is inevitably a competitive 
situation. Also, competition between two network carriers leading to duopoly does not 
necessarily mean the absence of competition (Graham, 1998).  
However, the assessment of competition between airlines seems to differ between 
various studies. Some researchers study competition from the perspective of the 
number of carriers, or airports, or traffic, or market share (market concentration). But 
an evaluation of competition based on city-pairs turns out to be more appropriate, 
though the issue of stop-overs when passing through another country somewhat 
complicates it as a measure. Dobruszkes (2009) designed two methods of evaluating 
competition: using the number of competitors and entropy. The latter is a capacity 
share index that provides a good measure of effective competition, calculated by 
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summing the squares of the shares (fractions or percentages) of seats provided by each 
airline on the route.  
Therefore, since competition can only be effective with more than two carriers 
competing in a market, in some developing countries like Nigeria, effective 
competition may not be possible on some of the routes due to the absence of a Nigerian 
carrier on many of the routes, leaving the route with a monopoly or duopoly service. 
Therefore, the impact of liberalisation in such a situation may be different from the 
evidence found in US and European markets.  
2.5.2 Impact on passenger traffic 
Traffic increases are another anticipated impact in terms passenger of freight demand. 
Hypothetically, it can be assumed that an increase in competition can lower prices 
which can stimulate more traffic demand (Button & Drexler, 2006). As a matter of fact, 
Xiaowen, Oum and Anming (2010) elaborated how liberalisation efforts have brought 
significant traffic growth, which according to them was mainly driven by two factors: 
first, liberalisation removes constraints on pricing, route entry, service capacity, and co-
operative arrangements among alliance members. Removal of these constraints allows 
airlines to compete more effectively and operate more efficiently, which reduces prices 
and increases service quality in terms of flight frequency and frequent flier 
programmes, for example. As a result, passenger traffic can be stimulated substantially. 
Second, liberalisation allows airlines to optimize their network configuration. The 
implementation of hub-and-spoke networks has enabled carriers to link small markets 
with their hub airports, thus expanding air services to new destinations.  
Meanwhile, there is much empirical evidence to support the above argument from all 
parts of world, both in developed and developing country markets. Some even develop 
a model for global applications, and most of the evidence from studies agrees that 
liberalisation enhances traffic growth for both passengers and freight. 
One of the significant demonstrative effects of liberalisation on traffic is the US 
market. For a period of 12 years encompassing the policy change (1976–87), passenger 
traffic had risen by 88 per cent, employment in the industry had risen from 340,000 to 
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450,000, scheduled passenger miles were up by 62 per cent and seat availability had 
grown by 65 per cent (Button, 1998).  
Another research study by UKCAA (2006) discovered that two years after 
liberalisation the number of direct services between the UK and India had increased 
from 34 to 112 services per week (an increase of 229 per cent). While most of these 
new services were operated between the two countries’ main airports (Heathrow in the 
UK, Delhi and Mumbai in India), services connecting secondary points in the UK and 
India also rose. In addition, the number of carriers operating between the two countries 
increased from three to five. 
Despite the fact that many analysts believe the stimulus impact of liberalisation can 
take several years to fully mature and bring a significant change, InterVISTAS-EU 
(2009) provided evidence, from some exceptional cases, where there was an instant 
impact on traffic changes as shown in Table 2.1 below. 
Table 2.1 Traffic growth rates on a selection of routes due to liberalisation 
Canada – USA bilateral in 1995, one year after traffic increased by 146.4%. 
Costa Rica – USA bilateral in 1995, one year after traffic increased by 118.5% 
Hong Kong – USA bilateral in 1996, one year after traffic grew by 21.1%. 
China – USA bilateral in 1996, one year after traffic increased by 174.3%.  
Brazil - USA bilateral in 1997, one year after traffic increased by 120.0.4%. 
Japan – USA bilateral in 1998, one year after traffic increased by 116.6%. 
Mexico – USA bilateral in 1999, one year after traffic increased by 169.6%. 
India - UK bilateral in 2004, two years after traffic increased by 229%. 
Source: InterVISTAS-EU (2009) 
Although it is proven that liberalisation stimulates traffic growth, there is no universal 
fixed ratio for the change. However, the level of traffic growth depends on each 
country-pair factors which include socio-economic links, the nature of liberalisation, 
distance and the age of the ASA. Accordingly, Permartini and Rousova (2008b) 
developed a universal empirical model with the aid of gravitational theory using a 
standard Air Liberalisation Index (ALI). The model estimated the impact of a change in 
the degree of air service liberalisation on the volume of international passengers with a 
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database of 2,300 air service agreements between 180 countries using the following 
regression: 
ln(Passenger Traffic) = α + ȕ1 ln(distance) + ȕβ border + ȕγ colony + ȕ4 language +ȕ5 low-
income + ȕ6 ASA_age + ȕ7 air liberalisation + Σk Ȗ k Dk + İ -------------- (2.1) 
Where ln(Passenger Traffic) is the total number of passengers travelling between two countries 
in log form, İ is the Error term, the symbol ln denotes logarithms, Dk denotes country k fixed 
effect in dummy. Air liberalisation denotes the degree of liberalisation of air service between 
the two countries.  
From the model, Permartini and Rousova (2008b) found robust evidence of a positive 
and significant relationship between passenger traffic and the degree of liberalisation of 
the aviation market. It estimated that increasing the degree of liberalisation from the 
25th to 75th percentile increases traffic by approximately 30 per cent. Overall, the 
gravity-type model explains an important proportion of the variance in the data, with an 
adjusted R2 of over 75 per cent. However, during the analysis of the role of specific 
provisions of agreements in liberalising the aviation market, they found that the 
removal of restrictions on price, capacity, cabotage rights and the possibility for airlines 
other than the flag carrier of the foreign country to operate a service are the most 
traffic-enhancing provisions of air service agreements. In addition, the most liberal type 
of ASA is found to increase traffic by 78 per cent relative to the most restrictive type. 
These results are robust to the use of different estimation techniques. The most 
remarkable significance about Permartini and Rousova’s (2008b)  study  that make it  
different from other studies, was  the use of indices of the degree of liberalisation 
developed by experts and widely used by WTO. This addresses the issue of 
multicollinearity among the dummy variables discovered in some previous studies such 
as that of the Intervista study in 2006–09. In addition, the research takes into 
consideration the differences in country pairs in terms of low income countries and 
high income countries. The research finally addressed the issue of the mismatch 
between data on bilateral passenger flow and the regulatory regime. 
However, the major weakness of the model includes the use of a maximum of only 3 
per cent of its sample from developing countries, which may not adequately represent 
the market performance of developing countries such as Nigeria. Another shortcoming 
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of the model is that it is a global model relationship which may not be as precise as 
market specific studies. Also, the use of 2005 data when liberalisation in many 
developing countries had just started without any noticeable effects may affect the 
generalisations of the study.  
From the available empirical evidence, the study is convinced that liberalisation and 
network competition in international markets lead to shifts in the spatial pattern of 
traffic flows as well as air fare reductions, which in turn substantially stimulates traffic. 
However, traffic increases for any given market also depends on underlying socio-
economic variables and levels of liberalisation.  
2.5.3 Impact on Flight Frequency 
Another impact associated with traffic increases is the increase in frequency of flights. 
This is one of the attributes of airline service quality that implies the number of aircraft 
departures, the total number of miles flown and the timeliness of service. The 
importance of frequency is compounded by evidence that it is high-yield business-class 
passengers who are most sensitive to this factor.  
According to Graham and Guyer (1999), the need to optimise frequency of service in a 
competitive market demands a smaller aircraft type. This leads to airlines having a mix 
of aircraft in their fleet. Furthermore, they claim that competitive market entry demands 
a matching of frequency with that of the incumbent carrier(s). Consequently, most 
carriers have linked frequency and status products, further reducing the capacity of 
their aircraft to install separate business class cabins and/or seating for those paying for 
premium tickets that maximise frequency benefits, including the ability to switch 
flights. It is readily apparent that the hypothetical use of larger aircraft conflicts with 
the evidence that airlines will continue to pursue strategies that accommodate growth 
primarily through additional frequencies. 
In this regard, the demand by airlines for smaller capacity aircraft of about 110–180 
passenger seats are on the increase. Boeing estimated that 70 per cent of aircraft 
deliveries over the next decade will be single aisle models (mostly less than 200 seats), 
which will account for 69.1 per cent of aircraft in 2016. Such projections underline the 
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fragility of any argument that growth can be partly accommodated in larger aircraft 
(Boeing, 2007). 
Liberalisation has also led to an increase in frequency as evident in εorrell’s (1998) 
analysis where the average frequencies offered on all intra-EU routes increased from 
13.9 departures per week in 1989 to 15.5 in 1992, subsequently declining to 14.5 in 
1995. This indicates some frequency competition in the first period, with the decline 
since 1992 explained by the addition of new non-stop regional services (and some 
charters switching to scheduled) with below average frequencies, rather than by any 
reduction in frequency on the denser routes. This is evident from the sharp increase in 
the number of routes served by only one carrier between June 1992 and 1995. Also, it 
was observed that the average load factor changed slightly between 1989 and 1992, but 
changed more between 1992 and 1995 on routes with competition from up to three 
carriers. Those routes with over three carriers competing were already served by larger 
aircraft, in part because of some fifth freedom operators with very large B747s. It was 
proven that airline competition at the route level can only be effective if the number of 
actual competitors is greater than two.  
In addition, Morrell (1998) agreed that competition is best described by the number of 
effective competitors, rather than just the number of carriers serving the route. This 
takes into account the limited ability to compete on low frequency leisure or fifth 
freedom flights. As predicted by contestability, a relatively large number of new firms 
entered the market in the first phase, but many did not survive the rise of competition, 
giving rise to the emergence of oligopolies (Morrell, 1998). 
Also, Schipper et al. (2002) found from the analysis of a sample of 34 routes in Europe 
with varying liberalisation statuses from 1988 to 1992 that fares on fully liberalised 
routes had fallen by 34 per cent, while the departure frequency had risen by 36 per cent. 
They argued that, as a result of multiple services, many routes were not economically 
sustainable, while institutional impediments limited entry on some routes, which 
remained monopolies. 
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2.5.4 Impact on Air fare/Consumer welfare 
The general economic principle from the Button and Drexler (2006) liberalisation 
graph (see Figure 2.1) is that deregulation removes barriers on entry and price, which 
stimulates additional supply from competitors; as a result the air fare declines, which 
creates some consumer welfare from the air fare saving. There is much empirical 
evidence that corroborates this theory. For instance, Forsyth (1998) simulated different 
scenarios of the deregulated market in the US by manipulating some of the regulation 
variables and discovered that substantial fare reduction would be possible through an 
increase in load factor. But due to inefficient competition with fixed fares and 
deregulated capacity, the load factor had fallen to a level that added substantially to 
cost but little to service quality. Therefore, it is suggested that additional load factor 
would lower fares at little extra cost.  
Evidence from a UK CAA (1998) study also examined changes in fares between 1992 
and 1997 for four markets (Amsterdam/London, Brussels/Rome, Madrid/Rome and 
Madrid/Milan) and found a mixed outcome. Fares had not fallen dramatically and, for 
some classes, especially business class, there had been a rise. The analysis did not 
reflect changes of patronage between classes or the effects of frequent flyers and other 
benefits. 
Morrison and Winston (2000) investigated the effects of deregulation on fares and 
service levels and found that deregulation led to significant reductions in fares; 80 per 
cent of passengers, accounting for 85 per cent of passenger miles, paid fares that were 
lower than the estimate of regulated fares in the US market. They believed the 
emergence of low-cost carriers played a significant role in this phenomenon, such as 
Southwest Airlines that accounted for nearly 40 per cent of the fare savings in the 
United States (based on a statistical analysis that compares fares in city-pair markets 
where Southwest offers service). 
Furthermore, Moselle et al. (2002) found that business class air fares from Heathrow to 
the US were more than 200 per cent higher than those from Frankfurt, Amsterdam and 
other leading European airports where open skies policies were agreed. As a result, UK 
business class passengers alone paid in excess of £2 billion a year more than their 
European counterparts for transatlantic fares. This is one of the impacts of the Bermuda 
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II agreement signed by the UK–US governments, which is more restrictive than open 
skies agreements. 
Another study by the European Union in 2003 found that the liberalisation of the EU 
airline market instigated a fall by 34 per cent in discounted air fares (in real terms – 
after inflation adjustment) between 1992 and 2000, while full economy fares declined 5 
per cent in real terms in the same period. Furthermore, fares fell on routes where there 
were at least three operators overall, after allowance is made for charter operations, 90–
95 per cent of passengers on intra-EU routes were travelling on reduced fares. 
However, there are variations in the patterns of fares charged across routes. Mandel 
(1998) found that on routes with three or more airlines (about a third of the total in 
terms of passengers carried) fares fell, but that there had been little change in fares in 
monopoly or duopoly markets.  
Gillen, Harris, & Oum (2002) developed a model to assess the effects of changes in ASA 
on the distribution of benefits and costs to airlines, consumers and foreign carriers. This 
study estimates a model that integrates all possible routes in the O-D market and 
applied simulation experiments on Canada–Japan routes to predict the likely outcome 
of liberalisation under different scenarios. The model describes a Price Index function 
P; and a Consumer equilibrium E; 
    ⌊∑         ⌋    ⁄   ------------------- (2.2)      
   ∑               -------------------------- (2.3) 
Where qr is the individual route demand measured in passenger unit terms and pr is the 
route price, r is individual routes, σ is elasticity substitution between any pair and route 
į is the weight of individual routes. 
Gillen, et al., (2002) discovered the effects of removing frequency regulation while 
regulating price and entry. In this scenario, the two carriers involved maintained 
profitability and the total route demand increased by only 1 per cent. However, relative 
to the base case this market outcome was less profitable for the Canadian carrier and 
slightly more profitable for the Japanese airline, making a combined net welfare loss of 
$4 million. 
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Furthermore, the study adds that the equilibrium results for the case of removing both 
frequency and entry regulations while maintaining price regulation attracted a new 
carrier from Canada with additional flights. The findings suggest an increase in traffic 
volumes on the route of 37 per cent over the previous case of frequency competition 
without entry. This scenario also produces positive welfare impacts relative to the no 
entry case. The gain in aggregate profits for carriers was about $31 million, while the 
gain in consumer benefit was approximately $30 million. 
Similarly, the study simulated the effects of removing price regulation with and without 
entry regulation, but with frequency regulation. The results with entry regulation show 
that the two airlines reduced fares by an average of 23 per cent, and attracted an almost 
equal number of passengers. The net welfare effect is positive, with the gain in 
consumer benefit slightly outweighing the reduction in carrier profits. But when both 
price and entry regulations are removed while maintaining frequency regulation, the 
study findings show that the entry of a new carrier stimulates the market demand, and 
offers consumers a wider range of choices. Consumer benefit here was far in excess of 
the scenario where frequency competition takes place in the absence of price 
competition (Gillen, et al., 2002).  
Further analysis by Gillen et al., (2002) simulated the effects of removing regulations 
on price, frequency and entry; it suggests the entry of a new carrier (Air Canada) makes 
the market much more competitive, and as a result, the equilibrium prices are 
significantly lower than the case with entry regulation and this stimulates a traffic 
volume increase of about 50 per cent. Additionally, there would be a fivefold increase 
in welfare gain to Canada because of the entry of Air Canada while Japan’s welfare 
gain is limited to an increase from $23 million to $38 million. 
In addition, the study discovered that liberalisation achieves not only a competitive 
increase on direct routes, but changes the relative attractiveness among alternative 
routings – that liberalisation of the Canada–Japan route would likely induce additional 
passengers travelling between the countries via the US to use the direct route, and some 
US passengers travelling to Japan, to use the route via Canada. The additional 
passengers increase traffic density and reduce per passenger cost, which could lower 
fares on the route (Gillen, et al., 2002). 
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Therefore, this study found that liberalisation is negatively correlated with air fare, but 
the ratio of the relationship varies from one route to another. However, it is observed 
that the fare changes were considerable where a low cost carrier exists in the market as 
observed by Morrison and Watson (2000).  
Most of the study areas where evidence of liberalisations impact is found occurred in 
developed countries. Therefore, extrapolation from their experience is potentially 
misleading because of the difference in the market structure and the nature of the rules 
that exist in different countries. In addition, experiences of the impact of liberalisation 
on various markets are not homogenous. Therefore, it would be deceptive to assume 
Nigeria’s air transport market would follow a similar pattern.   
2.5.5 Impact on cost efficiency  
Assessing the impact of liberalisation on airline efficiency is difficult as it involves 
classified information from the airlines. But, generally, there are quite marked 
differences in levels of productivity among airlines. Despite the challenges from 
airlines, some studies discovered the impact of liberalisation on cost efficiency by 
comparing the efficiency of airlines under periods of regulation and liberalisation, 
using different approaches.  
One of the traditional approaches to evaluate cost efficiency is to use the stochastic 
frontier method. For instance, Good, Röller and Sickles (1995) conducted a data 
envelopment and stochastic frontier analysis on eight European and eight US airlines 
which compared their productivity from 1976 to 1986. 
The study found that the EU carriers would save about $4 billion a year (in 1986 
dollars) if they became as efficient as US airlines. 
Similarly, Oum and Yu (1995), compared 23 international airlines from 1986 to 1993 
and, using a total factor productivity framework, found variations in the performance of 
carriers across regions. With the exception of the Japanese airlines, Asian carriers were 
found to have lower costs than European or US airlines. The post-liberalisation period 
assisted productivity improvements in European carriers compared with their US 
counterparts, probably due to catching-up consequences (Oum & Yu, 1995). 
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Another contribution from Moselle et al. (2002), found from the study of US–EU 
liberalisation that variations in costs across airlines reflect the existence of possible 
inefficiency that could be reduced by transatlantic international liberalisation. The 
analysis suggests that the potential for increased efficiency is possible if airlines whose 
costs are higher than the estimated best practice benchmark were able to reduce their 
costs to levels where total savings of about €β.9 billion annually is estimated. The study 
believes that a proportion of these cost savings would be passed to consumers in the 
form of lower fares. Also, an additional annual increase in consumer welfare of about 
€γ70 million arising from increased passenger traffic in response to the lower prices 
could be realized (Moselle, et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, Inglada et al. (2006) applied an efficiency frontier in the assessment of 
the economic and technical efficiency of various airline companies involved in liberal 
air services. They developed an efficiency frontier cost model as functions of capital, 
energy used, and work force. The model was applied to a sample of 20 international 
airlines from different continents and found that liberalisation has a tendency to reduce 
cost and improve efficiencies but this is not always the case in some airlines. It means 
there may be other contributing factors that cause various cost efficiencies. Their 
arguments could not ascertain the efficiency of these airlines before the liberalisation 
era. 
Another contribution is that the waves of alliance formations help airlines to rationalise 
services, consolidate traffic and reduce costs, as well as play a role in dictating the 
competitive strength of major alliances such as Star Alliance, One World, and Sky 
Team. Wang (2004) uses a theoretical model and shows an increase of this type of 
alliance is significantly related to market-specific variables in which deregulation 
influences the development of code sharing and marketing agreements. He concludes 
that increased traffic volumes will enhance operational efficiency by using larger 
planes that reduce costs for the long-haul market operating multiple connections 
through joint operations.  
This also proves the hypothesis that deregulation leads to the development of strategic 
alliances which in general increases the average number of flights and the number of 
passengers carried per flight on routes; that is to say, an increase in the levels of 
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cooperation between partners contributes to an increase in network share, passenger 
market share, number of direct flights/city-pairs, and the number of routes. 
2.5.6 Impact on Contemporary Development in Aviation  
 Liberalisation brought about some contemporary developments in air transport, which 
have shaped the business models of the industry, such developments include hub & 
spoke operations and Low cost carriers.  
The development of hub and spoke networks (HS) after low cost carriers (LCC) entry 
are believed to be a survival strategy for incumbent airlines after being exposed to 
competition (Dennis, 2007). Graham and Guyer (1999) claimed that in response to 
liberalisation, where new airlines have entered and compete with the incumbents in the 
market, the major carriers have a survival strategy of domination over new entrants, 
through the development of new business strategies like, hub and spoke networks, code 
sharing and alliances, frequency of service, and the setting up of low-cost carriers. 
This network pattern, which is repeated several times during the day, is essentially a 
supplier-driven strategy, maximising the online and interline connections available to a 
particular airline at their hub airport. A hub operation when combined with airport 
congestion and linked to an alliance strategy offers the real possibility of controlling 
competition at a particular airport. The objective of hub networks by airlines, according 
to Oum, Taylor and Zhang (1993) is to achieve cost efficiency by exploiting 
“economies of traffic density”. They further argued that relaxing foreign ownership and 
control restrictions will consolidate the market via mergers and acquisitions, allowing 
airlines to strengthen their networks and market position. 
The HS model survives among the legacy carriers, but the LCCs now handle a 
significant intra-continental market share, typically flying point to point. The network 
hub model offers consumers more convenience for routes, but point-to-point routes 
have proven less costly for airlines to implement. Over time, the legacy carriers and the 
LCCs will likely use some combination of point to point and hub networks to capture 
both economies of scale and pricing advantages. 
The LCC model is the competitive strategy mostly adopted by new entrants in to the 
market with much lower fares to attract customers that are highly elastic and typically 
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fly point to point. Doganis (2006) alleged that the model grows substantially and makes 
a significant impact in most developed country markets. The rapid growth of LCCs 
demonstrates that price can significantly affect markets. However, in order to provide 
much cheaper and more accessible services, the LCC operators use secondary and third 
level airports close to major cities as is the case with Ryanair that uses Liverpool 
airport instead of Manchester airport, or EasyJet, which uses Gatwick in place of 
Heathrow Airport, for example (Dennis, 2007). 
In liberalised markets like the EU single aviation market, LCCs have benefited most 
from the deregulation of beyond traffic rights, which give them freedom to establish 
airport bases in foreign countries (Doganis, 2010). In addition, development of LCCs in 
domestic markets can promote liberalisation policy by increasing the competitiveness 
of a nation’s airline industry as a whole. On the other hand, existing regulations on 
route entry, foreign ownership, and effective citizen control have constrained the 
expansion of LCCs.  
However, the development of LCCs has not impacted much on the Nigerian aviation 
market due to the absence of LCCs in the market either indigenous or foreign owned. 
2.6 Adverse Impact of Liberalisation 
With regards to liberalisation, previous discussions have been focussed on the 
affirmative input of liberalisation from theories and empirical analyses; however, the 
policy is believed to have some issues of concern for the industry. 
2.6.1 Protection of National Carriers 
εost countries’ main reasons for regulating air transport are to protect the national 
carrier, which is often regarded as a public asset; in this regard the carrier is given 
protection against competitive threats with monopoly power and, as such, the carrier 
becomes indifferent to market and customer concerns. For instance, the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 2001) observed that an overriding 
motivation of the history of the economic regulation of air transport in Africa has been 
the desire to ensure the protection of the national flag carriers. Consequently, African 
aviation policies are based on the concern of protection of the interests of national 
airlines rather than the interests of consumers (passengers and shippers). The desire to 
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protect flag carriers explains much of the attitudes of African countries towards air 
transport liberalisation. 
Furthermore, Abate (2007) added that most African countries are interested in having a 
national airline that is shielded by restrictive bilateral agreements in order to generate 
hard currency. Subsequently, airlines become strong interest groups that dictate policy 
for their own ends. 
In this regard, most country airlines enjoyed some form of monopoly and protection 
from competition under traditional BASAs. However, liberalisation allowed 
competition on price and frequency of service from other airlines. Consequently, many 
country airlines that enjoyed some form of monopoly and protection during the 
regulation era collapsed after being exposed to deregulated markets as was the case 
with Nigeria Airways in 2002. Even some European airlines were adversely affected by 
liberalisation policies, such as the Greek carrier (Olympic Airways) and SAS (Bowen, 
2010).  
2.6.2 Labour Issues 
The economic benefits of liberalisation have been substantial for the travelling public 
and the airline industry in general. Certain fundamental predicaments brought on by 
deregulation continue to afflict industry workers. Labour substitution has a negative 
impact in some countries where labour costs are high, as in developed countries.  
Gittell, Von Nordenflycht, Kochan, McKersie, and Bamber (2009) claimed that, due to 
the drop in air fares by 40 per cent following deregulation in 1978, airline employees 
have seen up to 40 per cent cuts in income, which involves about 545,000 employees in 
the US market. This claim reasons that, under regulation, airlines received returns on 
capital, giving profits to executives and employees, but these high returns had 
disappeared due to a higher consumer surplus a competitive market. Corporate interests 
considered the labour costs to be incompatible with what they interpreted as inefficient 
work rules, when compared with what they would theoretically have expected in a 
competitive market. 
In developing countries like Nigeria, labour could be affected by the liberalisation of 
carrier ownership; for example, foreign partner airlines employing pilots and technical 
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crews from abroad, which may result in job losses to some Nigerian pilots. However, 
the Nigerian carriers that dominate other West African countries may benefit from this 
policy too within the West African region.  
2.6.3 Environmental Concerns 
It is widely accepted that liberalisation of air transport promotes growth of the air 
transportation system as claimed by theories and empirical studies. However, the issue 
of sustainability and environmental impact is a matter of concern, most especially in 
developed countries where environmental impacts have reached an alarming stage.  
It is against this background that Graham and Guyer (1999) alleged that air transport 
constitutes one of the negative environmental externalities of the single European 
market, creating noise, atmospheric pollution and consuming large areas of land, while 
being dependent on non-renewable energy resources. According to them, air transport 
accounts for around 10 per cent of all transport energy consumption in the EU and is 
responsible for approximately 15 per cent of all transport CO2 emissions. Even though 
technological developments are reducing the negative environmental effects, such as 
low sound aircraft and fuel efficiency, the sector’s growth precipitates the effects much 
faster than technology returns on the negative impact. This raises the issue of the 
sustainability and capacity of the infrastructure. 
In another contribution, Goetz and Graham (2004) argued that globalisation and 
liberalisation have resulted in excessive air traffic growth and wasteful competition, 
thereby exacerbating negative social and environmental externalities incompatible with 
long-term sustainability. 
Traffic growth, however, is eroding attempts to move towards a more sustainable 
system, air transport having a higher growth rate than any other transport mode. 
Therefore, if the goal is environmental sustainability rather than global development, 
then it is apparent that a transport policy must be designed to reduce demand for 
mobility, a demand that is derived and can therefore be altered (Goetz & Graham, 
2004). The liberalisation policy for air transport arguably has an inverse relation with a 
commitment to sustainable mobility, and in apparent confirmation of the argument that 
policies for the mitigation of environmental impacts of transport are frustrated by 
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market developments. According to Dennis (2009) air transport accounts for about 3 
per cent of annual man made contribution to climate change mainly anthropogenic 
emissions of CO2 which was about 705 million tonnes per annum. Although the 
proportion seems to be inconsequential, there are some concerns such as the prevailing 
growth rate of aviation precipitated by contemporary issue like liberalisation, high per 
capita emission levels of aviation and the green house emission cap by international 
bodies (Dennis, 2009). In general, air transport has the potential to contribute to 
unsustainable development, while liberalisation is not only not mitigating the problems 
but rather precipitating it.    
2.6.4 Airport capacity constraints 
As stated earlier, liberalisation led to growth in air traffic (more passengers and cargo 
volumes, new airlines, and more airline frequencies), which increases the pressure on 
some infrastructure capacity such as airports. In some countries, capacity is 
overstretched and expansion is not easily implemented, as is evident in the UK at 
Heathrow airport, for example. 
Some developed country airports have been perceived as having overstretched capacity, 
although innovations in air traffic management and control have mitigated the problem 
for a while. According to Graham and Guyer (1999), the situation is portrayed as more 
complex by three crucial factors that create the geography of airport capacity 
restrictions. These are the different structures of airport infrastructure, the growth in 
demand for air transport, and the distribution of the demand for air transport. They 
cited the instance that runway capacity is a function of an airport’s layout in EU 
airports where only marginal increases in runway capacity can now be achieved 
without the construction of additional supporting infrastructure. 
 Secondly, they added that aggregate demand for air transport remains driven by GDP 
growth, with some significant contribution from changes in industrial logistics (just in 
time) and lifestyle (increases in income). Lastly, European air transport liberalisation 
has helped grow the air transport market through price competition (Graham & Guyer, 
1999). 
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Meanwhile, Airbus and Boeing (2007) estimated a global average annual growth rate in 
air traffic of 5 per cent over some years to come and the growth is equivalent to  a 
doubling of demand every 12 years. However, Graham and Guyer (1999) noted that the 
construction of runways, or even their lengthening, creates even more strenuous 
opposition in many European airports, which compounds the capacity challenges. 
Therefore, this suggests that there is likely to be conflict between demand or the 
projected growth in traffic and existing infrastructure at some European airports. 
Simply, the projected growth rates cannot be sustained within current infrastructure 
capacity. This is evident from the current slot scarcity in some airports such as London 
Heathrow, where the demand is very high and the slots are scarce. As a result, some 
airlines such as Nigeria’s Arik Air had to hire slots from BMI (British Midland 
Airways), even though it has the traffic rights to operate to the UK courtesy of the 
Nigeria-UK BASA. Therefore, this suggests that even if the UK and Nigeria liberalised 
their agreement, there is the possibility that the Nigerian carriers could face the 
challenge of slot allocation at UK airports.  
Meanwhile, the level of growth in most developing countries including Nigeria has not 
reached the optimum level of airport capacity. In fact, some airports in Nigeria are 
suffering from capacity underutilisation. As Ozoka (2009) pointed out, only Lagos 
airport has a reasonable traffic level that can be self-sustaining while the other four 
international airports are desperately in need of additional traffic to boost their revenue. 
The only anticipated constraints from traffic growth will be additional terminal 
capacity, most especially during the peak period at Lagos airport, although there may 
be a scarcity of resources to finance such projects.  
Although consumers benefit more from frequent services, the negative environmental 
effects of the widespread use of relatively small aircraft are compounded by 
unimpressive load factor statistics. As Goetz and Graham (2004) pointed out, the 
combination of frequency as a competitive weapon with relatively modest load factors 
means that the “slot productivity” of many key European airports rarely exceeds 100 
passengers per commercial aircraft movement. Airlines, moreover, are forced to try to 
sell surplus capacity through special fares and promotions. Such tactics, of course, 
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simply encourage increased mobility, further pressurising already scarce resources and 
increasing environmental impacts. 
2.6.5 Capital Flight Issue 
 Capital flight is an economic consequence that occurs when money or assets flow out 
of a country to another destination by an investor as a result of taxes on capital or the 
actions of equity holders. This has adverse effects on a country’s balance of payments.  
There is concern in the air transport industry that opening a market to be accessible to 
leading international foreign carriers, and competing with indigenous carriers without 
protection is like strangulating the latter, most especially the niches among them. 
Liberalisation allows market competition with little market guarantee or protection for 
indigenous carriers allowing leading international carriers to capitalise on the 
weaknesses of competitors and offer a high quality of service at a reasonable price. 
Because of their economies of scale advantages from their higher capacity and larger 
network, they tend to dominate the market. The situation is even worse if the agreement 
is between a developing country and a more advanced country. Therefore, the proceeds 
of the international market will end up going to other countries, causing capital flight 
that can create balance of payments imbalances. 
This is evident from the Nigerian market where foreign carriers dominate the 
international passenger market by over 85 per cent (Ismaila & Warnock-Smith, 2012). 
Also, Usim (2011) alleged that liberal bilateral has resulted in multiple frequencies and 
entry points to foreign registered airlines in which Nigeria loses $1.41 billion yearly to 
capital flight, while indigenous airlines operating internationally gross a paltry $28.37 
million out of that figure.  
Even the multiple entry points deprive local carriers of the market for distributing 
international passengers to their final destinations by using domestic operations. This 
may have contributed to the financial woes of indigenous carriers.  
2.7 Deregulation in Africa  
According to AFCAC (1999), African aviation policies have been based more on 
concern for protection of the interests of national airlines rather than the interests of the 
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consumers (passengers and shippers). The desire for the protection of flag carriers 
explains much of the attitude of African countries towards air transport policy, which is 
characterised by state control over traffic rights and the curtailment of fifth freedom 
rights, restrictions on frequencies and capacity, double approval of tariffs, single 
designation of a carrier on a route, and prohibitive demand for royalties. Consequently, 
the bilateral regulatory system has remained a bottleneck in the overall development of 
the air transport network in Africa, while the quantity and quality of air services have 
not improved (Bofinger, 2009). Therefore, the system has failed to serve the interests of 
the consumer or that of the airlines in fact and has restrained the continent’s potential 
for growth (Economic Commission for Africa, 2000).  
2.7.1 Development of Yamoussoukro Declaration 
In light of the limitations and shortcomings of the African bilateral system compounded 
by the growing trend towards globalisation, there has been a growing recognition by 
the 55 African countries of the limitations of the current bilateral framework and the 
need to launch initiatives towards a genuine liberalisation of air services. These 
initiatives for regional liberalisation, while perceived with the broadest consensus 
within the continent, somehow remained elusive until 1988. 
The need for a continent wide consensus and solution was discussed at length under the 
auspices of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) by African ministers 
responsible for civil aviation which led to the adoption, in October 1988, of the 
Yamoussoukro Declaration on a new African civil aviation policy that included 
comprehensive proposals for a general framework for air transport reform in Africa and 
the unification of the fragmented African air transport market. The objective was to 
create a beneficial environment for the development of intra-African and international 
air services. 
A further important step in the move towards intra-African air transport liberalisation 
was taken in November 1999 at a conference of African Ministers responsible for Civil 
Aviation held under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa in Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire.  
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After intensive discussions, the Ministers adopted a decision relating to the 
implementation of the Yamoussoukro Declaration concerning the liberalisation of 
access to air transport markets in Africa. The decision was subsequently endorsed by 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments of the African Economic Community 
in July 2000 under Article 10 of the Abuja treaty. The decision was published in the 
Official Journal of the African Economic Community on 12 July 2000. The decision 
entered into force on 12 August 2000 among the 44 African countries who had ratified 
the Abuja treaty.  
The framework provided for a continent-wide aviation agreement to liberalise the 
African skies with the aim of reaching full liberalisation by the year 2002. It removed 
all restrictions on traffic rights including the fifth freedom, capacity between city pairs, 
non-regulation of tariffs by government, multiple designations, and the complete 
liberalisation of cargo and non-scheduled air services. A monitoring body was 
established to oversee the implementation process. The decision gradually replaced the 
current fragmented regulatory regime by a unified system that gave airlines commercial 
opportunities on an equal basis and ensured that their activities were be governed by a 
common body of aviation rules. 
2.7.2 Liberalisation in Yamoussoukro Declaration 
In view of the YD development, a number of African countries have signed or amended 
bilateral agreements to introduce a more open and liberalised regime, lifting restrictions 
on traffic rights, capacity, frequency, tariffs and designation. 
In this regard, Nigeria has signed liberal bilateral agreements with many African 
countries to the level of YD, including all West African countries, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Cameroon, Morocco and Libya. However, some of these liberal bilateral 
agreements are not effective due to the absence or limitation of carriers in the member 
country or inadequate air transport markets between the two countries. 
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Table 2.2 Comparisons of YD provisions relative to other forms of ASA 
Provisions Traditional 
Bilateral 
Liberalised 
Bilateral 
YD Provisions 
Airline 
Designation 
Single from 
contracting Countries 
Multiple At least one 
Traffic Right 
(Routes) 
Limited 3rd , 4th 
and 5th (Only 
Specified routes in 
the BASA) 
Full fifth freedom 
(Open market access, 
flying on any route 
between two Countries) 
Full fifth freedom in 
Africa, as from 2002 
Fares Double Approval Double Disapproval Double Disapproval 
Capacity Equally shared among 
both designated 
airlines 
Free choice of A/C type 
and frequency 
Unlimited number of 
frequency  
Ownership Substantially and 
effectively owned 
by nationals or 
government of the 
contracting Countries 
More Liberal provision 
on foreign ownership 
Substantially and 
effectively owned by 
nationals/gov’t of 
the contracting 
Countries, or Country 
Parties to the 
YD 
Source: Doganis 2004 and ECA 2007 
2.7.3 Implementation and Sub regional Arrangements 
The Yamoussoukro Declaration has exerted pressure on the African sub regions for 
implementation on regional basis. As a result, a number of sub regional consultations 
and arrangements for the economic regulation of African air transport at the wider sub 
regional community level or among countries with a community of interest have been 
or are being developed (Bofinger, 2009). Some of these initiatives include the Banjul 
Accord, COMESA (Common Market for Eastern & Southern Africa), EMCA 
(Economic Monetary of Central Africa), EAC (Eastern African Community), SADC 
(Southern African Development Cooperation) and WAEMU (West African Economic 
& Monetary Union). 
The operational implementation has forged ahead with greater freedom to negotiate 
bilateral agreements, as evident in all areas of the continent. As a result, routes and 
aircraft sizes are better adapted to the market, and viable indigenous carriers have 
expanded. 
Implementation has been uneven across sub regions, however, with the greatest 
progress made in West Africa, particularly among the Banjul Accord Group of 
countries (see Table 2.3). In southern Africa, particularly, many domestic and 
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intercontinental markets remain protected, often in an effort to bolster unviable national 
carriers. Recent modelling suggests that full liberalisation in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) would reduce air fares by 18 to 40 per cent. With 
multiplier effects, such a reduction could add half a percentage point to economic 
growth in the region (Bofinger, 2009).  
 
Table 2.3 YD in the sub regional organisations 
Community Members Status of YD 
implementations 
Status of ASA 
liberalisation 
5/7th 
freedom 
Banjul Accord 
Group 
Cape-Verde, 
Gambia, Guinea, 
Liberia, Nigeria , 
S/Leone 
YD policy agreed on 
Multilateral ASA 
5th freedom 
granted. Tariff, 
capacity and 
frequency are set 
to free  
43% 
Economic 
Monetary of 
Central Africa 
(EMCA) 
Cameron, Chad, 
C/Africa, Gabon, 
Congo, DRC, 
E/Guinea 
YD principles is 
agreed, but some 
minor restrictions 
remain  
5th freedom. Free 
tariff, capacity and 
frequency. But 
max of 2 carriers 
per country. 
28% 
Common 
Market for 
Eastern & 
Southern Africa 
Most east African 
countries except 
Botswana, SA, 
Lesotho, Tanzania 
YD accepted but 
implementation is 
pending until a joint 
competition 
commission is 
formed. 
Liberalisation is 
pending. But when 
applied, 5th 
freedom, capacity, 
fare, destination 
will be free. 
14% 
Eastern African 
Community 
(EAC) 
Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanzania 
EAC issued a 
directive to amend 
ASAs to YD policy 
Air service is not 
liberalised. 
Because 
amendments 
remain pending 
16% 
Southern 
African 
Development 
(SADC) 
Countries south of 
Tanzania 
No steps were taken 
toward YD 
implementation. 
No liberalisation 
within SADC has 
been initiated 
6% 
West African 
Economic and 
Monetary 
Union 
(WAEMU) 
Benin, B/Faso, 
Cote D’Ivoire, 
G/Bissau, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal, 
Togo 
Within members, YD 
is fully implemented 
All freedoms 
including cabotage 
are granted. Tariff 
and capacity 
liberalised 
44% 
Source: Bofinger (2009) 
The Banjul Accord: The accord was for an accelerated implementation of the Declaration 
among the West African Countries (Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, 
Nigeria and the Gambia) and was concluded in April 1997. The purpose was to foster 
co-operation in the areas of provision and management of air traffic services, 
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establishment and exercise of Safety Oversight Procedures, and the establishment of a 
coordinated multilateral approach to the negotiation of agreements with respect to the 
granting of traffic rights, among others.  
Jallow (2001) added that in order to simplify the exchange of traffic rights, and market 
access, the Banjul Accord encouraged airlines of member countries to enter into 
commercial arrangements, so as to achieve efficiency and cost effectiveness; 
harmonisation of air transport regulations and air services agreements, joint capacity 
building, pooling of expert skills and services, and effectiveness in safety oversight 
practices. 
Some of the sub-regional initiatives described above aim at greater flexibility of rules 
that go beyond the existing bilateral regulatory framework.  
The countries involved adopted regional regulation of air traffic, either complementing 
or superseding the bilateral structure. These initiatives seem to indicate a trend towards 
sub regionalisation of air transport in Africa, mostly undertaken as part of the 
construction of common markets or economic integration processes that imply close 
economic integration between the member countries of a sub-region.  
2.7.4 Potential benefits/impacts of YD 
While the benefits of liberalisation are not perhaps any different from those in other 
parts of the world, in respect to Africa the benefits of regional liberalisation will have 
the added economic importance of strengthening the African market and ultimately 
enhancing the participation of African airlines in international air transport and the 
integration of the continent (Richman & Lyle, 2005). However, some of the specific 
potential benefits and impacts include the following: 
2.7.4.1 Efficiency  
The efficiency of air transport would be enhanced by allowing more open markets for 
suppliers. Freer markets in air transport would also allow sectors that make use of its 
services to become more efficient (Graham, 1995).  
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2.7.4.2 Increased frequency 
Liberalisation enables airlines to offer a wider range of destinations and more frequent 
services, thus improving the African network. In 2000, there was a maximum of 14 
flights per week from the UK to Nigeria, and by 2010, the agreement allowed up to 42 
flights per week on this country-pair (NCAA, 2010).  
Furthermore, the Ghanaian Minister of Transport Doreen Owusu-Fianko (2011) 
asserted that Ghana’s aviation industry has been noted as one of the fastest growing and 
perhaps most competitive in the West African sub region with a growth rate of about 20 
per cent, with the number of airlines plying their trade in the country having doubled 
from 15 at the beginning of the millennium to about 36 in 2011 and with increasing 
interest being shown by more foreign carriers. 
2.7.4.3 Stimulation of Traffic 
In most cases, liberalisation tends to encourage traffic development (Richman & Lyle, 
2005). This is what has happened with countries that have adopted liberalisation. For 
example, frequencies between Kenya and Uganda have increased to 20 flights per week 
from 11 flights per week. It appears that with this substantial increase in frequency, the 
load factors have not declined, indicating an overall increase of traffic.  
In addition, traffic growth of about 6 per cent in Africa (IATA, 2008) in recent years, 
which is above that of many other continents, is an encouragement and can be 
attributed to the liberal YD. Such a traffic increase may stimulate private sector 
participation in the development of the air transport industry. 
2.7.4.4 Improvement of Quality of Service 
Liberalisation offers significant benefits to the consumer in Africa. It can serve to 
increase the range of options and choices available to the travelling public, as well as 
improve the standards and quality of services (Richman & Lyle, 2005). 
2.7.4.5 Increases in investment  
Liberalisation has resulted in the emergence of new private airlines operating largely in 
the domestic and regional markets as found in many countries including Nigeria, when 
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in 2003 Virgin Nigeria was established by its UK parent airline. There is a growing 
trend towards the privatisation of national carriers on the continent. This is a positive 
development as privatisation tends to improve the performance of the airline industry. 
A growing number of major international airlines are acquiring equity in some African 
airlines. For instance, Kenya Airways and Ethiopian Airlines attracted investment from 
Lufthansa and KLM respectively and, as a result, their larger operating networks have a 
greater chance of survival and benefit from the competitive operating environment in 
Africa.  
 IT development is also attracting investment and increasing at a rapid rate. This should 
enable airlines to reduce costs and exploit opportunities for e-commerce (Chingosho, 
2005). 
2.7.4.6 Enhancement of Competitive Position 
Liberalisation may also improve the competitive position of African airlines by 
positioning them to be more competitive. Liberalisation has the potential to enable 
them to create new services and increase efficiency for the benefit of the travelling 
public. Consolidation in the African airline industry is progressing; with an increasing 
number of airlines joining the major worldwide alliance groups, for example Egypt Air 
being a member of Star Alliance and Ethiopian Airlines in Sky Team. 
2.7.4.7 Tariffs and Costs 
As a result of a freer market and reduction of costs, more fares that are competitive will 
be offered to the consumer. Already there are some indications that where a more 
liberal approach has been adopted, fares have gone down by more than 30 per cent in 
Eastern Africa as well as between East and Western Africa. In addition, average fares 
between Nairobi and Addis Ababa have gone down from US$630 to US$350 
(Chingosho, 2005).  
2.7.4.8 Benefits to Governments/Private Sector 
The expected increase in traffic will result in increased revenue to governments since 
more airlines will be operating, thus optimising the utilisation of the facilities in the 
areas of airport landing charges and air route navigational charges (Doganis, 2002). 
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Such incremental revenue could be ploughed back to further improve infrastructure and 
aviation safety and security. 
2.7.4.9 Encouragement of Tourist Traffic 
According to InterVISTAS-ga (2006) and Warnock-Smith (2008), liberalisation has the 
potential to encourage the development of tourist and cargo traffic. This encouragement 
will come through better access to the country, opening new markets as more airlines 
will be operating and offering more competitive pricing, creating the opportunity to 
attract more business into the country. For example, a tourist destination country that is 
relying exclusively on charter operations could attract higher income tourists seeking 
quality products and price combinations. In fact, many African countries are noted for 
being tourist destinations such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco and South Africa.  
The derived effect on tourism and trade, with all the multiplier effects, could bring up 
to an additional USD1.5 billion to the SADC region, including 70,000 new jobs (OAG, 
2010). Therefore, by restricting traffic to protect home airlines, a significant economic 
opportunity is being forfeited. 
2.7.5 Challenges for African Liberalisation 
Despite the potential benefits of the YD in African air transport markets and African 
development, there are still a number of outstanding issues that militate against the 
effective implementation of the liberalisation process: 
 A lack of commitment from the parties concerned is a major impediment. The 
Yamoussoukro Decision is yet to be fully implemented by most countries. As a 
result, Africans cannot speak with one voice when negotiating with the much 
stronger regional entities such as the European Union. The Cape Town Convention, 
which is meant to establish an international legal framework for financing aircraft, 
is yet to come into force because insufficient numbers of countries have ratified the 
agreement (Chingosho, 2005).  Airline directors are still distrustful of each other and hesitate to commit themselves 
to cooperation and integration arrangements. African airlines continue to operate 
individual services to Europe and Asia while better coordination and co-operation 
on these routes could lead to the creation of African hubs which would make it 
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possible to operate daily flights to Europe and Asia and also provide better air 
services to African capitals. Furthermore, the airlines fear that the implementation 
of the Declaration might place them at a disadvantage in commercial terms.  The absence of a level playing field for effective implementation of the 
liberalisation process, such as visa restrictions, work permits, government travel, 
exchange control, and other such hurdles do not exist in the EU single market.  Many African countries do not regulate competition or have institutions that 
specialise in competition matters, which definitely allows room for fare collusion 
(Doganis, 2010). This may be the case in Nigeria, where the Nigerian government 
claims that British Airways and Virgin Atlantic colluded and charged 
discriminatory air fares, giving evidence that air fares on the London route from 
Nigeria were almost twice those of Ghana to London, which are in the same region 
and almost the same distance.   Resources at the national level are often insufficient to establish organisational 
structure, especially with respect to civil aviation and airport authorities, and to 
ensure a constant upgrading of the regulatory regime. The development of 
appropriate regulations and a harmonised sub-regional civil aviation code requires a 
concrete programme of co-operation at the continental and sub-regional basis 
(Chingosho, 2005).  Currently, many civil aviation and airport authorities do not have appropriate 
skilled manpower due to a lack of financial resources and the fact that qualified 
trained people seek employment in other parts of the world. Staff productivity is 
below the world average – there is over-manning, but not enough trained personnel 
(Chingosho, 2009).  The absence or limitation of carrier capacity in most of the countries is a serious 
challenge for effective competition; otherwise, the emergence of monopolies on 
intraregional routes would defeat the objective of YD, which seeks to promote fair 
competition practices. Chingosho (2009) argued that many African carriers are 
undercapitalised and face tight liquidity. In short, most airlines have too much debt 
and very little equity. Equity financing may be the best option for airlines, but in its 
absence, the availability of debt funding at affordable interest rates is a key factor 
inhibiting expansion. 
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 In addition, ageing fleets result in low aircraft utilisation and generally unreliable 
services (AFRAA, 2005). Inadequate infrastructure, IT, safety and security facilities 
are a threat to the anticipated traffic growth from liberalisation in Africa. Indetie 
(2002) alleged that IT penetration among African airlines is about the lowest 
globally.  Although African labour is comparatively cheap, recent developments in 
IT are proving more cost-effective and reliable than dependence on manual 
operations.  As a result of the traffic boom, airlines from Europe and the Middle East are 
aggressively penetrating the African market and securing larger market shares, 
taking advantage of ill-prepared African operators. African airlines are therefore 
operating in a highly competitive environment and many carriers are unable to 
stand the competition and the high operating costs and thus fold up. In fact, the 
uneven playing field is putting a lot of strain on African airlines in their own 
markets and threatening their survival. Indetie (2002) sums up the ill preparedness 
of these African airlines as having limited capital, limited frequencies and networks 
(point-to-point operations), low application of IT, use of ageing fleets, poorly 
motivated staff, a lack of training, inadequate operating capital, a lack of 
commercial agreements with partners, an inability to plan for the long-term 
(overwhelmed by day-to-day operational challenges) and management instability.   Furthermore, the cost of running airlines in Africa is also believed to be affected by 
rising fuel prices, interest rate charges, and high airport charges.  Fuel prices globally are going up but, unlike elsewhere, few African airlines have 
hedged part of their fuel requirements. According to Indetie (2011), the result is that 
fuel costs in Africa represent about 30 per cent of total airline operating costs 
compared to 15–16 per cent some four years ago.  High airport taxes and charges are inhibiting the growth and development of the 
African air transport industry. Taxes, particularly for intra-African flights are 
sometimes higher than the actual fare for the flight. Airport and ATC charges 
represent about 10 per cent and this cost is continuing to grow in spite of declining 
yields and growing competition (Indeitie, 2011).  It is common business practice that the cost of debt and equity capital is paid out of 
operating profit. To do this, airlines need to realise an operating margin of 9–10 per 
cent on average. Unfortunately, African airlines have not been able to generate a 
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sufficient return on the capital invested. African airlines in recent years generated 
an average return of 6 per cent as opposed to an estimated cost of capital of 7.5 per 
cent (IATA, 2007).  
Finally, The Yamoussoukro Decision, signed by African civil aviation ministers in 
1999, set the framework for the intra-African liberalisation of the air transport industry. 
Liberalisation is progressing, even though slowly (Chingosho, 2005). However, 
consolidation of the African airline industry is expected to accelerate, especially with 
the full implementation of the Yamoussoukro Decision. Increased opening up of 
African skies should see the growth of low-cost carriers. Competition from these new 
players should be a strong incentive for legacy carriers to simplify their business 
models and to become more efficient operating entities. Another encouragement is that 
the operating environment is becoming more conducive to the growth of the industry, 
arising from the reduction of conflicts and a commitment to Africa's renaissance by 
politicians.  
2.8 Economic Regulation in Nigerian Civil Aviation 
The primary legislation regulating aviation in Nigeria is the Civil Aviation Act (CAA), 
first enacted in 1965, and now Cap. C. 13 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 
2004, together with the regulations made thereunder, the most prominent ones being 
the Civil Aviation (Air Transport) Licensing Regulations and the Air Navigation 
Regulations (FGN, 2004). 
The Air Navigation Regulations (ANRs) made pursuant to the CAA Cap C. 13 LFN 
2004 and the Air Navigation Regulations made by the NCAA and approved by the 
Minister in 2003 basically regulate air transport in Nigeria in terms of safety and 
economics. Although the ANR of 2003 made by the NCAA is stated to prevail and 
supersede, the matters not covered by it are still regulated by the ANRs, pursuant to the 
CAA Cap C. 13 LFN 2004.  
The ANRs of 2004 are modelled after ICAO Annexes and thus are in substantial 
conformity with ICAO’s international standards and recommended practices (NCAA, 
2011). They are additionally supplemented where necessary with sections from the 
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European Joint Aviation Requirements and/or the United States Federal Aviation 
Regulations.  
2.8.1 Market Access Regulation  
Air transport services are regulated by the issuance of licences and permits to operators 
who satisfy the stipulated requirements for the issuance of the licences and permits. 
According to NCAA (2011), a person seeking to provide air transport services in 
Nigeria must obtain an Air Transport Licence in respect of scheduled journeys, an Air 
Operating Permit for non-scheduled journeys and an Airline Tour Organiser’s δicence 
for tour organisers. 
However, there are regulations that apply in areas of financial fitness and nationality of 
ownership and control of air carriers. According to the act, any companies seeking to 
provide air transport services must have the following minimum paid-up share capital:  
• Five hundred million Naira for domestic operators ($3.2 million)  
 
• One billion Naira for regional operators ($6.4 million)  
 
• Two billion Naira for international operators ($12.8 million)  
The acts further stipulate other financial conditions to include details of insurance 
policy for hull, passenger/cargo and third party insurance in accordance with the 
relevant aviation regulation, bank reference in respect of the company, cash flow 
analysis and evidence of tax payments by the company and its directors. The NCAA 
monitors the financial position of an air carrier by regular screening of up-to-date 
monthly management accounts, quarterly balance sheets, and annual profit and loss 
accounts and cash flow projections.  
By virtue of Section 17 of the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act No. 16, 
1995, restrictions on ownership and control of air transport businesses that existed 
before have been removed. However, under the ANRs the NCAA may issue an AOC 
only if, among other things, the applicant for the AOC is a citizen of Nigeria. The said 
provision does not draw a distinction between natural persons and companies. 
Consequently, a company incorporated under the Laws of Nigeria regardless of the 
nationality of its shareholders would qualify as a citizen of Nigeria under the provisions 
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of the ANR aforesaid. A company having 100 per cent foreign ownership can therefore 
operate an air transport business in Nigeria. However, for purposes of designating 
operators to fly any regional or international route under the terms of bilateral or 
multilateral air services agreement, the policy of the Federal Government is to 
designate only airlines in respect of which Nigerians own at least 51 per cent of the 
equity of such airlines and are in effective control of it. 
Therefore, this sets the restrictions on carrier ownership and control, which is one of 
the provisions in most Nigerian ASAs. 
2.8.2 Traffic Rights and Route Entry Regulation  
According to the CAA Act (2004), domestic routes in Nigeria are liberalised and 
operators are free to fly any route without a special licence provided that they give 
notice of their flight schedules to the NCAA, the FAAN and the NAMA. However, 
with regard to rights by Nigerian carriers to operate international routes, an application 
is made to the Minister of Aviation for designation of an air carrier as a flag carrier to 
operate an international route that is the subject of an air services agreement between 
Nigeria and another country. The applicant must comply with guidelines set for 
designation. The application is sent by the Minister to the NCAA for technical 
evaluation. If a favourable report is issued by the NCAA, the minister may at his 
discretion designate such an air carrier as a flag carrier to operate the said route.  
For foreign airlines, seeking to operate in Nigeria, after designation of such airline by 
the relevant contracting country under the air service agreement, the notice of 
designation is forwarded to the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs which transmits 
the same to the Minister of Aviation. The Minister of Aviation sends the said 
documents to the NCAA for assessment on the suitability of the airline to operate in 
Nigeria under the terms of the bilateral air services. The process of assessment involves 
the evaluation of the documents issued by the home country and all other relevant 
documents that may be demanded by the NCAA from the airline. If the NCAA is 
satisfied with, the documents and other materials provided by such foreign carrier, it 
would give a favourable report to the Minister who may then issue the air traffic 
licence. Usually the air traffic rights specify the amount of frequencies given to such an 
air carrier and the airports of entry. These are usually in accordance with the relevant 
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air service agreements. Additional frequencies can be negotiated under the relevant air 
service agreement via commercial agreements between the Federal Government and 
the air carrier. 
This is also an important stage for international traffic, which forms a significant part of 
any country’s ASA. This covers the issue of airline designation and capacity control, 
especially frequency of flight and airport of entry. 
2.8.3 Airline Access/Competition Regulation  
According to the CAA Act of 2004, the policy on the aviation industry as it relates to 
domestic airlines is secured on free enterprise, and airlines may operate any routes in 
the country. But, foreign airlines operating in Nigeria are limited to the airport of entry 
specified in the relevant air traffic licence and are not allowed to operate domestic 
routes. 
This therefore rules out any cabotage flights, which is regarded as one of the significant 
liberal traffic rights granted to foreign carriers in ASAs. 
2.8.4 Air Fare Regulation 
The CAA Act (2004) did not regulate any air fares; as such, air operators may charge 
such fares as they deem appropriate for their services.  To prevent predatory pricing, 
the NCAA, under its general power to regulate, conducts economic audits on airlines 
offering such low prices for air services as appear inadequate to cover their costs and 
may impose relevant sanctions or issue directives where such an audit discloses 
predatory pricing (NCAA, 2006). 
This therefore suggests an important provision of ASAs, which indicates that the 
country could grant free pricing provision in the ASA unless the other country refuses. 
2.8.5 Foreign Airline Operations Regulation in Nigeria 
According to the CAA Act’s provision 18.5, for a foreign designated carrier to operate 
a scheduled international air service in the country, the carrier shall meet the following 
requirements: 
64 
 
(i) To be designated under an existing Bilateral Air Services Agreement (BASA) 
between its government and Nigeria. 
(ii) Submit necessary supporting documents through diplomatic channels to the NCAA. 
Details of such designation must be in accordance with the provisions of the existing 
BASA, upon which such designation is being made. 
(iii) Obtain a foreign carrier operating permit (FCOP) issued by the NCAA. The 
authority’s safety inspectors shall carry out a safety assessment audit of the airline’s 
base prior to the issuance of a FCOP and commencement of operations. 
However, after obtaining the FCOP certificate, NCAA (2006) expects airlines to abide 
by other regulations that guide their operations in the country, which include:  
- Shall not have sales offices or outlets in cities other than the point(s) of entry 
specified in the subsisting bilateral air services agreement under which the 
foreign carrier is designated, and this shall be limited to the airports. 
- Shall not distribute tickets through banks and other financial institutions. 
- Shall not engage in self-handling, but shall use the services of duly registered 
Nigerian handling companies. 
- Shall not conduct non-scheduled (charter) operations into and out of Nigeria 
without a flight clearance issued by the Authority. 
- Shall not engage in non-scheduled (charter) passenger or cargo operations into 
and out of Nigeria except in conjunction with a Nigerian ATOL holder. 
- Foreign airlines engaged in non-scheduled cargo operations in Nigeria shall 
obtain flight clearance from the Authority and also pay royalties to the 
Authority as may be determined by the Authority from time to time (CAA Acts, 
2004). 
However, if any carrier violates any provisions of the CAA Act, regulations, rules and 
order made thereunder, the NCAA may suspend or revoke the FCOP (NCAA, 2006). 
Some of these regulations such as sales offices and self-handling are created to 
encourage foreign carriers to outsource some of their auxiliary services to Nigerian 
nationals, such as travel agents and handling companies.  
65 
 
Meanwhile, according to the Act, the overriding principle of the country’s civil aviation 
sector with respect to international agreements (BASA, MASA, YD, Protocols and 
others), and the monitoring of carriers under such agreements, is the promotion of the 
overall national interest, which is guided by the following principles: 
(i) Encourage competition and the development of new and expanded international air 
services to benefit travellers, airlines, and tourism and business sectors. 
(ii) Create opportunities for Nigerian airlines to grow and compete successfully in a 
more liberalised global environment; 
(iii) Enable Nigerian airports to market themselves in a manner that is unhindered by 
bilateral constraints to the greatest extent possible; supporting and facilitating Nigeria’s 
international trade objectives; 
(iv) Support a safe, secure, efficient, economically healthy and viable Nigerian air 
transportation industry and; 
(v) Protect consumers from unreasonably discriminatory practices and the application 
of all subsisting consumer protection regulations (CAA Acts, 2004). 
 
2.8.6 ASA Monitoring Mechanism in Nigeria 
The Act also provides mechanisms for the monitoring and compliance with 
international regulations. Accordingly, NCAA monitors the operations of all foreign 
airlines operating in Nigeria so to as ensure that their operations are in accordance with 
the provisions of the existing BASAs, MASAs, Commercial Agreements and approvals 
guiding their operations. The authority ensures that the frequencies being operated by 
foreign airlines are in accordance with the seasonal schedules approved by the Minister. 
This shall include the collection of flight data, billing and maintenance of accounts and 
accounts for the payment of royalties accruing to the country from commercial 
agreements with foreign airlines. 
The Act also requires all foreign airlines having commercial agreements with Nigeria 
to pay all royalties accruing to the country into a designated account(s) with the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN). 
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In addition, the airlines should forward to the NCAA, passenger and cargo manifests, 
load sheets, air waybills and any other information necessary for accurate billing, not 
later than 24 hours after each flight. 
The Act further asserts that a reconciliation committee shall be instituted for resolution 
of disputes and discrepancies arising from bills forwarded to the foreign airlines by the 
authority. Non-compliance with the terms of payment in the commercial agreement by 
any airline will lead to the suspension or withdrawal of such services in addition to up 
to 9 per cent compound interest rate on the unsettled amount to be reflected in 
subsequent commercial agreements. 
The Act reiterates that the government shall continue to promote the interests of 
Nigeria in the monitoring and implementation of the Yamoussoukro Decision, the 
Banjul Accord Group (BAG) Agreements, and other multilateral agreements and 
protocols to which Nigeria is a signatory’s state. 
In addition, the government shall continue to support and facilitate the implementation 
of the resolution of the Banjul Accord Group Council of Ministers to turn airline 
operations of the BAG countries into domestic operations. 
2.9 International Operations in Nigeria  
A new paradigm of international competition among airlines emerged due to 
liberalisation policy and airline alliances (Doganis, 2006). This guided the Nigerian 
government’s negotiation of BASAs and Multilateral Air Services Agreements 
(MASAs) with other countries with the aim of achieving economic consideration and 
the principle of reciprocity. According to the εinistry of Aviation’s policy of β001, the 
objectives towards international operations include among others:  Designation of foreign carriers and tariffs based on the provision of an ASA; 
while Nigeria’s designated carriers shall operate based on these conditions.  Foreign Airlines operating in Nigeria shall submit their seasonal schedule for 
ministry’s approval.  Commercial agreements, code share arrangements and alliances by the 
designated carrier with other airlines shall be filed with the ministry.  The ministry shall issue approval for flight clearance under the ASA, while non-
scheduled commercial flights shall be issued by NCAA.  The National Airspace Management Agency is to issue clearance for over-
flights and technical landings. 
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 All route rights continue to belong to the government, and there shall be no 
route transfers between airlines. However, mergers and acquisitions should be 
encouraged among the airlines.  NCAA is to monitor ASA compliance. The government shall ensure the 
realisation of the goals of the Yamoussoukro Declaration, Banjul Accord, Open 
Skies agreement and MASA without compromising the national interest and 
growth of the industry. 
As a result, Nigeria has signed bilateral air service agreements with 70 countries, 
including an open skies agreement with the USA and a multilateral service agreement 
with African countries under the Yamoussoukro Declaration of 1998, as well as the 
Banjul Accord for West Africa countries. Some of these BASAs were signed as early 
as the 1960s although many of them have undergone review. 
As a fall-out from these agreements, many international traffic routes opened in the 
country. Table 2.4 below shows the leading international routes from Nigeria with the 
number of operators providing services.  
Table 2.4 Major International Routes and Operators in the Nigeria Market  
S/N Route Airports No of 
Operators 
Nigeria 
Operators 
Foreign 
Carriers 
Frequency 
(flights/wk) 
1 Nig-UK LOS, ABV  3 ARIK BA, Virgin 33 
2 Nig-USA LOS, ABV  3 ARIK Delta, United 13 
3 Nig-SA LOS 3 ARIK, Air Nig SAA 19 
4 Nig-Ghana LOS 3 Air Nig, ARIK, 
Aero 
- 49 
5 Nig-UAE LOS 1 - Emirate 14 
6 Nig-Qatar LOS 1 - QATAR 7 
7 Nig-Ethiopia LOS, ABV  1 - Ethiopia 21 
8 Nig-Egypt LOS, ABV, 
KNO  
1 - Egypt Air 12 
9 Nig-Kenya LOS  1 - Kenya air 7 
10 Nig-France LOS, PHC  1 - Air France 10 
11 Nig-Germany LOS, ABV  1 - Lufthansa 12 
12 Nig-Neth’land LOS, ABV, 
KNO  
1 - KLM 13 
13 Nig-Italy LOS  1 - Alitalia 3 
14 Nig-Turkey LOS 1 - Turkish 4 
15 Nig-Spain LOS 1 - Iberia 3 
16 Nig-Morocco LOS 1 - Royal Air 
Morocco  
4 
17 Nig-Libya LOS 1 - Afriqiyah  8 
Source: FAAN (2010) [Key: LOS-Lagos; ABV-Abuja; KNO-Kano; PHC-Port Harcourt] 
 
Contributing to the growth of international traffic may have been a stable aim of the 
national policy (stable civilian administration), accompanied by growth of the country’s 
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GDP as a result of the rise in the price of crude oil (the major source of the country’s 
income), economic reform such as deregulation of the aviation sector, the privatisation 
of government industries, and minimum wage upgrades, among others. All these led to 
growth in market demand for international air services, which attracted foreign carriers 
to enter the market, such as Emirates airline (2004), Qatar Airways (2007), Turkish 
Airlines (2007) and China Southern Airways (2007). 
 
From Table 2.5, international traffic grew astronomically from 1998 to 2008 by about 
200 per cent over the period. The traffic is the total from the five international airports, 
namely, Lagos, Abuja, Port Harcourt, Kano and Calabar as show in the Figure 2.2. The 
distribution of passengers from the airports is uneven as shown in Table 2.5.  
 
Table 2.5 International Passenger Distribution  
Year Abuja Calabar Kano Lagos PH Total 
1995 - - 123,464 1,664,485 13,171 1,801,120 
1996 - - 82,958 1,693,567 14,239 1,790,764 
1997 - - 141,820 1,158,792 28,927 1,329,539 
1998 - - 153,545 1,000,414 43,819 1,197,778 
1999 13,923 - 208,103 1,205,487 38,612 1,466,134 
2000 43,971 - 154,082 1,421,909 40,937 1,660,899 
2001 86,893 223 225,632 1,791,485 45,801 2,150,034 
2002 112,350 6,427 216,854 1,906,385 53,807 2,295,823 
2003 133,350 5,219 222,228 1,840,037 65,756 2,266,590 
2004 145,074 1,226 216,537 1,943,686 94,859 2,381,382 
2005 182,639 383 240,702 2,102,601 149,294  2,124,677 
2006 184,163 3,932 246,444 2,152,315 106,218 2,693,072 
2007 231,607 2,361 219,666 2,430,224  - 2,884,155 
2008 329,177 683 217,235 2,688,595 11,756 3,247,446 
2009 395,974 362 134,760 2,324,469 13,209 2,868,774 
 Source: FAAN & NCAA, 2010 
From Table 2.5, total international passenger traffic from Nigeria grew from 1,466,134 
passengers in 1999 to 2,868,774 passengers in 2009. This is quite remarkable, and may 
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be connected with these factors: the growth in GDP, the stable political system, and 
reform in the aviation sector. 
Figure 2.2 Map of Nigeria showing the international airports 
Also, Table 2.5 shows that Lagos was the major international airport with about 80–90 
per cent of total international passengers, while Abuja grew rapidly from 13,923 
passengers in 1999 to 395,974 passengers in 2009, which is about 250 per cent growth 
in ten years.  However, the other airports at Kano, Port Harcourt and Calabar recorded 
a gradual decline in passenger traffic from 1995 to 2009. 
2.10 Deregulation/Liberalisation Progress and Assessments 
Anyanwu (1996), Akpoghomeh (1999) and Idrisu (2004) claimed that the first attempt 
at deregulation in Nigerian air transport was in 1988, when entry restrictions were 
lifted, allowing three private airlines to commence scheduled domestic air services. 
This initiated two airline policies that limited the main routes to Nigeria Airways and 
one independent airline. Competition on the basis of air fares and routes was ruled out, 
and the airlines competed only on the level of services provided (Akpoghomeh, 1999). 
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This was similar to the Australian policy in the 1970s and early 1980s (Forsyth, 1982). 
The basic objective of this move was to increase competition between the airlines and 
also allow airline management to respond quickly to changing market conditions. In 
addition, the African Union responded to global liberalisation efforts and formulated 
the Yamoussoukro Declaration – a new African Civil Aviation policy adopted in 
October 1988. The declaration called for the liberalisation and integration of air 
services, so as to pave the way for the continent to participate actively in the 
globalisation process and regional development. In line with this declaration, 
government policy was directed towards liberalisation and limited or guided 
deregulation of the air transport market (Akpoghomeh, 1999; Idrisu, 2004).  
This led to the reorganisation of the government agencies as well as the 
commercialisation and privatisation of some of them. The period also witnessed 
extremely difficult circumstances in Nigeria’s aviation history where passenger traffic 
and other activities at the airport dwindled tremendously mainly due to growing costs, 
poor management, incompatible policy with structure, and an unfriendly investment 
environment with high risk caused by political instability (Akpoghomeh, 1999).  
Oluwakoya (2011) further adds that the restoration of democratic government in 1999 
was the beginning of genuine deregulation of the whole economy and growing investor 
confidence in the nation. The government set up institutions that would oversee the 
privatisation of a number of public sectors of the Nigerian economy, including aviation 
agencies such as airports, airlines, handling companies and others. In addition, the 
sector agencies and institutions were restructured in 1999 so as to achieve the goal of a 
the new aviation policy that included deregulation of the sector. The sector was 
restructured to have 6 organisations namely; NCAA, NAMA, FAAN, NIMET, NCAT 
and AIB, while the national carrier was liquidated due to excessive debts over its value; 
however, both handling companies NAHCO and SAHCOL were privatised. The 
restructuring according to the then Minister of Aviation was based on ICAO SARPs 
(Chukwe, 2003). 
Idrisu (2004) summed up the deregulation and liberalisation policy in Nigeria as 
involving:  
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- The institution of a New Civil Aviation Policy of 2001 in line with the 
liberalisation trend, especially the Yamoussoukro Decision, backed by law. 
- Commencement of the review of existing Bilateral Air Services Agreements 
with African countries, in line with the provisions of the Yamoussoukro 
Decision.  
- Deregulation of the domestic aviation market, where several private airlines 
were granted a licence to undertake local, regional and international operations. 
- Privatisation of public companies such as Nigeria Airways (liquidated), 
handling companies and terminal building concessionaires (Bi Courtney). 
- Implementation of a multiple designation with the U.K. government; 
- Signing of an open skies agreement with the United States of America; 
- Granting commercial agreements with a number of countries’ airlines such as 
Germany, France, the Netherlands and UAE. This arrangement permits the 
airlines of the second party to provide additional frequencies from the agreed 
BASAs.  
2.11 Assessment of Impacts in Nigeria 
According to Akpoghomeh (1999), more than 104 different airlines rushed to register 
with the defunct Federal Civil Aviation Authority and FAAN after the commencement 
of deregulation in 1988, which relaxed entry regulation but as at 1999 only about 40 
per cent were operational. There was also deregulation of the military administration, 
which was done without adequate institutional structure and privatisation, and was 
criticised as promoting public enterprises (Graham, 2005). However, the study of 
Akpoghomeh (1999) was not able to assess the traffic situation after registration of 
additional carriers in the country, even though it was claimed that many of the carriers 
failed due to managerial incompetency . 
In another study, Oluwakoya (2011) carried out research from the published and 
unpublished documents database, where the impact of deregulation and liberalisation in 
the Nigerian air transport industry was examined. The results of this study reveal that 
an unprecedented growth in traffic was recorded from 2000 to 2004. The policy 
brought about market expansion and investment opportunities. There was a significant 
increase of freight tonnage and passenger traffic of 54 per cent and 9.4 per cent per 
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annum, respectively, during the period. In this way, it significantly contributed to the 
enhancement of Nigerian economic development, such as healthy competition needed 
for growth and development, increased participation in the industry by the private 
sector and foreign airlines, and increased international route traffic or connectivity to 
more international hubs such as Dubai, Cairo, Qatar, Atlanta and Ankara. There was 
significant private investment worth about US$5 billion, which covered among others 
initial equity financing from Virgin Nigeria and Arik Air for orders of aircrafts and 
other set-up costs (Oluwakoya, 2011). 
Oluwakoya (2011) further claimed that the increase in the number of points of entry 
from two to four made international traffic easily accessible to all parts of the country, 
while private participation in airport infrastructure development was encouraging. The 
study also concluded that the institutional framework and operational capacity were 
enhanced. However, the policy formulation framework was strengthened towards 
innovations and competitive advantage, thereby inducing effectiveness, efficiency and 
reliability in the operations and management of the industry. 
The findings are in conformity with the traditional impact of deregulation as obtained 
in other countries. However, the study’s arguments are weak owing to using only 
descriptive statistics to compare data for different periods, without the use of any 
statistical tools to prove or disprove that the rise in traffic levels during this period was 
a result of deregulation and liberalisation policy only, instead of other exogenous 
factors such as changes in GDP (proxy for income level). During the period of this 
study, traffic rose by about 100 per cent while GDP grew by about 150 per cent as 
shown in Table 5.4. Therefore, the study should have isolated the impact of 
deregulation and other exogenous factors from traffic growth.  
Furthermore, the study did not elaborate the impact of international traffic liberalisation 
on the country, but rather focused more on domestic deregulation impacts; and the 
negative impacts were not discussed. A huge amount of private investment in the sector 
was discovered, but the return from the investment was not revealed, even though it 
may be of equal interest, in order to make a comprehensive assessment of the situation. 
Another shortcoming is that the period of analysis was from 2000–04; probably six 
years later many other things would have changed and new developments may have 
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occurred. Therefore, there is a likelihood his argument may not be the same when 
recent developments are taken into account.  
A study by Idrisu (2004) examined progress made in the area of air transport 
liberalisation and “open skies” in Africa in the face of the poor economic situation and 
the stage of development in the continent. The study used questionnaires (administered 
to a group of stakeholders) and traffic data from Nigeria. The study also applied the 
chi-squared technique to test the hypothesis of the samples’ opinion on the issues. The 
findings revealed that: 
 The economic situation and stage of development in the African continent was 
ripe for full liberalisation of air transport, which can improve the African 
business environment.   The Yamoussoukro Decision had not achieved much because African countries 
lacked the political will to implement the provisions.  African airlines were undercapitalised and so would need to pull resources 
together through mergers and acquisitions before going into alliances with the 
mega-carriers of developed countries; while a country like Nigeria without a 
national carrier could only be an onlooker in the liberalised aviation market. 
However, it is noticed that the approach did not use any market data or industry data to 
prove the claim, but rather relied on people’s opinions on certain questions. Therefore, 
it is extremely difficult to convince many readers of the findings. 
In addition, a sample of 136 opinions may not adequately represent the entire African 
passenger market. Therefore, this created a gap in knowledge in the literature and 
empirical analysis. Hence, this research is attempting to fill the gap by applying an 
appropriate research instruments for assessing the impacts of liberalisation as obtained 
in other countries. This is performed by developing an econometric model with the use 
of macroeconomic variables and air traffic data to establish the relationship.  
Another issue that is raising concern for policy makers and the financial sector in the 
country is capital flight, which this research believes may have been precipitated by the 
international liberalisation policy in the country. Capital flight is an economic 
consequence that occurs when money or assets flow out of a country to another 
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destination by an investor as a result of taxes on capital or equity holders. In this case, 
many international carriers that enter the Nigerian market as a result of the liberal 
policy succeed in getting huge patronage from Nigerian passengers, and money realised 
by the airlines in the business is being repatriated to shareholders abroad. This, 
according to economics, has adverse effects on the country’s balance of payments. This 
is evident from the submissions to the Senate Committee on Aviation in Nigeria by 
CBN and NCAA, published in The Punch newspaper of 20 September 2012. CBN 
claims that total remittance by foreign airlines between 2000 and 2011 reached $4.3 
billion, while NCAA put the figure of ticket sales by airlines between 2006 and 2011 at 
about $5.4 billion (Punch, 2012). This shows that a huge amount of revenue accrued to 
the market goes to international airlines, but they argue that the policy fails to inform 
the benefits accrued to the industry and the consumer. In addition, the consequences of 
foreign airlines’ absence would be more disastrous since there is currently no 
alternative in the market. 
Therefore, there is gap in knowledge in identifying the impact of liberalisation of 
international air transport in Nigeria as done by many developed countries. Even the 
attempt by three studies carried out by  Akpoghomeh (1999), Idrisu (2004), and 
Oluwakoya (2011) did not really focus on international services. Therefore, this 
research is going to build upon work done in other countries and fill the gap in 
knowledge on the impact of liberalisation of international air transport in Nigeria using 
a similar approach to that taken for some other countries. The methodological approach 
accordingly differed significantly with other localised studies as discussed in the next 
chapter.     
2.12 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter has explained deregulation and liberalisation from the theoretical point of 
view where the economic policy theory of regulation justifies deregulation; and the 
integration of political consideration into utility maximisation where the government 
uses the mechanism to control excessive competition in the market in the interest of the 
public. The policy mechanisms include price, product quality, frequency, distribution 
and information.  
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Meanwhile, in response to the development of air transport in areas of technology, 
economics and politics, an institutional framework for regulation was developed by the 
ICAO and applied globally. This involves a regulatory structure and a legal framework 
in the form of licences, regulations and agreements. In addition, the chapter reveals that 
the major instrument for international economic regulation is the ASA. Furthermore, 
the chapter explores the key features of ASAs that indicate the liberalisation level 
guiding scheduled air passenger services, namely, the granting of traffic rights, 
designation, capacity, tariffs, withholding, and cooperative arrangements.  
The chapter also discusses deregulation and liberalisation concepts and developments 
from a global perspective along with their impact on traffic, competition, frequencies, 
air fares, costs and efficiency. In summary, the chapter discovered from various 
international markets in Europe, America and Asia that liberalisation has multiple 
economic benefits for both the operators and the passengers. Specifically, liberalisation 
is found to stimulate traffic growth significantly for both passengers and freight 
services. This has a multiplier effect on other market variables, for instance passenger 
increases lead to more frequencies and increases in traffic density. This reduces cost 
per passenger which could lower air fares on the route. In addition, the chapter 
identifies the impacts on other contemporary developments in the aviation market such 
as hubbing and airline alliances. The adverse effects of liberalisation policy to the 
industry and economy in general are highlighted. 
Finally, the chapter examined the liberalisation policy practice among African countries 
(YD) where it is found to have potential benefits to countries’ carriers and the 
development of air traffic in the continent if implemented. However, the chapter 
highlights the challenges faced by African countries in YD implementation. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology of the Research 
3.1 Introduction 
Research methodology is the backbone of any research study, which designs how 
research should be undertaken to the conclusion (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). 
This involves the design of a research plan from research conception to research 
methods, from the development of interrelationships between variables using 
appropriate scientific tools, to the research findings. This chapter provides an 
appropriate framework for the research methodology used, which entails the 
development of an appropriate research paradigm and philosophy for the research, the 
identification of a suitable approach and strategy, as well as suitable research methods 
necessary for the analysis techniques and procedures used to obtain the data.  The 
chapter also discusses the justification for the selection of data based on theory and 
empirical studies. 
This research aims to examine the impact of the liberalisation of international air 
transport services in developing countries. The main objective is to evaluate the 
economic implications of liberalising market access of international air services in 
Nigeria. As air traffic demand is the pivotal variable for assessment of the impact, the 
methodology develops a model to express the relationship between traffic demand, 
liberalisation and other variables. The techniques for analysing consumer welfare, 
competition and airport capacity are also examined. 
3.2 Research Paradigm 
According to Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, Jackson, and Lowe (2008), philosophical 
thinking is fundamental to the conception of a research design and can influence the 
quality of the research process and the outcome. The research philosophy contains an 
assumption that supports the research strategy and the methods. However, the two most 
common strategies of research philosophy are ontology and epistemology (Bryman & 
Bell, 2007; Saunders, et al., 2009).  The former is about the nature of reality and 
existence, while the latter concerns the best way of enquiring into the nature of the 
world. Traditionally, most research is extracted from different ontological and 
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epistemological assumptions in the designing of methodologies for the research work. 
Hence, Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) established the connection between the 
philosophical strategies in the conduct of research. They depict the relationship as 
similar to the trunk of a tree that has four layers of rings as shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
The outer ring or bark of the tree symbolizes the methods and techniques adopted in the 
research that aid data collection, such as interviews and questionnaires. These are clear 
visible features of the research to the general public. The methodology is the 
combination of techniques used to enquire about a specific situation. Epistemology is 
the general assumptions about ways of enquiring about the nature of the world, while 
ontology is the philosophical assumptions on the nature of reality. 
The ontology philosophy represented by the inner-most core of the tree believes in 
reality, while epistemology is the link between reality and the researcher, and the 
methodology is the procedure used to discover the reality (Sobh & Berry, 2005). The 
methods and techniques rely on decisions and assumptions from methodology, 
epistemology and ontology that are not visible (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2008). 
Therefore, these four elements form the research paradigm, which is essentially the 
overall system concept that guides any research.  
However, there are various choices of research paradigm that can guide research work. 
According to Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2011) there is no ‘best option’, but the 
 
 
 
Epistemology 
Ontology 
Methods & 
techniques 
Methodology 
Figure 3.1 Research paradigms; Source: Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) 
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choice depends on the research questions that the researcher seeks to answer, which are 
possible to answer using various philosophical strategies outlined in the “research 
onion” – Figure 3.2.  
 
Figure 3.2 Research Onion; Source: Saunders, et al. (2011) 
3.3 Research Philosophy Assumption 
There are numerous schools of thought concerning the available options for research 
philosophies by different philosophers. However, the most common belief consists of 
four philosophies, namely positivism, realism, constructivism (or interpretivism), and 
pragmatism or critical theory (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Saunders, et al., 2009). Often 
these four options can be further subdivided into other subcategories.  
3.3.1 Positivism 
The main concern of the positivism philosophy is that the “social world exists 
externally and that its properties should be measured through objective reflection or 
intuition” (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2008). They also maintained that positivism is the 
best way of examining human and social conduct due to the effect of metaphysical 
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conjecture. The highlights of the main philosophical assumptions of positivism given 
by Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) include: 
- The researcher should be independently minded 
- Social science should identify the causal explanations and fundamental laws 
that explain regularities in social conduct 
- There should be hypothesis and deduction which enable science to progress 
- Operational concepts need to be defined, such that they can be quantifiable 
- Problems are summarised into the simplest possible element for clear 
understanding 
- To be able to generalise the outcome to the wider population, an adequate 
sample size must be selected 
- In cross-sectional analysis, regularities should be recognised from the contrast 
of variation across samples  
- The strategy of the research depends on the objectives of the study. 
The common methods of data collection under positivism involve highly structured, 
large samples that are measurable and quantitative, but can also be qualitative 
(Saunders, et al., 2009). Since the assumptions of positivism are observed to be highly 
correlated with this research’s objectives and questions, it is therefore appropriate to 
associate this research with a positivist approach.  
3.3.2 Constructivism or Interpretivism 
Another paradigm of philosophy is constructivism or interpretivism which believes that 
reality is not objective and exterior, but socially constructed by people (Easterby-Smith 
et al., 2008). It is added that the focus should be on what people believe and sense. 
Therefore, this philosophy believes in appreciating the different experiences of people 
rather than probing for outside causes and fundamental laws to explain the behaviours. 
This clearly deviates from these research objectives; and as such, this research cannot 
be regarded as interpretivism.  
3.3.3 Realism Paradigm 
Realism refers to external reality as consisting of structures that are themselves sets of 
interrelated objects and mechanisms (Sobh & Berry, 2005). The realism philosophy 
understands the difference between the real world and a particular view of it and 
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constructs various views of this reality in terms of time and place (Riege, 2003). It is 
believed that social phenomena by their nature are fragile and causal impacts are not 
fixed but are contingent on their environment. Hence, the desire of realism research is 
to develop a family of answers that covers several contingent contexts and different 
reflective participants. 
3.3.4 Pragmatism (Critical Theory) 
This is a compromise between realism and positivism, which rejects the idea of 
predetermined theories that shape knowledge and facts, or that people can construct 
their own facts out of nothing (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2008). The key idea is that any 
meaningful structure should emanate from the practical experience of individuals.  
Pragmatism has a significant value in social science research, because it focuses on a 
process that is particularly relevant to social knowledge and learning, in which its 
impact on methods can be seen in the tradition and methods of grounded theory 
(Easter-Smith et al., 2008). Furthermore, Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) suggested the 
various methodologies commonly associated with different epistemologies as shown in 
the Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 Methodology Associated with Different Research Philosophies 
Ontology Realism Positivism Interpretivism Pragmatism 
Epistemology 
Methodology 
Strong 
Positivism 
Positivism Constructiveness Strong 
Constructiveness 
Aims Discovery Exposure Convergence Invention 
Starting point Hypothesis Propositions Questions Critique 
Designs Experiment Large survey; 
multi class 
Cases and Survey Engagement and 
reflexivity 
Data type Numbers & 
Facts 
Numbers & 
words 
Words & Numbers Discourse & 
experiences 
Analysis/ 
interpretation 
Verification/ 
falsification 
Correlation & 
regression 
Triangulation and 
comparison 
Sense-making; 
understanding 
Outcomes Confirmation 
of theories 
Theory testing 
&  generation 
Theory generation New insights and 
actions 
Source: Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) 
Table 3.1 shows how positivism and constructiveness epistemology are linked to 
realism and interpretivism ontology. It suggests that positivism and interpretivism have 
weaker epistemology and have some overlap in their methodology, while realism and 
pragmatism have stronger epistemology with a diverging view in methodology. 
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Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) further explained that realism research aims to discover 
the laws and theories that rationalise reality, which is achieved via experiment. This 
removes unconventional reason and allows major factors to be evaluated precisely, so 
that the hypotheses is verified or falsified. However, positivism that is less strong in 
epistemology believes that reality can be accessed easily; hence, the need to infer the 
nature of the reality indirectly through surveys of large samples of people, activities or 
organizations. In this case, quantitative data, sometimes supplemented by qualitative 
data are required for some statistical analyses such as regression and correlation. The 
analysis identifies regularities in behaviour, which allows propositions to be tested and 
new ideas to be developed. 
The constructiveness position assumed the existence of different realities; hence, the 
need for several methods, both qualitative and quantitative, that can generate views and 
experience of diverse opinions of observers using triangulation (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2008). However, a stronger constructiveness (pragmatism) assumes the absence of pre-
existing reality, and the aim is to understand how the structures are invented.  
3.4 Research Approaches 
From the layers of the “research onion” in Figure γ.β, this research examines the 
various research philosophical paradigms and identifies positivism as the appropriate 
research philosophy of this study. However, the research considers the options for 
research approaches. The approach could be deductive or inductive. A deductive 
approach means that the study develops a theory and hypothesis, and a research design 
to test the hypothesis. Alternatively, an inductive approach involves collection of data 
and the development of theory from the analysis. Saunders et al. (2009) outline the 
major difference between the two approaches as shown in Table 3.2 below.  
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Table 3.2 Difference between Two Research Approaches 
Deduction Approach Emphasis Inductive Approach Emphasis 
Scientific principles Gaining and understanding of the meanings 
humans attach to events 
The need to explain causal relationships 
between variables 
A close understanding of the research context 
Collection of quantitative data Collection of qualitative data 
Application of controls to ensure clarity of 
definition 
A more flexible structure to permit changes of 
research emphasis 
Highly structured approach and independence 
of the researcher 
Realisation that the researcher is part of the 
research process 
Necessity to select samples of sufficient size 
to generalise conclusions 
Less concern of the need to generalise 
Source: Saunders et al. (2009) 
It has become clear from the two options that this research on the impact of 
liberalisation of international air transport is best suited to a deductive approach, since 
the research needs to explain a causal relationship between traffic demand and other 
independent variables including liberalisation, which involves a lot of quantitative data 
collected from a sufficient sample size to enable a valid generalisation to be made for 
the whole country’s international air traffic. 
3.5 Research Purpose and Strategy 
Unlike the research approach, which clearly distinguished between two options, the 
research purpose can be for an exploratory, descriptive or explanatory purpose 
(Saunders, et al., 2009). The selection of the purpose is determined by the research 
questions. Exploratory research is a methodological approach that is primarily 
concerned with discovery and with generating theory. Exploratory research is 
conducted either through a literature search or interviewing experts or focus group 
interviews (Saunders et al., 2009); while descriptive studies are meant to provide an 
accurate profile of persons, events or phenomena – a prelude or extension of 
exploratory or explanatory research. Saunders et al. (2009) asserted that an explanatory 
study is meant to establish causal relations between the variables, which more precisely 
define the purpose of this research.  
Meanwhile, the selection of an appropriate research strategy depends also on the 
research questions and objectives, current knowledge, the available of resources (time 
and funds) and philosophical support (Saunders et al., 2009). The common strategies 
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employed in research outlined in the research onion comprise: experiment, survey, case 
study, action research, grounded theory, ethnography and archival research. 
Experimental research is very common in natural sciences’ research but rare in social 
science. The aim of this research is to study the fundamental association between 
variables; experimental research mostly requires a laboratory, and accordingly appears 
to be exploratory and explanatory research that answers the “how” and “why” question 
of a research (Saunders et al., 2009). The researcher has greater control over the 
research process. Hence, this type of strategy may not be suitable for a study on the 
impact of liberalisation.  
According to Saunders et al. (2009), the survey is another type of strategy that is 
associated with a deductive approach, commonly applied in social science research that 
seeks to answer questions on “whom”, “where”, “what and how”. They further allege 
that survey appears to be exploratory and descriptive, which requires the collection of a 
lot of quantitative data by administering questionnaires to samples of a population. The 
data analysis under survey includes descriptive and inferential statistics in which the 
outcome can suggest possible reasons for a relationship between variables and even 
development of a model for the relationship. Moreover, Saunders et al. (2009) added 
that the findings of the survey, if data are sufficient to represent the population, can be 
generalised. But the major drawback of the survey strategy is that it is not wide ranging 
compared to some other strategies (Saunders et al., 2009). Hence, this strategy seems 
likely to be suitable for this particular research project in achieving some of its 
objectives. 
A case study strategy of conducting research involves practical examination of a 
particular observable fact in real life using several proofs. It is very useful in getting a 
rich understanding of the research context for exploratory and explanatory analysis, and 
has the ability to provide answers to research questions on “why”, “what” and “how” 
(Saunders et al., 2009). The commonly used techniques for data collection under case 
study are interviews, observation, documentary analysis and questionnaires. However, 
in most cases triangulation is advised in comparing multiple sources so as to ensure 
reliability of the data. Also, Saunders et al. (2009) contend that a case study may 
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feature several cases, so as to establish whether findings for one case could be the same 
in other cases.  
Another research strategy is action research, which Kemmis and McTaggart (1998) 
claimed entails conducting a systematic investigation of a group of people so as to 
resolve their organisational issues that are causing discord. The aim of action research 
is to bring about a collaboration of understanding in the participants that emphasises 
changes in their social circumstances. It is a democratic problem-solving approach 
achieved through a cyclical process that moves between initial problem identification 
and reflection to planning, taking action, evaluation, then further reflection and 
planning. Therefore, this type of research that involves the researcher in the project is 
not in conformity with the dictate of the positivist philosophy which guides this 
research. 
Grounded theory is another strategy commonly applied to qualitative research; its main 
thrust according to Glaser and Strauss (1967, cited in Saunders et al., 2009) is to 
generate theories regarding social phenomena, which is to develop a higher-level 
understanding that is “grounded” in, or derived from, a systematic analysis of data. 
Grounded theory is appropriate when the study of social interactions or experiences 
aims to explain a process, not to test or verify an existing theory. Researchers approach 
the question with disciplinary interest, background assumptions and an acquaintance 
with the literature in the domain, but they neither develop nor test hypotheses. Rather, 
the theory emerges through a close and careful analysis of the data. 
It is therefore clearly evident from the various strategy options outlined in the research 
onion, that as this research is based on the purpose of establishing a causal relationship 
between liberalisation and air transport demand, specifically the case of the Nigerian 
market, and a case study and survey are the most suitable – in this case, the use of a 
survey strategy as part of a case study. 
3.6 Choice of Research Methods 
The next stage in the research onion is the choice of methods, which Saunders et al. 
(2009) claimed to involve a combination of data collection techniques and analysis 
procedures that have three choices – mono method, mixed method, and multi method. 
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Mono method refers to the use of a single data collection technique and corresponding 
analysis procedure, while multi method suggests the use of more than one data 
collection technique and analysis procedure to answer research questions. But the 
mixed method study combines quantitative and qualitative collection techniques and 
analysis procedures, as well as combining qualitative and quantitative approaches at 
other phases of the research through converting qualitative information into 
quantitative data (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Therefore, it is fairly convincing that this research lends itself to a mixed method 
approach. This is because the research requires different types of data from various 
sources. For instance, information on liberalisation policy is in qualitative form, which 
has to be converted to quantitative data for analysis.  
3.7 Time Horizons 
The time horizons of a research study are independent of research strategy or choice of 
methods, but the objective and scope of the research will dictate the appropriate time 
horizons, which could be cross-sectional or longitudinal (Saunders et al., 2009). 
According to Saunders et al. (2009), a cross-sectional study is an event at a particular 
point in time, usually due to time constraints or an absence of long-term data, whereas a 
longitudinal study is an event over a longer period of time, capable of isolating change 
and development, and associated with constructionist research (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2012). 
Also, Bryman and Bell (2007) alleged that a cross-sectional analysis requires data on 
several observations or events at a particular period in connection with two or more 
variables, which are examined to detect the pattern of relationship. The highlights of 
the main features of cross-sectional studies include: multiple cases or observations, a 
fixed period of time, quantifiable data, and a focus on relationships (causation). It is 
also a very common approach with surveys and questionnaires, and belongs to the 
positivism research philosophy (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). 
In this regard, this research has adopted the use of a cross-sectional study in 
determining the causal relation between variables. The advantages of cross-sectional 
analysis include the ability to isolate the effects of changes in air transport policy on 
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local development (InterVISTAS-ga2, 2006). Cross-sectional analysis assumes that 
every country route will display unique traffic volumes, socio-economic variables, and 
degrees of liberalisation in the air service agreements. Accordingly, the study is capable 
of making use of many countries’ traffic as multiple cases over a one-year period of 
time. 
3.8 Research Design 
After carefully examining the various options in the research paradigm as outlined in 
the research onion, this research recognises an appropriate research philosophy, 
research approach, research purpose, research strategy, research methods and time 
horizons of the research as depicted in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3 Research Design Framework Based on Research Onion 
The aim of the research design is to highlight data collection techniques and 
methodology for the analysis. The data collection involves identification and 
justification of data requirements and the sources of data, while analysis involves the 
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• Explanatory (establish causal relationships between variables) 
RESEARCH 
STRATEGY 
• Survey - case study (Associated with deductive approach, which helps 
understand explanatary analysis) 
RESEARCH 
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techniques required for the description and explanation of the variables leading to the 
research findings. 
In addition, the research design is also guided by theories and empirical analysis used 
in air transport research. For instance, Button and Drexler (2006), Vasigh (2008) and 
Doganis (2010) stated that demand forecasting techniques in air transport research can 
have a qualitative or quantitative approach, and are applicable to the study of air service 
liberalisation. The quantitative methods include time series and causal or econometric 
methods. The causal model such as the gravity model and multiple regressions are 
commonly appropriate where country-pair traffic is available. A traditional approach to 
study the impact of liberalisation can be represented by the schematic diagram below 
(Grancay, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Research Methods options 
Therefore, from the diagram in Figure 3.4, the research could be approached using any 
of the following techniques: 
 Survey techniques (Qualitative) where professionals and passengers’ opinions 
are sought. However, the major weakness is the possibility of prejudiced 
responses, which could be a basis for swayed opinion rather than for objective 
analysis (Grancay, 2009). 
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 Econometric methods (Quantitative), which is basically developing statistical 
models, and has the capability of separating the effects of changes in air 
transport policy on local development (Grancay, 2009). Also, Vasigh et al. 
(2008) preferred the use of quantitative modelling or regression and time series 
in the forecasting of air traffic based on the advantages, which include tests of 
reliability that can determine the accuracy of the forecast and behavioural 
relationships. Although there is the risk of choosing an inappropriate model, this 
method seems to be suitable for these research objectives.  Input–output analysis is another quantitative technique that uses Keynesian 
multipliers. This is attained through tracing local expenditure on air 
transportation either by aggregation or multiplication of sectors. The problem 
associated with this technique is the selection and the difficult estimation of a 
correct time frame in the analysis and value of the multiplier. It appears that this 
method may not be appropriate to the objectives of the research analysis. In 
addition, it involves a lot of classified information that is not easy to obtain.  Time series analysis is longitudinal and requires data over a long period for the 
analysis – a minimum period of 15 years (Grancay, 2009). However, the 
implementation of a liberalisation policy for international markets involving 
Nigeria only started recently (period of analysis 2000–11). Therefore, this 
approach may not be feasible for this case.  
Therefore, the most appropriate and convincing methodology on the impact of 
liberalisation in Nigerian international air transport would be to adopt a combination of 
survey and econometric methods in conducting the research, while theories and 
empirical studies will provide the framework for analysis that will lead to the research 
findings as depicted in Figure 3.5 below. 
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Figure 3.5 Research Funnel 
3.9 Data Collection 
3.9.1 Secondary Data Required and Identification of Variables 
One of the major challenges in the development of a statistical model is the 
identification of the independent variables (Gujarati, 2003). Also, the development of a 
causal model that expresses air traffic demand between a pair of countries on a vector 
of geographic, socio-economic and regulatory variables requires reliable secondary 
data from the countries involved (Vasigh, et al., 2008). However, the first task is the 
identification of the required data. Accordingly, Fields (2005) claimed that deciding the 
actual predictors to use in developing a complex model with several potential 
predictors involves consultation of previous studies and theories with similar objectives 
that have yielded a reliable and generalised model. In this regard, the research explores 
some relevant previous studies on air transport demand and its relationship with 
liberalisation.  
It is common knowledge that air transport is a derived demand for achieving economic, 
social and political journey purposes. Therefore, demand for air transport hinges on the 
socio-economic and political needs of the community. To buttress the argument, 
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Doganis (2006) stated that air transport demand from passengers or shippers is related 
to and affected by one or more economic, social or supply factors. Also, in an 
economic sense, demand theory suggests that demand for any products or services 
depends primarily on market price, supply (market regulation), customer level of 
income and taste, and that change in any one of these variables will affect demand. 
Therefore, transport demand between two countries depends on the interplay of 
numerous economic and socio-political variables. Furthermore, explorations of 
previous studies should guide this research in identifying the appropriate data required 
for the building of a model that can explain the relationships. 
Jorge-Calderón (1997) believed that demand for air transport can be broadly 
categorised into two types of variable: firstly, geo-economic variables, which arise 
from economic activity and location factors, determine the level of air transport 
demand between countries. The variables commonly used to capture the influence of 
these factors are income and population at the route end points (cities, countries) and 
the distance between them. Income and population are regarded as generative variables, 
because air transport demand is positively related to them. Secondly, service-related 
variables, which include quality of service and price, are used as the main determinants 
of air transport demand. Jorge-Calderón (1997) pointed out that flight frequency and 
aircraft size are mostly used to capture the influence of quality-related variables.  
Doganis (2006) and Vasigh, et al. (2008) summarised the socio-economic variables 
affecting levels and growth of passenger traffic demand to include: personal income; 
air service supply (represented by schedule, frequency and comfort); safety; state of the 
economy; air fares; distance; population growth/size; economic activity/trade; travel 
restrictions; historical/cultural links; and other random factors. 
In addition to these factors, Piermatini and Rousova (2008b) included language, 
liberalisation and government regulations, and colonies and borders as influencers of 
air traffic demand.  
One of the key factors presented above that influence air transport markets between 
countries is the variable pertaining to the BASAs and the level of regulation (Doganis, 
2006). The permitted number of airline designations, pricing restrictions, capacity 
controls and air traffic rights effectively define the level of service supply and market 
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structure for airlines in general. As such, the effect of liberalising these attributes can 
significantly affect the level of traffic demand, price and service quality. 
Dresner and Tretheway (1992) developed an econometric model that analyses price 
effects of changes in market structure as a result of the liberalisation of the North 
Atlantic market (between Europe and North America). The theoretical framework 
estimates the determinants of fares across routes governed by varying degrees of 
liberalisation are based on a standard profit maximisation equation. The empirical 
model developed using a two-stage least squares technique considers the problem of 
endogeneity of including passenger traffic demand in the price equation. The impact of 
liberalisation is depicted by a dummy variable which separates liberal and restrictive 
BASA regimes alongside other explanatory variables. 
InterVISTAS-EU (2009) used a cross-sectional gravitational modelling approach to 
prove that economic factors such as GDP, international trade and geographical 
variables are the most influential determinants of traffic between any country-pair 
along with ASA regulatory variables. Piermartini and Rousava (2008b) apply a gravity-
type model to explain bilateral passenger traffic using a standard Air Liberalisation 
Index (ALI) developed by WTO. The study estimates the impact of liberalising air 
transport services on air passenger flows for a sample of 184 countries. The variables 
employed in the model development apart from ALI include distance, ASA age, 
common language/culture, colony, border sharing, and country fixed effects. Although 
the model is more complex with many of the variables as dummies, it finds robust 
evidence of a positive and significant relationship between the volumes of traffic and 
the degree of liberalisation of the aviation market using different estimation techniques.  
The major strength of Piermartini and Rousava’s (2008b) model is the application of a 
standard ALI, which provides a better gradation of liberalisation that mitigates 
collinearity between different policies. But a model developed from analysing global 
airline markets may be less reliable than a model developed from market-specific data. 
Also, the model did not consider inactive ASAs in the formulation of the ALI. The 
specific market-based model in this study will take into account all market features. 
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Similar studies carried out by other scholars with different approaches, variables, 
numbers of observations, and models on determining the liberalisation impact are 
summarised for analogy in Table 3.3.  
Table 3.3 Strength of explanatory Variables in the Liberalisation Models 
 
Table 3.3 shows some studies on liberalisation using different explanatory variables, 
which suggested the use of either macroeconomic variables or industry traffic variables 
to forecast traffic demand. This is based on a strong relationship with the dependent 
variable (traffic volume) as indicated by the R2 values, hence, these justify the use of 
any of these variables in developing a traffic demand model.  
In selecting the appropriate independent variables responsible for determining the 
dependent variable (traffic demand), from the available market variables and 
macroeconomic variables as identified by other studies, the influential factors affecting 
Author/study 
 
Objective Variables used Model used  R2  Obs  
Gillen (2001) Evaluate the 
impact of ASA 
changes 
ASA, Passengers, 
Revenue, airport 
staff 
Air Lib Model, 
demand/supply, I/O 
model 
  
Matsumoto 
(2004) 
International air 
network structure 
assessment 
GDP, Population, 
distance, 
Gravity in log linear 
form (OLS) 
0.70 209 
Doganis (2004) Forecast traffic 
between airports 
Scheduled 
passenger traffic, 
air fares, 
frequency, 
Gravity model 0.94 47 
Intervistas 
group (2006)  
Impact of lib. 
International air 
services  
ASA, GDP, 
service trade, 
intervening 
opportunities. 
Gravity model, 
elasticity, 
0.67 800 
Warnock-
Smith 
&Morrell 
(2008) 
Examines 
relationship 
between traffic 
and lib. policy 
Liberalisation 
scale, GDP, 
dummy 
Regression analysis 
in log linear form. 
0.95 11 
Piermartini & 
Rousova 
(2008) WTO 
Estimate the 
impacts of lib. on 
passengers  
ALI, distance, 
ASA age, GDP, 
language, colony, 
Air liberalisation 
index, Regression 
model and Factor 
analysis 
0.75 1294 
Geleso, & 
Shepherd 
(2009) 
Examine the link 
between more 
liberalisation and 
trade 
Export/import, 
transport cost, 
ASA tariff 
Air Liberalisation 
Index in the gravity 
model 
0.97 240 
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air transport demand in the Nigeria market can be considered. However, some of the 
factors are statistically correlated and the multicollinearity problem may be present if 
used together in the model. This informs the choice of the following factors as 
independent variables and also serves as a proxy for some other variables: 
 GDP as a proxy of a state economy, income and population: this will be the  
combined  GDP in US$ of the two countries involved (InterVISTAS-ga2, 2006; 
Warnock-Smith et al, 2008).   Trade volume between the two countries as a proxy of economic activity. The 
total trade value in US$ of goods only will be used, because trade in services 
data are not available (Geloso Grosso & Shepherd, 2009).   Liberalisation index as a proxy of service quality, frequency and travel 
restrictions. This is represented by the air service agreement between two 
countries (WTO, 2007).  Dummy variable as a proxy for: common language/historical/cultural link 
(Piermartini & Rousova, 2008a).   Distance: average distance in km between the two countries (Matsumoto, 2004).  Air fare: Average economy fare charged in US$ between the two countries 
(Doganis, 2006).  
The first four variables are positively related to the dependent variable. But, distance 
and air fare have an inverse relationship with traffic demand levels; that is, the shorter 
the distance the greater the traffic volume, but as distance becomes very small, maybe 
just across the border, air transport diminishes in importance owing to competition 
from alternative transport modes that are cheaper or more flexible (Matsumoto, 2004). 
However, some studies argue against the inclusion of air fares in traffic demand 
estimation, due to high correlation with distance or travel time resulting in 
multicollinearity problems (Renaraju et al., cited in Grosche, Rothlauf, & Heinzl, 
2007). Also, the issue of volatility of fare which is determined by many other factors 
such as route density, time, competition and operational cost – all these make it 
difficult to estimate air fares (Jorge-Caldero, 1997; Doganis, 2004). 
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However, this research considers air fare inclusion as a trial in the analysis so as to 
determine its impact on the Nigerian market, but if the analysis reveals a very high 
collinearity of fares against other factors, then it can be dropped from the final model.  
The research therefore identifies the above six factors as the variables that affect and 
determine passenger traffic demand between Nigeria and other countries, although 
there may be other less significant factors that can be considered as error terms in the 
relationship.   
3.9.2 Justification for the selection of variables 
3.9.2.1  Passenger volumes 
According to Vasigh, et al. (2008), air transport demand is evaluated in terms of the 
number of passengers, revenue passenger miles (RPM), or revenue tonne miles (RTM). 
RPM represents one seat occupied by a revenue generating passenger who is carried 
one mile. RTM represents one tonne of revenue cargo carried for one mile. It is critical 
to understand the nature of demand for the industry. Accordingly, the research will use 
scheduled passenger records for international traffic to and from Nigeria as a proxy for 
air transport demand as the dependent variable in the model. 
Since the approach is cross-sectional, a substantial number of countries’ passenger 
traffic would be required as the number of observations. There should be a ratio of at 
least 15 countries for each independent variable as recommended by Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham, and Black (1998). Therefore, with six independent variables, the research 
should have at least 90 countries’ route traffic observations.  
Almost all the empirical studies on air liberalisation used passenger records as a basis 
for assessment of traffic demand.  
3.9.2.2 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
It is generally believed that one of the factors affecting growth in air transport is 
economic prosperity, measured by indicators such as GDP or GNP  per capita, which 
explains why air travel grows significantly in one country or city, and stagnates in 
another country or city (Vasigh, et al., 2008). 
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There is available evidence that demonstrates a close relationship between economic 
development and air transport activity. For instance, Button and Taylor (2000) claim 
that there are two key elements that influence air transport growth, namely, GDP and 
fares. Over the past four decades there appears to have been a change in the balance of 
importance between GDP and real price factors. Between 1960 and 1990, some 80 per 
cent of traffic growth globally was explained by GDP growth, with 20 per cent due to 
price reductions. In the 1990s, this appears to be nearer 60 per cent and 40 per cent 
respectively. Since 1990, price reductions have become more prominent, with average 
world GDP growth rates starting to soften. They further argue that air transport activity 
can be further demonstrated by comparing income per capita with per capita demand 
for air travel. The per capita demand for air travel is increasing due to an increase in per 
capita income, which in turn increases the personal disposable income spent on air 
travel through low frill airlines operating in the air transport market. Therefore, this 
suggests that people are substituting rail/road modes for the air mode. In addition, air 
traffic is growing roughly two times GDP growth in developed economies and 1.5 
times GDP growth in developing economies (Boeing, 2009). This is witnessed by an 
increase in aviation activity that provides a useful indicator of a flourishing national 
economy, as evidenced by the high traffic in most developed countries.  
GDP refers to total market value of all final goods and services produced by a country 
in a given year (Vasigh et al., 2008), which is equal to consumer, investment, 
government expenditure, and value of exports minus imports. Another proxy for 
income is GDP per capita which is defined as an approximation of the value of goods 
produced per person in the country, equal to the country's GDP divided by the total 
number of people in the country. However, if per capita is used, the inclusion of 
country population is meant to reflect the total country production capacity. 
Population is another factor influencing traffic growth. Strong population growth rates 
in developing and emerging countries such as China and India have helped spur air 
traffic demand (Doganis, 2010). However, population growth must be accompanied by 
income growth, for there to be a significant effect on traffic demand (Vasigh et al., 
2008). Since GDP is the product of per capita and the population of the country, the 
research decided to use GDP as the proxy of both per capita (income) and population. 
Some previous studies such as InterVISTAS-ga2 (2006) used GDP instead of per capita 
96 
 
income. In this regard, aggregate GDP for the two countries involved will be required 
as an independent variable representing the income level and population of the two 
countries. 
3.9.2.3 Trade value ($) 
The need for the inclusion of trade stems from the fact that demand for air transport is a 
derived demand and trade is one of the main facilitators of links between two countries 
or cities for the distribution of raw materials, finished products, or human skills.  
Air transport, like other transport services, is associated with international trade in two 
distinct ways (Doganis, 2002). First, air transport is traded as a service in its own right. 
Second, it is a key intermediate service for many other kinds of trade, in the domain of 
both goods and services (such as tourism). Numerous studies have highlighted the 
importance of an efficient, effective and reliable air transport infrastructure, especially 
in developing countries, to ensure the materialisation of the gains from trade (WTO, 
2007). These studies also highlight the crucial role of international civil aviation in 
contributing to the development process and its role in the leisure and commercial 
decisions of many people. This importance is expected to increase as a result of 
technological innovation, deregulation and enhanced market access for foreign 
companies, which are all making air transport more accessible to a wider set of 
customers in a broader range of countries (Doganis, 2002).  
Notable studies that considered trade value as a predictor variable include 
InterVISTAS-ga2 (2006) and Grosso and Shepherd (2009). However, the 
InterVISTAS-ga2 study used service trade only and did not include trade of goods 
between countries due to the absence of goods trade data. This research intends to use 
trade value of goods for import and export between Nigeria and other countries. The 
total value of trade (US$) in a year will be used as one of the predictor variables 
responsible for traffic between the two partner countries. 
3.9.2.4 Distance (KM) 
Distance is one of the geographical factors that transport is trying to overcome (Vasigh 
et al., 2008). Transportation costs play a fundamental role in shaping the pattern of 
economic activity and the demand for transport (Gillen, et al., 2002). Because of the 
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measurement issues related to transport costs, geographic distance is predominately 
used as a proxy for transport costs (Behar & Venables, 2010). However, there have 
been limited studies on the link between distance and transport cost.  
Empirical research has extensively relied on geographic distance between the origin of 
a principal agent and the destination of an economic event as a proxy for transport cost 
(Doganis, 2010). This approach is justified by the simplifying assumption that distance 
increases freight costs over space. As the distance is found to have a large negative 
effect on international trade flows in almost all studies, it is commonly interpreted that 
transport costs significantly discourage foreign trade (Disdier & Head, 2008). 
It therefore means that distance affects transport demand in a negative way: the more 
the distance the lower the demand. However, air transport has added another dimension 
– that the closer the distance the less the demand, because as the distance becomes a lot 
closer, there may be an alternative mode, which may be cheaper, such as road or rail. 
This suggests that the role of distance in determining air transport demand is estimated 
to be log linear (Doganis, 2002). 
Some empirical studies that used distance include εatsumoto’s (2004) assessment of 
the international air network structure, and Piermatini and Rousova’s (β008) estimate 
of the impacts of liberalisation on passenger traffic. This research therefore considers 
distance as another factor influencing air traffic demand in the model. 
3.9.2.5 Air Fare ($) 
According to basic economic demand theory, the law of demand states that “all things 
being equal as price of a good or service increases, the quantity demanded decreases”. 
That is, at a certain price the passenger would consider it to be too expensive, and some 
would decide not to fly. The demand curve describes the demand schedule as the 
number of passengers willing and able to pay alternative prices in a given period, and it 
is always downward sloping as in Figure 3.6 below (Vasigh et al., 2008). 
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Figure 3.6 Economic Demand Theories; Source: Vasigh et al, (2008) 
The graph shows that the effect of the ticket price on the quantity demanded is always 
causing movement on the demand curve, and it is an inverse relationship. 
Therefore, air fare is similar to distance as a barrier to traffic demand. This study, like 
other studies, considers air fare as another independent variable that can affect 
international air traffic demand in Nigeria. However, the theory has further argued that 
some passengers would still pay the price no matter how high; such passengers are 
considered price insensitive and the demand to be inelastic (InterVISTAS-EU, 2007).  
The air ticket price is itself determined by other issues such as the time of purchase, 
period of the year, competition, route distance, class, and cost of service. This affects 
the price paid by different passengers for the same journey. 
In this context, the average economy fare would be used for the evaluation measure in 
US$ for all the selected country routes for the period of study. The analysis should be 
able to come out with the impact of air fare on the demand for international air 
transport services in the country. 
3.9.2.6 Air Liberalisation Index (ALI) 
Air liberalisation impact is the key factor in this study. However, in quantifying its 
impact, liberalisation policy has to be converted from qualitative information to 
quantitative data in the form of an index. In this regard, the research will construct a 
liberalisation index similar to the one developed by the World Trade Organization. 
Demand Curve 
Quantity 
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According to Piermartini and Rousova (2008b), the ALI developed by WTO in 2006 is 
a professional-based index. The scales assigned to various aspects of any agreement 
were based on a consultation of a group of experts in the industry, so as to capture the 
relative importance of each provision in the agreement. In this regard, each provision 
was assigned a value scale from 0 to 8, which means an agreement should have a 
liberalisation index from 0 to 50, where 0 implies the most restrictive ASA and 50 
implies the most liberalised agreement (WTO, 2006). 
Therefore, the nature of the Air Service Agreements (ASAs) between Nigeria and 
countries with traffic will be considered. The following components of an ASA will be 
examined and assigned weight to construct an index.  
- Grant of rights (5th freedom/ 6th freedom /cabotage). 
- Capacity (predetermination, Bermuda I, free determination) 
- Tariffs (dual approval, country of origin, dual disapproval, free pricing) 
- Withholding (ownership, community of interest, principal business) 
- Designation (single or multiple designation) 
- Cooperative arrangement (allowed or not allowed) 
The air liberalisation index will be calculated by selecting the provision of each 
components and assigning a score from zero to eight. A zero value indicates the most 
restrictive provision and eight the most liberal (see Appendix 3). The ALI is an 
aggregate weight of scores of the components.  
3.9.2.7 Dummy variable 
According to Doganis (2010), a historical or cultural link is among the factors affecting 
passenger demand for international air transport between countries; this is characterised 
by a common language or common religious beliefs between the countries. This is the 
reason why countries that share a historical link and common official language have 
high traffic demand, as the case between Australia or New Zealand and the UK, Hong 
Kong and the UK, Portugal and Brazil, Nigeria and the UK, and South Africa and the 
Netherlands. Common language and culture facilitates exchange of ideas/knowledge 
and transactions among the people of the countries involved. Also, Piermartini and 
Rousava (2008) argue that a common official language and historical links have a 
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positive impact on passenger traffic demand; hence, their research captures the cultural 
aspect with dummies for common links. 
In this regard, this research also denotes the variable as a dummy, which takes the value 
of one or zero. Therefore, countries that share a common official language with Nigeria 
take the value one, and otherwise zero. After identifying and justifying the data 
required for the research, the research now focuses on the collection method.  
3.9.3 Data sources 
The only available means of collecting the above data is from secondary sources where 
such records were compiled for operational and planning uses. However, the main 
challenges in secondary data collection include reliability and validity of the data 
(Bryman & Bell, 2007). Also, some of the data involves confidentiality issues. 
In order to ensure the reliability and validity of the data, the research adopts 
triangulation in the data collection from at least two different sources for comparison 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Hence, the following are regarded as the sources of the 
variables: 
3.9.3.1 Passenger traffic data sources 
IATA (PaxIS) is an international source that provides robust traffic data for all country-
pairs. PaxIs is a product developed by IATA that provides airline passenger market 
intelligence and real time data covering ticket information on over 400 global 
international airlines. The information uses the Billing and Settlement Plan (BSP) 
which captures data on passenger and ticket information covering passenger volume, 
average fare  in US$, point of origin, connection, and destination airport (IATA, 2012). 
The database is capable of providing at least 70 per cent of the international traffic data 
between country-pairs including indirect traffic, because it is based on a Global 
Distribution System (IATA, 2012). This source is used in many previous studies by 
academics and professional organisations such as Intervistas group and IATA. 
Therefore, PaxIS is the source for international traffic demand by passengers between 
Nigeria and other countries of the world. 
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The Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) is the air transport regulatory body in 
the country saddled with the responsibility of monitoring and regulating the system. 
The airlines provide all passenger coupons to the organisation as part of monitoring. 
The organisation provides all passenger traffic by airline to countries with a direct link 
to Nigeria. However, the major weakness of the database is that data for countries 
without a direct traffic link with Nigeria were unobtainable. That is, the passenger data 
provided by the agency did not include indirect traffic.  
The Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) is responsible for providing an 
interface between passengers and the airlines. It compiles information on all passengers 
that embark and disembark from all airlines. This is compiled from the airport 
passenger tax data. The authority provides passenger traffic data by airlines and country 
of first destination. However, the data were not able to isolate stop-over passengers 
from the schedule.  
3.9.3.2  GDP data sources 
The data on GDP for each country of the world is sourced from the World Bank, which 
is a global data base of world economic activities and development. The information is 
a web based database of development indicators. Each country’s GDP is sourced and 
added to Nigeria’s GDP to form an aggregate GDP per country pair. This data is 
reliable and provide sources of information to many international researchers. 
Another source for Nigeria GDP data is the country apex bank of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN). The CBN provided only Nigeria GDP, and could not provide 
information on other country GDPs.  
3.9.3.3 Trade (Import/Export) data source 
The data on trade value representing the sum of imports and exports measured in US$ 
is sourced from the National Bureau of Statistics in Abuja-Nigeria. This is the 
organisation responsible for the Nigerian databank. The agency compiles such trade 
data from the record of customs duty paid at the airports and seaports on all goods 
imported and exported. The trade data provided include a list of the items, the quantity, 
value, origin/destination country, and month of the transaction. Therefore, the research 
had to extract the total amount for each country per annum from the database.  
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The weakness of the data is that only data on physical goods were provided, without 
data on services traded. In this regard, it represents a sample instead of the population. 
Meanwhile, the data are not accessible freely because of ethical and national security 
issues. They were provided only on the grounds of a request for academic purposes.  
The Central Bank of Nigeria is also another source for international trade. However, the 
two agencies complement each other in data compilation. As a result, the data from the 
two agencies are the same. 
3.9.3.4 Air liberalisation data sources 
1) Federal Ministry of Aviation (Nigeria). The ministry is responsible for 
formulating civil aviation policy and negotiating all air service agreements with 
other countries including reviews. However, due to government confidentiality, 
this research was only allowed to examine the documents. Therefore, the ASA 
signed with each country was examined and the provision on each component 
of the ASA had to be summarised and not presented.  
2) Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA). This organisation complemented the 
ministry data on ASAs with the list of airlines including foreign carriers granted 
traffic rights in the country (on frequency, designation, and entry point). From 
these records, the research was able to determine active and inactive air service 
agreements. 
3) Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria. This organisation provided the 
quarterly/annual flight schedules of airlines in the country’s airports, which 
further complement the data of NCAA. 
Some other countries’ Civil Aviation Authorities were also consulted in order to confirm the 
information on ASAs with Nigeria such as: 
1) The British Civil Aviation Authority provided a summary of the UK–Nigeria 
Air Service Agreement. 
2) The United Arab Emirates General Civil Aviation Authority provided a 
summary of the ASA between the UAE and Nigeria. 
3) The African Civil Aviation Association (AFCAAC) provided a copy of African 
countries liberalisation policy called Yamoussoukro Declaration.  
103 
 
3.9.3.5 Air fare sources 
IATA PaxIS provided the data of all international average economy fares to and from 
Nigeria from other countries for the years 2009 and 2010. This was based on e-
bookings from airlines and travel agents that covered over 70 per cent of routes, and 
provides a reasonable sample from the population. However, it is extremely difficult to 
obtain another source for verification purposes owing to confidentiality issues from the 
airlines.  
3.9.3.6 Distance (KM) sources 
IATA PaxIs: IATA provided average distance travelled by airlines in transporting 
passengers between country-pairs including transit passengers; as such, this provided a 
source for Nigerian international travel distances covered by the airlines to various 
destinations in 2009 and 2010. The data were purchased from IATA. 
Google Maps: This map computes distances between cities globally, although this 
provides only a direct link between cities. However, this data is only needed for 
comparison purposes with the data provided by IATA. 
3.9.3.7 Dummy sources 
As explained above, the dummy variable represents the country’s relationship with 
Nigeria in terms of common official language (English), or common historical/cultural 
link. The information on this was sourced from each country’s profile as provided by 
USA (CIA library publication on world facts). Also, the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office provided another source that confirms the CIA data. This 
provides a good source for commonwealth country members and their profiles.  
In order to ensure data reliability, all data were collected from at least two different 
sources with the exception of data on air fares for which there was only one source. 
3.9.4 Organizing the Data 
After collecting the data from the secondary sources, some of the data were in a 
different format was not suitable for direct substitution in the analysis. Hence, the 
research transformed such data to fit into the model analysis. The data collected on 
GDP (US$), Air fares (US$), Trade ($) and Distance (km) did not require further 
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transformation and, as such, were used as provided. For the dummy variable (1 or 0), 
countries that share a common language or history or culture with Nigeria take the 
value of one, while countries with no such common linkage are assigned a zero value. 
Data on the air liberalisation index (ALI) were derived from the nature of the ASAs 
between Nigeria and other countries. The information came in qualitative form; hence, 
the data had to be converted to numerical values by measuring the degree of 
liberalisation of ASA features. The WTO (2006) identified seven features of ASAs as 
relevant indicators of  liberalisation for scheduled air passenger services, and each of 
the components is assigned a weight index between 0 and 8, where 0 denotes the most 
restrictive agreement and 8 denotes the most liberal provision in the seven components 
of each ASA (see detail in Appendix 3). 
Table 3.4 Methods for computing ALI 
Features Agreement options Weighted 
index (ALI) 
Remark 
Granting of right  5th freedom 
7th freedom 
Cabotage 
6 
6 
6 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Liberal 
Capacity Pre determination 
Bermuda1 
Free determination 
0 
4 
8 
Restricted 
Liberal 
Most liberal 
Tariff Dual approval 
Origin Disapproval 
Zone pricing 
Dual disapproval 
Free pricing 
0 
3 
4  
6 
8 
Restricted 
Less restricted 
Moderate 
Liberal 
Most liberal 
Designation Single designation 
Multiple designation 
0 
4 
Restricted 
Liberal 
Withholding Substantial ownership 
Community of Interest 
Principle place of business  
0 
4 
6 
Restricted 
Liberal 
Most Liberal 
Cooperative 
agreement 
Allowed 
Not allowed 
3 
0 
Liberal 
Restricted 
Statistic exchange Required 
Not required 
0 
3 
Restricted 
Liberal 
Source: WTO (2006) 
The Air Liberalisation Index (ALI) is the aggregate value of all the features in any 
agreement ranging from 0 to a maximum of 50, where 0 is associated with the most 
restrictive agreement and 50 denotes the most liberal agreement. 
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3.9.5 Primary Data from Field survey 
Since the scope of the research is limited to passenger traffic, in studying passenger 
demand, there is a need to understand the socio-economic characteristics of passengers 
in the market, which might suggest the passenger responses to a liberal air policy, and 
also to reinforce the quantitative data. 
The aim of this approach is to identify the socio-economic characteristics of the 
passengers in the Nigerian international market, which is one of the study’s objectives. 
The approach would determine the following data: 
- The composition of the passengers; business or leisure travellers 
- The different nationalities of the passengers 
- The age group, profession, and income level of the passengers 
- The origin and final destination of the passengers 
- The frequency of passenger journeys per annum 
- Rationale for the selection of airline by passengers 
A field survey was conducted where the above data were collected with the use of a 
structured questionnaire. The questionnaires were administered to the travelling 
passengers preparing for departure at Lagos and Abuja international airports.  
The information from the survey about the characteristics of the passengers would 
reinforce and complement the quantitative findings and enrich the discussion for better 
understanding of liberalisation impacts. It would also be useful in the determination of 
passenger elasticity coefficients for both business and leisure travellers, where the 
consumer impact could be evaluated.  
3.9.5.1  Sample size 
The total passenger population for the international market as at 2010 (research base 
year) was about 2.7 million passengers. The survey was not able to cover all the 
population, so in order to be able to generalise the findings a reasonable and acceptable 
number of responses has to be covered (Saunders et al., 2009; Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
In this regard, Saunders et al. (2009) recommended an acceptable sample size of at 
least 384 passengers for a population between one and ten million at the 95 per cent 
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confidence level (5 per cent margin of error). However, despite the minimum sample 
size, a higher number of samples would be preferable and more reliable (Doganis, 
2010). Hence, the research decided to increase the sample size despite the limitation of 
resources available to 600 passengers. Accordingly, 600 hundred questionnaires were 
administered to randomly selected passengers at the airports. About 512 passengers 
successfully responded, which represents the sample of the population of passengers 
for analysis. 
3.9.5.2  Sampling techniques 
Since the research has established the actual sample size required that can generalise 
the findings of the research to the whole market, the research also identified the 
departing international passengers in the market as the most appropriate sampling 
frame. The departing passengers have some dwell time that can be used to attend to 
research questionnaires while waiting for departure. 
The consideration of the sampling technique that would enable unbiased inference from 
the sample of a population depends on the population division/strata, geographical 
spread, contact approach, and periodic pattern (Saunders et al, 2009). In this regard, the 
research observed that the international passengers in the market were mainly divided 
into various international routes for about 25 countries, with each country route having 
a particular schedule for departure. Also, the passengers in the market were segmented 
based on journey purpose, business or leisure, taking into account their travels seasons, 
which are influenced by summer or winter. Face to face contact with the passengers 
was selected as the most suitable option within the airport departure halls. The 
questionnaires were self-completed by the passengers, while the researchers waited 
after administering to them. 
As a result of the evident market heterogeneity, the research adopted stratified random 
sampling in the distribution of questionnaires at the two main international airports of 
Lagos and Abuja. These two airports handled 96 percent of the market traffic in 2010 
(NCAA, 2011). The questionnaires were administered in June (summer) and November 
(winter), so as to represent any type of travellers in the sample. The proportion of 
distribution between the airports was based on the market share of each airport. In the 
year 2010, Abuja Airport handled 18 percent and Lagos Airport handled 73 percent of 
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the international passengers in the market (NCAA, 2011). Hence, the questionnaires 
were split into 30 percent and 70 percent for Abuja and Lagos Airports respectively. 
Furthermore, the distribution of questionnaires at the airport was spread across time, so 
as to cover all international routes. The research observed that each country route has a 
flight schedule pattern in the market. The flight schedule in the airports for 2010 
indicated that Europe and North America started from 7.00am to 10.30am and another 
schedule from 6.30pm to 10.30pm. Flight schedules to Asia commenced from 12.30pm 
to 3.30pm and 7.30pm to 10.00pm. Meanwhile, most West African country schedules 
commenced from 9.00am to 4.00pm, and other African countries flight schedules 
started by 10.30am and went through to 4.00pm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Sampling techniques 
3.9.6 Triangulation of evidence 
Triangulation refers to the use of more than one approach to the investigation of a 
research question in order to enhance confidence in the ensuing findings (Bryman, 
2007).  Management research that relies on the use of a single research method may be 
affected by the limitations associated with that method or from the specific application 
of it; hence, triangulation offers the prospect of enhanced confidence and reliability. 
Meanwhile, Denzin (1970) distinguished four forms of triangulation namely; data 
triangulation (entails gathering data through several sampling strategies, or different 
sources, or different time frames); methodological triangulation (using more than one 
method for gathering data); theoretical triangulation (the use of more than one 
         SAMPLE                   
(600 questionnaires) 
ABUJA (30%) LAGOS (70%) 
7.00am-
10.30am 
(10%)   
11.00am -
3.30pm 
(10%) 
6.30pm – 
10.00pm 
(10%) 
11.00am -
3.30pm 
(25%) 
6.30pm – 
10.00 pm 
(25%) 
7.00am-
10.30am 
(20%) 
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theoretical position in interpreting data); and Investigator triangulation (involving more 
than one researcher in the field to gather and interpret data). In this regard, this research 
used the first three forms of triangulation. 
3.9.6.1 Triangulation of Data 
This research used data triangulation in the collection of both secondary and primary 
data. Secondary data on traffic demand, air fare, distance, trade, ALI, and distance were 
collected from separate and unrelated sources, so as to verify and ensure the validity of 
the data collected (see section 3.9.3 for detail). The primary data collection, which 
involved a questionnaire administered to international passengers, was administered at 
two different times (summer and winter) and also from two different international 
airports (Abuja and Lagos).   
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Figure 3.8 Triangulation of data 
 
3.9.6.2  Triangulation of Methodology 
This research also used triangulation of methodology in the collection of data. Though 
the data collected differed from each other, the analysed data converged to answer the 
research questions. In this research, the main methods involved collection of secondary 
data using a triangulation approach and a field survey of passengers.  The secondary 
data provided information on country pair traffic demand, trade, air fare, distance, ALI, 
dummy, traffic trends, and competing airlines and routes, while the field survey 
supplied the inaccessible information from secondary sources and verified some of the 
secondary data. The data from the survey included; market trends, routes, competing 
ABUJA Airport 
summer & winter 
LAGOS Airport   
summer & winter 
 Total Sample 
Passenger 
survey 
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airlines, passenger profiles, journey type, trip purpose, and motivational factors for 
selection of airline.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3.9 Triangulation of research methods 
3.10 Model Development 
After the research identified the appropriate predictor variables that explain the 
dependent variable, a valid statistical model using any recognised scientific approach 
was developed, and lastly the validity of the model was tested. This was followed by 
the application of the model in forecasting the impact. It was against this background 
that the model of international passenger traffic in Nigeria in relation with other 
variables was developed.  
Modelling is the determination of the functional relationship by calibration of the 
variables from the database. However, modelling air transport demand has different 
approaches, as claimed by various studies. 
For instance, Verleger (1972) suggested that demand for air transportation service can 
be analysed within three different relatively simple theoretical frameworks: cross-
sectional, aggregate (time series), and point-to-point. Cross-sectional and aggregate can 
provide estimates of the average values of parameters.  
Regression
, Market, 
Entropy, 
Descriptiv
e, Cross- 
tabulation 
Pax traffic, trade, fare,  
ALI, dummy,  
Distance; 
Traffic trends; routes       Pax profile, journey 
type, Competing airlines,        trip purpose, 
motivational                                           ;                     
Triangulation of 
methodology 
Field survey Secondary data 
Outcome: traffic growth, mkt 
competition, pax welfare 
Analysis  Analysis 
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Also, Doganis (2002) argued that the forecasting methods commonly used in air 
transport fall broadly into three groups of growing complexity: qualitative methods, 
time series, and causal or econometric methods such as regression and gravity models. 
The causal model is commonly appropriate where country-pair traffic is available. This 
view was further corroborated by Vasigh et al. (2008) who said each of the approaches 
has its own limitations and strengths. 
Furthermore, a recent study on Nigeria suggested that econometric models (regression 
and gravity models) can be used in quantifying the causal relationship of traffic demand 
and a set of independents variables: by implementing change in any one of the 
variables, the consequent impact on demand levels are predicted. The study also claims 
that multiple regression models are, however, the most reliable method for forecasting 
air travel demand (Aderemo, 2010).  
Verleger (1972) claimed that travel or communication between two cities will decrease 
as the distance between them increases, similar to the gravitational law of physics 
developed by the famous scientist Newton, and suggested that the gravity model 
specification is most frequently tested against cross-sectional data. 
A simple formulation of a gravity model for human spatial interaction used for the 
prediction of travel demand between two cities i and j is 
                                              -------------------- (3.1) 
Where     is the passenger volume between i and j. Ai and    are attraction factors of i 
and j,     is the distance between the cities, and k is a constant,   is a parameter that 
controls the influence of the distance on travel demand and α controls the influence of 
the attraction factors. Usually, the attraction and deterrence is expressed not only by a 
single variable but by a combination of various factors. In this study’s case, the factors 
include GDP, trade, air liberalisation index, fare, distance, and historical link.  
Parameters are calibrated to ensure the most accurate prediction of the expected travel 
demand (the difference between predicted and observed travel demand should be low). 
Thus, data include historical passenger demand between Nigeria and other countries for 
a particular period as a dependent variable, as well as corresponding data for the 
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influencing factors between the countries. A reasonable observation for samples of 
countries is required over a particular period; considering the number of variables, there 
should be a minimum ratio of 5 to 1, but the most appropriate is between 15 and 20 to 1 
ratio of observations to independent variable – with such a ratio the results should be 
generalisable (Hair, et al., 1998). In this case, study of at least γ0 countries’ traffic data 
are required to develop the model, but in order to generalise the model, there should be 
at least 95 observations (country-pair).  
Based on the reliability and the advantages of econometric modelling, the research will 
apply a cross-sectional regression model in determining the relationships between the 
dependent and the independent variables. The advantages consist of the ability to 
isolate the effects of changes in air transport policy on local development 
(InterVISTAS-ga2, 2006).  
3.10.1 Estimating the Model Parameters 
Data collected from secondary sources will be subject to scientific processing and 
scrutiny to allow for meaningful understanding, inferences and validations of 
relationship between variables, which could estimate the impact of the liberalisation 
policy.  
Traffic
AB 
= F [GDPAB, Trade AB, ALIAB, Dummy (1,0)AB,] /DistAB, Fare  ------------ (3.2)  
Equation (3.2) is the expression of Traffic as a function of the independent variables GDP, 
Trade, ALI, Air fare, Distance, and a Dummy. The expression can be mathematically expressed 
as;  
 Traffic AB = ȕ0 + ȕ1(GDPAB) +ȕ2(Trade AB) +ȕ3(ALIAB) – ȕ4(Air FareAB) – ȕ5(DistAB) + ȕ6 
(Dummy AB 0,1) + İ                                       ------------------------------------------- (3.3)
 
This is a multiple regression equation where TrafficAB is determined by independent 
variables, where; ȕ0 is the intercept and constant term; Gross Domestic Product 
(GDPAB) is the product of the GDP of the two countries. The specification assumes that 
changes in the GDP of each country in the country-pair will have identical influences 
on the level of traffic. The GDP term proved the most influential exogenous variable in 
terms of significance and explanatory power; TradeAB is the total value of trade in 
goods exchange between Nigeria (A) and the other country (B) in a year, expressed in 
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US dollars; Air FareAB is the average economy fare paid by passengers travelling by air 
between country A and B in the year, given in US$; DistanceAB is the distance between 
Nigeria’s capital city and the other country’s capital city in 000 km;  DummyAB is the 
dummy variable representing cultural links that affect traffic levels in some cases, such 
as a common language, colony and history. This takes the value of zero or one; The Air 
Liberalisation Index (ALIAB) variable is the nature of ASAs between Nigeria and other 
countries and is quantified by the degree of liberalisation of the aviation market, 
measured by the air liberalisation index; Error (İ) is the inclusion of error or residual 
and is to acknowledge that predicted values in social sciences are almost never exactly 
correct and that to acquire a true value requires the inclusion of a term that adjusts for 
the discrepancy between the predicted value and actual value (klienbaum, 1988). Thus, 
ȕ0, ȕ1, ȕβ, ȕγ, ȕ4, ȕ5 are the coefficients of the model relationship. This is an ideal 
linear function, which depicts demand relationships very well, and can easily be solved 
using the method of least squares (Draper & Smith, 1981). 
A multiple regression model represented by equation (3.3) will determine the 
relationship between traffic, the extent of liberalisation and socio-economic condition 
variables. The model will be estimated using cross-sectional data on about 137 
countries from Nigeria (Number of observations). The analysis will use data from the 
years 2010 and 2009 as the sample years.  
The cross-sectional analysis assumes that a particular route to each country will display 
unique traffic volumes, socio-economic variables, and degrees of liberalisation in the 
air service agreements (InterVISTAS-ga2, 2006). Through correcting for variations in 
economic activity and other extraneous factors, this approach seeks to explain 
variations in passenger traffic between different routes from Nigeria to variations in 
their bilateral agreements.  
Meanwhile, spatial relations of human nature are most often not proportionally 
correlated, thus could display characteristics of a nonlinear relationship. The marginal 
effects of each independent variable depend on the value of other variables in the 
demand function. This type of relationship is estimated by the method of least squares 
by first transforming values into a linear relationship using logarithms (Zlatopher 1984 
cited in Aderamo, (2010). 
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In this regard, the variables are transformed, so as to meet the criteria of linearity for 
multiple regression analysis. The model is calibrated using Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) with an SPSS package adopting a stepwise elimination method, where the 
independent variable significance contribution is determined. The stepwise method is 
capable of removing any independent variable that makes no statistically significant 
contribution to the dependent variable (Field, 2005). Meanwhile, the statistical 
indicators will explain the relationship between the predictors and the response 
variable. 
The calibration will determine the coefficients of the equation (α, ȕ0, ȕ1, ȕβ,ȕγ) and 
other statistical values, such as the coefficient of determination R2, t-statistic. The 
values will explain the strength of the exogenous variables including liberalisation in 
determining the endogenous variable (traffic volume).  
3.10.2 Validation of the Model 
After calibration of the model using the stepwise method, all the statistical indicators 
and multiple regression parameters were determined. The next step was to validate the 
model. There are several purposes to validation: firstly, to test whether the model’s 
parameters are statistically significant; secondly, to test whether the model meets the 
assumptions of multiple regression; and lastly, to use the model and estimated traffic 
demand on a particular route and compare it with the actual value,  so that the model 
can be validated (Hair, et al., 1998). 
3.10.2.1 Testing the model parameters 
Partial Coefficient (β): Beta-coefficients represent the independent contributions of each 
independent variable to the prediction of the dependent variable. This determines 
whether the impacts represented by the coefficients ȕ can be generalised to the whole 
population. The appropriate test of significance is the t-test which is calculated for all 
variables and is given as the coefficient over the standard error. The calculated value is 
compared to the table value for a sample size n at a confidence level of 0.05 or 0.01 (α). 
If the t value is greater than the table value (2.0 or –2.0) at 95% confidence level, then 
the coefficient is statistically significant in the regression. Anything within the range of 
–2.0 to 2.0 shows weak statistical significance. Also, for all values of t, the 
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corresponding p value should be less than 5 per cent, and anything above this value is 
rejected in the model. However, it is possible to accept a t-statistic value between ±1 
and ±2 if the p value is below 0.05 (Hair, et al., 1998).  
Correlation Coefficient R: Traditionally, the degree to which two or more independent 
variables are related to the dependent (Y) variable is expressed as the correlation 
coefficient R, which is the square root of R-square (Hair, et al., 1998). R can assume 
values between 0 and 1, where 0 suggests no correlation and 1 indicates perfect 
correlation. 
Coefficient of determination (R2): The R-squared measures the proportions of the variance 
of the dependent variable about its mean that is explained by the independent variables 
(Hair, et al., 1998). If the variability of the residual values around the regression line 
relative to the overall variability is small, the predictions from the regression equation 
are good (Hair, et al., 1998). In most cases, the ratio and R-squared will fall somewhere 
between these extremes, that is, between 0.0 and 1.0. Ideally, it is preferred to explain 
most if not all of the original variability (Hair, et al., 1998). The R-squared value is an 
indicator of how well the model fits the data (e.g., an R-square close to 1.0 indicates 
that we have accounted for almost all of the variability with the variables specified in 
the model).  
Adj R2: Adjusted coefficient of determination is a modified measure of the coefficient 
of determination that takes into account the number of independent variables included 
in the regression equation and the sample size. The addition of independent variable Xi 
will cause R2 to rise, the adjusted R2 may fall if the added independent variable has 
little effect or the degrees of freedom become too small (Hair, et al., 1998). 
F value (t-values): The significance testing of regression coefficients provides an 
empirical assessment of variables’ true impact. The F value of a relationship at the 95% 
confidence level will determine the significance and robustness of the relationship; a 
higher F value is desirable for a good model and provides evidence of the existence of a 
linear relationship between the response and the explanatory variables.  
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According to Heirs et al. (1998), in testing the hypothesis, if the amount of variation 
explained by the regression model is more than the variation explained by the average 
(R2 is greater than zero), the F ratio is used: 
                               ⁄        ⁄         --------------------------------------- (3.4) 
dfr = no of coefficients + intercepts – 1 
dfrd = Sample size – no of estimated coefficient 
SSEr = Sum of square error repressors 
SSEt = Sum of square error total 
The F ratio for multiple regressions with six variables and a high number of 
observations should be greater than the critical value (Table value) at 0.05 significance 
levels. If the F ratio is greater than the critical value, then the null hypothesis is 
rejected.  
3.10.2.2 Assumptions of Multiple Regression 
Predicted and Residual Scores: The regression line expresses the best prediction of the 
dependent variable (Y), given the independent variables (X). However, it is natural to 
have substantial variation of the observed points around the fitted regression line as in a 
scatter plot. The deviation of a particular point from the regression line (predicted 
value) is called the residual value, and it should not have any regular pattern – this 
would imply the model must have left out another significant variable (Hair, et al., 
1998). 
Assumption of Linearity: In multiple linear regressions it is assumed that the relationship 
between variables is linear, but in practice this assumption is virtually impossible (Hair, 
et al., 1998), hence, multiple regression procedures are not greatly affected by minor 
deviations from this assumption. However, as a rule it is prudent to always look at the 
scatter plot of the variables of interest. If curvature in the relationships is evident, then  
consider either transforming the variables, or explicitly allowing for nonlinear 
components (Hair, et al., 1998). 
Normality Assumption: It is assumed in multiple regressions that the residuals (predicted 
minus observed values) follow a normal distribution (Field, 2005). Although most tests 
(specifically the F-test) are quite robust with regard to violations of this assumption, 
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Hair et al. (1998) suggest a review of major variables’ distribution before drawing a 
conclusion. This can be realised by producing histograms of the residual values as well 
as normal probability plots. 
3.10.2.3 Choosing another Sample 
Another way of validating the model is by the use of another sample, different from the 
first sample. In this regard, the research makes use of the 2010 database for 
international traffic and all the independent variables recorded in the year in the 
development of the model. To validate the model, the research makes use of another 
sample drawn from the 2009 database for the corresponding variables and develops the 
same model. The two models are compared and correlated.  
3.11 Application of the Model to Determine Traffic Demand 
From the values of coefficients determined in the calibration, the research will create a 
quantitative expression between the endogenous variable and the exogenous variables 
including liberalisation policy to represent equation (3.3). 
The research will use the expression to forecasts the demand of traffic in Nigeria if 
certain components of liberalisation are relaxed. Specifically, the research will forecast 
the passenger traffic volume due to an increase in the liberalisation index.  
3.11.1 Market Access Liberalisation 
This refers to liberalisation in terms of the bilateral air service agreements relating to 
airline designation, capacity restrictions, pricing restrictions, fifth freedom rights and 
cooperative arrangements. For the case of open skies agreements, there will be multiple 
airline designation between countries, with the freedom to operate any route without 
restriction on capacity, frequency or price, and unlimited freedom for services. 
Therefore, the research simulates other countries’ traffic that is regulated by restricted 
BASAs versus an OSA model, which increases the liberalisation index to 26, while 
holding other independent variables constant. 
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3.11.2 Ownership and Control Liberalisation 
This refers to liberalisation of ownership and control restrictions placed on the 
country’s airlines operating international services. The analysis considers the impact if 
these restrictions are removed (e.g. restrictions on foreign ownership). As this form of 
liberalisation is considered separately from market access liberalisation, it is assumed 
that a principal place of business requirement replaces the national ownership 
requirements within the ASAs as is the case with the Yamoussoukro Declaration, 
which will increase the liberalisation index to 32. The traffic of other countries is also 
stimulated when carrier ownership restrictions are liberalised and at the same time 
other independent variables remain constant. 
3.11.3 Combined Market Access and Ownership Control Liberalisation 
Furthermore, the research will also forecast traffic volumes using a combination of 
market access liberalisation and carrier’s ownership and control freedoms for other 
countries while holding other independent variables constant.  
3.12 Impacts on Air fare and Consumer Welfare 
If the model is tested to be significant and meets all the assumptions of multiple 
regression, then the research will apply the model in forecasting future passenger traffic 
when air transport is liberalised, with the assumption of the “ceteris paribus” law, 
which implies that all other factors that could affect the outcome (such as the GDP and 
Trade) remain constant. The coefficients obtained can be used to estimate passenger 
volumes for the observations if any variable is changed, which in this case is the 
liberalisation index. A change in traffic as a result of change in liberalisation will also 
lead to change in other matters such as prices and airport utilisation as described in 
Figure 3.10 below. 
The change in price is based on the theory of elasticity and empirical evidence (Button, 
Costa, & Cruz, 2007). Also, a change in airport utilisation is inevitable, possibly with 
some consequences (Gillen, et al., 2002; A. Graham, 2000). 
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Figure 3.10  Impact of Liberalisation Chart 
Change in demand in an economic and market sense can lead to a change in supply and 
a change in price; in this case, the change in traffic demand can cause a change in 
service frequency/capacity and also a change in air fares. Further analysis of air fare 
change can lead to an estimation of its effect on passengers in the form of consumer 
gains or losses. Furthermore, an increase in service frequency/capacity may lead to 
additional utilisation of airport facilities in which the designed capacity has to 
accommodate the increase of passenger services; otherwise, the result will be 
congestion and delays.  
In order to appreciate the impact of change in traffic demand in relation to price, there 
is a need to apply the theory of demand elasticity in air transport, which, according to 
Vasigh (2008) measures the sensitivity of demand to a change in price; that is, demand 
elasticity measures the proportional change of quantity demanded that results from a 
change in one of the factors influencing the demand. But, generally, the elasticity of 
transport demand can be elastic to price or income. 
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3.12.1 Price Elasticity 
For this research, the interest will be on price elasticity which is defined as the 
proportional change in quantity demanded divided by proportional change in price. 
Price elasticity of demand   indicates the proportional change in quantity demanded 
that results from a 1 per cent change in price.  
                                                                   ------------------------------ (3.5) 
 
Different values of price elasticity of demand show different reactions of demand to a 
price change:   = 0: zero elasticity, demand is stable and completely independent from price changes;  < 1: inelastic demand, the proportional change in quantity demanded is less than the 
proportional change in price;   = 1: the proportional change in quantity demanded equals the proportional change in 
price;  > 1: elastic demand, the proportional change in quantity demanded is greater than the 
proportional change in price. 
Ticket price is one of the variables in the above model, meaning that it is one of the 
determinants of traffic demand. In this context, Vasigh et al. (2008) claimed that price 
is the only determinant of demand that causes a movement along the demand curve 
while changes in other variables cause a shift in the demand curve. 
Meanwhile, price elasticity in international air transport differs from one market to 
another and also from one period to another, such as summer and winter periods. Also, 
the length of routes affects demand elasticity: longer routes have lower elasticity than 
shorter routes, because shorter routes may have substitutes from other modes. Another 
important factor is the purpose of travel: short-term price elasticity of business 
passengers is low. On the other hand, demand for leisure travel in economy class is 
considerably elastic (Grancay, 2009). 
Gillen, Morrison and Stewart (2004) studied price elasticity of air transport for different 
lengths and purposes of journeys globally, and developed a standard chart of price 
elasticity ranging from –0.26 to –1.7. These are the most widely cited values of price 
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elasticity of demand for air travel (Grancay, 2009). Short leisure flights were identified 
as the most elastic market segment with median value of 1.52. This means a 1 per cent 
increase in flight ticket prices leads to a 1.52 per cent decrease in demand. Conversely, 
the least elastic market segment is constituted by long international business flights 
with median value of –0.27; a 1 per cent increase in flight ticket prices leads to a 0.27 
per cent decrease in travel.  
But the weakness of this elasticity chart is that it did not take into account the 
differences in economic prosperity of various regions or countries of the world. In other 
words, Gillen, Morrison and Stewart (2004)  applied the same value to both low 
income and high income countries. Hence, this research would determine the average 
price elasticity of the Nigerian international air travel market. 
3.12.2 Passenger Impact: Consumer Surplus 
Fare reductions lead to consumer surplus gains, estimated on the basis that much of the 
traffic stimulation from liberalisation is due to fare reductions and increases in 
frequency (Gillen, et al., 2002). 
Fare reduction estimation assumes that for country-pairs with a direct air service prior 
to liberalisation traffic stimulation was attributable to fare reductions; while for 
country-pairs that did not previously have a direct service, two-thirds of the traffic 
increase was attributable to fare reductions and one-third was attributable to improved 
service levels in terms of having a direct service and increased frequency 
(InterVISTAS-EU Consulting, 2009).  
Therefore, fare reduction is calculated as follows:  
Country Pairs with Direct Service                                                              ---------------------------- (3.6) 
Country Pairs without Direct Service                                                                  ----------------------- (3.7) 
Consumer surplus is frequently used in economic welfare analysis and is defined as the 
amount that consumers save from a purchase of a product or service for a price below 
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the original price that consumers were willing to pay (InterVISTAS-EU Consulting, 
2009). 
 Intervistas (2009) further illustrated the concept of consumer surplus as in Figure 3.11 
which shows a standard demand curve representing the relationship between price and 
quantity demand – as price declines the amount demanded increases. 
 Price 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11 Consumer surplus illustrations 
For the original price at P
0
, the consumer surplus is represented by triangle area Pm AP0. 
Passengers to the left of Q
0 
were willing to a pay a price higher than P
0
; summing the 
difference between each consumer’s willingness to pay and P
0
produces the area.  
If the air fare is reduced to P
1 
in the market (due to a liberal policy) then the consumer 
surplus is increased by an amount equal to Area P0ABP1. 
The diagram shows that the gain in consumer surplus comprises two parts:  
- Area P0ACP1: the fare savings for existing passengers is calculated as average fare 
saving x number of existing passengers. This element represents a transfer of producer 
surplus to consumer surplus. 
- Area ABC: this is a net gain in welfare resulting from additional passengers being 
able to access air services due to the lower fare. In this analysis, this element of 
consumer surplus is estimated as ½ x average fare saving x number of new passengers.  
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3.13 Impact on Airport Utilisation 
The study found some evidence of the link between liberalisation and traffic volumes 
from theories and empirical studies. For instance, a positive correlation is established 
between air liberalisation reform and traffic capacity growth, with flexibility towards 
airline entry leading to greater output and competition (Warnock-Smith et al, 2008). 
This therefore implies that an increase in traffic demand is expected from liberalisation 
policy in Nigeria, which as a result may increase the utilisation of infrastructure such as 
airports. Meanwhile, in order not to create an imbalance between traffic demand and 
infrastructural capacity management, the research evaluates the possible capacity 
challenges from the expected passenger traffic increase as a result of the liberalisation 
of the industry. According to ICAO Airport Economics Manual (Doc. 9562) core 
airport indicators are critical drivers of many other performance indicators, and the core 
indicator values (whether expressed in passengers, movements, or freight tonnes) 
influence asset utilisation and airport costs per passenger or movement. Furthermore, 
ICAO (2005) asserted that the core indicators are also critical drivers of some aspects 
of service quality, particularly delays, as airports approach saturation. This view is 
supported by Graham (2012) who reasons that as traffic demand approaches capacity, 
system congestion and delays increase sharply, a situation that alerts the authority to 
initiate actions to remedy the situation in the intermediate and long term. 
In this regard, the ICAO airport manual suggests that the core indicators used to track 
the fundamental measures of airport activity involve annual passenger volumes and 
aircraft movements. It also suggests that airport operational indicators such as service 
quality that focus on the level of services be measured by Practical Hourly Capacity, 
Gate Departure Delay, Taxi Departure Delay, Baggage Delivery Time, Security 
Clearing Time, Border Control Clearing Time and Check-in to Gate Time.  
In view of this concern, the research assesses the capacity of the four Nigerian 
international airports based on three key components, terminal capacity, apron capacity 
and runway capacity, with a view to determining their capability of accommodating the 
additional passenger traffic anticipated from liberalisation. 
Meanwhile, Ashford, Stanton, and Moore (1997) recommended the assessment of 
airport capacity based on the design of critical aircraft capability, terminal building 
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design capacity (TBDC), apron holding capacity and number of runways. According to 
FAAN (2009), all Nigerian international airports are designed to accommodate most 
critical civilian aircraft normally in use for any commercial services ranging from small 
aircraft to B747 aircraft, while Lagos airport can even accommodate Concorde aircraft. 
Also, holding apron and runway capacity are designed to handle a significant numbers 
of aircraft with appropriate traffic management. In this regard, the envisaged capacity 
challenge is likely to arise from current TBDC. 
To evaluate the capability of TBDC, the research employs the standardised ‘Typical 
Peak Hour Passengers’ recommended by the US Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) as a measure of assessing the capacity demand model. The Typical Peak Hour 
Passenger (TPHP) is defined as the peak hour of the average peak day of the peak 
month in a year (Ashford et al., 1997, p. 34). To compute the TPHP from annual 
passenger traffic demand, the FAA recommended the relationship as in Table 3.5 
below. 
Table 3.5 FAA Recommended TPHP as a percentage of Annual Traffic 
Total Annual Passenger (Million) TPHP as % of annual 
30 and above 0.035 
20.00 – 29.99  0.04 
10.00 – 19.99  0.045 
1.00 – 9.99 0.05 
0.5 – 0.99 0.08 
0.1 – 0.49 0.13 
Under 0.1 0.2 
Source: Ashford et al. (1997) 
Table 3.5 shows that if an airport handles 30 million passengers and above, the design 
TPHP should be 0.035 per cent of the annual passenger traffic. For instance, the current 
international passenger traffic demand of 2.7 million passengers per annum requires 
TPHP of 1,350 (0.05 per cent of 2,700,000), but according to FAAN (2007) Lagos 
international airport alone is designed to have 3,675 TPHP, which suggests that the 
airport can conveniently accommodate double the total international traffic. 
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Therefore, the research evaluates the expected traffic passenger demand increase from 
further liberalisation against the current designed capacity of the airport, so as to 
determine whether there is likely to be an airport capacity challenge.  
3.14 Impact on Market Competition 
An increase in liberalisation also causes an increase in airline competition, due to the 
additional supply of new entrants and the increase in frequency of the incumbent 
carriers (Button & Drexler, 2006). There are several techniques for evaluating 
competition in the air transport market, but those commonly in use, according to 
Dobruszkes (2009), include the number of competitors, the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) and Entropy.  
The first techniques that measure number of operators on a route are very simple, but 
the main weakness is overlooking uneven distribution of services by the operators in 
which one carrier can substantially dominate the market (Fu, Lijesen, & Oum, 2006).  
However, to remedy the problem of first method concentration, indexes are often used 
like HHI and entropy. The traditional HHI is computed by squaring the market share of 
each firm competing in a market, and then summing the resulting numbers, expressed 
as: 
                             ----------------- (3.8) 
(where, Sn is the market share of nth firm) 
 The HHI value can range from close to zero to 10,000. A market with very low 
competition and close to being a monopoly will have a very high market concentration 
value. If, for example, there were only one firm in an industry, that firm would have 
100 per cent market share, and the HHI would equal 10,000 (100^2), indicating a 
monopoly. Or, if there were thousands of firms competing, each would have nearly 0 
per cent market share, and the HHI would be close to zero, indicating nearly perfect 
competition. 
Also, another measure of competition  suggested by Frenken, Van Terwisga, Verburg, 
and Burghouwt (2004) uses an entropy value, which is a capacity share index that 
provides a good measure of effective competition, calculated by summing the squares 
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of the shares (fractions or percentages) of seats provided by each airline on the route. 
Entropy has the advantage of additively, where it can be aggregated or disaggregated 
(Frenken, et al., 2004).  
      ∑                ----------------------- (3.9) 
Where n is the number of airlines, and x is the market share. On any route H=0 if a 
market is monopolistic and H=1 if the route is served by an equal distribution of 10 
carriers (perfect competition).  
Consequently, because of the advantage of entropy over HHI as highlighted by Frenken 
et al (2004), and the recent acceptability of it, this research adopts this technique in 
evaluating market competition for each route’s network.  
3.15 Summary of the chapter 
This chapter has identified the various research paradigms and philosophies applied to 
research studies and concluded that positivism is the most suitable philosophy for the 
research objectives in this study. Moreover, deductive reasoning is considered as the 
most appropriate approach in determining the research purpose, which establishes a 
causal relationship between variables. Also, the research adopts survey and case 
research as the strategy for achieving the objectives of the study. In addition, the 
research method is a mixed method choice in a cross-sectional time frame of analysis, 
which has the ability to isolate the impact of a change in regulation policy across 
different observations with different regulatory issues. Furthermore, the chapter 
discovered and justified the selection of variables required for the development of the 
research model.  
The chapter also outlined the method of data analysis using multiple regression 
techniques; after validation of the model, the model is expected to simulate traffic 
change from a change in liberalisation on any route. This can lead to a change in price 
and consumer welfare. The chapter revealed the procedures for the analysis of 
competition and consumer surplus impacts along with an assessment of these impacts 
on airport capacity. 
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Chapter Four : Market Traffic Data Analysis and Discussion 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an analysis and discussion of secondary data collected on the 
Nigerian international air transport market covering the period of international 
regulatory change over the years 2001 to 2010. It gives an overview of the country’s 
traffic regulation policy, which demonstrates the level of liberalisation for each 
country’s ASA. The chapter also gives an overview and passenger traffic trends in the 
market across international routes revealing the major operators, and the level of airline 
competition. 
The analysis in this chapter guides the research to achieve the study’s first and second 
objectives. This includes reviewing the country’s ASAs with other countries and 
determining the level of liberalisation based on the World Trade Organization’s index 
of liberalisation, as well as evaluating the performance of the ASAs based on 
international passenger demand in the Nigerian market. In this regard, the chapter 
summarises and tabulates the secondary data, and with the help of Excel the data are 
analysed. The method of analysis involves indexing, descriptive statistics, and entropy.  
The presentation, analysis and discussion of the data in this chapter covers a review of 
the ASAs concerning all active bilateral countries; the level of liberalisation in the 
ASAs; traffic trends in the market; an origin and destination traffic analysis; airline 
competition and a summary of the chapter.  
4.2 International Air Service Agreements 
4.2.1 Agreements Exchange with Other Countries 
The research discovered from the Ministry of Aviation that the Nigerian government 
has signed a number of international air service agreements with over 50 countries for 
the purpose of facilitating international air traffic between Nigeria and other countries 
of the world. After a critical review of the agreements and further consultation with 
ministry officials, the documents show that the nature of ASAs differs from one 
127 
 
country to another with various degrees of regulation on some of the provisions. The 
main provisions for consideration in the study covered: the issue of traffic right 
exchange; airline designation; capacity controls; tariff regulation; withholding 
conditions on the designated airline; and provisions for commercial agreement. These 
six provisions form the key policy levers of traditional air service agreements for all 
countries of the world (Doganis, 2006; Piermatini & Rousova, 2009). Therefore, the 
research considers only these six provisions in each country’s ASA with Nigeria as the 
technique for reviewing the country’s air service agreement. 
Although the agreements for each country differ from each another, all the agreements’ 
provisions are drawn from the standard format of BASA provided by the ICAO 
standard and recommended practice under the International Air Traffic Manual Doc. 
9626 (ICAO, 2004b). However, the agreement on each provision for any country 
depends on the perceived traffic demand on the route and the capability of each country 
in terms of supply of air services. This is supported by Kasper (1988), who claims the 
scope of rights and privileges exchanged is influenced by certain factors such as the 
bargaining power of each side during the negotiations, the air transport policy of each 
party – whether liberal or protectionist or somewhere in between – the market share of 
each party, the size of the national airlines of each party and their potentialities, as well 
as the political, economic and cultural status of each party in general.  
This research examines significant number countries’ ASA exchanges with Nigeria as 
provided by the documents of the Federal Ministry of Aviation in Abuja, which is the 
custodian of such vital information, and also the chief negotiator with other countries 
on behalf of the Nigerian government. The information provided is confirmed and 
verified by the NCAA. In addition, the information is further strengthened by the 
airport authority schedules of airline timetables released quarterly, which show the 
frequency and destinations of each airline from Nigerian airports. Furthermore, some 
countries’ CAAs were also contacted and provided useful information on their 
respective ASA exchanges with Nigeria such as UK, UAE, & the Netherlands. The 
information collected on each country’s ASA covering the six provisions on traffic 
rights (fifth freedom), capacity (frequency), tariff (air fare), airline designation, 
withholding (ownership and control of airline) and commercial agreement are 
summarised and tabulated for ease of comparison in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1  Nature of Nigeria’s ASA with Other Countries 
Country  5th freedom Capacity(freq) Tariff  Designation Withholding Comm Agr’ment Type Remark 
UK Not permitted  Pre determine Free Multiple Flag carrier Not available BASA(restricted) Active 
USA Permitted Free determine Free Multiple Flag carrier Not available Open Skies Active 
Ghana Permitted Free determine Free Multiple Community Interest Not required Yamoussoukro Active 
S/Africa Not Permitted  Pre determine Free Multiple Flag carrier Not available BASA(restrict) Active 
UAE Not Permitted   Pre determine Free Single Flag carrier Available BASA/Comm Agmt Active 
Netherland Not Permitted Pre determine Free Single Flag carrier Permitted BASA/Comm Agmt Active 
Germany Not Permitted   Pre determine Free Single Flag carrier Available BASA/Comm Agmt Active 
France Not Permitted   Pre determine Free Single Flag carrier Permitted BASA/Comm Agmt Active 
Italy Not Permitted   Pre determine Free Single Flag carrier Not available BASA(restricted) Active 
Spain Not  Permitted  Pre determine Free Single Flag carrier Not available BASA(restricted) Active 
S/Arabia Not  Permitted   Pre determine Free Single Flag carrier Not available BASA(restricted) Active 
Egypt Permitted  Free determine Free Single Flag carrier Not available Yamoussoukro Active 
Qatar Not Permitted   Pre determine Free Single Flag carrier Available BASA(restricted) Active 
China Permitted  Pre determine Free Multiple Flag carrier Not available BASA(restricted) Unsteady 
Ethiopia Permitted  Free determine Free Single Community Interest Not required Yamoussoukro Active 
Cameron Permitted  Free determine Free Multiple Community Interest Not required Yamoussoukro Active 
Cote D'Ivoire Permitted  Free determine Free Multiple Community Interest Not required Yamoussoukro Active 
Kenya Permitted  Free determine Free Single Community Interest Not required Yamoussoukro Active 
Lebanon Permitted Pre determine Free Single Flag carrier Permitted BASA/Comm Agmt Active 
Turkey Not Permitted  Pre determine Free Single Flag carrier Not available BASA(restricted) Active 
Morocco Permitted  Free determine Free Single Community Interest Not required Yamoussoukro Active 
Senegal Permitted  Free determine Free Single Community Interest Not required Yamoussoukro Active 
Sierra Leone Permitted  Free determine Free Single Community Interest Not required Yamoussoukro Active 
Sudan Not Permitted    Pre determine Free Single Flag carrier Not available BASA(restricted) Active 
India Not  Permitted   Pre determine Free Single Flag carrier Not available BASA(restricted) Inactive 
Australia Nil Pre determine Free Single Flag carrier Not available BASA(restrict) Inactive 
Ireland Nil Pre determine Free Single Flag carrier Not available BASA(restrict) Inactive 
Malaysia Not   Permitted  Pre determine Free Single Flag carrier Not available BASA(restrict) Inactive 
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Source:FMOA(2011) 
Israel Nil Nil NIL NIL NIL NIL Nil Inconclusive 
Gabon Not   Permitted   Pre determine Free Single Flag carrier Not available BASA(restrict) Inactive 
Singapore Nil Nil NIL NIL NIL NIL Nil On plan 
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Table 4.1 shows a sample of 30 countries that have a BASA with Nigeria out of a 
total of about 50 countries. These countries were selected because of the reasonable 
amount of passenger traffic demand to and from Nigeria. The sample represents about 
60 per cent of the country’s BASAs, while the traffic to these countries represents 
over 95 per cent of the country’s overall traffic. 
The most important part of any agreement is the exchange of traffic rights between 
the countries. The decision of exchange of traffic rights is chosen from the “Freedoms 
of air” template provided by the ICAO (see Appendix 1). As noted earlier in the 
literature, the first two, regarded as technical freedoms, were multilaterally agreed by 
all member countries, but for the third to the ninth freedoms, regarded as commercial 
freedoms, member countries are allowed to negotiate among themselves (Doganis, 
2002).  
In this regard, the Nigeria permits the third and fourth freedoms for commercial 
purposes in all its agreements, and even permits the fifth freedom to some selected 
countries based on mutual understanding.  
Meanwhile, the provisions of other freedoms are merely specific conditions 
accompanying the traffic right exchange between the countries, and include: capacity, 
tariffs, designation of carriers, withholding rules and commercial agreements. In view 
of the similarities between various countries’ conditions, the research categorised the 
agreements into four types, namely: restricted BASA, BASA with commercial 
agreement, Yamoussoukro Agreement (YD), and Open Skies Agreement (OSA).  
4.2.2 BASA restricted 
This is a bilateral air service agreement that is designed with a strictness based on the 
principle of protectionism for each carrier. Table 4.1 shows that a significant number 
of countries’ traffic is governed by BASA restricted terms, in which the following 
provisions apply:  
5th Freedoms Traffic rights, regarded as more liberal arrangement, are not allowed. 
Instead, third and fourth freedoms of traffic are allowed. Capacity in terms of 
frequency and seats is set as predetermined regarded as the most restrictive. In this 
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case, frequency has to be agreed prior to the commencement of service. However, the 
capacity of aircraft size was updated by the Bermuda I regime, where airlines were 
given limited rights to set capacity based on market demand, which involve changing 
aircraft gauge but the same permitted frequency. 
Tariffs refer to the setting of prices for air services; under a restricted BASA, most 
countries’ agreements allow airlines to set tariffs freely and independently, except in 
the case of some restricted BASAs. Designation refers to the naming of carriers to 
operate services between two countries. In the restricted BASA, most of the 
agreements permit a single carrier designation from each country, except in the UK 
agreement, which allows for multiple designation. 
Withholding defined as the condition required for the designated airline of the foreign 
country to operate in another country. Under a restricted BASA agreement, permitted 
carriers had to be flag carrier, which means the carrier should be substantially owned 
and controlled by nationals of the country by at least 51 percent. Also, under a 
restricted BASA, commercial agreement amendments are not observed, but could be 
granted to airlines if the need arises.  
There are thirteen countries with restricted BASAs, although there are a few 
variations in some countries’ provisions. The countries with restricted BASAs from 
the table include: the UK, South Africa, Italy, Spain, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
China, Sudan, India, Australia, Ireland, Malaysia and Gabon. 
The restricted BASA used to be the starting point for most other types of agreement 
and is most regulated agreement. However, in most of Nigeria restricted BASA price 
and capacity setting were allowed to be determined freely by the airlines, while 
frequencies and points of entry were strictly regulated by the authority concerned; this 
indeed inhibits airlines from quickly responding to market demand. This may be the 
reason why some airlines that were designated in the Nigeria market were not able to 
respond to the increases in demand through additional frequencies, as such airlines 
respond by increasing air fares, because of the monopoly or duopoly power they have 
on the route; such airlines include British Airways and Saudi Airways. The UK 
agreement is restrictive but with some compromise such as partial fifth freedoms 
granted to some airlines, multiple designation and free pricing. 
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Furthermore, the research found from the ministry that the BASA with Israel showing 
significant traffic to/from Nigeria is inconclusive due to some conditions being 
imposed by Israel concerning matters of extra security.  
Below is a summary of a restricted BASA between the UK and Nigeria: 
According to the UK CAA (2011), the UK - Nigeria BASA was signed in 1988, and 
has been amended by Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) that contain the following 
provisions: First, on the Designation provision, the Agreement allows each country to 
designate up to three airlines; on the UK side, currently there are BA, BMI and 
Virgin, while for the Nigeria side, the current designate includes Arik Air, Air Nigeria 
and Kabo Airline (a designation exists for Bellview, but this airline has long ceased 
operations). Secondly, on traffic rights, the agreement allowed the UK airlines to 
operate scheduled services on the following routes: points in UK – (intermediate 
points) Abidjan, Accra – Kano, Lagos and Abuja – (points beyond) Abidjan, Accra, 
Douala, Harare, Lusaka and Libreville. Nigerian designated airlines have the 
following routes available to them: Points in Nigeria – (intermediate points) Rome, 
Paris, Zurich, Frankfurt – London and Manchester – (points beyond) Amsterdam, 
Copenhagen, Moscow. Thirdly, on the issue of fifth freedom traffic rights, Nigerian 
airlines may exercise fifth freedom traffic rights between Rome and the UK on three 
services per week. There are no fifth freedom traffic rights currently available for UK 
airlines. Fourthly, the capacity provision requires UK designated airlines to operate up 
to 21 services per week between the UK and named points in Nigeria (Abuja, Kano, 
Lagos), in total. Also, the Nigerian designated airlines have up to 21 services per 
week from Nigeria to London Heathrow or any other London airport, in total.  With 
regard to destinations in Nigeria other than Kano, Abuja, Lagos, airlines might be 
subject to having to pay royalties or subject to commercial agreements under Nigerian 
guidelines. Frequencies to such destinations would be outside the bilateral ASA.  
Fifthly, the tariff provision allowed airlines to set fares freely and independently (NB: 
the original provisions of the bilateral agreement included ones where tariffs had to be 
agreed between airlines). Lastly, with regards to corporate or commercial agreements, 
it is common in Nigeria for airlines to be required to enter into such arrangements, or 
be subject to demands for ‘royalties’. However, the UK-Nigeria Air Services 
Agreement is silent on such topics.  
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Also, from the agreements signed by Nigeria with these 14 countries, only the UK and 
South Africa routes have Nigerian carriers competing on the routes, which gives rise 
to a duopoly situations – as such these agreements were considered very active. 
Furthermore, agreements with Qatar, Turkey and Sudan were also active but with 
only one airline from these countries servicing the routes without any Nigeria carrier 
participating; this may be due to inadequate number of aircraft or market demand.  
Meanwhile, agreements with Australia, India, Ireland, Malaysia, and Singapore were 
regarded as inactive due to the absence of any direct air services on the routes. This 
may be due to inadequate market demand coupled with distance in some cases. Also, 
countries like China, Gabon, Congo, and Zambia have an agreement with Nigeria, but 
the direct traffic was observed to be unstable, due to the withdrawal of the designated 
carriers on the routes like China Southern Airlines, and Air Gabon. The suspension of 
these carriers in the market could not be established by the research but the ASAs of 
the countries are still valid, suggesting that airlines can voluntarily withdraw due to 
market conditions or any other supplier related problems.  
4.2.3 BASA with commercial agreements 
This type of agreement has the same provisions as the restricted BASAs but allows 
some compromise that permits commercial agreements with the airlines if the need 
arises. 
According to the ministry, this agreement does not permit fifth freedom rights. The 
airlines are not permitted to carry commercial passengers from any third party country 
directly to/from Nigeria. However, the airlines can provide such services via their 
respective hubs before connecting the passengers to various final destinations in other 
countries.  This arrangement requires prior agreements, though not specifically 
mentioned in Nigeria’s ASAs.  
Also, under the withholding provision, only flag carriers were permitted to be a 
designated carrier, which is regarded as a less liberal arrangement.   
The agreement, however, was liberal with regard to tariffs, where airlines were free to 
set the fare based on market equilibrium. This may be the reason why the fare used to 
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vary periodically, with higher fares in November/December during the peak period, 
and lower fares used in February and March each year. 
Capacity in terms of frequency and point of entry is fixed at initial agreement stage, 
but permits a commercial agreement in the future if any of the designated airlines 
wish to expand their service capacity in terms of frequency or airport of entry. Such 
airlines have to pay royalties to the Nigerian’s government (Federal Ministry of 
Aviation, 2001). There is no restriction on aircraft size/gauge, the airlines being 
expected to provide a reasonable aircraft size based on the market demand.  
Usually, commercial agreements come after airlines have tested the market and 
realised a growing passenger demand for their services; then the carrier will push for a 
commercial agreement permitting the airline to increase service frequency or entry 
points. Commercial agreements usual come separately from the BASA, but under a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), during the BASA reviewing process (Federal 
Ministry of Aviation, 2001). Countries with this type of agreement include:  
(1) UAE with Emirates airline providing seven flights per week from Lagos to Dubai 
in the initial agreement, which has been reviewed to 14 flights from Lagos airport. 
However, an additional request to fly from Abuja to Dubai has yet to be granted. 
 (β) France’s designated carrier Air France has increased its frequency and entry 
points to Port Harcourt. The airline enjoys 11 flights from Lagos and Port Harcourt. 
Moreover, the airline’s request for expansion to Abuja airport has recently been 
granted. 
 (3) The Netherlands, with KLM as a designated carrier in the agreement, has 
expanded its operations to two additional airports, Abuja and Kano. The airline’s total 
number of flights per week has risen from seven to 16 per week. 
(4) Germany which designated Lufthansa as the only carrier, with an initial seven 
flights per week from Lagos airport, later was reviewed to 14 flights from Lagos and 
Abuja airports.  
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Table 4.2 Countries with Additional Commercial Agreement and the Airlines 
S/No Country Foreign 
carrier 
designated 
Nigeria 
carrier 
Initial flights 
per week 
Current flights 
per week 
1 Netherlands KLM - 3 16 
2 UAE Emirates - 7 14 
3 Germany Lufthansa - 3 12 
4 France Air France - 3 11 
Sources: FMOA & FAAN (2011) 
It is worth noting that there were no Nigerian carriers partaking in the service 
provision to these destinations; as such, these airlines enjoyed an absolute monopoly 
in these markets, even though the majority of passengers on these airlines were in 
transit as shown in the survey data and the secondary data from IATA PaxIs (2011) 
and NCAA (2011) (see Appendix 5). 
The Nigerian government benefitted immensely from the revenue realised in these 
commercial arrangements, as the government is involved in running the affairs of the 
air transportation system (Nigerian Civil aviation Policy, 2001). The revenue realised 
(termed as the BASA fund) is shared between 5 government agencies namely, NCAA, 
FAAN, NAMA, NIMET, and NCAT.  
4.2.4 Open Skies Agreements 
A fully liberal bilateral air service agreement would allow any number of airlines to 
be designated by each state, and also permit the airlines to operate unrestricted on any 
routes between the respective countries with unlimited fifth freedom rights available. 
It would allow airlines to set fares freely without seeking approval from the 
aeronautical authorities (Doganis, 2010). A typical example of this type of agreement 
is the open skies agreement (OSA) designed by the USA that has become its model of 
BASA with other countries including Nigeria.  
According to the Nigerian and USA governments (2002) the open skies agreement 
signed between Nigeria and the United States of America in 2002 was aimed at 
promoting an international air transport system based on competition among the 
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airlines in the market place with minimum government interference and regulation. 
The summary of the 12 page agreement has these provisions among others: 
On traffic right, each party grants the other party traffic rights for scheduled and 
unscheduled flights from points before the US via the US and immediate points to a 
point in Nigeria and beyond; and similarly, from points before Nigeria via Nigeria and 
immediate points to a point or points in the US and beyond. 
Regarding designation, each country has the right to designate as many airlines as it 
wishes to conduct international air services and withdraw or alter the designation. 
Also, the agreement allows for fair competition; accordingly, each party shall allow 
each designated airline to determine the frequency and capacity of the services it 
offers based upon commercial consideration in the marketplace. Also, neither party 
shall impose on the other party’s designated airlines a first refusal requirement, uplift 
ratio, objection fee or any requirement with respect to capacity, frequency or traffic. 
On the air fare, each party shall allow prices for air services to be decided by each 
designated airline based on market competition. 
However, the withholding regulation states that “each designated airline should be 
substantially owned and effectively controlled by nationals of the party”. Therefore, 
this is a restricted arrangement similar to a restricted BASA. 
In terms of cooperative arrangements, each designated airline is allowed to enter into 
code-sharing or leasing arrangements with airlines of either country, or with those of 
third countries, subject to the usual regulations. An optional provision authorises 
code-sharing between airlines and surface transportation companies. 
The OSA indicates the two countries’ airlines have been granted unlimited fifth 
freedoms on routes between the countries. While capacity is determined freely for any 
airline wishing to increase its flight frequencies or points of entry, as such, airlines 
entering into a commercial agreement for additional traffic with another country is not 
required (as is the case for BASA). Also, tariffs and air fares are freely determined 
based on market forces. But carriers must be owned and controlled by the nationals of 
the countries involved. Another significant liberal arrangement is the designation of 
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the carriers, where each country can designate as many as it wants without any 
limitation. 
The agreement was signed in 2002, but became effective as from 2005. It only 
became fully active after Nigerian aviation attained a category 1 FAA safety standard 
in 2008. The route has traffic with two or three airlines from the US side while from 
the Nigeria side there have been one or two carriers as well. The number of carriers 
on the route has been fluctuating due to the free entry and exit agreement. In 2007, 
Virgin Nigeria Ltd was designated as one of the Nigerian carriers, but the USA 
government objected on the ground of violating the condition of withholding, and as 
such, the carrier was not allowed to operate on the route. 
In general, the OSA has liberalised full market access but still regulates carrier 
ownership and control and as such, this type of ASA is not fully liberalised. 
4.2.5 Yamoussoukro Declaration 
Another type of more liberal air service agreement is the Yamoussoukro Declaration 
which was signed by Nigeria as part of a multilateral agreement with other African 
nations in 1998. It is the most liberal agreement signed by the Nigeria government.  
The agreement emanated from a meeting of African heads of state held in 
Yamoussoukro in Côte d’Ivoire in 1998. 
According to the African Civil Aviation Commission-AFCAC (1999), YD was based 
on considering the need to harmonise air transport policies in order to reduce non-
physical barriers that impede the sustainable development of air transport services in 
Africa. Furthermore, YD was mindful of the globalisation of the world economy 
which required safe, reliable and affordable air transport services necessary for the 
free movement of persons, goods and services in Africa. In this regard, African states 
agreed for the gradual liberalisation of scheduled and non-scheduled intra-African air 
transport services in the areas of traffic rights, capacity, frequency, designation and air 
fare among others. 
According to the YD agreement, the guidelines of the key provisions of the agreement 
are summarised as: 
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The traffic rights provision required countries to grant each other free exercise of the 
first, second, third, fourth and fifth freedoms of the air on scheduled and non-
scheduled flights by an eligible airline to/from their respective territories. This 
differed from EU multilateral agreements (liberalisation) which allows up to 6th, 7th, 
8th and 9th freedoms. 
In case of tariff charges by the designated airlines for the carriage of passengers, 
cargo and mail there is no approval required by the aeronautical authorities of the 
countries. The airlines shall in this case file such tariffs before competent authorities 
30 working days before they enter into effect. 
On the capacity and frequency provisions, the agreement sets no limit on the number 
of frequencies and capacity offered on air services linking any city-pair combination 
between the country parties concerned (subject to the provisions of Article 3 - 
http://www.afcac.org/en/documents/conferences/July2012/yde.pdf). Each designated 
airline will be allowed to mount and operate such capacity and frequency as such 
airline deems appropriate. Consistent with this right, no state party is unilaterally 
allowed to limit the volume of traffic, the type of aircraft to be operated or the number 
of flights per week, except for environmental, safety, technical or other special 
consideration. 
On the designation right, each country has the right to designate in writing at least one 
airline to operate intra-Africa air transport services in accordance with this decision. It 
is required to notify the other country party through diplomatic channels. A country 
may also designate an eligible airline from another state party to operate air services 
on its behalf. Also, the country has the right to designate an eligible African 
multinational airline in which it is a stakeholder and this airline has to be accepted by 
the other state parties. However, for an airline to be eligible for designation, it must 
meet these requirements:  
 Legally established in accordance with the regulations applicable in a country;   Have its headquarters, central administration and principal place of business 
located in the country concerned;  Duly licensed by a country as defined in Annex 6 of the Chicago Convention; 
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 Fully own or have long-term leases exceeding six months on an aircraft. 
Regarding cooperative arrangements on the agreed routes, a designated airline of one 
country party may enter into cooperative marketing arrangements such as blocked-
space, code-sharing, franchising or leasing arrangements with an airline or airlines of 
the other country party. 
Meanwhile, YD is the only multilateral agreement signed by the Nigerian government 
with other African countries; the agreement was coordinated by the Economic 
Commission for Africa, an arm of the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
Organisation (UNESCO). Moreover, the YD is not automatically applied to all 
African countries, as in the case of Nigeria and South Africa which still had a 
restricted BASA as at 2011. This therefore implies that, even after multilateral 
ratification, countries have to review their former agreement and allow YD to be 
effective. 
YD is the most liberal air service agreement when compared with the previous 
agreements; it is more liberal than the open skies agreement in that the former allows 
only flag carriers as designated airlines while YD accepts an airline with a principal 
place of business in a member country as a designated airline.  
From the top 30 countries with traffic to/from Nigeria as depicted in Table 4.5, eight 
African countries ratified the YD agreement with Nigeria at different periods from 
1999 to 2005. The countries include Ghana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Kenya, εorocco, Senegal and Sierra δeone. Hence, this supersedes the 
former bilateral agreements with these countries as evidenced by the flight traffic 
schedules released by the Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria in September, 2010, 
showing the flight schedule of each country’s airlines and destinations. For instance, 
EgyptAir had up to 3 flights in some days from three different Nigerian airports.  
Also, three different Nigerian carriers had four flights to Ghana on daily basis. As a 
result of these agreements, there have been significant levels of passenger traffic 
to/from Nigeria.  
Further observation from the traffic trends shows that only the Ghana route has more 
than one carrier providing a commercial service and all the airlines were observed to 
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be Nigerian carriers competing in the market. It is likely that Ghana did not have 
adequate carriers to compete with Nigeria, despite the viability of the routes in terms 
of the short distance and high demand. Similarly, only one carrier or sometimes two 
from the Nigerian side provided scheduled air services to other West African 
countries, namely Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and Sierra δeone.  
It was only in the Cameroon market where there has sometimes been one carrier from 
each country competing, even though the route may not have had adequate demand to 
attract more than two carriers based on the traffic demand in 2010 as shown in Table 
4.5. 
However, other African countries with very strong carriers such as Egypt, Ethiopia 
and Kenya were making the best used of the YD agreement. The airlines were 
aggressively providing scheduled flight services from the Nigerian market to other 
parts of the world via their respective country hubs. In this regard, Kenya’s airline had 
seven flights a week; Ethiopia’s airline had 14 flights per week from Abuja and 
Lagos; while Egypt’s airline provided about 1β flights per week from Abuja, Lagos 
and Kano. Furthermore, the research observed from the survey and secondary data, 
that the majority of these airlines’ passengers were in transit to other destinations. 
There were no Nigerian carriers on these three routes, due to inadequate fleets from 
the Nigerian carriers that were expected to reciprocate and compete with their 
counterparts. As such, the three carriers were enjoying some form of market 
monopoly.  
In summary, the research observed that since 1999 the Nigerian government has 
signed a lot of new ASAs and also reviewed several of the existing agreements that 
incorporate current market needs. Consequently, the industry has witnessed the entry 
of many new international airlines such as Emirates, Qatar, Delta Air Lines, Virgin 
Atlantic and China Southern.  
4.3 Liberalisation Level of ASA 
The level of liberalisation of any agreement depends on the strictness of the regulation 
on each provision in the policy. The research has observed that among the four types 
of ASA, restricted BASA, BASA commercial, OSA and YD, each have some level of 
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liberalisation. The ASA information was provided in a qualitative form. Therefore, for 
computation purposes the study assigned a scale to measure the level of liberalisation 
in each of the four agreements as designed by WTO in 2006 (WTO, 2006). 
Table 4.3 Different Types of Nigerian ASA and Level of Liberalisation 
S/N ASA Provisions BASA 
(Restricted) 
BASA 
(Commercial) 
Yamoussoukro 
Declaration 
 
Open 
Skies 
1 Grants of Rights 
3rd–4th Freedom – 0 
5th Freedom (5thFD) – 6 
7th Freedom – 6 
Cabotage – 6 
3rd–4th FD = 
0 
3rd–4th FD = 0 5thFD = 6 5thFD = 6 
2 Tariff 
Dual Approval (DA) – 0 
Origin disapproval (OD) – 3 
Dual Disapproval (DD) – 6 
Free pricing (FP) – 8 
 
DD = 6  
 
DD = 8 
 
FP = 8 FP = 8 
3 Withholding 
Flag carrier (FC) – 0 
Community of Interest (CI)–4 
Principal Place of Buss(PP)–6 
FC = 0 FC = 0 PP = 6 FC = 0 
4 Designation 
Single designation (SD) – 0 
Multiple designation (MD) –4 
SD = 0 SD = 0 MD = 4 MD = 4 
5 Capacity 
Predetermined (PD) – 0 
Bermuda regime (BR) – 4 
Free determination (FD) – 8 
PD = 4 BR = 4 FD = 8 FD = 8 
6 Commercial agreements 
 
CA=0 CA = 4 Not Required Not 
required 
7 Liberalisation index 
 
 
10 16 32 26 
Source: WTO, 2006 
The above liberalisation scale or index was developed by the WTO secretariat, based 
on the judgement of experts in aviation. The experts assigned various weight on each 
provision of ASA on the basis of the effect of removing obstacles in freeing trade in 
air services (Piermartini & Rousova, 2008a). The scaling of each provision is 
explained in detail in Appendix 3. 
Table 4.3 shows that the most liberal agreement Nigeria signed was the YD with a 
total Air Liberalisation Index (ALI) of 32 on the WTO scale, made up of these 
provisions: granted fifth freedom rights (6 points), tariffs as free pricing (8 points), 
withholding decided as principal place of business (6 points), multiple designation (4 
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points), and capacity set as free determination (8 points); as such the need for 
commercial agreements did not arise. 
The second most liberal agreement allowed in Nigeria was an open skies agreement 
(OSA), which has the same provisions as YD but with a withholding provision set as 
flag carrier (0 points). Therefore, OSA has a total weight of 26 on the ALI. 
The most restrictive BASA has an ALI value of 10, which grants up to the fourth 
traffic right only (0 points). The agreement allowed double disapproval (6 points), but 
capacity control on frequency predetermined (0 points). The agreement designated 
only a single carrier for each country, and provision was made for any airline to seek 
a commercial agreement if there is a need. 
The BASA with a commercial agreement has the same provisions as BASA restricted 
but a bit more liberal by allowing additional frequencies/capacity (4 points) bringing 
the total ALI to 16 values. Therefore, the liberalisation index for each model of ASA 
comprising the various component provisions is depicted in Figure 4.1 below. 
 
Figure 4.1 ALI in different ASAs; source: FMOA (2011) 
4.4 Traffic Trends in the International Market  
As a result of the air service agreements signed with other countries of which some 
have been liberalised, many of the designated international airlines entered the 
Nigerian air transport market for passengers, cargo, and mail providing scheduled and 
unscheduled services. One of main ways of assessing the performance of these air 
service agreements is by studying the traffic trends generated by the designated 
airlines. 
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In this regard, the research collected data from both NCAA and FAAN, and charted 
the pattern of international passenger traffic over ten years from the airports of Lagos, 
Abuja, Kano, Calabar, and Port Harcourt as shown in Table 4.4 and 4.5. About 76 per 
cent of the passengers were from Lagos International Airport, while Abuja had 18 per 
cent of the passenger market, Kano and Port Harcourt had about 4 per cent and 1 per 
cent of the annual passenger traffic respectively (details of the airport analysis and 
airline distribution are attached as Appendix 5).  
Table 4.4 Annual International Scheduled Passenger Traffic and GDP in Nigeria 
Year Total Passenger  Annual GDP  
Billion $ 
 % Passenger 
change 
 % GDP 
change 
2001 1,506,878 161.08     
2002 1,798,063 169.84 19.32 5.44 
2003 1,719,533 175.27 -4.37 3.2 
2004 1,843,154 197.49 7.19 12.68 
2005 1,700,252 224.61 -7.75 13.74 
2006 1,514,656 244.64 -10.92 8.91 
2007 2,323,949 268.26 53.43 9.65 
2008 2,557,264 295.34 10.04 10.1 
2009 2,619,918 319.91 2.45 8.32 
2010 2,758,086 340.92 5.27 6.57 
Total 20,341,753   74.67 78.6 
Sources: NCAA (2011) and World Bank (2011) 
Table 4.4 shows the country’s international market has witnessed unsteady passenger 
traffic growth in the observed ten year period. The industry recorded a total of 
20,341,753 international passengers in scheduled services with a growth rate of 83 
percent over the ten years (2001-10), implying an average growth rate of 8.3 per cent 
per annum. This value is not far from the global air traffic estimated by ATAG in 
2008 to be around 5.5 per cent. This shows the market is in a growth phase which is 
typical of a growth economy, similar to what developed countries witnessed in the 
1980s and 1990s. This also suggests that the market is not near its saturation point. 
The market appears to be both cyclical and strongly influenced by external factors – 
mostly economic activity represented by GDP. Meanwhile during the same period 
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(2001-10) the country’s economy (GDP) witnessed a similar growth rate of 111% 
according to World Bank, showing that the traffic growth rate is slower than the GDP 
growth rate, which appears similar to the global picture. ATAG (2008) claimed that 
60 to 80 per cent of global air traffic growth is attributed to economic activity growth 
and estimated that air traffic growth outpaced GDP by 1.2–2.0 per cent.  
The research compares international traffic growth in Nigeria with the country’s 
economic growth measured in GDP over the ten years as shown in column 3 of the 
Table 4.4. Economic growth per annum for the country was consistent but traffic 
growth was unsteady due to the influence of other factors as depicted in Figure 4.2 
below. However, total growth of the two variables over the ten years indicated a 
significant correlation. Therefore, the average ratio of the growth rate of the traffic 
and GDP is estimated as: 
  Total % change of GDP/ Total % change in Traffic 
  Thus, 111/83 = 1.34  
This therefore means that for an increase in the country’s GDP by 1.γ4 per cent there 
is a corresponding increase in passenger international traffic by 1.0 per cent, which is 
within the range estimated by ATAG. This implies that the two moves in a simlar 
direction over the longer term, with traffic rates slightly lagging behind GDP.  
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Figure 4.2 Annual International traffic Vs GDP; Sources: NCAA (2011) and World Bank 
(2011) 
In addition to GDP (proxy of economic activity in the country), there were other 
factors that affect the growth of international passenger traffic in the country. Boeing 
(2010) alleges that the remaining 20 to 40 per cent of global air travel growth results 
from the stimulation provided by the value travellers place on the speed and 
convenience that only air travel can offer. For example, travellers value choice of 
arrival and departure times, routings, non-stop flights, choice of carriers, service level, 
and fares. Liberalisation is the primary driver enabling value creation in the global air 
transport network and typically gives rise to a “bump” in traffic demand (IATA, β007; 
Boeing, 2010). 
The research observed that the country’s reform of liberalisation policy may have 
contributed to the growth by allowing more foreign carriers to have access to the 
market, despite the absence of capable carriers from Nigeria to reciprocate the foreign 
market access. For instance, Emirates of UAE entered the market in 2004, Qatar 
airways and Turkish Airlines joined the market in 2007 and 2005 respectively. These 
three airlines in 2010 airlifted a total of 479,442 international passengers, representing 
about 18 per cent of the annual total. 
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Also, the policy enables existing carriers to expand their scheduled operations by 
allowing additional frequencies and points of entry into the country as in the case of 
KLM, Lufthansa, Air France and Ethiopia Airways. All of them now operate 
scheduled services from Abuja airport in addition to Lagos airport. The additional 
services contributed 7.2 per cent of the annual total traffic in 2010.  
Another influential liberalisation matter was the open skies agreement with the USA 
signed in 2002 which became more effective in 2009 when US carriers started 
accessing the Nigerian market after the country attained a CAT 1 assessment from the 
US FAA. The FAA conducts an International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) 
Program on each country’s CAA that holds traffic rights to the US market.  The IASA 
assessment determines if the foreign CAA provides oversight to its carriers according 
to international standards. If the CAA meets these standards, the FAA gives it a 
Category 1 rating, which means airlines from the assessed country may initiate or 
continue services to the USA in the normal manner and take part in reciprocal code-
share arrangements with US carriers. 
Meanwhile, the research discovered from the secondary data that the decline in 
growth in the middle of the period from 2003 to 2006 may not have been unconnected 
with the collapse of some home carriers that had a significant market share such as 
Nigerian Airways (liquidated in 2002), Ghana Airways (ceased in 2005), Swissair 
(collapsed in 2002), Sabena (ceased in 2002), Air Gabon (collapsed in 2006) and Air 
Afrique (ceased in 2002). These airlines lifted 274,014 passengers in 2001 
representing 18.2 per cent of the annul total. These entire airlines left the market at 
different periods of time mostly due to the financial crisis that bedevilled international 
carriers caused by an unprecedented increase in fuel prices and the US September 11 
crisis. During that period, there were no new carriers that entered the market and the 
existing carriers were limited by ASAs from expanding their operations.  
Therefore, in summary, international air passenger traffic from 2001 to 2010 
exhibited an overall growth of 83 per cent due mainly to the corresponding growth in 
the country’s GDP of 111 per cent. Even though the growth of GDP was steady, that 
of traffic was patchy, which signified there were other factors responsible for the 
development of international air passengers. Further, the research believes that the 
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supply of services, which depends partly on liberalisation policies and other business 
matters, may have contributed to the unsteady growth of the industry. The analysis 
shows that the growth rate of Nigerian international traffic is not far from the global 
value as obtained by ATAG in 2010. 
The research further assesses the actual impact of liberalisation on traffic growth in 
the country in chapter six. 
4.5 Analysis of Origin and Destination for Direct Traffic 
4.5.1 Market Outlook  
A thorough examination of the origins and destinations of the airlines involved in the 
ten years of the study indicates that the structure of the market and players have a 
consistent pattern with slight variation of countries and operators within the period of 
review. Most of the time, the availability and conditions of the operators shape the 
structure of the traffic. For instance, in the early period of the study there was traffic 
to some countries before the collapse of the countries’ national carriers, such as 
Belgium (Sabena), Switzerland and Gabon. Table 4.5 summarizes the pattern of the 
origin and destination routes in the year 2010 for the country, indicating the passenger 
traffic for each country route, percentage traffic of the total, average growth rate per 
annum of the route traffic, number of flights per week, airlines’ market share, 
entry/departure airports, and nature of the market.  
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Table 4.5 Origin and Destination Direct Traffic 
Country/ 
route 
Pax 
traffic 
% 
Share 
AGR 
/yr 
Flgt/
wk 
Airlines & mkt share  Airport Market 
UK 574,076 20.81 6.30 32 BA (49%),Virgin 
(33%), Arik (18%) 
 LOS, 
ABV 
Competition 
UAE 310,048 11.24 44.70 14 Emirates (100%) LOS Monopoly 
Neth’land 223,146 8.09 4.70 10 KLM (100%) LOS, 
ABV 
Monopoly 
Germany 212,238 7.70 13.70 7 Lufthansa (100%) LOS Monopoly 
Ghana 211,630 7.67 21.70 49 Air Nig (35%), Arik 
(35%), Aero (30%) 
LOS Competition 
S/Africa 175,630 6.37 11.40 11 SAA (72%) and Arik 
(28%) 
LOS  Duopoly 
France 175,381 6.36 -0.70 11 Air France (100%) LOS, 
PHC 
Monopoly 
Ethiopia 138,527 5.02 4.70 21 Ethiopian Airline 
(100%) 
 LOS, 
ABV  
Monopoly 
USA 135,659 4.92 47.20 15 Delta Air (89%) and 
Arik (11%) 
 LOS, 
ABV  
Duopoly 
Qatar 128,468 4.66 55.50 7 Qatar airways (100%) LOS  Monopoly 
Egypt 105,712 3.83 19.40 9 Egypt Air (100%)  LOS, 
KNO  
Monopoly 
Kenya 63,678 2.31 4.70 7 Kenya airways (100%) LOS  Monopoly 
Turkey 40,926 1.48 10.00 4 Turkish airline (100%) LOS  Monopoly 
Senegal 38,229 1.39 89.00 3 Air Nig (100%) LOS  Monopoly 
Libya 29,221 1.06 16.50 4 Afriqiyah Air (100%) LOS  Monopoly 
Lebanon 27,456 1.00 -3.60 6 Middle East Air 
(100%) 
 LOS, 
KNO  
Monopoly 
Italy 26,708 0.97 1.80 3 Alitalia (100%) LOS  Monopoly 
Spain 26,152 0.95 -0.30 3 Iberia (100%) LOS  Monopoly 
S/Leon 21,978 0.80 3.00 4 Arik (100%) LOS  Monopoly 
Cameroun 19,656 0.71 -5.40 4 Air Nig (100%) LOS  Monopoly 
S/Arabia 18,317 0.66 -1.90 3 Saudi Airline (100%) LOS  Monopoly 
Morocco 16,996 0.62 332 4 R. Air Morocco 
(100%) 
LOS  Monopoly 
Benin 15,234 0.55 27.50 3 Air Nig (100%) LOS Monopoly 
Sudan 14,754 0.53 -3.10 3 Sudan Airline (100%) LOS Monopoly 
C D'Ivoire 8,266 0.30 -8.90 3 Air Nig (100%) LOS Monopoly 
TOTAL 2,758,086 100      
Sources: NCAA and FAAN (2010)  [Key: AGR-Average growth rate; Flgt-flight] 
Table 4.5 above suggests that, as at 2010, the country had direct international 
passenger traffic to 25 countries with a total passenger volume of 2,758,086 on 
scheduled services (NCAA, 2011). According to Piermartini and Rousova (2008b), 
the total passenger traffic represents the degree of liberalisation of the agreement 
between countries that defines the operating conditions of the carriers. This implies 
that an absence of carriers to operate direct traffic renders the agreement inactive as in 
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the case of some countries such as Australia, Malaysia, Ireland and Gabon (in Table 
4.1). 
In this regard, the ASAs signed with the 25 countries governed the conditions of the 
carriers’ operations in the market. The research discovered that about 85 per cent of 
the total passenger traffic comes from the top ten destination countries, with 
reasonable and consistent traffic with possibility of liberalisation impact. Therefore, 
the research intends to carry out further in-depth analysis of the top ten destination 
countries so as to expose some aspects of liberalisation impacts such as traffic growth, 
competition, expansion to other airports, and frequency of services.  However, the 
remaining 15 countries had 15 per cent of traffic, may have a very limited 
liberalisation impacts due to low traffic demand which led to inconsistent traffic on 
the routes.  
4.5.2 UK – Nigeria Market 
This is oldest route in Nigerian international traffic dating back to the early 1950s and 
the service has been consistent. However, from 2001 to 2010 the route had total 
scheduled traffic of 5,082,924 passengers which was higher than any other single 
route. For instance, in 2010 the route passenger volume of 574,076 accounted for 20.8 
per cent of annual international passenger traffic in the country. The high passenger 
traffic on the route may have been fuelled by the suspension of direct traffic from the 
US to Nigeria for technical reasons; this route was reopened in 2009/2010. This was 
evident from the fact that a significant number of UK-bound passengers were in 
transit to the US. For instance, NCAA (2010) indicated that in 2005, there were 
39,516 passengers on transit to the US via the UK route. Also, after the restoration of 
direct traffic to the US in 2009 the demand on the UK route declined in 2010, as 
shown above in Table 4.5. 
 Traffic growth: The route also has an average traffic growth rate of 6.3 per cent per 
annum which is close to the global industry average of 5 per cent estimated by 
Doganis (2010) and Boeing (2010).  
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Figure 4.3 Annual Pax; UK – NIG; Source: NCAA (2011) 
Apart from GDP growth in the two countries, other contributors to the high passenger 
traffic may have been some other obvious factors, prominent among them being the 
historical colonial link and common language between the countries. Also, the 
colonial relationship influences the growth of international trade and investment 
between the countries. The National Bureau of Statistics-NBS (2011) claims the value 
of trade (export/import) between the countries was worth US$ 2.54 Billion in 2010 
alone.  
The route was still governed by a restricted ASA (as in Table 4.1) with some level of 
liberalisation such as partial fifth freedom to some airlines, multiple designation, free 
pricing, additional frequencies and multiple airports of entry. These liberalisation 
provisions may have added value to the traffic. The route should have a maximum of 
42 flights per week from three carriers from each side, but only 28 flights from three 
carriers existed as at 2010. This may be attributed to lack of capacity from the Nigeria 
carriers, and shortage of airport slots at Heathrow Airport in the UK and lack of 
interest to operate from the other 2 airports at Gatwick and Manchester even though 
the agreement allowed.  
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Figure 4.4 2010 UK –Nig traffic by airline; Source: NCAA (2011) 
 
Meanwhile, the designated UK carriers, British Airways and Virgin Atlantic provided 
14 and seven flights per week, respectively, while the Nigeria designated carrier Arik 
Air was only able to offer 11 flights per week from 2 airports Lagos( with IATA code 
LOS) and Abuja (IATA code ABV). The market traffic data (Appendix 5) shows the 
market share of the carriers, UK airlines have 83 per cent of which BA controlled 49 
per cent as depicted in Figure 4.4. 
Competition: The nature of the UK–Nigeria route market suggested a market 
competition based on Graham’s (1998) arguments that competition begins to be 
effective once there are three or more carriers competing in a route. However, unequal 
distribution of the services among the carriers and possible domination by one carrier 
should not be regarded as perfect competition. 
Entropy (H) as indicator of competition was used to evaluate the competitiveness in 
the route, thus;    ∑                Where, n is the number of airlines, and x is the market share. 
On any route H=0 if a market is served by one carrier and H=1 if the route is served 
by an equal distribution of ten carriers. Therefore, a high value of H is most desirable.  
Therefore, the entropy (H) of the Nigeria–UK route, for three airlines (Arik, 18 per 
cent; BA, 49 per cent; and Virgin, 33 per cent) is given as: 
 H= 0.18Log (0.18) + 0.49Log (0.49) + 0.33Log (0.33) = 0.44 -------------- (4.1) 
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 Therefore, the level of competition on the route is given by an entropy value of 0.44 
which is regarded as moderate competition level, which means an absence of 
domination and dictation of the market by one operator. In such a situation passengers 
stand to gain in terms of price competition and quality of service. However, because 
of the few competitors, there is the possibility of collusion between two or three 
competitors for anti-competitive behaviour by surcharging the passengers, as was the 
case in 2007 when the British Office of Fair Trading (OFT) accused BA and Virgin 
Atlantic of collusion and charging high fuel surcharges to passengers sometime 
between 2004 and 2006, which led to the heavy penalty of the carriers. 
Another constraint to effective competition was the unsteady supply of services by 
operators from the carriers, most especially on the Nigerian side. Initially, Nigeria 
Airways was involved in the route but ceased in 2002, and another carrier, Bellview, 
entered the route from 2005 but ceased operating in 2009 as shown in the full traffic 
data (Appendix 5). However, another airline from the Nigeria side, Arik Air, just 
started operating in 2009. Therefore, frequent carriers exiting from the market affects 
the competition level by changing the entropy value. 
Traffic to other Airports: Forsyth (1998) alleged that among the impacts of 
liberalisation is the development of traffic to secondary and regional airports. In this 
regard, the ASA permitted traffic expansion to some airports in Abuja and Kano 
(Nigeria), likewise in the UK the traffic could be extended to Gatwick and 
Manchester. Hence, BA and Arik Air expanded the scheduled service to Abuja 
airport, this accounted for about 22 per cent of the total annual traffic in 2010 on the 
route as depicted in Figure 4.4.  
The survey also found out that over 80 per cent of the passengers on the route were 
Nigerian, either on business travel or visiting friends and relatives, with few other 
nationals on business to Nigeria. The high traffic demand on the route was as a result 
of economic propensity, trade, and historical link/common language between the 
countries. Moreover, liberalisation facilitates the supply of air service between the 
countries leading to more growth, increased competition and additional airports of 
entry/departure. Meanwhile, the research found some constraints that militate against 
growing traffic on the route which include an airport slot situation at Heathrow. This 
153 
 
is evident from the suspension of Arik Air traffic from Abuja airport to Heathrow due 
to the scarcity of a slot at the airport sometime in May 2012 (Arik, 2012) . Another 
constraint to traffic demand is the issue of entry visas by the UK Border Agency, 
where most of the time there were delays, or entry was even denied to prospective 
travellers, as claimed by the travellers in the survey.  This suggested that visa delay is 
one of the challenges to travellers, which do not give the passengers opportunity to 
make adequate choice of the available carriers due to limited time from the visa 
release and travelling date. However, this research is not capable to evaluate how it 
affects demand.   
4.5.3 UAE – Nigeria Market 
 This route was second in the country with high traffic, and it accounted for 11.24 per 
cent of the total traffic market share in 2010. The route traffic was governed by the 
restricted BASA as claimed by the FMOA which was confirmed by the United Arab 
Civil Aviation Authority (UAE CAA). However, due to market demand, a 
commercial agreement in the form of a MoU by the two countries was formulated 
outside the agreement, which granted additional capacity of frequency to the operators 
while in turn the operators pay royalties to the Nigerian government. Therefore, the 
BASA was liberal as it allowed commercial agreements in response to the needs of 
the airline; in addition, the agreement also permitted free pricing which is an aspect of 
liberalisation. 
 
Figure 4.5  Annual Pax UAE –Nig; Source: NCAA (2011) 
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The route had a growing traffic trend as depicted in figure 4.5 above. The route had a 
low traffic volume until 2003 when Emirates airline entered the market, making it the 
second busiest in 2010 with 14 flights per week. Emirates airline has two flights per 
day from Lagos to Dubai (100 per cent increase from the initial capacity agreement, 
courtesy of a commercial agreement). The route has had an average growth rate of 
44.7 per cent per annum in seven years (2003 to 2010).  
Moreover, Emirates airline was the only operator on the route for direct service which 
suggested a monopolistic market. However, due to the nature of passenger 
distribution in which a substantial number of them were on transit to other countries, 
the airline was competing with other network carriers for transit passengers. For 
instance, an analysis of the 2005 traffic indicated that a significant proportion of the 
passengers’ final destination was to Asian countries, as shown in figure 4.6 below. 
The alternatives carriers for the passengers include Qatar Airways, Ethiopian 
Airways, Turkish Airline, Saudi Airways, and South Africa airline. 
 
Figure 4.6 UAE Pax final destinations;  Source: NCAA (2011) 
An analysis of 2005 data indicates that only 36 per cent of the passenger destination 
was Dubai while 64 per cent were destined for other countries as depicted in Figure 
4.6. Similarly, the data from NCAA (2011) and IATAPaxIs (2012) revealed that 59.5 
per cent and 65.6 per cent of the total passenger traffic on the route in 2009 and 2010 
respectively were on transit to other country destinations. This suggested that some 
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element of competition exists with other network carriers in the transit of passengers 
to Asian countries. Another competition level exists in the route with other carriers 
that provide indirect traffic to Dubai. For instance, in 2005 the detail of the route 
passenger traffic by airlines from Lagos airport as shown in table 4.6 indicated that 
there were other network carriers competing for the route such as Ethiopia and Kenya 
airlines. These two airlines may have been able to compete favourably with Emirates 
because their hub lies between the two destinations and they enjoy liberal rights more 
including the fifth freedom.  
Table 4.6  Market share of airlines on Nig–UAE route in 2005 
Airlines Passengers Airlifted Market Share (%) 
EMIRATES  8,342  24.95 
ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES  14,259  42.65 
KENYA AIRWAYS  9,201  27.52 
OTHERS  1,628  4.87 
TOTAL  33,430  100.00 
Source: NCAA (2011) 
Therefore, the liberal aspects of the agreement permit free pricing and commercial 
arrangements that grant additional frequency to the carrier, which has contributed to 
the growth of traffic and airline competition.  
Also, the research survey discovered that over 80 per cent of the passengers were 
Nigerians on business and leisure travel to Dubai. The high growth may be attributed 
to a number of reasons such as level of trade (import and export) between the 
countries, which according to the Nigeria Bureau of Statistics (2011) reached $1.13 
Billion in 2010 from $84.79 Million in 2005 (1229 per cent increase). Other 
noticeable factors that contributed to the traffic growth discovered during the survey 
include the booming of the tourism industry in Dubai, facilitated by the easy visa 
process. Also, language may be another factor because the English language is the 
main official language in Nigeria and it is the second official language in Dubai, 
which attracts Nigerian students and civil servants for studies and 
conferences/workshops. 
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4.5.4 Netherlands - Nigeria Market 
This was the third busy route of the Nigerian market in 2010, and was governed by 
BASA which permitted commercial agreements between the airlines and the Nigerian 
civil authority. The route was operated by a lone carrier KLM which operates 
scheduled service from two Nigerian airports (Lagos and Abuja).  
   Table 4.7 KLM passenger traffic from Nigeria airports 
   Source: NCAA (2011) 
Table 4.7 shows that the route had a total of 2,034,244 passengers carried by the 
designated carriers over ten years with an average growth rate of 3.58 per cent per 
annum which was below the country’s market growth rate of 8.γ per cent. 
A cursory look at the configuration of the passengers from the survey indicates that 
about 75 per cent were Nigerian travellers to various European and American cities. 
Meanwhile, the breakdown of passengers on Lagos to Amsterdam in 2005 shows that 
15 per cent of the passengers had Netherlands as their final destination, while 38 per 
cent of them headed for various cities in the USA, 26 per cent had destination to 
various cities in the UK, 3 per cent to Asian countries and the remaining 33 per cent 
were on transit to other European cities as shown in Figure 4.7 below.  
Year Passenger   % change 
2001 164,332  
2002 172,658  5.0666 
2003 189,909  9.9914 
2004 222,585  17.2061 
2005 215,810  -3.0437 
2006 154,302  -28.5011 
2007 233,044  51.0311 
2008 224,675  -3.5912 
2009 233,783  4.0538 
2010 223,146  -4.5499 
 Total 2,034,244  47.6632 
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Figure 4.7 Nigeria – Netherlands route passengers’ destinations in 2005; Source: NCAA 
(2011) 
Similarly, in 2009 the research estimated from NCAA and IATA data that only 
47,423, representing about 20 per cent of the total route passengers of 233,783, were 
destined for the Netherlands, while the remaining were on transit. But in 2010, the 
percentage of transit passengers rose to 84 per cent. This suggested a greater 
significance for the number of Nigeria–Netherlands route passengers in transit and 
signified an element of competition with other network carriers in the distribution of 
passengers worldwide. 
Meanwhile, the significant developments on the route associated with liberalisation 
impacts include moderate traffic growth, elements of competition with other network 
carriers for passengers travelling to European cities and the US, and additional 
airports for departure/arrival. This was because the liberal aspects of the ASA 
permitted commercial agreements that eventually led to an increase in frequencies at 
new points of departure/arrival. Also, the growth of the aggregate GDP of the 
countries may have contributed, since the research had estimated the ratio of GDP 
growth to traffic growth as 1.3 to 1 in Nigeria. The growth of international trade 
between the countries might have also contributed because according to the NBS 
(β011) the two countries’ trade witnessed an average growth rate of γ6 per cent per 
annum from 2005 to 2010. 
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4.5.5 Germany - Nigeria Market 
This was another busy route to Europe with one flight per day from Lagos airport 
based on the restricted BASA which allowed a commercial agreement with airlines 
when needed. The route air service has been provided by a lone designated German 
Carrier (Lufthansa) and had a market share of 7.7 per cent of the total passengers in 
2010, with an average steady growth rate of 20 per cent per annum in ten years as 
shown in Figure 4.8. However, as a result of traffic growth, the airline commenced 
flights from Abuja airport with five flights per week to Germany as from 2011. 
 
Figure 4.8  Nigeria–Germany traffic: Source NCAA (2011) 
Further analysis of the passengers suggests that a significant percentage were on 
transit to other European cities including where direct traffic exists; this is evident 
from the survey and the 2005 passenger final destination breakdown in figure 4.9 
below. 
 
Figure 4.9 Lufthansa Passengers final destinations; Source: NCAA (2011) 
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Figure 4.9 shows that 40 per cent of the passengers had a final destination to USA 
cities and about 51 per cent were destined for European cities, while Australia, 
Canada and Asian countries had 3 per cent each. This confirmed the belief that the 
only carrier on the route may be in competition with other network carriers in the 
distribution of passengers from Nigeria to European and USA cities.  
Therefore, the liberal aspects of the Nigeria–Germany ASA that granted commercial 
agreements may have played a role in the growth of traffic and, hence, the 
competition; although other factors such as passenger income (a proxy of GDP) and 
trade between the countries were also capable of influencing traffic growth. However, 
subsequent analysis would be able to isolate the contribution of each factor.  
4.5.6 Ghana - Nigeria Market 
This was the shortest distance among the top ten routes with an average distance of 
about 517 km which means that there was the possibility of competition with other 
modes of transport on the route. Moreover, the route was ruled by the Yamoussoukro 
declaration which liberalised the ASA completely between the countries. The traffic 
demand on the route has been threatened by instability of the airlines involved, and as 
a consequence, the route had unsteady traffic growth as shown in figure 4.10. Despite 
the challenges, the route had an average growth rate of 11 per cent per annum over the 
ten years and a market share of about 7.6 per cent of international passenger traffic in 
the country in 2010. The traffic trend in ten years is shown in Figure 4.10.  
 
Figure 4.10 Nig- Ghana annual Pax; Source: NCAA (2011) 
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The drop in traffic in 2003 may not be unconnected with the unstable service by the 
major service provider (Ghana Airways, which eventually collapsed in 2005), which 
created a shortage of supply of airline services. Meanwhile, passenger traffic picked 
up steadily as from 2006, mainly from designated Nigerian private carriers. The route 
was always in competition with several carriers over the ten years. However, during 
the period about seven different carriers provided service on the route at different 
times (see Appendix 5), but as at 2010, only three Nigerian carriers were in the 
market competing for passengers. Therefore, the level of competition on the route 
using entropy (H) developed by Frenken et al. (2004) can be evaluated as:          
         
   H= 0.3Log(0.3) + 0.35Log(0.35) + 0.35Log(0.35) = 0.47 ---------------- (4.2) 
 
Table 4.8 Airline Traffic between Nigeria and Ghana in 2010 
Airlines  Passengers carried % share of market 
Aero contractor 63,009  29.8 
Arik Air 74,527  35.2 
Virgin Nigeria 74,094  35 
Total 211,630  
Source: NCAA (2011) 
The entropy value of 0.475 indicates fair competition among the airlines which 
suggests price and quality service competition. 
It therefore implies that the YD agreement which was the most liberalised agreement 
Nigeria had was responsible for a multiple designation of airlines flying to Ghana, 
making them compete in terms of frequencies, price and quality of service. 
Furthermore, a strong link between the neighbouring countries was inspired by the 
common language which facilitates exchange of manpower resources and trade 
between the countries. Also, the shape of the two countries’ economies had significant 
impacts on the traffic level because the two countries were the largest economies in 
the West African region and their economies witnessed significant growth during the 
time of review.  
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4.5.7 South Africa - Nigeria Market 
According to FMOA (2011), the route was still governed by BASA instead of YD as 
recommended by AFCAC, because the two countries could not reach agreement on 
the YD principle; despite this, the ASA had made some compromises which allowed 
multiple designations and free pricing. The route had a market share of about 6.4% of 
the total annual international passenger traffic in 2010. The route had duopoly market 
structure traffic from Lagos to Johannesburg, with one airline from each country 
providing service in 2010. 
 
Figure 4.11 Nig- SA Annual Pax;   Source: NCAA (2011) 
Figure 4.11 depicts modest traffic growth in the route with an average rate of 15.4 per 
cent per annum over the ten years. The majority of the passengers were destined to 
South African cities while about 30 per cent of the passengers were on transit to other 
southern African countries such as Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana, based on the 
2005 traffic data.  
The growth of traffic may be attributed mainly to aggregate economy of the two 
countries as well as huge investment and trade between the countries. This was also 
encouraged by the common official language which facilitates communication, 
exchange of human resources and academic knowledge among others. However, the 
role of liberalisation in this case may be minimal because of the low level of 
liberalisation index.  
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4.5.8 France - Nigeria Market 
This was another route to Europe governed by a BASA which permitted commercial 
agreements between the airline and the Nigerian government. The route was operated 
by a single carrier (Air France) which operates a scheduled service from two Nigerian 
airports (Lagos and Port Harcourt). The airline had a market share of 6.3 per cent of 
the total passengers in 2010, with an average growth rate –0.7 per cent per annum 
over ten years as shown in Figure 4.12. This was far below the industry average 
growth rate, estimated earlier to be 8.3 per cent in the period. 
 
Figure 4.12 Nig- France annual Pax; Source: NCAA (2011) 
Nevertheless, the negative trend of the traffic on the route was very difficult to 
postulate by the research because all factors that should promote growth were 
available, such as economic growth of the country’s GDP, increase in trade by γγ per 
cent between the countries, and favourable ASA. Although the airline enjoyed 
monopoly on the route, competition with other European airlines in the market could 
have affected the airline’s market growth. The analysis of the airline passengers’ 
destination in 2005 strengthens the competition argument among European carriers, 
as depicted in Figure 4.13.  
Therefore, the research believes that the only possible impacts of liberalisation on the 
route were: increase in flight frequency, additional airport of departure/arrival, and 
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enhancement of competition with other network carriers for passengers travelling to 
EU cities and the USA.  
 
Figure 4.13 AF Pax destinations;   Source: NCAA (2011) 
4.5.9 Ethiopia - Nigeria Market 
This was another route with high traffic within the Africa region governed by YD that 
permits unlimited fifth freedom. The route traffic was provided by one of the most 
vibrant African carriers, Ethiopian Airlines, which enjoyed considerable monopoly 
because Nigeria does not have a designated carrier on the route. According to NCAA 
(2011), the airline passenger traffic accounted for 5 per cent of the Nigerian total 
international passenger market in 2010. 
 
Figure 4.14 Nig- Ethiopia annual passenger; Source: NCAA (2011) 
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The airline during the ten years of the review had a considerable growth rate of 4.7 
per cent of passenger traffic in Nigeria. The airline used the fifth freedom to connect 
traffic from Nigeria to West African countries when the need arose, such as in 2003 
the airline had flights to Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire from Nigeria. The airline had three 
flights on a daily basis from Nigeria to its hub in Addis Ababa, with two flights from 
Lagos airport (morning/evening) and Abuja airport. Further analysis showed that a 
significant proportion of the passengers were on transit to other destinations, mostly 
Asia and Middle East countries; this is evident from a sample of 2005 passenger 
traffic from Lagos Airport as depicted in Figure 4.15. 
 
Figure 4.15 Ethiopian Air Pax destinations; Source: NCAA (2011) 
The distribution of the final destination shows about 78 per cent of the passengers 
travelled to Asia and Middle East countries, while the other 22 per cent of passengers 
travelled to African countries. However, the airline passenger destination pattern 
shows a correlation with other Middle East carriers such as Emirates and Qatar, which 
suggests viable competition among the carriers.  
The traffic volume and growth on the route could be attributed solely to the 
liberalisation (YD), which permitted a vibrant carrier to carry on traffic in the market 
where the flag carriers’ capacities were floppy. However, it would be absurd to 
associate the traffic with other factors, because the Ethiopian economy was very weak 
(as indicated by GDP values in the Appendix 9), so also trade with Nigeria was 
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insignificant when compare with traffic volume, and there was no common language 
or cultural relationship between the countries. 
Therefore, the only attribute of the route was the high liberalisation index which 
instigated traffic growth and competition with other network carriers for travellers to 
Asia, the Middle East and African countries which constituted about 95% of the route 
passengers as shown in Figure 4.15. 
4.5.10 USA – Nigeria Market 
The route was regulated by an open skies agreement of the US and Nigeria 
governments signed in 2002, but normal direct flights resumed in 2009 after a long 
term of suspension by the US government on the grounds that Nigerian air transport 
system safety was not able to meet the US FAA criteria for category 1. As a 
consequence, all airlines from the US withdrew from the route for safety concerns. 
However, North American Airlines returned to the route in 2005 while Delta Airlines 
also resumed in 2007, and in 2008, the US FAA lifted the suspension on the route 
traffic after the country met the criteria for category 1 safety standards. Before the 
route traffic suspension, travellers had to fly through other countries, especially 
Europe; this boosted the market of European carriers as evident in the breakdown of 
airline passengers in the 2005 data (NCAA, 2011).  
After the resumption of scheduled direct traffic in 2007, passenger traffic increased 
with an average growth rate of 45 per cent per annum in three years as shown in 
Figure 4.16, while the traffic on the route accounted for about 4.9 per cent of total 
international passenger traffic in 2010. 
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Figure 4.16 Nig-USA direct annual Pax traffic; Source: NCAA (2011) 
The route was a duopolistic market with Delta Airlines (US carrier) dominating with 
89 per cent of the passengers, while Arik Air (Nigeria carrier) handled only 11 per 
cent of the route passengers. Due to growing market acceptability in 2009, Delta 
Airlines expanded its entry point to Abuja airport since the airline has the right based 
on liberal agreement. Furthermore, the airline has the right to exercise the fifth 
freedom from the Nigeria route as permitted in the agreement.  
Meanwhile, a substantial numbers of passengers were destined to USA cities with a 
few travelling to Canada, as discovered by researching the passengers’ survey. 
The liberalisation benefits include growth of traffic, additional frequency, airline 
alliance, and additional airport of entry/departure. However, traffic growth could not 
be associated with liberalisation alone, other factors such as economy, trade, and 
common language played a significant role as well, as evidenced from the cross-
sectional analysis. 
4.5.11 Qatar – Nigeria Market 
The route traffic started in 2007 and governed by restricted BASA signed by the 
governments of the countries. As a result, Qatar Airways was designated as the 
operator of the service and as at 2010; the airline enjoyed seven flights per week and 
was able to convey around 4.7 per cent of Nigeria’s annual total international 
passengers. Three years after the commencement of the flight the airline had an 
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average unprecedented traffic growth rate of 42 per cent per annum, as shown in 
Figure 4.17 below. 
 
Figure 4.17 Nig – Qatar annual Pax;  Source: NCAA (2011) 
Moreover, based on the research survey, a substantial number of route passengers 
were on transit to other Middle East and Asian countries. The survey also confirmed 
the data collected from NCAA and IATA (2011) which showed that, out of a total 
128,468 airline passengers carried from Nigeria, only 26,029 passengers had their 
destination at Doha (the hub of the carrier) – the other passengers were on transit. 
This also suggested another carrier choice for travellers to Asia, the Middle East and 
Pacific region from Nigeria which increased the level of competition in the market 
among the carriers from Africa and the Middle East. 
Therefore, liberalisation on the route permitted the carrier to convey passengers for 
direct and indirect traffic, allowed free pricing, and alliances. As a result, there was 
traffic growth and competition among airlines. However, it would be hard to associate 
other factors such as trade and language with the traffic growth since the two 
countries have no significant trade link or common language or culture, as evident 
from the secondary data collected (Appendix 9). 
4.6 Competition by Airlines 
As observed from theories and empirical evidence, one of the benefits of liberalisation 
is to increase competition between airlines in terms of air fares, frequencies, 
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schedules, comfort, and other airline services which improves the quality of the 
services for the benefit of the passengers. However, Graham (1997) argued that 
competition exists on a route when there are at least three airlines on a route in 
operation. It therefore implies that only two routes from the 25 international routes in 
the market were competitive. Also, there were two routes with a duopolistic market, 
while the rest had monopolistic situations. 
As expected, the research observed from the 2005 data and the research survey that 
another level of competition exists in the market from network carriers on two 
segments, the eastbound segment and the northbound segment. The competition was 
precipitated by the composition of the passengers which the survey discovered to be 
mostly business travellers, whose concern, according to Doganis (2006) was the 
availability of convenient flights in respect of the route and cost.  
The eastbound segment includes travellers to Asia, the Middle East and Pacific 
countries where passengers have the option to select from the available airlines whose 
hubs fall on the routes, such as Ethiopia Airlines, Emirates, Qatar, Egypt Air and 
Middle East Airline. According to NCAA (2011), the traffic in the segment accounted 
for 30 per cent of the annual traffic in 2010 with eight carriers in competition, as 
depicted in Figure 4.18. Also, the composition of the passengers’ final destination 
from the survey in Table 5.21 and the data in Table 4.5 attested to the competition 
between the airlines on this segment. 
 
Figure 4.18 Eastbound Traffic segment; Source: NCAA (2011) 
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The route traffic had a final destination to about 24 countries in the regions, based on 
IATA PaxIs (2011), although it was possible to have a small fraction of passengers in 
these carriers heading to other destination outside the region, but this may not be more 
than 5 per cent, based on the 2005 traffic data. Also, it was possible to have a small 
fraction of passengers travelling to the regions with different carriers other than the 
eight competitors, which may not be more than 2 per cent, according to the 2005 
traffic data from NCAA. 
Therefore, using the passenger traffic for the year 2010 of the East bound airlines as 
depicted in Figure 4.18; the competition level of this market segment using entropy is 
as follows: 
Entropy (H) = 0.37Log (0.37) + 0.17Log (0.17) + 0.15Log (0.15) + 0.13Log (0.13) + 
0.08Log (0.08) + 0.05Log (0.05) + 0.03Log (0.03) + 0.02Log (0.02) = 0.749 -----(4.3) 
The entropy value of 0.749 indicates a high competition level among the eight carriers 
for the eastbound traffic segment, which affects the quality of services, air fares, 
comfort, service accessibility, and convenience of the passengers.  
The second market segment comprises European and North American bound routes 
where passengers have the option to select an airline whose hub falls in Europe, such 
as BA, Air France, KLM, Lufthansa, Iberia or Alitalia. The survey and data from 
NCAA, and IATA PaxIs showed that travellers choose an airline based on seat 
availability, convenience and price in respect of a direct or indirect service on this 
segment. The segment traffic accounted for 49.8 per cent of the market share with 
nine carriers in competition. This also confirmed some of the previous empirical 
evidence on the liberalisation effect of European carriers; for instance, InterVISTAS-
EU Consulting (2009) argued that EU formation of a single aviation market had 
increased competition on many routes. However, it was possible some fraction of 
passengers used other airlines which may not be so significant, according to 2005 
traffic data provided by NCAA.  
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Figure 4.19 Northbound Segment traffic in 2010; Source: NCAA (2011) 
The research observed the existence of competition among airlines on the Northbound 
segment from the composition of their passengers final destinations in the survey 
carried out in 2011 (see Table 5.21) and the secondary data of 2005 traffic as 
presented in Table 4.5. 
Therefore, using  Northbound airlines traffic for the year 2010 as depicted in Figure 
4.19, the competition level of this market segment using entropy (H) is as follows; 
 H = 0.21Log (0.21) + 0.16Log (0.16) + 0.16Log (0.16) + 0.14Log (0.14) + 0.13Log 
(0.13) + 0.09Log (0.09) + 0.07Log (0.07) + 0.02Log (0.02) + 0.02Log (0.02) ---- (4.4) 
H = 0.873 is a very high competition level (maximum of 1.0)  
This suggests very high competition in this market, which approaches perfect market 
competition if the entropy value reaches 1.0. 
In conclusion, the chapter observed that there was some level of liberalisation in all 
the routes, from the minimum of free pricing, applicable to all the routes, to a 
maximum of permitting fifth freedom, applicable to some routes. This inspired the 
supply of air services in many of the routes when other socio-economic factors such 
as GDP, trade and cultural links trigger the demand for traffic growth in the market. 
This resulted in competition in some of the routes for direct traffic and also for 
indirect traffic from two market segments. Another effect of liberalisation in the 
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market was the growing expansion of traffic to other secondary markets at Abuja, 
Kano and Port Harcourt.  
4.7 Summary of the Chapter’s Findings  
This chapter has presented and analysed secondary data collected from the Nigeria’s 
traffic market. It appraised the current ASAs signed between Nigeria and other 
countries where various levels of liberalisation concerning some fundamental issues, 
namely traffic rights, airline designation, capacity controls, tariff regulation, 
withholding conditions on the designated airline, and provisions for commercial 
agreements in each agreement were ascertained. The findings show that some 
countries’ provisions were similar and could be categorised into four different types, 
namely restricted BASA, BASA with commercial agreements, YD, and open skies 
agreement. The YD signed as a multilateral agreement with African countries was the 
most liberal type with an Air Liberalisation Index value of 32 while the restricted 
BASA was the least liberal with an index value of 10. 
Traffic trends generated by the designated airlines were evaluated over ten years from 
the four international airports in Nigeria. Traffic saw an unsteady passenger average 
growth of 8.3 per cent per annum for the ten years with a total record of 20.34 million 
international scheduled passengers. The market appeared to be both cyclical and 
strongly influenced by external factors, mostly social and economic in nature.  
The examination of origin and destination markets involving Nigeria indicated direct 
traffic to 25 countries mostly with the partner countries’ carriers as the major 
operators in the market. An in-depth analysis of the top ten destination countries 
exposed various aspects of liberalisation impact such as traffic growth, competition, 
expansion to other airports, and frequency of services in most of the routes, which 
could be attributed to the various levels of liberalisation in the country’s ASAs. 
Meanwhile, only the UK and Ghana country-pairs were found to benefit from a 
competitive market, while the remaining routes had monopoly situations with the 
exception of the US and South African, where duopoly markets exist. In addition, 
there was strong evidence of indirect competition among the network carriers for 
Europe-bound traffic on one hand, and also more competition for Middle East/Asia 
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bound traffic, which suggested that almost all the routes had alternative operators, 
providing indirect traffic. The European market competition level had a very high 
entropy value of 0.87 while the Asia/Middle East market segment had entropy of 
0.75, which was also regarded as a high level of competition. 
The analysis therefore, highlighted the effects of liberalisation together with other 
factors like GDP, Trade and market conditions in the areas of traffic growth, 
competition and entry points. But in estimating the actual impact of these factors, 
including liberalisation, the research would subsequently apply a cross-sectional 
analysis in multiple regressions, capable of isolating the effect of each factor as 
discussed in chapter six.  
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Chapter Five: Results and Analysis of Passenger Survey 
5.1 Introduction 
One of the research objectives is to determine the socio-economic characteristics of 
international passengers in the Nigerian market. This information was virtually absent 
from the market secondary data; hence a field survey of international air passengers in 
Nigeria was conducted. This chapter’s aim is to present the findings obtained from the 
field research of Nigerian airports.  
The passenger field survey is part of the research work with the aim of gaining insight 
into and knowledge of the nature of international passenger traffic in the Nigerian 
market. International passengers are one of the major consumers that tend to be 
affected by liberalisation policies. Hence, appreciation of the nature of passengers will 
enable the prediction of the likely impact on passengers when a liberalisation policy is 
changed.  The survey ascertains the demographic profile and nature of international 
travellers, route patterns, market competitors, and the rationale for selection of carrier 
by passengers in the market. Specifically, the survey data consist of journey purpose, 
final and intermediate origins/destinations, airlines, airports, routes flown, and 
country of residence, nationality, age group and income. The information generated is 
to complement the secondary data findings and verify some assumptions made by the 
research such as dominance of business travellers and route network competition.  
A clear view of the passengers will enable the research to understand the likely 
qualitative impacts of further liberalisation in the market.  
5.2 Sampling 
A sample of six hundred passengers was randomly selected at Lagos and Abuja 
Airport on departure, and a questionnaire was administered to each of them. Of the 
512 questionnaires returned, 502 were found to be valid and were coded for analysis. 
The remaining 10 had some errors and incomplete information which render them 
invalid. The sample represents a population of about three million international 
passengers in the country as at 2010, which exceeded the minimum sample size 
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recommended by Saunders, δewis, and Thornhill’s (2009) of  384 for a population of 
2 to 10 million. The sample size is based on the 95% confidence level and 5% margin 
of error, as well as equal proportions of responses expected to have particular 
attributes (see section 3.9.5). 
The questionnaire comprised two sections – one on passengers’ demographic profile 
and the other on their journey profile. The reliability of the data is obtained by the 
high correlation of the data collected from the questionnaire administered at two 
different airports (Lagos and Abuja), as well as the time of the administering of the 
questionnaires (June, 2011 and November, 2011).   
The obtained data were analysed using appropriate methods, which involved 
descriptive and frequency analyses, then a bivariate analysis using cross-tabulation, 
and lastly inferential statistics using a one-way and two-way chi squared test.  
5.3 Analysis techniques 
After the data collection and coding, there is generally a need to examine trends in 
variables’ distribution, which show the frequency of occurrence of each event. 
Accordingly, all the variables were explained by using frequency analysis so as to 
observe the trend in the distribution. The quantifiable variables were also analysed 
descriptively, covering age group, annual income and frequency of travel over three 
years by the passengers. This information broadened our understanding of the 
passenger’s social values and their travelling patterns, which have impacts on the 
other variables observed. For instance, income level has an impact on the journey 
purpose be it business or VFR or leisure (Shaw, 2011). The analysis was run by SPSS 
software, and the results indicate the following observations. 
5.4 Passenger Nationality 
The first question in the questionnaire was the nationality of the passengers in the 
market; this provided a picture of the user’s identity which can be useful to airlines 
and decision makers. Therefore, the frequency distribution of the passenger’s 
nationality from the sample is shown in Table 5.1 below.  
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Table 5.1 Passengers Nationality 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid American 10 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Other Asian 16 3.2 3.2 5.2 
British 11 2.2 2.2 7.4 
C/African 12 2.4 2.4 9.8 
Caribbean 1 0.2 0.2 10.0 
E/African 4 0.8 0.8 10.8 
Other 
European 
8 1.6 1.6 12.4 
Middle East 11 2.2 2.2 14.5 
Nigerian 298 59.4 59.4 73.9 
S/African 34 6.8 6.8 80.7 
Other 
W/African 
97 19.3 19.3 100.0 
Total 502 100.0 100.0  
Source: Field survey (2011) 
Table 5.1 shows the nationality of the passengers in the market in which 502 
passengers responded. The pattern shows that market passengers were made up of 298 
Nigerians, representing 59.4 per cent of the total passengers, followed by 97 other 
West African nationals from neighbouring countries that were mostly in transit for 
intercontinental traffic. This was because Lagos international airport with high 
connectivity serves as a hub for West African travellers. This was facilitated by the 
provision that West African nationals do not require visas to enter Nigeria by 
ECOWAS charter. The nationality of the passengers in the market is represented by 
Figure 5.1 below.  
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Figure 5.1 Passengers nationality: Source: Field survey (2011) 
Furthermore, other African national passengers (East, Central and southern African) 
comprised 10 per cent (54 passengers). Most of them were on business missions to 
Nigeria or other West African countries. The passengers came from Botswana, 
Congo, Cameroon, Gabon and Uganda. Also, among the passengers, 20 European 
nationals (3.8 per cent) comprise 11 British, as well as Irish, German, Dutch, Spanish 
and Swiss, most of them on business missions to Nigeria; also, the presence of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) involved in oil and gas exploration may have 
provided a basis for such nationals’ frequent visits to Nigeria. Other nationals 
included eight Lebanese residing in Nigeria for business, and visiting friends and 
relatives. Also, there were 14 Asians from China and India on business missions, and 
8 Americans and 2 Canadians. In total, the market configuration consists of about 60 
per cent Nigerian and 40 per cent other nationals. 
The configuration of international passengers’ nationality in Nigeria is similar to the 
pattern obtained in the UK, as evidenced by the survey carried out by UKCAA in 
2010 on passenger nationalities in five UK airports that revealed that UK citizens 
constituted about 64 per cent, while foreign nationals constituted about 36 per cent 
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(UKCAA, 2011). This similarity with UK suggests that nationality of each country 
tends to be the dominant passengers in the country international air travel market.   
5.5 Passengers’ Country of Residence 
The information on nationality is complemented by information on the country of 
residence of the passengers as depicted in table 5.2 below. 
Table 5.2 Country of Residence 
  Country Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Angola 1 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Barbados 1 0.2 0.2 0.4 
C/African 10 2.0 2.0 2.4 
Cameroun 8 1.6 1.6 4.0 
Canada 3 0.6 0.6 4.6 
China 3 0.6 0.6 5.2 
Denmark 2 0.4 0.4 5.6 
Dubai 6 1.2 1.2 6.8 
E/Africa 6 1.2 1.2 8.0 
Germany 2 0.4 0.4 8.4 
Hong Kong 2 0.4 0.4 8.8 
India 7 1.4 1.4 10.2 
Italy 2 0.4 0.4 10.6 
Korea 1 0.2 0.2 10.8 
Lebanon 6 1.2 1.2 12.0 
Netherland 1 0.2 0.2 12.2 
Nigeria 261 52.0 52.0 64.1 
Norway 1 0.2 0.2 64.3 
Pakistan 1 0.2 0.2 64.5 
Portugal 1 0.2 0.2 64.7 
Russia 1 0.2 0.2 64.9 
Spain 1 0.2 0.2 65.1 
Ss/African 36 7.2 7.2 72.3 
Switzerland 2 0.4 0.4 72.7 
Thailand 1 0.2 0.2 72.9 
UK 32 6.4 6.4 79.3 
Ukraine 2 0.4 0.4 79.7 
USA 14 2.8 2.8 82.5 
W/African 88 17.5 17.5 100.0 
Total 502 100.0 100.0  
Source: Field survey (2011) [Key: Ss/African- Southern African countries] 
Table 5.2 indicates that 52 per cent of passengers resided in Nigeria, while 6.4 per cent were 
based in other West African countries. In summary it shows that about 48 per cent of the 
passengers were on a visit to Nigeria for either business or leisure. 
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However, further analysis by cross-tabulation of the country of residence of the passengers 
against their nationality is depicted in Table 5.3 below. 
Table 5.3 Country of residence against Nationality 
 Passengers’ nationality Total 
NA OA Br CA Cr EA EU ME Nig SA WA 
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Angola 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Barbados 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
C/African 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
Cameron 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 
Canada 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
China 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Dubai 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 6 
E/Africa 0 0 0 1 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 6 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
H’ Kong 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
India 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Italy 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Lebanon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 6 
Neth’land 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Nigeria 1 3 3 0 0 0 0 5 242 0 7 261 
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Pakistan 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Ss/Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 34 1 36 
Swis’land 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
UK 0 0 6 0 0 0 1 0 24 0 1 32 
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
USA 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 14 
W/Africa 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 79 88 
Total 10 16 11 12 1 4 8 11 298 34 97 502 
Source: Field survey (2011) [Key: NA-North American; OA-other Asians; Br-British, CA=central African; 
Cr-Caribbean; EA-East African; EU-other European; ME-Middle East; Nig-Nigerian; SA-South African; WA-
West African] 
Table 5.3 shows that out of 261 passengers residing in Nigeria, 20 were foreign 
nationals and the rest were Nigerian. Similarly, out of 298 Nigerian passengers, 56 
resided outside the country and 242 resided in the country. The results suggest that air 
traffic right granted to various airlines as a result of the country BASA is benefiting 
passengers across all nationals.  
 Also, 88 out of 97, representing about 90 per cent of the other West African 
nationals, resided in their various countries, which serve as evidence that the Nigerian 
Airport (Lagos international airport) is serving as one West African hub for 
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intercontinental travel because of its high connectivity. This is supported by statistics 
from FAAN (2012) which shows that Lagos International Airport (MMAI) had 
28,128 international schedules flights to 34 destinations in 2011, which was followed 
by Ghana International airport (Kotoka, Accra) with 22,082 flights to 23 destinations 
in the same year (Ghana Airport, 2013). Furthermore, only Lagos International 
Airport had direct traffic to other West African countries in 2010 as shown in Table 
4.5.  
5.6 Passengers’ Journey Purpose 
According to Vasigh, Tacker, & Fleming(2008), there are two major classes of trip 
purpose: business and leisure travellers; while Doganis (2010)further divided the 
pattern of air travel into business, leisure, visiting friends &relatives (VFR) and 
others. Furthermore, Shaw (2011) claimed that each class of passenger group shows a 
different characteristic attitude towards price change: leisure travellers are regarded as 
price sensitive, while business travellers, in most cases, are more concerned with 
frequency timing and convenience.  
Information on passenger journey purpose not only helps airlines in planning but also 
provides policy makers and other service providers with the information to predict the 
likely response of each class of passengers when certain policies or market strategies 
such as liberalisation are implemented. However, the questionnaire combined the 
VFR and leisure travellers in to one class of leisure travellers, which were clearly 
distinct from business travellers as shown in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 Journey Purpose 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid  N/A 3 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Business 370 73.7 73.7 74.3 
Leisure 129 25.7 25.7 100.0 
Total 502 100.0 100  
Source: Field survey (2011) 
There were γ70 passengers in the business travellers’ category representing 7γ.7 per 
cent of the sample, most of them travelling for the purpose of official assignments, or 
business trips, or pursuing education/training or religious pilgrimage. Meanwhile, 
only 129 passengers, representing 25.7 per cent, were visiting friends/relatives or 
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travelling for leisure purposes, with the majority of them being Diaspora Nigerians 
visiting friends/relatives at home, while 0.6 per cent did not respond to the question. 
Further analysis of journey purpose based on the passengers’ nationality is shown in 
Table 5.5 which indicates the same dominance of business passengers over leisure 
travellers in all nationalities except Middle East nationals, mostly Lebanese, who 
were discovered to be visiting friends and relatives in Nigeria or Lebanon.  
Table 5.5 Passenger's nationality against Journey purpose 
 Journey purpose Total 
 NA Business Leisure 
Passengers’ 
nationality 
American 0 8 2 10 
Asian 0 10 6 16 
British 0 6 5 11 
C/African 0 11 1 12 
Caribbean 0 0 1 1 
E/African 1 3 0 4 
European 0 6 2 8 
Middle East 0 2 9 11 
Nig 2 205 91 298 
S/African 0 31 3 34 
W/African 0 88 9 97 
Total 3 370 129 502 
     Source: Field survey (2011) 
Moreover, the three variables are summarized into one table that shows the interface 
between the journey’s purpose and country of residence in relation to the nationality, 
as depicted in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6 Nationality, Country of residence, and Journey purpose 
Passengers Business  Leisure/VFR Total 
Nigerian resident at home 189 64 253 
Nigerian resident abroad 34 28 62 
Foreign nationals resident in Nigeria 15 20 35 
Foreign nationals resident outside Nigeria 132 17 149 
Total 370 129 499 
Source: Field survey (2011)  
The finding of the dominance of business travellers over leisure travellers is as 
expected. This is because Nigeria is not a tourism destination country, and has not 
made significant development in tourism attraction infrastructure compared with 
countries like South Africa, Kenya and Egypt. Furthermore, the level of individual 
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income represented by per capita income in the country given by the World Bank as 
$1,452.00 per annum is not adequate enough to support a high level of leisure 
travelling. 
 
Figure 5.2 Cross tabulation Passengers’ nationality/country of residence; Source: Field 
survey (2011) 
However, cross-tabulation of the passengers’ nationality against country of residence 
of the passengers and travel purpose as depicted by Figure 5.2 indicates passengers 
resident in Nigeria constituted 50.97 per cent while Nigerian residents in Europe 
constituted 15.51 per cent, and other West African residents constituted 14.13 per 
cent, which was very close to the number of West African nationals. This confirms 
the assumption that the West African nationals were either in-transit or on missions to 
Nigeria, but resided in their respective countries. 
The pattern of dominance of the business travellers over leisure travellers was typical 
in the developed countries during the 1970s (Doganis, 2002). However, recent 
evidence shows the dominance of leisure travellers in developed countries. For 
instance, the survey of passenger profiles at five UK airports in 2010 by CAA shows 
the dominance of leisure travellers by 78 per cent to 22 per cent of business travellers.  
One interpretation of the data is that the dominance of business travellers in 
international traffic in the country indicates that the passengers were price insensitive 
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and concerned more about schedules and convenience of airlines that guarantees ease 
of flight availability. This finding corroborates the analysis of the secondary data 
collected on the country’s traffic which shows that price was not a factor in 
determining passenger traffic demand (see Chapter 6).  
Therefore, the research noted the ratio of this key segment of the international air 
market, whereby the research could use the information in predicting the reaction of 
each segment to the policy of liberalisation, if further implemented.  
Similarly, other African residence passengers constituted 14.4 per cent which nearly 
correlates with the number of other African nationals (13.02 per cent), indicating that 
most of them were on a mission to Nigeria or the West African region.   
5.7 Passengers’ Professions 
The occupations of the passengers in the market show different professional 
categories, namely BE (business & entrepreneur), CS (civil servant), retiree, students, 
and others (artists, athletes, consultants). The frequency distribution of the sample is 
shown in Table 5.7 below. 
Table 5.7 Passengers professions 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid  1 0.2 0.2 0.2 
BE 160 31.9 32.0 32.2 
CS 108 21.5 21.6 53.8 
Diplomat 10 2.0 2.0 55.8 
Others 150 29.9 30.0 85.8 
Retiree 11 2.2 2.2 88.0 
Student 60 12.0 12.0 100.0 
Total 500 99.6 100.0  
Missing 00 2 0.4   
Total 502 100.0   
Source: Field survey (2011) 
The occupation of the international passengers from a sample of 500 indicates that 
business/entrepreneurs constitute 31.9 per cent with 160 passengers in number. The 
group of other professionals comprising consultants, politicians, policy makers, 
sportsmen/athletes, artists and the rest constituted the next most significant category 
with 29.9 per cent with 150 passengers. Also, civil servants in both the public and 
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private sectors were equally significant in the distribution of international passengers, 
with 108 in number representing 21.5 per cent of the sample. This was followed by 
the student group, most of them Nigerians studying outside the country, particularly 
England, the USA and Malaysia, representing 12.0 per cent of the sample with 60 in 
number. There were also 11 retirees and 10 diplomats in the mix of passengers 
(Figure 5.3). 
 
Figure 5.3 Pax occupations; Source: Field survey (2011) 
Furthermore, in each group of professionals, the dominance of business travellers 
over leisure travellers was visibly noticeable. There was a disparity in the ratio of 
business and leisure travellers in the categories of the passengers’ profession. Under 
the business/entrepreneur group the ratio of passengers travelling for business purpose 
to that of leisure travellers was 83 per cent to 17 per cent, while under the group of 
others the ratio was 67 per cent to 33 per cent, respectively. 
It therefore means that substantial proportions of the passengers were businessmen, 
civil servants, students and others, constituting 96.35 per cent of the distribution. This 
also confirms the dominance of the socio-economic group in the configuration of 
international passengers in Nigeria. This group will be more interested in liberalised 
air traffic with respect to more frequent flight schedules and greater accessibility. 
Meanwhile, examination of the passengers’ profession across nationality shows the 
dominant pattern of business/entrepreneur, civil servant and others across all 
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nationalities. Moreover, most of the students in the market were from African 
countries except one British national as shown in Table 5.8 below 
Table 5.8 Passengers' Nationality and Profession 
 Passengers profession Total 
 BE CS Diplomat others Retiree student 
Passengers 
nationality 
American 0 5 2 0 3 0 0 10 
Asian 0 8 1 0 7 0 0 16 
British 0 6 3 0 1 0 1 11 
C/African 1 0 1 0 9 0 1 12 
Caribbean 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
E/African 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 4 
European 0 5 0 1 2 0 0 8 
M/East 0 6 2 0 2 0 1 11 
Nigerian 0 91 79 8 64 6 49 297 
S/African 0 8 12 0 9 0 5 34 
W/African 0 28 7 1 52 5 3 96 
Total 1 160 108 10 150 11 60 500 
Source: Field survey (2011) 
5.8 Passengers’ Current Job positions 
The profiles of the passengers also include their level of responsibility in the place of 
work, since the majority are business travellers from civil servants, businessmen and 
other professionals. The research classifies the various positions from top 
management, senior/middle level management, senior officers to junior cadre and 
others as shown in table 5.9 below. 
Table 5.9 Passengers' job position 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid N/A 92 18.7 18.7 18.7 
Junior 23 4.6 4.6 23.3 
S/Mdl mng 80 15.9 15.9 39.2 
Other 105 20.9 20.9 60.2 
Snr officer 87 17.3 17.3 77.5 
Top mng 113 22.5 22.5 100.0 
Total 502 100.0 100.0  
Source: Field survey (2011) 
From the sample, only 410 of the passengers disclosed their current status, of which 
113 of them were in top management, representing 22.5 per cent. This was followed 
by the others group (not defined) with 105 passengers representing 20.9 per cent. 
Additionally, senior officers among the passengers occupied the third hierarchy with 
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87 passengers in number which was 17.3 per cent. Also, senior and middle cadre 
management positions occupied the third hierarchy with 80 passengers, representing 
15.9 per cent. Lastly, passengers employed in junior cadre were 23 only, representing 
4.6 per cent, and 92 passengers did not disclose their position, representing 18.3 per 
cent of the distribution.  
 
Figure 5.4 Pax positions; Source: Field survey (2011) 
A cross-tabulation of the passengers current position against journey purpose shows 
that there were both leisure and business travellers in each category as shown in 
Figure 5.4 above. As observed earlier, the top management group leads the other 
groups in terms of size. Meanwhile, leisure travellers were greater in number in the 
group of others which comprise students and retirees that travel for holiday. 
5.9 Passengers’ Age Variable 
A total of 488 passengers responded to age enquiry which has a distribution pattern as 
shown in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.5 Pax Age distribution;Source: Field survey (2011) 
The survey discovered that the working age group dominated the travellers in the 
country. The working age ranged from 18 to 60 years of age with 488 passengers 
combined, which constituted 93.3 per cent of the distribution. The distribution also 
shows a similar pattern in both business and leisure travellers. The highest frequency 
age group was 31–45 years and was reflected in both leisure and business travellers. 
Also, the analysis approximately maintains the ratio of business travellers to leisure 
travellers to be 3 to 1 in both age groups, except in the first group (1–15 years) where 
there were three business travellers and two leisure travellers. However, the business 
travellers in the first group were students, and the leisure travellers were also students 
on holiday. There were only two business travellers in the last group, above 75 years 
old, with no leisure travellers. 
Table 5.10 Descriptive statistics of passengers’ age group 
 Stat Value  Leisure  Business  All Passengers 
Mean 40.4 39 39.4 
Median 40.6 39 39.2 
Mode 40.4 39 39.4 
Range 74 89 89 
Variance 187.1 181.2 189.9 
Std Deviation 13.68 13.46 13.78 
 
The descriptive analysis of the age distribution of the international passengers in the 
country from the survey depicts a near normal distribution pattern with mean, median 
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and mode all lying in the centre and nearly the same, as shown in Table 5.10. This 
was reflected in all the passengers as well as in the two groups of travellers.  
Also, the variance and standard deviation of all the passengers were found to be 189.9 
and 13.78 respectively. However, since the standard deviations across the various 
categories of travellers are small relative to the means, it therefore implies that the 
mean responses were reliable measures of the central tendency to infer about the 
average response of each category. Hence, the average age of international traveller in 
the country was 39–40 years for both leisure and business travellers.  
This implies that any policy on air transport to be taken by the government or the 
airline should be geared toward satisfaction or motivation of this age group. 
Therefore, understanding the needs of this group is paramount in formulating 
appropriate strategy and policy. 
5.10 Passengers’ Annual Income Level 
The importance of passenger’s income level in air transport cannot be 
overemphasized because it is the significant factor in the determination of air 
transport demand (Vasigh, et al., 2008). 
In the questionnaire, not all respondents were able to disclose their income level. 
Therefore, only 238 (representing 45.68 per cent) contributed in the income level 
questions as shown in Figure 5.6 below.  
 
Figure 5.6 Pax Annual Income level; Source: Field survey (2011) 
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The analysis indicated that passengers earning from 0 to $15,000 per annum 
constituted 41.3 per cent (128 passengers). This was followed by 86 passengers 
earning from $16,000 to $30,000, representing 27.7 per cent; while passengers 
earning from $31,000 to $50,000 were 47 in number, representing 15.2 per cent. Also, 
higher income earners (above $50,000 but less than $100,000) were just 32 in 
number, representing 10.3 per cent; while highest income earners (above $100,000 
per annum) comprised just 17 passengers only (5.5 per cent). This shows that a 
substantial proportion of the passengers (70 per cent) earn below $30,000 per annum. 
But for most business travellers, travel demand is not much affected by relative low 
incomes, because the travel expenses are usually paid by his employer (Doganis, 
2010). 
Table 5.11 Descriptive statistics of passengers income level in $ (000) 
Stat Value  Leisure  Business  All Passengers 
Mean 32.18 31.48 31.72 
Median 21.77 20.25 20.71 
Mode 11.11 11.37 11.29 
Range 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Variance 1247.58 1213.15 1224.36 
Std Deviation 35.32 34.83 34.99 
 
The distribution of the income data shows a skewed curve towards the left (0.998) 
with a mean distribution of $31,720 for all passengers. The mean income for leisure 
travellers was a bit higher than the mean of business travellers. There was a slight 
difference in the median of each group from the total, but the mode of the distribution 
was almost the same for each group. Hence, the average income of the Nigerian 
international traveller was $31,720 per annum. This is higher than the average GDP 
per capita of $2,200 estimated for 2007–11 by the World Bank. The huge disparity is 
as expected because, out of a population of 152 million from the 2006 census, only 
about 3 million people used international air travel in the year 2010, which is 
presumed to have higher income than the average of the country.  
The relationship between liberalisation and passengers’ income is that income enables 
passengers to afford tickets(Moselle, et al., 2002). Hence, all things being equal, a 
more liberal policy leads to a reduction in air fares which enables passengers to afford 
189 
 
more tickets from their income, most especially leisure travellers and some business 
travellers, such as travellers for religious purposes, medical research and education.  
Table 5.12 Nationality and Annual income of passengers 
 Passenger Annual income Total 
$0-
$15,000 
$16,000-
$30,000 
$31,000-
$50,000 
$51,000-
$100,000 
$101,-
$150,000 
Above 
$150,000 
Passengers 
nationality 
American 0 1 1 6 0 1 9 
Asian 3 1 1 0 0 0 5 
British 2 0 3 3 2 1 11 
C/African 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Caribbean 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
E/African 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 
European 1 1 0 1 2 0 5 
Nigeria 77 61 31 14 4 0 187 
S/African 9 2 1 1 0 0 13 
W/African 8 2 1 1 0 0 12 
Total 103 70 38 26 8 2 247 
Source: Field survey (2011) 
 
The major setback of the income analysis is the number of respondents of 247 which 
is less than the minimum sample size required of 384; consequently, it will be 
difficult to generalize the findings on income to the general population. 
5.11 Frequency of the Trip 
The various categories of response on the number of international flights made in the 
last three years is summarized and presented in Figure 5.7 below. 
 
Figure 5.7 Frequency of flights; Source: Field survey (2011) 
The number of trips made by passengers in the last three years indicated that 221 of 
them made 1–3 trips or an average of 2 trips in 3 years, which constituted 45.3 per 
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cent of the total distribution. This was followed by 104 travellers that had made 4–6 
trips in the last three years which corresponds to 23.9 per cent of the passengers; 
while the passengers that made 7–9 trips in three years were 43 in number, 
representing 9.8 per cent. The last group is for the most frequent travellers that made 
more than nine trips in the last three years with 98 respondents representing 21.02 per 
cent. 
Meanwhile, the frequency of travel by nationality of passengers shows that all 
nationalities have frequent travellers as well as non-frequent travellers as shown in 
Table 5.13. 
Table 5.13 Passengers' nationality against frequency of trip  
 Frequency of trips in 3 yrs Total 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Passengers 
nationality 
American 0 1 0 0 5 0 0 1 0 3  10 
Asian 0 4 0 1 6 0 0 0 0 5  16 
British 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 4  11 
C/African 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0  12 
Caribbean 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0  1 
E/African 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  2 
European 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 4  8 
Mid/ East 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 4  11 
Nigerian 5 113 15 9 42 9 3 21 1 59  278 
S/African 0 22 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 1  29 
W/African 0 46 1 3 14 1 0 6 0 18  89 
Total 5 200 16 16 78 10 3 39 1 98  467 
 Source: Field survey (2011) 
Therefore, the distribution had a mixed group of nationalities, with less frequent 
travellers (1-3 trips) constituting about 47.5 percent, while more frequent travellers 
with more than 1 trip per annum (4 and above) making up 52.5 percent. Also, in all 
the categories there were both leisure and business travellers.  
Table 5.14 Descriptive statistics of passengers' flight frequency 
Stat Value  Leisure  Business  All Passengers  
Mean 5.1 4.9 5  
Std Deviation 3.99 3.21 3.19  
 
From Table 5.14 above it can be seen that leisure travellers slightly travel more than 
business travellers, but the combined passengers mean was five trips per 3 years. This 
was supported by the value of standard deviation of 3.19 which was less than the 
mean value. 
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Therefore, more liberalised policy has a tendency to encourage more flight 
frequencies and additional airports for departure/landing as evident in the ASA (see 
section 5.2 above). Hence, this could provide a boost to the needs of business 
travellers whose concerns were convenient schedules and flight availability. 
Also, as other studies have shown, air liberalisation causes a drop in air fares, as is 
evident in the European market (Moselle, et al., 2002) Also, it is a known fact that 
leisure travellers are very sensitive to price, hence, the air fare reduction will 
encourage leisure travellers in the market to travel more and increase the frequency of 
flights, on the assumption that all things (such as income) remain equal. 
5.12 International Traffic 
5.12.1 Routes 
The journey profile of the passengers randomly selected in the survey indicates the 
routes, airlines, departure airports, and destination of the passengers. In this regard, 
only 490 passengers disclosed their journey profile out of a total of 502 passengers.  
The traffic routes specify the airline route from Nigeria to the country of first arrival 
which can be the final destination (for direct traffic) or transit airport (for indirect 
traffic). At the time of the survey, there were a total of 36 international routes for 
direct traffic to and from the four international airports in Nigeria.  
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Table 5.15 Traffic routes 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
  N/A 5 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Abidjan 3 0.6 0.6 1.6 
Accra 33 6.6 6.6 8.2 
Addis Ababa 51 11.0 9.8 17.9 
Amsterdam 37 7.4 7.4 25.3 
Cairo 15 2.8 2.8 28.1 
Cameron 35 7.0 7.0 35.1 
Congo 4 0.8 0.8 35.7 
Cotonou 4 0.8 0.8 36.5 
Doha 18 3.6 3.6 40.0 
Dubai 44 8.8 8.8 48.8 
Frankfurt 18 3.6 3.6 52.4 
Gambia 4 0.8 0.8 53.2 
Jeddah 26 5.2 5.2 58.6 
Lebanon 17 3.4 3.4 62.0 
Liberia 1 0.2 0.2 62.2 
London 74 14.7 14.7 76.9 
Nairobi 76 15.1 15.1 92.0 
Paris 3 0.6 0.6 92.6 
S/Africa 3 0.6 0.6 93.2 
Senegal 3 0.6 0.6 93.8 
Spain 2 0.4 0.4 94.2 
Togo 3 0.6 0.6 94.8 
Turkey 8 1.6 1.6 96.4 
USA 18 3.6 3.6 100.0 
Total 502 100.0 100.0  
Source: Field survey (2011) 
The random selection of passengers from each route is unevenly distributed which 
nearly reflects the market outlook, although the time of the survey affected the 
selection of routes because each airline has different schedule times. Hence, the 
selection of a high number of passengers on the Nairobi route was influenced by a 
concurrence of survey time and the schedule of the passengers travelling via that 
route. Meanwhile, other routes such as London, Dubai, Amsterdam, Addis Ababa, 
Accra and USA used to have a significant proportion of market passengers based on 
the secondary data for 2010 (NCAA, 2011). The choice of route by passenger is 
highly influenced by the choice of airline and the final destination. 
5.12.2 Direct and Indirect Traffic 
The research also found that the passengers were divided into two groups by the 
nature of their journey: while some passengers travel directly from a Nigerian airport 
to their final destination airport, other passengers travel via another country’s airport, 
as transit, before connecting to another flight to their destination. 
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Table 5.16 provides a summary of the frequency of the number of passengers on 
direct traffic routes against passengers travelling via transit.  
Table 5.16 Direct or Indirect traffic 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
  N/A 6 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Direct 269 53.6 53.6 54.8 
Indirect 227 45.2 45.2 100.0 
Total 502 100.0 100.0  
Source: Field survey (2011) 
The Table 5.16 shows the structure of the international market in the country, with 
269 passengers representing 53.6 per cent of direct traffic, while 227 passengers, 
equivalent of 45.2 per cent, were travelling via a connecting flight to another final 
destination, and six passengers did not provide any information about the nature of the 
travel. 
5.12.3 The Choice of Airline 
The patterns of the choice of airline mostly reflect the choice of routes, as shown in 
Table 5.17 below. This is due to the constraints of some ASAs where foreign airlines 
departing from Nigeria have to connect to their country first, except in the case of the 
fifth freedom being allowed in the agreement. Also, even for those carriers with fifth 
freedom right, the hub and spoke strategy makes them conveniently manage the 
traffic in this type of pattern (Doganis, 2010). 
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Table 5.17 Airline used 
Airline Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 N/A 4 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Air France 3 0.6 0.6 1.4 
Air Nig 26 5.2 5.2 6.6 
Arik 70 13.9 13.9 20.5 
Asky 42 8.4 8.4 28.9 
BA 6 1.2 1.2 30.1 
Delta 17 3.4 3.4 33.5 
Egypt 15 3.0 3.0 36.5 
Emirate 44 8.8 8.8 45.2 
Ethiopia 51 10.2 10.2 55.4 
Iberia 2 0.4 0.4 55.8 
Kenya Air 76 15.2 15.9 71.7 
KLM 37 7.4 7.4 79.1 
Lufthansa 18 3.6 3.6 82.7 
Max 26 4.8 4.8 87.5 
MEA 17 3.4 3.4 90.8 
Qatar Air 18 3.6 3.6 94.4 
SAA 3 0.6 0.6 95.0 
Turkish 8 1.6 1.6 96.6 
United A 1 0.2 0.2 96.8 
Vig Atlatic 10 2.0 2.0 98.8 
Vig Nig 6 1.2 1.2 100.0 
Total 502 100.0 100.0  
Source: Field survey (2011) 
 
Table 5.17 shows that from the total of 21 airlines used by the passengers in the 
survey only four were Nigerian indigenous carriers namely, Arik, Air Nig, Virgin Nig 
and Max Air with a combine passenger market share of 25.1%. The rest of about 74% 
of passengers were handled by foreign registered carriers. This shows that foreign 
carriers dominated the market as found in the secondary source in Table 4.5.  
In addition, airline passengers were examined according to the nature of the travel, 
and it was discovered that many airlines have more transit passengers than direct 
travellers. According to Table 5.18, Ethiopian Airlines, Kenya Airways, KLM, 
Lufthansa, Qatar Airways, and Turkish Air have more transit passengers than direct 
travellers to their hub, which confirms the travel pattern discovered in the secondary 
data. The traffic demand of these airlines was mostly influenced by the liberal ASAs 
which permitted them to lift indirect traffic passengers, while other factors such as 
GDP, trade and cultural links have more influence on the direct traffic. This is further 
confirmed by the nature of other airlines with a higher number of direct travellers 
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above the transiting travellers such as BA, Delta, Emirates, SAA and Virgin Atlantic. 
These airlines’ home countries have significant traffic demand to/from Nigeria due 
not only to some form of liberal ASAs but also to the influence of other factors such 
GDP, trade, and cultural links. 
Table 5.18 Airline used against traffic type 
 Traffic type Total 
 NA  Direct  Indirect 
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irl
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 N/A 4 0 0 4 
Air France 0 2 1 3 
Air Nigeria 0 26 0 26 
Arik 0 68 2 70 
Asky 0 35 7 42 
BA 0 5 1 6 
Delta 0 17 0 17 
Egypt 0 8 7 15 
Emirates 1 25 18 44 
Ethiopia 0 7 44 51 
Iberia 0 2 0 2 
Kenya Air 1 6 73 80 
KLM 0 1 36 37 
Lufthansa 0 4 14 18 
Max 0 24 0 24 
MEA 0 17 0 17 
Qatar Air 0 0 18 18 
SAA 0 3 0 3 
Turkish 0 2 6 8 
United Airlines 0 1 0 1 
Virgin Atlantic 0 10 0 10 
Virgin Nigeria 0 6 0 6 
Total 6 269 227 502 
Source: Field survey (2011) 
Further analysis of the market shows the patronage of the airlines by various 
nationalities as shown in Table 5.19 below. The nationality of various airline 
passengers came from different countries as expected, while Nigerian were found 
among each airline (except in MEA) due to the dominance of the Nigerians in the 
market.  In some cases, the nationality of the passenger has an influence in the choice 
of home carriers, as found in the MEA and Kenyan Airways passengers. Meanwhile, 
it is observed that the network carriers have patronage from all other nationals which 
might be due to accessibility, competition and airline alliance facilitated by 
liberalisation. For instance, the British nationals travelled with KLM, Arik, Virgin 
Atlantic and Kenyan Airways. 
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Table 5.19 Airline used against passengers' nationality 
 Passengers nationality Total 
US OA Br CA Cr EA EU M E Nig SA WA 
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 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 4 
Air France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 
Air Nig 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 13 0 11 26 
Arik 0 0 4 0 1 0 1 0 62 0 2 70 
Asky 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 6 0 27 42 
BA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 1 6 
Delta 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 17 
Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 11 0 1 15 
Emirate 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 0 3 44 
Ethiopia 0 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 38 0 6 51 
Iberia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Kenya  0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 24 34 17 80 
KLM 1 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 28 0 0 37 
Lufthansa 4 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 11 0 0 18 
Max 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 20 24 
MEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 7 17 
Qatar Air 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 0 0 18 
SAA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 
Turkish 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 8 
United  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Virg Atl 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 1 10 
Virg Nig 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 6 
Total 10 16 11 12 1 4 8 11 298 34 97 502 
Source: Field survey (2011)[US-American; OA-other Asians; Br-British, CA=central African; Cr-
Caribbean; EA-East African; EU-other European; ME-Middle East; Nig-Nigerian; SA-South African; WA-West 
African] 
 
It was also observed that convenience (flight time and cost) may have influenced 
some nationals in the choice of airline as the case of other Asian that chose mostly 
Emirate and Ethiopia Airways. Similarly, about 75% of other European nationals flew 
with KLM and Lufthansa.  It also, emerges that all of the American nationals flew by 
US carriers and European carriers. Therefore, it shows that Nigerian travellers have 
the opportunity to travel by any international network carriers of their choice due to 
availability, carriers’ network and convenience facilitated by liberalisation policy.   
5.12.4 Final Destination of the Passengers 
The number of final destinations was recorded as 53 countries from the 24 routes and 
carried by 21 airlines. The research discovered the final destinations of the passengers 
which show the following distribution frequency.  
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Table 5.20 Passengers' final destination 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
  N/A 6 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Abidjan 3 0.6 0.6 1.8 
Addis Ababa 5 1.0 1.0 2.8 
Amsterdam 2 0.4 0.4 3.2 
Barbados 1 0.2 0.2 3.4 
Botswana 25 5.0 5.0 8.4 
Burundi 3 0.6 0.6 9.0 
Cairo 2 0.4 0.4 9.4 
Cameron 29 5.8 5.8 15.1 
Canada 2 0.4 0.4 15.5 
China 27 5.4 5.4 20.9 
Congo 10 2.0 2.0 22.9 
Cotonou 3 0.6 0.6 23.5 
Denmark 2 0.4 0.4 23.9 
Dubai 51 10.2 10.2 34.1 
Egypt 5 1.0 1.0 35.1 
Frankfurt 4 0.8 0.8 35.9 
Gabon 7 1.4 1.4 37.1 
Gambia 4 0.8 0.8 37.8 
Ghana 33 6.6 6.6 44.6 
Guinea 1 0.2 0.2 44.8 
Hong Kong 5 1.0 1.0 45.8 
India 13 2.6 2.6 48.4 
Ireland 1 0.2 0.2 48.6 
Italy 4 0.8 0.8 49.4 
Kenya 7 1.4 1.4 50.8 
Korea 2 0.4 0.4 51.2 
Lebanon 18 3.6 3.6 54.8 
Liberia 1 0.2 0.2 55.0 
London 93 18.5 18.5 73.5 
Malaysia 3 0.6 0.6 74.1 
Manchester 1 0.2 0.2 74.3 
Mozambique 1 0.2 0.2 74.5 
Norway 1 0.2 0.2 74.7 
Pakistan 2 0.4 0.4 75.1 
Paris 2 0.4 0.4 75.5 
Poland 1 0.2 0.2 75.7 
Russia 1 0.2 0.2 75.9 
S/Africa 7 1.4 1.4 77.3 
S/Arabia 49 9.8 9.8 87.1 
Scotland 3 0.6 0.6 87.6 
Senegal 3 0.6 0.6 88.2 
Singapore 1 0.2 0.2 88.4 
Spain 2 0.4 0.4 88.8 
Swiss land 2 0.4 0.4 89.2 
Syria 1 0.2 0.2 89.4 
Thailand 1 0.2 0.2 89.6 
Togo 3 0.6 0.6 90.2 
Turkey 3 0.6 0.6 90.8 
Uganda 2 0.4 0.4 91.2 
Ukraine 3 0.6 0.6 91.8 
USA 39 7.8 7.8 99.6 
Zambia 1 0.2 0.2 99.8 
Zimbabwe 1 0.2 0.2 100.0 
Total 502 100.0 100.0  
Source: Field survey (2011) 
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The final destination of the passengers shows that substantial numbers of them were 
travelling to other destinations than the designated routes’ destination, which 
suggested that the passengers were in transit.  
The routes with a higher number of transit passengers than direct passengers include 
Nigeria–Qatar, Nigeria–Ethiopia, Nigeria–Kenya, Nigeria–Netherlands, Nigeria–
France, Nigeria–Germany and Nigeria–Turkey. 
The nature of the distribution of the passengers confirmed the secondary data pattern 
collected from IATA and the NCAA, which suggests significant passengers travel in 
transit to countries without direct traffic links to Nigeria such as India, China, 
Malaysia and others (shown in Tables 5.20 and 5.21)  
Meanwhile, with cross-tabulation the research explores the relationship between the 
airlines, the routes and the final destination as shown in the summary table below, 
while a full cross-tabulation is shown in the Appendix 8. 
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Table 5.21 Passengers distributions-routes, airlines, airports and destinations 
Route Depart Airports Airlines  Passengers Final Destinations 
Nig – UK ABV, LOS Arik, BA, Virgin 74 EU, NA 
Nig – Netherland ABV, LOS KLM 37 EU, NA 
Nig – Ghana LOS Arik, Air Nig 33 Ghana 
Nig – S/Arabia LOS Max Air 26 Saudi Arabia 
Nig – Germany ABV, LOS Lufthansa 18 EU, NA 
Nig – UAE LOS Emirates 44 ME, ASIA, PC 
Nig – Ethiopia ABV, LOS Ethiopian Air 51 Africa, ME, Asia 
Nig – Congo LOS AskyA 3 Africa 
Nig – Kenya LOS Kenya Air 76 Africa, ME, Asia 
Nig – Cameroun LOS Air Nigeria 35 Africa 
Nig – Qatar LOS Qatar airways 18 ME, ASIA, PC 
Nig – USA ABV, LOS Delta Air 18 NA, SA 
Nig – Egypt LOS Egypt Air 15 Africa, ME, Asia 
Nig – Turkey LOS Turkish Airline 8 EU, NA 
Nig – France LOS Air France 3 EU, NA 
Nig – Spain LOS Iberia 2 EU, SA 
Nig – S/Africa LOS SAA, Arik 3 Africa, Asia, Pc 
Nig – Côte d’Ivoire LOS Arik, Ethiopia 3 W Africa 
Nig – Senegal LOS Arik 3 W Africa 
Nig – Togo LOS AskyA 3 W Africa 
Nig – Gambia LOS Arik 4 W Africa 
Nig – Cotonou LOS AskyA 4  W Africa 
Nig – Liberia LOS Air Nigeria 1 W Africa 
 Source: Field survey (2011); [Key: ABV= Abuja International Airport; LOS= Lagos International 
Airport; EU= European countries; NA= North American; ME=Middle East countries; ASIA= Indian & 
Far East Asian countries: SA= South America; PC= Asian pacific; Africa= other African countries] 
Table 5.21 shows 23 routes which represent 67 per cent of the total routes in the 
market at the time of survey. The routes were similar to the 2010 market routes 
provided by NCAA as in Table 4.5. Therefore, this substantiates the origins and 
destinations of the traffic route data provided from the secondary source.  
Also, the Table 5.21 shows that 74 passengers were selected on the Nigeria–UK route 
both from Abuja airport and Lagos airport. The passengers were also travelling using 
all three carriers on the route: Arik Air (58 passengers), Virgin Atlantic Airline (10 
passengers) and BA (6 passengers). The final destinations of the route passengers 
were various cities in Europe (EU) and North America (NA), including cities in 
Europe where direct traffic from other airlines exists such as Paris. Also, further 
analysis of passenger’s final destination, as depicted in Table 5.21, indicated that the 
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total number of passengers travelling to the UK was greater than the direct route 
traffic in Table 5.18, which suggests that there were other passengers from indirect 
traffic airlines such as KLM, Lufthansa and Turkish airlines. Therefore, this 
corroborates the analysis of secondary data in Chapter Five, which discovered the 
web of competition by European network carriers in the Nigerian market. Also, 
another interpretation suggests some characteristics of business travellers concerned 
about flight availability and reservations in respect of convenience; and furthermore, 
there was the possibility of leisure travellers’ concern about cheap flights in respect of 
the inconvenience of stopovers.  
In addition, the 37 passengers chosen on the Nigeria–Netherlands route from both 
airports, Abuja and Lagos, used the only carrier on the route, KLM. However, for the 
final destination of the Netherlands, there were only three passengers staying in the 
country, which implies that the other 34 passengers were on transit to other European 
cities including those in the UK, and some of them had destinations in the USA.  
Moreover, the routes to Germany, Turkey, France and Spain, with 18, 8, 3, and 2 
passengers respectively had a single carrier on each route and operated by their 
countries’ national carrier. These routes had a similarity with the Netherlands route in 
terms of traffic destination countries in Europe and North America. In addition, Iberia 
Airlines on the Spain route carried passengers destined for South American countries. 
Therefore, this also confirms the competition among carriers on the European routes. 
Meanwhile, passengers travelling to Middle East (ME), Asian and Pacific (PC) 
countries from the survey were observed to follow the Dubai route, the Qatar route, 
the Turkey route and the Kenya and Ethiopia route. That suggests the airlines on these 
route were also in competition as noticed in section 6.5. Moreover, substantial 
numbers of passengers on these routes were in transit to other countries such as 
China, India, Malaysia, Hong Kong, S/Korea and Singapore; for instance, Qatar 
Airways had 18 passengers, but none of them had Qatar as their final destination.  
The survey also discovered the passengers travelling on some of the African carriers, 
namely Kenya Airways, Ethiopia Airlines, Egypt Air and South African Airways 
were destined for other African, Asian and Middle East countries. This was evident 
from 76 Kenya airline passengers where 32 of them were travelling to Botswana, two 
201 
 
to the UK and five to Saudi Arabia. Also 51 of the passengers on Ethiopia Airlines 
were on transit to China, Dubai, India and other African countries.  
The survey found that the route to West African countries such as Ghana, Senegal and 
Côte d’Ivoire had mainly Nigerian carriers, namely Arik and Air Nigeria. Some of the 
passengers on the route were in transit for connection with other network carriers at 
Lagos Airport which provides a hub for West African travellers.  
5.13 Rationale for Choosing Carrier 
Closely related with the pattern of routes is the choice of airlines, where passengers 
selected airlines based on the availability of the flights on the routes. But, as 
discovered in the survey, most of the routes had only one carrier operating which 
suggests market monopoly. However, modern airline business and liberalisation 
policies facilitated competition on the route networks in respect of direct or indirect 
traffic by network carriers. As a result, passengers have a choice of carriers for most 
of their journeys.  
The decision by passengers to choose a particular carrier was based on individual 
priority (in terms of time and cost) as well the quality of airline services offered. 
However, the research sought the three top passenger priorities from seven identified 
common rationales needed by travellers, namely: air fare; schedule (airport, timing, 
frequency, and punctuality); convenience (reservation, capacity, seat availability); 
safety reputation; frequent flyer programme; promotion/advertisements; comfort 
(aircraft type, meals, entertainment). The frequency output of passengers’ first priority 
is depicted below in Table 5.22. 
Table 5.22 First reason for chosen a carrier 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid  N/A 225 44.8 44.8 44.8 
Brand name 5 1.0 1.0 45.8 
Convenience  27 5.4 5.4 51.2 
Comfort 4 .8 .8 52.0 
Fare 153 30.5 30.5 82.5 
FFP 10 2.0 2.0 84.5 
Promotion 5 1.0 1.0 85.5 
Safety 18 3.6 3.6 89.0 
Schedule 55 11.0 11.0 100.0 
Total 502 100.0 100.0  
Source: Field Survey (2011) 
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Table 5.22 shows that 225 passengers did not indicate their first priority for reason 
known to them, while 153 passengers, representing 30.5 per cent of the sample, 
agreed with air fare as their main concern in selecting a carrier for the journey. 
Moreover, 55 passengers indicated airline schedules as their top most priority, and 27 
passengers gave convenience as their main interest. Also, 18 passengers chose safety 
and ten chose frequent flyer programme, while airline promotion and brand name 
attracted five passengers each, and comfort was first priority for only four passengers. 
After the choice of first priority, passengers also made a choice of the second factors 
influencing patronage of the airline after the first priority, as shown in Table 5.23 
below.  
Table 5.23 Second reasons for chosen a carrier 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid  N/A 271 54.0 54.0 54.0 
Brand name 7 1.4 1.4 55.4 
Convenience 69 13.7 13.7 69.1 
Comfort 12 2.4 2.4 71.5 
Fare 23 4.6 4.6 76.1 
FFP 10 2.0 2.0 78.1 
Promotion 4 0.8 0.8 78.9 
safety 47 9.4 9.4 88.2 
Schedule 59 11.8 11.8 100.0 
Total 502 100.0 100.0  
Source: Field Survey (2011) 
Table 5.23 shows that 13.7 per cent of the sample accepted flight convenience as the 
second priority for selecting a carrier. This was followed by 59 passengers (11.8 per 
cent) deciding for airline schedule, while safety concern was decided by 47 
passengers (9.4 per cent). However, 271 passengers representing 54 per cent did not 
decide their second priority. 
 
The third priority of the passengers among these factors is shown in Table 5.24.  
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Table 5.24 Third reason for chosen a carrier 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid  N/A 290 57.8 57.8 57.8 
Brand name 13 2.6 2.6 60.4 
Convenience 42 8.4 8.4 68.7 
Comfort 47 9.4 9.4 78.1 
Fare 22 4.4 4.4 82.5 
FFP 17 3.4 3.4 85.9 
Promotion 9 1.8 1.8 87.6 
Safety 42 8.4 8.4 96.0 
Schedule 20 4.0 4.0 100.0 
Total 502 100.0 100.0  
Source: Field Survey (2011) 
In the selection of third priority for considering a carrier for the journey, comfort 
came on top with 9.4 per cent, followed by convenience and safety with 8.4 per cent 
each. However, the number of passengers not having third priority was 57.8 per cent, 
which is higher than the number without first and second priority. This suggests the 
possibility that many passengers only consider one or two topmost priorities. Also, the 
priority for the comfort option as the leading third priority, while the same option is 
the least considered factor in the first priority suggests an inverse relationship that is 
difficult to explain for the study. However, other factors such as air fare, schedule, 
convenience and safety show consistent trends in priority selection by the passengers. 
However, in order to evaluate the eight rationales based on the priority order, the 
research ranked them using three Likert scale decisions where first priority is given 3 
points, the second priority is given 2 points and the third priority is scored 1 point. 
The research compared the tables, aggregated the score for each rationale, and ranked 
them based on total score as shown in Table 5.25 below.  
Table 5.25 Aggregate weights for each rationale 
 First 
priority X (3 
score) 
2nd priority 
X (2 score) 
3rd Priority 
X (1 score) 
Cumulative Weight 
Valid Brand name 5 (3) 7(2) 13 (1) 42 
Convenience  27(3) 69(2) 42(1) 261 
Comfort 4(3) 12(2) 47(1) 83 
Fare 153(3) 23(2) 22(1) 527 
FFP 10(3) 10(2) 17(1) 67 
Promotion 5(3) 4(2) 9(1) 32 
Safety 18(3) 47(2) 42(1) 190 
Schedule 55(3) 59(2) 20(1) 303 
Source: Field survey (2011) 
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Air fare was rated topmost priority with a total weight score of 527; this was followed 
by schedule (airport, timing and frequency) with a score of 303, while flight 
convenience (reservation, capacity, and available seat) came third with 261. The 
fourth position with a score of 190 was safety, followed by comfort with 83 average 
score. Also, frequent flyer programme (FFP) of various airlines occupied sixth 
position with a score of 67, while brand name of the airline was in seventh position 
with 42 aggregate weight score, and lastly, promotion and advertisement occupied the 
lowest rated rationale with a score of 57. The result may be due to the high percentage 
of business travellers in the market, the level of income, and profession of the 
passengers, as well as airline competition. One interpretation of high priority for air 
fare is that it is the common need of all passengers. For instance, business travellers 
will go for the best price deal if there are alternative airline schedules for their trip, 
which means it is the second criteria for business travellers; while, leisure travellers’ 
priority is the best deal to their destination from the available airline. 
Also, the high score for schedule and convenience is justified because it is a very 
sensitive demand for business travellers that dominate the market. But the average 
score for safety may not be surprising because airline safety has recently become 
homogenous and standardized and, as such, travellers regard all airlines in terms of 
safety with little difference.  
However, a low score for comfort, regarded as a need of leisure travellers, was due to 
the proportion of leisure travellers among the passengers. 
Promotion and advertisements could only entice passengers into the market if the 
airline was to offer unique incentives such as fares different from others. Therefore, a 
possible interpretation is that there may have been airlines in the market at the time 
that did not offer any adequate incentives to customers, or even if there were 
incentives, the message had not reached the potential customers. 
The score for FFP in the market may be connected with the reasonable number of 
frequent travellers in the market, the research having discovered that passengers in the 
market made an average of five trips in three years, which was enough to qualify them 
for any airline FFP. However, the low score of FFP may be attributed to lack of 
commitment or awareness of the programme by the passengers in the market despite 
the average of 5 trips in three years. 
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However, a significant proportion of the respondents, at least 225 representing 44% of 
the sample did not specify any of the priority, may be none of the seven factors listed 
meet their concern when selecting a carrier.  
5.14 Analysis of the Hypotheses 
A nonparametric test was conducted to test the null hypothesis using one sample chi 
square test across all the variables. In this case, all the variables involved are 
measured and relationships are examined as shown in Table 5.26 below. The 
probability of obtaining such a relationship if there were no relationship in the 
population means the null hypothesis would be true. 
Table 5.26 Hypothesis testing of the variables 
 Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
1 The categories of Passenger nationality 
occur with equal probabilities 
One-Sample, Chi-
Square Test 
.000 Reject the null 
hypothesis 
2 The categories of Country of Residence 
occur with equal probabilities 
One-Sample Chi-Square 
Test 
.000 Reject the null 
hypothesis 
3 The categories of Passenger profession 
occur with equal probabilities 
One-Sample Chi-Square 
Test 
.000 Reject the null 
hypothesis 
4 The categories of Passenger position 
occur with equal probabilities 
One-Sample Chi-Square 
Test 
.000 Reject the null 
hypothesis 
5 The categories of Departing Airport 
occur with equal probabilities 
One-Sample Chi-Square 
Test 
.000 Reject the null 
hypothesis 
6 The categories of Final destination 
country occur with equal probabilities 
One-Sample Chi-Square 
Test 
.000 Reject the null 
hypothesis 
7 The categories of Via occur with 
equal probabilities 
One-Sample Chi-Square 
Test 
.000 Reject the null 
hypothesis 
8 The categories of Direct or Indirect 
traffic occur with equal probabilities 
One-Sample Chi-Square 
Test 
.000 Reject the null 
hypothesis 
9 The categories of Airline used occur 
with equal probabilities 
One-Sample Chi-Square 
Test 
.000 Reject the null 
hypothesis 
10 The categories of Journey purpose 
occur with equal probabilities 
One-Sample Chi-Square 
Test 
.000 Reject the null 
hypothesis 
11 The categories of First Reason for 
selecting carrier occur with equal 
probabilities 
One-Sample Chi-Square 
Test 
.000 Reject the null 
hypothesis 
12 The categories of Second Reason for 
selection occur with equal probabilities 
One-Sample Chi-Square 
Test 
.000 Reject the null 
hypothesis 
13 The categories of Third Reason occur 
with equal probabilities 
One-Sample Chi-Square 
Test 
.000 Reject the null 
hypothesis 
14 The distribution of Passenger age is 
normal with mean 3.099 and Standard 
deviation 0.889. 
One-Sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Test 
.000 Reject the null 
hypothesis 
15 The distribution of Passenger annual 
income is normal with mean 2.077 and 
standard deviation 1.189. 
One-Sample 
Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov Test 
.000 Reject the null 
hypothesis 
16 The distribution of Frequency of trip in 
3 yrs is normal with mean 4.942 and 
standard deviation 3.273. 
One-Sample, 
Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov Test 
.000 Reject the null 
hypothesis 
 
206 
 
Table 5.26 shows that for the hypothesis in the first variable we reject the null 
hypothesis which assumed that the categories of the passenger’s nationality occurred 
with equal probability at significance value (p < 0.005). Similarly, the null hypothesis 
of the passenger’s nationality occurring at equal probability is rejected at significance 
value (p<0.005). Also, the null hypothesis that assumed all the various variables 
occurred with equal probability at significance value (p < 0.005) is rejected.  
Table 5.27 Summary of descriptive statistics of the nominal variables 
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. 
Error 
Statistic Std. 
Error 
Passenger age 497 3.10 0.889 0.359 0.110 -.156 0.219 
Passenger annual 
income 
247 2.08 1.189 0.993 0.155 .260 0.309 
Frequency of trip in 3 
yrs 
467 4.94 3.273 0.685 0.113 -.684 0.225 
Valid N (list wise) 230       
 
The other three nominal variables were tested with one sample using a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, which also corroborated skewness and kurtosis values as in Table 5.27 
above. In this regard, the distribution of passenger’s age is normal with mean value of 
3.099 and standard deviation of 0.889 at significance level as depicted by Table 5.27. 
Hence, there is no evidence to reject the claims that the sample population is normally 
distributed. Similarly, the distribution of passenger’s annual income is normal with a 
mean value of 2.0777 and standard deviation of 1.189; consequently, the null 
hypothesis is rejected. Also, the passenger’s frequency of travel in three years is 
normally distributed with mean value of 4.942 and standard deviation of 3.274, thus; 
as a result, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
5.15 Summary of the Chapter 
The chapter has presented and analysed the primary data collected for the research, 
with the aim of determining the socio-economic characteristics of passengers in 
Nigerian international air transport markets. Also, the primary data validate and 
complement certain information missing in the secondary data namely; passenger 
profile, journey purpose, and a rationale for selecting carriers. Accordingly, the 
chapter analysed the data using descriptive and bivariate analysis. 
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The analysis of the passenger survey strengthened the findings of the secondary data 
analysis such as competition among the carriers, routes and destinations. But the key 
discoveries in the analysis include the ratio of business travellers to that of leisure 
travellers, found to be 3 to 1, while Nigerian travellers constituted about 63 per cent 
of the passenger market.  
Furthermore, the survey revealed that more than half of the passengers were civil 
servants and business entrepreneurs of which a substantial number were in top 
management positions. The average annual income of passengers was evaluated at 
$31,720, and the mean number of trips by passengers in the market was five trips over 
three years (2009-11). The survey also found that competition provided the 
passengers with different options for most of their flights, of which passengers made a 
choice based on three top priorities: air fare, flight convenience and schedule. The 
data were validated with appropriate statistical tests at the 95 per cent significance 
level which suggests that the analysis’ conclusion is also valid. 
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Chapter Six: Analysis of Liberalisation Impacts 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter estimates the impact of liberalisation in Nigeria’s international air traffic 
by developing an empirical model that explains the relationship between the 
dependent variable (traffic demand) and the independent variables including 
liberalisation, using multiple regression techniques as described in Chapter 3. The 
chapter analysis is aimed at achieving the fourth and fifth objectives of the research 
which include determining the impacts of liberalisation on traffic demand and 
passenger welfare in the market, and evaluating the impacts of further liberalizing 
market access and carrier ownership. 
The impacts of liberalisation will be assessed by forecasting a change in traffic 
demand; as indicated in the literature review (Chapter 2), ASAs are said to stimulate 
the performance of traffic demand. 
The first section calibrates the model of the research which also involves analysis 
using descriptive, correlation and ANOVA tests. In addition, all the output parameters 
of multiple regressions such as the coefficients of the model are interpreted and 
discussed, while the model undergoes appropriate statistical tests to ascertain its 
validity.  
In the second section of the chapter, the research applies a gravity-type model to 
forecast future traffic demand and its impact when current regulations are further 
liberalised in the Nigerian international air market. Estimated future traffic is 
determined for the top 20 country destinations. Furthermore, as a result of traffic 
changes in the market, other market variables would be affected. Therefore, the 
research estimates the likely impact of traffic change on the market average air fare as 
well as consumer savings or welfare. The expected traffic increases are examined 
against airport designed capacities so as to avoid imbalance between the demand and 
supply of critical infrastructure capacity.  
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6.2 Analysis of results and empirical model development 
6.2.1 Calibration of the model 
A cross-sectional analysis was carried out as the model is capable of expressing a 
relationship between traffic, the level of liberalisation and the socio-economic 
conditions between a country-pair within a specific period of time (InterVISTAS-ga2, 
2006). The database of variables comprises: passenger traffic volume, aggregate GDP 
($), international trade (export and import values in $), level of liberalisation index, 
average air fares ($), distance (km), and a dummy variable (as a proxy for common 
language/cultural relations). 
The observations are from a sample of 137 countries representing over 95 per cent of 
international traffic to/from Nigeria in 2010. In multiple regression analysis, a larger 
sample enhances reliability especially where it involves several independent variables 
like this case. In this regard, Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black (1998) suggested that  
sample size ratio to number of independent variables should be at least 10 – 15, while 
Field (2009) recommended that for five predictor variables there should be at least 
109 observations in a sample for reliability. Therefore, in this case the sample size of 
137 countries should be reliable for the analysis.  
The research employs multiple regressions on Ordinary Least Square (OLS) with the 
aid of SPSS. The regression procedure used for the analysis is stepwise regression. 
Stepwise regression is a statistical method for selecting the most significant 
independent variables from any given set of variables, rejecting or excluding the 
variables that are not making any significant impact on the dependent variable 
(Draper & Smith, 1981). However, to verify the findings of stepwise, the analysis also 
employed the ‘enters’ method which confirms the findings. Enter method unlike 
stepwise, does not reject or exclude any variable that makes no significant impact, but 
rather analyse each variable according to its significance contribution. 
In order to meet the assumptions of multiple linear regressions the data on passenger 
traffic, aggregate GDP, and trade had to be transformed to logarithms from their 
linear values. However, the final analysis excluded air fare as an independent variable 
from the model. This may not be unconnected to the high correlation between air fare 
and distance variable as shown in the correlation matrix Table 7.3. As certain theories 
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suggest the two variables are highly correlated, using them together can cause 
multicollinearity concerns, and sometimes each one serves as a proxy to the others 
(Piermartini & Rousova 2008; Vasigh, Tacker, & Fleming, 2008). Therefore, it was 
decided to use a distance variable instead of air fare for the analysis, because it 
contributes statistically at a significant value as shown in the model parameter in 
Table 6.6 with a t stat value of –3.741 (p<.005), while air fare did not make a 
statistically significant contribution with a t value lying between –1.0 and 0.0 ( 
p>.005). This suggests that the traffic demand was inelastic which was confirmed by 
the field survey. The output of the results is presented as follows: 
6.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The output of Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 indicates that the analysis made used only 112 
out of the 137 countries, due to incomplete data for some countries for some of the 
variables. In this regard, only 112 countries have complete data on all the variables. 
The output shows the mean and the standard deviation of each variable. 
Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics of Real Values 
 
 N Minimum Maximum (Million) Mean (Million) 
Std. 
Deviation(Million) 
PaxTraffic 132 36 0.393 0.013 0.0413 
Agg GDP($) 132 2.0X1011 100000 656000 1500000 
Trade ($) 112 2703 23400 742 24800 
Valid N (list wise) 112     
 
Table 6.1 shows that average passenger traffic volume was 12,650 for each country-
pair out of 132 countries used with a standard deviation of 41,255.63 due to the wide 
range of data from a maximum of 392,528 to a minimum of 36 passengers. Also, the 
mean and standard deviation of aggregate GDP and Trade ($) have a similar pattern to 
passenger traffic. However, these three variables were transformed in order to meet 
the assumption of multiple regressions for valid analysis which gives rise to other 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis as depicted in Table 6.2.  
 
 
 
211 
 
Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics of the variable used 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
LnPax 7.43102 2.142816 112 
LnGDP 26.65531 .868196 112 
LnTrade 17.10917 3.533296 112 
Air Fare($) 874.37 483.820 112 
Distance(KM) 7205.25 3986.131 112 
Air Lib Index 4.21 8.898 112 
Lang/Culture Link .31 .464 112 
 
Table 6.2 shows the average number of passengers in log form (LnPax) is 7.43102 
with a standard deviation (SD) of 2.142816. Also, the mean aggregate GDP in log 
form is 26.65531 and Standard deviation is 0.868196. The liberalisation index has an 
average value of 4.β1 with SD of 8.898 from the 11β countries’ observations, while 
the average of Trade in log form is 17.10917 with SD of 3.533296. 
6.2.3 Correlations Matrix 
Table 6.3 indicates the value of the Pearson correlation coefficient (r) between each 
pair of variables. This tested the issue of the multicollinearity problem. Almost all the 
independent variables are not highly correlated, so there is no cause for 
multicollinearity concern. Field (2001) estimated that  r coefficient greater than 0.7 is 
a concern. From the table, air fare and distance have the highest value of r=0.84 which 
may likely cause a multicollinearity problem if used together. This confirms the 
suggestion of many studies where distance was sometimes used as a proxy for air 
fare. Also, lnGDP and trade has a moderate correlation 0.602, likewise ALI and 
Distance with r =-.552. These moderate correlations have the potential for 
multicollinearity concern.  Meanwhile, the other independent variables do not have a 
high value of r that can cause any concern. Most of the correlations are statistically 
significant (p<0.05) for the 11β countries’ observations. Therefore, the variables have 
met one of the conditions of the multiple regressions. 
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Table 6.3 Correlations matrix 
 
 lnPax lnGDP LnTrade 
Air 
Fare($) Distance(KM) 
Air Lib 
Index 
Lang/Culture 
Link 
Pearson 
Correlation 
lnPax 1.000 .552 .638 -.218 -.265 .567 .298 
lnGDP .552 1.000 .602 .319 .282 .048 .007 
LnTrade .638 .602 1.000 .067 .069 .180 .101 
Air Fare($) -.218 .319 .067 1.000 .844 -.461 .029 
Distance(KM) -.265 .282 .069 .844 1.000 -.552 .067 
Air Lib Index .567 .048 .180 -.461 -.552 1.000 .162 
Lang/Culture 
Link 
.298 .007 .101 .029 .067 .162 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) lnPax . .000 .000 .010 .002 .000 .001 
lnGDP .000 . .000 .000 .001 .309 .469 
LnTrade .000 .000 . .241 .236 .028 .146 
Air Fare($) .010 .000 .241 . .000 .000 .381 
Distance(KM) .002 .001 .236 .000 . .000 .242 
Air Lib Index .000 .309 .028 .000 .000 . .044 
Lang/Culture 
Link 
.001 .469 .146 .381 .242 .044 . 
N lnPax 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
lnGDP 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
LnTrade 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
Air Fare($) 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
Distance(KM) 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
Air Lib Index 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
Lang/Culture 
Link 
112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
 
Table 6.3 shows that airfare and distance variables have a negative correlation with 
traffic demand while the other variables show a positive correlation with traffic 
demand as expected. However, the entire predictors variables are reasonably 
correlated with the dependent variable with Lntrade having the highest correlation 
(r=0.638) and air fare having the least value r= –0.218. This suggests that the 
predictors are related to the dependent variables and can be used to predict them with 
the appropriate model. 
6.2.4 Overall Model Summary 
The model summary in table 6.4 shows how the model is successful in predicting 
passenger traffic demand. A stepwise technique is used in formulating the best model. 
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In this regard, five different models are estimated. The forward stepwise increased the 
number of variables used in the model until the R2 coefficient starts decreasing.   
 
Table 6.4 Model Summary 
 
Model 
R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 
1 .638a .407 .401 1.66047 
2 .793b .629 .622 1.31873 
3 .823c .678 .669 1.23476 
4 .851d .725 .714 1.14695 
5 .885e .783 .772 1.02397 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade 
b. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index 
c. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index, lnGDP 
d. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index, lnGDP, Lang/Culture Link 
e. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index, lnGDP, Lang/Culture Link, Distance(KM) 
f. Dependent Variable: lnPax 
 
 
The first model selected the liberalisation index only as the predictor variable which 
was able to explain 63.8 per cent (R) of the model. The second model (2) added 
LnTrade index to the first model and was able to cause 79.3 per cent of the LnPax. 
These continue until the fifth model which is considered as the best overall model 
explaining 88.5 per cent (R) of the relationship after including all the possible 
predictors variables, with the exception of air fare. The rejection of air fare was 
automatically made by the stepwise approach which suggested that air fare has no 
statistical contribution to the dependent variable. This was also confirmed by another 
method, the entered approach, which gives the value of t-stat of air fare below 1.0 and 
p> 0.05, which justified the exclusion of the variable statistically. 
The best model has a corresponding value of R2 of 78.3 per cent, which measures the 
variability in the outcome accounted for by the predictors. That means GDP, trade, 
liberalisation index, air fare, and language/cultural association were able to account 
for 78.3 per cent of the traffic volume between Nigeria and any other country by air. 
However, the remaining 21.7 per cent is accounted for by error terms and other 
random events. 
Adjusted R2 of 0.772 gives the idea of how the model can be generalized. Ideally, the 
adj-R2 should be very close or equal to the value of R2 for a model to qualify for 
generalization. In this case the difference is 0.783 – 0.772 = 0.011 (1.1 per cent), and 
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is a very small shrinkage, which means if the model were derived from the population 
rather than a sample it would account for approximately 1 per cent less variance in the 
outcome. It also proves that cross-validity of the model is very good (Field, 2005). 
6.2.5 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
The ANOVA indicates that the model is a significant fit of the data overall if the 
significance value is less than 0.05. Table 6.5 is the ANOVA of the model. The F-
ratio represents the ratio of the improvement in the prediction as a result of fitting the 
model relative to the inaccuracy that still exists in the model.  
Table 6.5 ANOVA 
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 208.050 1 208.050 75.458 .000a 
Residual 303.286 110 2.757   
Total 511.336 111    
2 Regression 321.779 2 160.890 92.516 .000b 
Residual 189.557 109 1.739   
Total 511.336 111    
3 Regression 346.676 3 115.559 75.795 .000c 
Residual 164.660 108 1.525   
Total 511.336 111    
4 Regression 370.579 4 92.645 70.426 .000d 
Residual 140.757 107 1.315   
Total 511.336 111    
5 Regression 400.194 5 80.039 76.336 .000e 
Residual 111.142 106 1.049   
Total 511.336 111    
a. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade 
b. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index 
c. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index, lnGDP 
d. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index, lnGDP, Lang/Culture Link 
e. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index, lnGDP, Lang/Culture Link, Distance(KM) 
f. Dependent Variable: lnPax 
 
From the last model in Table 6.5, the F-ratio is 76.336 (p<0.005), which is much 
greater than the critical F (6, 113) value of 2.16 at 0.05 significance from the standard 
F-table. Therefore, the model has statistically significantly improved the ability to 
predict the outcome (klienbaum, 1988). It also provides evidence of the existence of a 
linear relationship between the passenger traffic demand and the five explanatory 
variables. 
6.2.6 Model Parameters 
Table 6.6 of the output shows the model parameters for both steps in the hierarchy. 
The last step is the chosen model. The Beta (B) values designate the relationship 
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between traffic demand and each predictor. If the value is positive or negative, it 
indicates a relationship. Also, the B value suggests the degree each predictor affects 
the outcome if all other variables are held constant. Each coefficient has an associated 
standard error indicating the extent the values would vary across different samples. 
Field (2009) suggested that if the t-test associated with a coefficient is less than -2.0 
or greater than +2.0, while the p value is less than 0.05, then the predictor is making a 
significant contribution to the model. Also, the smaller the p value the greater the 
contribution of the predictor (if t value is large enough). In this case, all the p values 
are 0.000, LnGDP makes the biggest contribution, followed by air lib index then trade 
and language/cultural link, while distance make the smallest contribution.  
The standardized coefficient values indicate the number of standard deviations that 
the outcome will change as a result of one standard deviation change in the predictor. 
All the standardized beta values are measured in standard deviation units and so are 
directly comparable.  
Table 6.6  Coefficients 
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta 
Zero-
order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .772 .784  .984 .327      
LnTrade .389 .045 .638 8.687 .000 .638 .638 .638 1.000 1.000 
2 (Constant) 1.559 .630  2.474 .015      
LnTrade .316 .037 .518 8.618 .000 .638 .637 .502 .940 1.064 
Air Lib Index .120 .015 .487 8.098 .000 .614 .613 .472 .940 1.064 
3 (Constant) -14.772 4.106  -3.597 .000      
LnTrade .215 .043 .352 5.031 .000 .638 .436 .275 .610 1.639 
Air Lib Index .121 .014 .491 8.714 .000 .614 .643 .476 .939 1.065 
lnGDP .678 .169 .275 4.019 .000 .552 .361 .219 .638 1.568 
4 (Constant) -16.109 3.791  -4.250 .000      
LnTrade .194 .040 .317 4.898 .000 .638 .428 .246 .602 1.662 
Air Lib Index .115 .013 .467 8.965 .000 .614 .655 .451 .930 1.075 
lnGDP .729 .156 .296 4.686 .000 .552 .413 .236 .634 1.577 
Lang/Culture 
Link 
1.050 .232 .231 4.528 .000 .332 .401 .228 .970 1.031 
5 (Constant) -21.629 3.583  -6.037 .000      
LnTrade .184 .036 .301 5.147 .000 .638 .447 .233 .600 1.667 
Air Lib Index .084 .013 .341 6.410 .000 .614 .529 .290 .726 1.378 
lnGDP .985 .149 .400 6.616 .000 .552 .541 .300 .562 1.780 
Lang/Culture 
Link 
1.202 .211 .264 5.696 .000 .332 .484 .258 .951 1.052 
Distance(KM) .000 .000 -.275 -5.088 .000 -.265 -.443 -
.230 
.702 1.425 
a. Dependent Variable: lnPax 
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The unstandardized coefficient in the fifth model represents the estimated values of 
beta (ȕ) and these values indicate the individual contribution of each predictor to the 
model. The model is mathematically expressed as;                                                                                                                     -------------------   (6.1) 
The coefficients indicate the relationship between passenger traffic demand (Pax) and 
each other predictor. The constant/intercept value and the distance coefficients show 
an inverse relationship with passenger traffic, while GDP, trade, air liberalisation 
index, and dummy coefficients show a positive relationship with passenger traffic 
demand. The air fare variable is systematically excluded in the model for not 
contributing statistically to the dependent variable. Though the model recognizes the 
contribution of the distance variable in the model, the actual coefficient of 0.00014 is 
very insignificant to be reckoned in the model, unless the distance is below 1000km. 
Also, the insignificant contribution of air fare and distance validate the high 
correlation of the two variables (output Table 6.3). All the coefficients show the signs 
that are predicted based on theory and some previous studies. 
6.2.7 Model Coefficients Values 
The coefficients’ values indicate each predictor’s effects on passenger traffic if other 
predictors are held constant. Further analysis of the impact of each variable in the 
model is as follows: 
6.2.7.1 Intercept/constant 
The negative intercept of ȕ0 = -21.629 means it is possible in certain situations that there 
may be zero passenger demand by air between Nigeria and some countries, which is 
possible in reality. 
The t stat value of –6.037 (p<0.005) means that it is making a significant contribution 
to the model.  
This implies that –21.629 is the unconditional expected mean of the log of passenger 
traffic. Therefore, the actual value is expected to be (exponential of –21.629) = 0.4 X 
10-9.This is the geometric mean of passengers. The emphasis here is the geometric 
mean instead of the arithmetic mean. OLS regression of the original variable y is used 
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to estimate the expected arithmetic mean and OLS regression of the log transformed 
outcome variable is to estimate the expected geometric mean of the original variable. 
6.2.7.2 LnTrade 
The positive coefficient (β1) value of 0.184 with corresponding t value of 5.147 
(p<0.005) indicates that trade between Nigeria and any other country has a significant 
positive impact on traffic demand. 
Since, both dependent and independent variable are log transformed, Bruin (2000) 
describes such a relationship as elastic and interpreted that a 1 percent change in the 
independent variable will result in  (coefficient) percent change in the dependent 
variable. Hence, 1 percent change in trade volume can result in a change in passenger 
traffic demand by 0.184 percent in a year.   
This positive relation is further confirmed by the partial regression plot of LnPax 
against Lntrade provided by the model below (Figure 6.1). 
 
Figure 6.1 Partial regression plot Trade 
This also validates the theory that the economic activity level between countries 
influences traffic demand between them (Vasign et al, 2008).  The value is significant 
enough to influence passenger traffic demand between countries. This could be one of 
the major reasons why traffic countries such as China, Taiwan, UAE, Thailand, and 
Malaysia witnessed growth in traffic with Nigeria. 
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6.2.7.3 Aggregate GDP 
This is the aggregate GDP of Nigeria and any other country which represents the 
income level and population of the market. The model coefficient β2 for the aggGDP 
is 0.985, the corresponding t value of 6.616 (p<0.001) shows that aggregate GDP is a 
statistically significant factor as postulated by theory and other empirical studies. 
Since both the dependent and independent variables are log transformed, it therefore 
means that for any increase in aggregate GDP by 1 per cent there is going to be an 
increase in passenger traffic by 0.985 per cent using the same approach in the above. 
This value is comparable to the value estimated in the previous chapter where GDP to 
traffic ratio was found to be 1:1.05 using different data and methods. 
The relationship is represented by a partial plot of LnPax against LnGDP below: 
 
Figure 6.2 Partial regression plot GDP 
6.2.7.4 Air Liberalisation Index 
The value of the coefficient (β3) of air liberalisation index is 0.084 contributing to 
passenger traffic in log form, which is statistically significant by the corresponding t-
value 6.41 (p<0.001). Since, the dependent variable is log transformed while ALI 
variable is its original value, the format for interpretation is that dependent variables 
changes by 100*(coefficient) percent for a unit increase in the independent variables 
while other variables in the model are held constant (Bruin, 2006). Therefore, in this 
model a unit increase of ALI can cause an increase of 8.4 percent in traffic demand. 
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For instance, an increase of ALI from OSA (26) to YD (32) can generate additional 
traffic demand by about 50%, (which was liberalisation of carrier’s ownership and 
control). This value is not far from the estimate of the other empirical study value, for 
example, WTO (2006) estimated impacts of removing ownership and control 
restrictions on international air traffic could stimulate a 34- 39% traffic increase in 
some countries. 
This corroborates with economic theories and previous studies that deregulated air 
transport could stimulate traffic demand. The relationship is represented by a partial 
plot. 
 
Figure 6.3 Partial regression plot ALI 
 
Therefore, the model has proved that the ALI is significant in affecting air traffic 
between any country and Nigeria. The actual impact of liberalisation on the various 
routes will be evaluated in the next section 6.3.  
6.2.7.5 Distance 
The value of the distance (β4) coefficient of -0.00012 and corresponding t value of –
5.088 indicates that the relationship between distance and passenger is inverse, 
meaning the more the distance the less the traffic.  
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The distance variable is in its original form, while the passenger traffic is in log 
format, hence the relation is that the dependent variable decrease by 100*(coefficient) 
for a unit increase of distance. That is 1km distance increase can reduce traffic 
demand by 0.012 per cent. The relationship of distance with passenger traffic demand 
in this case, is not like others because distance is a static value that may not change 
over time. The distance impact could be understood, by comparing two countries with 
similarities in the other factors but with significance difference in the distance. For 
instance, the UK and the USA traffic from Nigeria in 2010 and the factors affecting 
them indicated that USA has more motivating factors but the distance, which is 
negative factor, was also significantly higher. Hence, traffic from US to Nigeria was 
affected negatively in comparison with UK -Nigeria traffic. 
This suggests that distance is an impediment and can affect travel in any way. Also, 
because of high correlation with air fare (as shown in table 6.2) of about 0.844, it 
indicates that the international traffic demand is inelastic – only a high change in price 
can affect the market demand which portrays a typical traveller. Meanwhile the 
relationship is represented by the partial regression plot below. 
 
Figure 6.4 Partial regression plot Distance 
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6.2.7.6 Dummy 
The dummy, being a proxy of common language, colonial and cultural link, takes a 
value of 1 or 0 and has a significant influence on international passenger traffic 
demand. The coefficient (β5) of 1.202 and a t value of –5.696 (p<0.001), implies that 
changing a dummy variable from 1 to 0 can reduce the traffic by about 120.2 percent 
[100*(coefficient) = 100*1.202], while holding other variables constant. 
 This proves the theory from other empirical studies that common language and other 
historical links are very significant factors that influence traffic demand between 
communities (Piermartini and Rousova, 2008). This may be why the top six countries 
(UK, UAE, USA, Ghana, South Africa and India) in terms of traffic have a common 
language with Nigeria. 
The relationship is represented by the partial regression plot below. 
 
Figure 6.5 Partial regression plot Dummy 
6.2.8 Excluded Variable 
Table 6.7 shows a summary of excluded variables for the stage of hierarchy that gives 
the estimate of each predictor’s beta values (Coefficient) if entered into the equation 
at that point with corresponding t value at significant p value. 
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Table 6.7  Excluded Variables 
 
Model 
Beta In T Sig. Partial Correlation 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF Minimum Tolerance 
1 lnGDP .264a 2.972 .004 .274 .638 1.568 .638 
Air Fare($) -.262a -3.767 .000 -.339 .996 1.005 .996 
Distance(KM) -.311a -4.588 .000 -.402 .995 1.005 .995 
Air Lib Index .467a 7.751 .000 .596 .967 1.034 .967 
Lang/Culture Link .236a 3.339 .001 .305 .990 1.010 .990 
2 lnGDP .310b 4.533 .000 .400 .634 1.577 .615 
Air Fare($) -.052b -.771 .442 -.074 .764 1.309 .743 
Distance(KM) -.069b -.949 .345 -.091 .667 1.500 .648 
Lang/Culture Link .172b 2.955 .004 .274 .969 1.032 .947 
3 Air Fare($) -.176c -2.712 .008 -.254 .666 1.501 .553 
Distance(KM) -.182c -2.661 .009 -.249 .600 1.665 .571 
Lang/Culture Link .187c 3.536 .001 .323 .966 1.036 .610 
4 Air Fare($) -.211d -3.451 .001 -.318 .654 1.530 .547 
Distance(KM) -.242d -3.741 .000 -.342 .575 1.740 .563 
5 Air Fare($) -.092e -.983 .328 -.095 .277 3.616 .243 
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), LnTrade 
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index 
c. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index, lnGDP 
d. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index, lnGDP, Lang/Culture Link 
e. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index, lnGDP, Lang/Culture Link, Distance(KM) 
f. Dependent Variable: lnPax 
 
In the stepwise method the predictor with the highest t stat will be entered and 
continue until all the predictors are entered except the predictor with t stat value that 
has a sig p value more than 0.05. As a result of this, air fare is excluded with a very 
low t stat value of –0.983 and p >0.05 which suggests it is not significant to the 
model. This suggests that air fare is not a factor in determining traffic demand.  
However, using the enter method shows the actual contribution of air fare in the 
expression, as in Table 6.8 below. 
 
Table 6.8 Coefficients 
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -23.088 3.915  -5.897 .000 
LnGDP 1.026 .164 .416 6.268 .000 
LnTrade .198 .038 .325 5.158 .000 
Air Fare($) .000 .000 -.092 -.983 .328 
Distance (km) -9.030E-5 .000 -.167 -1.686 .095 
Air Lib Index .083 .016 .317 5.030 .000 
Lang/Culture Link 1.026 .233 .224 4.402 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: LnPax 
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Table 6.8 indicates that the coefficient value of air fare is 0.000 at t value of –0.983 
(p>0.1), hence it is rejected. However, one would expect the two variables distance 
(km) and air fare to be transformed into log form for possible contribution, but even 
after transforming them there was no improvement in their contribution; although the 
transformed variables met the conditions of normality and linearity tests, the actual 
values of the variables also met the conditions of normality and linearity tests as 
shown below. In addition, the two variables in log form reduced the strength of power 
of the coefficient of determination of the equation R2 from 74.6 per cent to 71.9 per 
cent because of high correlations that can cause collinearity problems.  
 
Table 6.9 Model Summary 
 
 R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .848a .719 .703 1.16920 1.856 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LnDist, LnTrade, Lang/Culture Link, LnGDP, Air Lib Index, LnFare 
b. Dependent Variable: LnPax 
 
 
 
Table 6.10 Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -19.189 3.981  -4.820 .000 
LnGDP .933 .183 .379 5.099 .000 
LnTrade .199 .041 .326 4.860 .000 
Air Lib Index .104 .021 .399 5.044 .000 
Lang/Culture Link .856 .242 .187 3.542 .001 
LnFare -.551 .494 -.157 -1.115 .267 
LnDist .133 .415 .049 .319 .750 
a. Dependent Variable: LnPax 
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Figure 6.6 Normality of Distance 
 
 
Figure 6.7 Normality of Air fare 
After transformation, the normality plots of the two variables turn into these plots below: 
 
Figure 6.8 Normality of lnDistance 
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Figure 6.9 Normality of lnfare 
Both plots meet the normality test conditions as shown, but the first two show better 
normal plots. Therefore, if a variable meets the conditions of normality and linearity 
there is no basis for transformation as in this case (Hair, et al., 1998). 
In addition, if the two variables are used in log form, their contributions are still not 
statistically significant from the t values at 95 per cent confidence level. 
6.2.9 Testing Assumptions of Multiple Regression 
In order to draw a conclusion about a population from a regression analysis done on a 
sample, several assumptions must be met, which include the following: 
6.2.9.1 Multicollinearity 
There should be no high correlation between two or more predictors.  Hair et al 
(1998) suggested correlation higher than 0.8 should be a concern. In this case, all the 
variables are not highly correlated as shown in the correlation matrix table 6.3. 
Another way of testing multicollinearity is in the value of Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) which is an index that measure the variance of an estimated regression 
coefficient increase due to collinearity, and the value should be around 1.0, and any 
value up to 10 then multicollinearity exists (Field, 2009). But in this context, all the 
values lie between 1.0 and 1.8 as shown in the last column in table 6.6. Therefore, 
there is no multicollinearity concern for this model. 
6.2.9.2 Normality and Linearity 
All the variables have to be linear and normally distributed; otherwise, the variables 
have to be transformed to achieve the condition (Hair, et al, 1998). In this regard, the 
dependent variables, aggGDP, and trade did not meet the conditions and as such, they 
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were transformed to log form. But other variables met the criteria as seen in the 
normal plot below. The linear p-p plot of variable is in Appendix 11. 
 
Figure 6.10 Normality plot of LnTrade 
 
 
Figure 6.11 Normality of lnPax 
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Figure 6.12 Normality plot of lnGDP 
 
 
 
Figure 6.13 Normality plot of ALI 
  
6.2.9.3 Normal Distribution of Errors 
It is assumed that residuals in the model are randomly normally distributed with the 
mean value of zero. This assumption means that the differences between the model 
and the observed data are most frequently zero or very close to zero, and that 
differences much greater than zero happen only occasionally as shown in the 
histogram below. In this case Mean= –2.18 * 10-15, with standard deviation of 0.978 
and n=112. The model residual is represented by the dependent variable error term.  
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Figure 6.14 Normality distributions of Errors 
6.2.9.4 Linearity 
The mean values of the outcome variable for each increment of the predictors lie 
along a straight line suggesting that the model is a linear relationship as shown in the 
figure below. 
 
Figure 6.15 Linearity plot of the model 
 
The normal plot of the residuals shows the points close to a diagonal line; this shows 
linearity of the dependent residual at each increment of the predictor variables. Hence, 
the assumption is satisfied.  
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According to Field ( 2005) if all the above assumptions are met, the model from the 
sample can be accurately applied to the population. The coefficients and parameters 
are said to be unbiased. 
An unbiased model means that an average of the regression model from the sample is 
the same as the population model, and although it is possible that a model obtained 
from another sample may not be the same as the population model, the likelihood of 
them being the same is increased. 
Table 6.11 Residuals Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 4.2603 14.2387 7.4462 1.85367 112 
Residual -2.30580 2.61906 .00000 1.08192 112 
Std. Predicted Value -1.719 3.664 .000 1.000 112 
Std. Residual -2.083 2.366 .000 .977 112 
a. Dependent Variable: LnPax 
6.2.10  Case-wise diagnosis 
This analysis produced a summary of the residual statistics which were examined for 
extreme cases. Table 6.12 shows the cases that have a standardized residual less than 
–2 or greater than 2 (since the criterion was ±2) which means ordinarily the sample 
should expect 95 per cent of the cases to have standardized residual within ±2. 
Therefore, the sample of 112 countries should have about five cases of observations 
(5 per cent) to have residuals outside the limit. The samples of 112 countries were 
selected from the list of 137 countries, due to incomplete data on 25 countries.  
Table 6.12 Extreme cases 
Case Number Std. Residual LnPax Predicted Value Residual Status 
39 2.211 10.33 7.8816 2.44793  
67 2.191 10.22 7.7974 2.42528  
97 2.261 10.17 7.6639 2.50303  
125 2.366 11.61 8.9863 2.61906  
127 -2.083 11.93 14.2387 -2.30580  
 
The case-wise diagnosis of each observation (attached as Appendix 11) indicated that 
five countries have high residual value from the predicted value of the model as 
shown in Table 6.12 above. However, the research was able to offer possible reasons 
for the high disparity from the model estimates, thus: 
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For observation no. 39 in Appendix 11, this denotes traffic to Ethiopia with a residual 
excess of 2.4 for log Pax from the predicted value. This may not be unconnected to 
high passenger traffic, mostly transiting through the country en route to other 
countries in which some passengers may transit for more than 48 hours. Although 
liberalisation is high, other factors such as GDP, trade and the dummy are very low in 
comparison to the traffic level.  
Similarly, observation no. 97 with the excess residual of 2.5 for log Pax is the traffic 
to Qatar, which has the same reason as Ethiopia. The service is provided only by 
Qatar Airways which aggressively market their service in Nigeria, but most of the 
passengers were Nigerian travelling on transit to China, India, Asia,   and other 
Middle East Asian countries. This aggressive marketing of Ethiopia and Qatar airlines 
earned them significantly higher passenger traffic than the prediction of the 
corresponding factors of GDP, trade, liberalisation index, and historical or common 
language with Nigeria; this is also a unique case.  
However, for observation no. 67 (in Appendix 11), this denotes traffic to Lebanon 
with a residual excess of 2.4 for log Pax from the predicted value. This is due to high 
passenger traffic but with low GDP and trade, and absence of any cultural or common 
language with Nigeria. The high number of passengers is mostly attributed to a large 
number of Lebanese traders resident in Nigeria and other West African countries; this 
is confirmed by the field survey which shows the composition of the passengers 
travelling to Lebanon. The service is solely provided by a single carrier, Middle East 
Airlines (MEA) from Lebanon. This may be a unique case of traffic due to another 
factor different from the predictors’ variable used in the model.  
Observation no. 125 denotes traffic to UAE (Dubai) with a residual excess of 2.6 for 
log Pax from the predicted value. This is also due to high passenger traffic mainly 
owing to the influence of trade and leisure as revealed by the field survey. Moreover, 
substantial numbers of passengers were in transit en route to China, India, and other 
Asian and Middle East countries. In addition, the ease of getting entry visas to the 
country by Nigerians may have influenced the level of traffic when compared with 
other countries. The service was provided only by Emirates with 14 flights per week. 
Therefore, the excess passengers may be attributed to the level of trade and tourism as 
well as aggressive marketing of the airline for transit passengers. This makes the case 
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unique since the passenger level is beyond the prediction of the model using the 
independent variables. 
Observation no. 127 denotes traffic to the USA, with a residual shortfall of –2.3 for 
log Pax from the predicted value. This may be due to the excessively high value of 
US GDP which makes it look abnormal when compared with other countries. 
However, the high prediction may be influenced by high GDP value. In addition, 
there may be other factors that undermine traffic between the two countries such as 
the challenge of travelling visas, as it was found in the field survey that over 75 per 
cent of the passengers were Nigerian and complained of the difficulty of getting USA 
entry visas. This suggests the reason for passenger traffic deficit to/from the country 
despite high significance of aggregate GDP and trade/investment between the 
countries. Therefore, traffic to the USA is another unique case where the prediction 
and the actual traffic differ significantly. 
But apart from the above five cases, for about 113 of the other observations, the 
predictions and the actual passengers agreed with minor differences. Also, as 
expected, the model prediction should have 95 per cent accuracy within the average 
standard error of ±2.00, which suggests that 5 per cent of the observations could be 
outside the normal range of the average standard error. The 5 per cent of 113 
countries’ observations produced five countries with abnormal prediction value.  
6.2.11 Validation of the model 
The research summarizes and compares the results from the three samples’ analysis, 
in order to validate and ensure the reliability of the model.  
The multiple regressions of the cross-sectional data were evaluated using OLS for 
three different samples collected from different years 2009, 2010 and combined 
2009/10. The results of the analysis are as follows in Table 6.13. 
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Table 6.13 Multiple regression output of the 3 samples 
 MR parameters 2009 Samples 2010 Samples Combined 2009–10 
Observations (N) 112 112 225 
R 86.8% 88.5% 84.6% 
R2 75.3% 78.3% 74.1% 
Adjusted R2 74.1% 77.2% 71.0% 
F value 61.887 
(.000) 
76.335 
(.000) 
110.677 
(.000) 
Coefficients of the Variables   
Constant/intercepts  
 
t-stat 
p-value 
-26.598 
 
-6.516 
(.000) 
-21.629 
 
-6.237 
(.000) 
-25.282 
 
-9.299 
(.000) 
LnGDP 
 
t-stat 
p-value 
1.125 
 
7.571 
(0.000) 
0.985 
 
6.616 
(.000) 
1.173 
 
10.413 
(.000) 
LnTrade 
 
t-stat 
p-value 
0.078 
 
2.221 
(.028) 
0.184 
 
5.147 
(.000) 
0.132 
 
4.876 
(.000) 
ALI 
 
t-stat 
p-value 
0.094 
 
6.256 
(.000) 
0.082 
 
6.910 
(.000) 
0.045 
 
6.095 
(0.000) 
Dummy 
 
t-stat 
p-value 
0.977 
 
4.424 
(.000) 
1.202 
 
5.696 
(.000) 
1.242 
 
7.434 
(.000) 
Distance 
 
t-sat 
p-value 
0.000 
 
-4.242 
(.000) 
0.000 
 
-5.088 
(.000) 
0.000 
 
-8.072 
(.000) 
 
All coefficients of the explanatory variables and other regression parameters are 
highly correlated for the three samples. The values also have the expected sign and 
are significant. The model from the three samples rejected air fare both in actual value 
and in log form; this implies that air fare has no effect on passenger traffic demand  
The results show a positive and significant effect of liberalisation on passenger flows. 
Overall, the regression model explains an important proportion of the variance of the 
data, with R2 value of at least 74.1 per cent from a combined sample. 
Therefore, there is enough evidence to suggest the validity and reliability of the 
model, which explains the country’s international passenger demand as functions of 
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international trade ($), aggregate GDP ($), air liberalisation index, distance and 
dummy variable. The model is statistically valid since it meets the conditions for 
multiple regression assumptions, namely: t-test, F-test, normality, linearity, 
multicollinearity and residual diagnosis (normality and heteroscedasticity). The model 
arguments were further supported by another sample model from a different year 
which generates almost the same model coefficient and confirms the variables’ 
relationship. 
In view of the validity of the model, the research would apply the model to determine 
the impact of liberalisation policy in the country by forecasting the future traffic when 
ASAs change.  
6.2.12 Analysis of the model with ALI variable as Dummy 
The main concern of the research is the level of liberalisation of ASAs which was 
split into four categories. Such a grouping can also be represented by a set of dummy 
variables in the analysis (InterVISTAS-ga2, 2006). In this regard, the research created 
five independent dummy variables to represent each category of ASA namely, 
dummyALI1 (BASA restricted), dummyALI2 (BASA commercial), dummyALI3 
(OSA), dummyALI4 (YD) and dummyALI0 (for countries without ASA), while the 
group of countries without ASA serve as baseline for the analysis. The four dummies 
replaced the ALI variable in the equation 6.2.The summary of the analysis using 
dummies for various categories of ALI is depicted below  in Table 6.14. 
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Table 6.14 Result of the analysis with ASA as dummy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.14 shows the model of the relationship between passenger traffic and the 
independent variables of LnGDP, LnTrade, distance, DummyLang, DummyALI2, 
and DummyALI4 at 95% confidence level (P<0.05) and acceptable t stat value. 
Meanwhile, the model rejected the variables of DummyALI1, DummyALI2, and Air 
fare, because of p>0.05 and an unacceptable t stat value. The model has an F value of 
64.715 (p<0.05), and an R2 of 0.787%, which implies that the independent variables 
were able to explain 88.7 percent of the dependent variable at a significant value. The 
detailed results of the analysis can be found in Appendix 12. Hence, the model is 
mathematical expressed as;                                                                                              ----------------------------- (6.4)
  
The above equation therefore considered Air lib index as a contributing factor only 
when the ASA is either BASA commercial or YD, while other ASAs are not 
statistically contributing to the passenger traffic demand. 
Variable  Coefficient T stat P value 
Constant -24.212 -6.571 P<0.05 
LnGDP 1.087 7.145 P<0.05 
LnTrade 0.18 5.054 P<0.05 
Distance 0.0001 -5.301 P<0.05 
DummyLang 1.176 5.572 P<0.05 
DummyALI2 1.768 4.04 P<0.05 
DummyALI4 2.424 6.068 P<0.05 
 
Rejected variable Coefficient T stat P value 
DummyALI1 0.053 1.006 0.317 
DummyALI3 -0.037 -0.733 0.465 
Air fare -0.13 -1.527 0.13 
 
N=112    
F = 64.715   P<0.05 
R=0.887    
R2= 0.787    
Adj R2=0.775    
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However, when the model shown in equation 6.4 is compared with model in equation 
6.2, a significant correlation was evident in the coefficient values, R2, F stat, and t 
stat. In addition, both the models are statistically significant and rejected the inclusion 
of air fare as a variable.   
Table 6.15 Comparing the parameters of the two models 
 
Model with ASA as ALI Model with ASA as dummy 
 
Variable  Coefficient Coefficient Diff 
Constant -21.629 -24.212 2.583 
LnGDP 0.985 1.087 0.102 
LnTrade 0.184 0.18 0.004 
Distance 0.0001 0.0001 0 
DummyLang 1.202 1.176 -0.026 
ALI 0.082 NA  
DummyALI2 NA 1.768  
DummyALI4 NA 2.424  
 
Rejected variable Coefficient P value 
DummyALI1 NA 0.053  
DummyALI3 NA -0.037  
Air fare -0.092 -0.13 0.038 
 
N 112 112 0 
F  75.334 64.715 -10.619 
R 0.885 0.887 0.002 
R2  0.783 0.787 0.004 
Adj R2 0.772 0.775 0.003 
DW 1.345 1.364 0.019 
 
Table 6.15 indicated an insignificant difference in the parameters of the two models, 
which suggested a very significant correlation between the models. The major 
difference is that the model with ALI considers ASA as an index value based on a 
WTO scale, while the second model considers various categories as dummy variables. 
In the first model, each category of ASA makes a contribution to the demand of the 
traffic based on the aggregate weight of various components of ASA, while the 
second model rejected the contribution of 2 categories of ASA (BASA restricted and 
OSA)  statistically insignificant in the model due to their coefficients’ t stat value and 
p>0.05. Therefore, the research found that the second model that uses dummy as a 
proxy for ASA instead of a liberalisation index has a major weakness of not 
recognising all the categories of ASA specifically restricted BASA and Open skies 
agreements. This may not be unconnected with the issue of multi-collinearity in the 
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use of dummy as variables describing ASAs. Piermatini & Rousova (2008) argued 
that the liberalisation index developed by WTO was aimed at addressing the 
shortcomings of using dummy variables as discovered in previous research studies, 
such as InterVISTAS-ga2 (2006). Hence, this research considered the first model that 
uses the ALI, because of its advantage over the second model. 
6.3 Forecasted Impacts of Further Liberalisation 
6.3.1 Model Applications 
The model developed in section 6.2 expressed the relationship between traffic demand 
and other independent variables including ALI. The research applied the model to 
estimate future traffic demand scenarios if some of the components of ALI in the 
ASA are changed.                                                                                                                                     ------------------------------- (6.2) 
In the model, as explained earlier, LnPax (in logarithmic form) stands for passenger 
traffic demand between Nigeria and any other country as a function of generative 
variables; volume of international trade between the two countries (in log form), 
aggregate countries GDP (in log form), nature of ALI (proxy of ASA), and dummy 
variable (which represents common language or cultural link between the countries). 
Also, distance between the countries is an impedance variable with statistical 
significance influence, but the contribution is very insignificant to the overall model 
with coefficient (0.000). The relation has a constant negative value of –21.629 as Beta 
zero in a multiple regression model.  
The research applied the equations to the top 25 countries with high passenger traffic 
demand to/from Nigeria, which represents about 95 per cent of their international 
traffic and includes seven countries without direct traffic. However, it is assumed that 
the ceteris paribus rule holds that when ASAs change other independent variables 
remain constant. Also, it is assumed that the maximum liberalisation the Nigerian 
government could offer to any country in the world is the YD model because that was 
the most liberal ASA permitted by the Nigerian Civil Aviation policy as at 2010.  
There are other policy options that are more liberal than YD but Nigeria, like many 
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countries of the world, still believes in some form regulation in the industry for the 
purpose of national interest. 
The impacts of liberalisation were evaluated by specifying the change in current ASA. 
As previously highlighted in Chapter 4 (section 4.2), the research classified the four 
different types of ASA in the country based on the level of liberalisation, namely: 
restricted BASA, BASA with commercial agreements, Open Skies Agreement, and 
the Yamoussoukro Declaration (YD) model. 
According to the WTO scale (Table 4.3), BASA restricted has the lowest 
liberalisation index of 10 which allows for free pricing and set capacity based on the 
Bermuda type agreement. This was followed by BASA with commercial agreements 
that added commercial agreement to the provision of BASA restricted. Airlines can 
enter into negotiation with the government for additional flight frequency or airport of 
arrival which increases ALI value to 14. 
The third level of ASA was the Open skies Agreement (OSA) model with ALI value 
of 26 which permitted the fifth freedom, free determination of capacity and free 
pricing, and allowed multiple designations.  
The last group was the YD agreement, regarded as the most liberal with the same 
provisions as OSA, and added the permission of community carrier principles under 
the withholding of the carrier, which makes ALI to be 32. 
The impact of liberalizing market access was evaluated when a country’s ASA was 
changed to an OSA agreement, while the impact of liberalizing ownership and control 
was evaluated when a country’s ASA was changed from OSA to YD, which 
liberalises ownership and control to a community carrier.  
The results of the top countries with traffic excluded some African countries with 
fully liberalised ASA such as Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya, Cameroon and Ghana, because 
these countries’ ASA (YD) is used as a benchmark and assumed to be the maximum 
the country policy could allow. 
The results of impact assessment on 19 other countries that were not liberalised as YD 
were evaluated and tabulated as depicted in Table 6.16 below. 
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Table 6.16 Estimate of Traffic under Different ASA in Log Form 
 
Country Actual
ALI 
Actual 
LnPax 
Estimate 
LnPax2 
Diff. LnT(A
LI0) 
lnT(A
LI1) 
lnT(A
LI2) 
lnT(A
LI3) 
lnT 
(ALI4) 
UK 14 12.880 12.790 0.09 NA NA 12.88 13.557 13.893 
UAE 16 11.610 11.200 0.41 NA NA 11.61 12.280 12.616 
USA 26 11.930 14.433 -2.50 NA NA NA 11.940 12.276 
S/Africa 14 11.580 11.080 0.50 NA 11.58 12.08 12.750 13.060 
Germany 16 10.580 11.820 -1.24 NA NA 10.58 11.270 11.587 
Netherl’d 16 10.480 10.830 -0.35 NA NA 10.480 11.150 11.486 
France 16 10.450 11.923 -1.47 NA NA 10.45 11.120 11.456 
Lebanon 16 10.220 8.710 1.51 NA NA 10.22 10.890 11.226 
Qatar 16 10.170 8.736 1.43 NA NA 10.170 10.840 11.176 
Italy 10 10.670 11.199 -0.53 NA 10.67  11.17 11.840 12.176 
S/Arabia 10 9.880 10.456 0.58 NA 10.456  10.956 11.626 11.962 
Turkey 10 9.420 9.852 -0.43 NA 9.420   9.920 10.590 10.926 
Spain 10 9.380 10.696 -1.32 NA  9.380   9.880 10.550 10.886 
India - 10.850 10.360 0.49 10.850 11.692 12.190 12.860 13.196 
China - 10.810 11.440 -0.63 10.810 11.650 12.150 12.820 13.156 
Ireland - 10.170 9.288 0.88 10.170  11.010 11.510 12.180 12.514 
Malaysia - 9.790 9.630 0.16 9.790  10.630 11.130 11.800 12.136 
Switzerl’d - 9.290 8.743 0.55 9.290  10.130 10.630 11.300 11.636 
Canada - 9.730 10.200 -0.47 9.730  10.570 11.070 11.740 12.076 
Source: Author’s computation 
Table 6.16 shows an estimated traffic change for the top 19 countries that were not 
liberalised as YD. The research assumed that fully liberalised countries should have 
an ALI of 32, as is the case of some African countries. However, as indicated in the 
current ALI of the USA, the highest value of 26 derives from the open skies 
agreement, but this could not achieve YD liberalisation because of the restriction on 
ownership control of the carrier. The ‘Actual δnPax’ column indicated the actual 
traffic in log form between the partner country and Nigeria in β010, while ‘Estimate 
δnPaxβ’ indicated the predicted traffic from the model. As expected, there is some 
difference between the predicted value and the actual value since the model is an 
estimate with standard error of ±2.00 (p< 0.05). Each observation error is represented 
by the Diff. column in the table.  
Table 6.16 shows countries’ passenger traffic in log form in the various stages of AδI 
and the forecasted future traffic if the ASA is further liberalised. ‘δnT(AδI0)’ 
signifies the log of traffic of countries without a direct service, which include India, 
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China, Ireland, Malaysia, Switzerland and Canada; but other countries with direct 
traffic from Nigeria do not have data at this stage. 
The next stage is ‘δnT(AδI1)’, when there was a direct air traffic service regulated by 
a restricted BASA with an ALI of 10. The values represent the logarithms of annual 
traffic of such countries, namely, Italy, Spain, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Also, it 
projected the value of traffic for the countries without direct service in case the 
countries could have direct traffic to be regulated by a restricted BASA; meanwhile 
countries with a higher value of ALI indicated no available data at this stage.  
The third stage is ‘δnT(AδIβ)’ which indicates traffic governed by a fairly liberal 
ASA that permits multiple designations or more flight frequency, which adds to the 
provision of restricted BASA with ALI value of 16. Such countries include the UK, 
South Africa, UAE, the Netherlands, Germany, France and Qatar. Also, future traffic 
is estimated for the countries with restricted BASA and countries with indirect air 
service in case their ASAs are upgraded to BASA with commercial right.  
The fourth stage of ‘δnT(AδIγ)’ is the Open Skies Agreement (USA model) which is 
very liberal and permits unlimited market access including the fifth freedom with ALI 
value of 26. However, only the USA has such agreement with Nigeria; the other 
countries were forecasted values in case such countries’ ASAs are upgraded to the 
Open Skies Agreements model.  
The last stage, ‘δnT(AδI4)’ is regarded as the YD model that liberalised ownership 
and control of the designated carriers in addition to the provisions of OSA. The model 
is the most liberal agreement in the country with 32 as the ALI value. All the values 
were projected traffic in logarithmic form in case the countries’ ASAs were upgraded 
to the YD model. 
The values of the current and projected traffic in Table 6.16 are in logarithmic form. 
Therefore, to estimate actual impacts in terms of change in passenger traffic 
percentage, the research converted the log values in the table to the actual passenger 
volume, and also evaluated the percentage increase of each stage of the ASA. The 
conversion led to the formation of Table 6.17 which is the reflection of Table 6.16.  
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Table 6.17 Estimated Traffic Volume Change under Different ASAs 
Countr
y 
Pax 
(ALI0) 
Pax 
(ALI1) 
Pax 
(ALI2) 
Pax 
(ALI3) 
Pax (ALI4) %chg
0 
%chg1 %chg2 %chg3 
UK NA NA 392,528 772,201 1,080,571 NA NA 65.20 33.29 
UAE NA NA 109,680 215,346 301,342 NA NA 65.02 33.29 
USA NA NA NA 153,289 214,486 NA NA NA 33.28 
S/Africa NA NA 176,310 344,552 469,771 NA NA 66.30 30.75 
Germany NA NA 39,376 78,433 107,689 NA NA 64.31 31.44 
Netherl’d NA NA 35,734 69,564 97,343 NA NA 64.26 33.29 
France NA NA 34,566 67,508 94,466 NA NA 64.55 33.29 
Lebanon NA NA 27,519 53,637 75,057 NA NA 64.37 33.29 
Qatar NA NA 26,029 51,021 71,396 NA NA 64.87 33.29 
Italy NA 43,078 70,969 138,690 194,075 NA 48.91 64.60 33.29 
S/Arabia NA 34,752 57,297 111,972 156,686 NA 48.98 64.60 33.29 
Turkey NA 12,333 20,333 39,735 55,603 NA  48.98 64.60  33.29 
Spain NA 11,849 19,536 38,177 53,423 NA  48.98 64.60  33.29 
India 51,377 119,611 19,6811 384,616 538,208 79.81  48.80 64.60  33.29 
China 49,424 114,691 189,094 369,535 517,104 79.54  48.98 64.60  33.29 
Ireland 26,237 60,476 99,708 194,853 272,120 78.97  48.98 64.60  33.09 
Malaysia 17,854 41,357 68,186 133,252 186,465 79.39  48.98 64.60  33.29 
Swissl’d 10,853 25,084 41,357 80,822 113,097 79.20  48.98 64.60  33.29 
Canada 16,824 38,949 64,216 125,492 175,606 79.34  48.98 64.60  33.29 
 Source: Authors computation [Key: chg-change] 
Table 6.17 shows the traffic volume of various countries in 2010 under different ASA 
rules, while the bold values indicate traffic projection of the countries when ASA 
level is deregulated to the next ASA level. The ‘% change’ denotes the equivalent 
percentage change in traffic from the previous value. For instance, countries without 
direct traffic from Nigeria like India, China, Ireland and others can expect an increase 
in traffic by 79% if direct traffic commenced under restricted BASA. Also, countries’ 
traffic governed by restricted BASA could have a 48% increase in passengers if ASA 
is deregulated to BASA commercial, while further deregulation to OSA model could 
attract an additional 64% of traffic demand. Further liberalisation could generate 
additional traffic demand by 33%. The values of percentage increase appeared to be 
uniform due to linearity of the model developed by OLS, but the actual traffic demand 
for each country is distinctive. 
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6.3.2 Impact on Traffic: Liberalizing Market Access 
The forecasted increase in international passenger traffic to and from Nigeria due to 
liberalisation is depicted in Table 6.17, which shows the actual passenger volume 
traffic for the countries at various stages of ALI. The second column of Pax(ALI0) 
suggests passenger traffic volume when ALI was 0 which implies no direct traffic 
between Nigeria and the country. The countries without direct traffic but with 
reasonable passenger volumes were India, China, Ireland, Malaysia, Switzerland, and 
Canada. However, the model simulated and forecasted these countries traffic with 
restricted BASA (ALI=10) which generate additional passenger volume, as indicated 
in the corresponding value of Pax(ALI1). These passenger volume increases are 
evaluated to be about 79% as denoted in column 7 of Table 6.17. This suggests that 
countries with reasonable passenger demand with Nigeria but without direct traffic 
could witness an upsurge in passenger traffic demand by about 79% if direct air flight 
service is started under regulation of restricted BASA. However, the research could 
not determine the reasonable period to observe the growth, but  InterVISTAS-EU 
Consulting (2009; UKCAA, 2006) suggested a period of 1 to 2 years is enough to 
witness some of the impacts of traffic growth as witnessed between the UK and India. 
But in some cases, the effects spread across many years as was the case in Europe and 
US. 
Also, under Pax(ALI1), there were countries with  current traffic governed by the 
restricted BASA, namely Italy, Spain, S/Arabia, and Turkey. The traffic of the 
countries governed by restricted BASA if simulated with BASA commercial (ALI 
=16) could generate a corresponding increase in passenger traffic demand as shown in 
Pax(ALI2), which was estimated to be about a 49% increase in all the countries traffic 
as shown under %change1. Therefore, the research concludes that changing the 
regulation from restricted BASA to BASA (commercial) could instigate a 49% 
increase in traffic demand. Similarly, the five countries without direct traffic are 
simulated to have 49% increases in traffic from the simulated traffic regulated by 
BASA restricted.  
Already, countries like Germany, France, Netherlands, Qatar, UAE, and Lebanon 
have their traffic regulated by BASA (commercial). In most cases, it was the airline of 
these countries that will request, through separate MOU, additional frequency of 
242 
 
flights or airport of arrival/departure from the restricted BASA signed by their 
country's government. Hence, the airlines enjoyed greater market access than other 
countries’ airlines ruled by restricted BASA. This is evident in the volume of 
passengers carried by airlines as shown in Table 4.5, while Table 6.17 indicated the 
final destination of the passengers. Also, UK and S/African traffic were governed by 
restricted BASA which allowed multiple designations. As such, the ALI was 
enhanced to a value of 14, with the corresponding traffic value under Pax(ALI2). The 
research also forecasted the traffic scenario for these countries when regulation is 
relaxed to an open skies agreement (US model) where  unlimited fifth freedom and 
multiple designation are granted, capacity is freely determined for any airline wishing 
to increase its flight frequencies or point of entry as permission for airlines entering 
commercial agreement with another country is not required. As a result, the model 
forecasted about a 65% increase in passenger traffic for the countries, as indicated in 
the Table 6.15 under ‘’%changeβ’’ column. 
The increase in traffic volume is comparable with other empirical evidence obtained 
in developed countries. For instance, UKCAA (2006) estimated in 2 years after 
liberalizing the UK–India route in 2004-2006, annual traffic grew from 87,000 to 
181,000 passengers  (108% increase). Also, Brattle Group (2002) projected additional 
transatlantic passengers between 4.1 million and 11.0 million from EU–US 
liberalisation policy.  
However, there is no standard passenger traffic increase from the liberalisation policy 
with universal application as it depends on the routes. Accordingly,  InterVISTAS-
ga2(2006) claimed that the US open skies agreements with other countries stimulated 
traffic growth ranging from 21.1% to 174% in the first full calendar year after the 
traffic commenced. 
6.3.3 Impact of liberalising carrier ownership 
The last stage of ASA is the most liberal which lowers the regulation on carrier 
ownership and control to a more liberal provision of principal place of business for 
any carrier. The YD model incorporates all OSA provisions plus the liberalisation of 
carrier ownership that sum up the ALI to be 32. This was the type of agreement the 
country signed with some African countries, for example, Ghana, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Senegal, Benin, Sierra Leone, and Libya. Therefore, the research assumed that 
243 
 
this will be the maximum liberal policy the country can accept, as such other 
countries’ ASAs could be further liberalised to the country benchmark. As noted the 
only difference between YD and OSA is the carrier’s ownership provision, which 
suggests that changing from OSA to YD will determine the impacts of liberalising 
carrier ownership and control. For this reason, the research simulated all the countries 
traffic to be regulated by YD, which is indicated by Pax(ALI4) in Table 6.17. The 
outcome shows that the traffic volume for each country was found to increase by 
about 33% (%change3). Therefore, the research concludes that liberalisation of 
carriers ownership in any Nigerian international traffic route could stimulate 
passenger traffic growth by about 33% in 1- 2 years. This value is almost similar to 
the other empirical study value, for example, WTO (2006) estimated impacts of 
removing ownership and control restrictions on international air traffic could 
stimulate a 34- 39% traffic increase in some countries. 
6.3.4 Impact of liberalising combined market access and Carrier ownership 
The research simulated the model to predict the impacts on traffic when all these 
countries ASA are changed to YD, which means liberalising market access and 
carriers ownership at the same time from each country regulation. The estimated 
traffic outcome is shown in Table 6.18. 
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Table 6.18  Traffic Increases due to full liberalisation 
Country  LnPax  LnPax2 Pax1  Pax2 % Change 
UK 12.797 14.141 361,132 1,384,708 117.26 
USA 11.940 12.276 153,277 214,486 33.29 
UAE 11.260 12.436 77,668 251,702 105.68 
S/Africa 11.312 12.656 81,797 313,640 117.26 
Germany 11.896 13.072 146,679 475,442 105.69 
Netherland 10.893 12.069 53798 174,381 105.69 
France 11.991 13.167 161,297 522,824 105.69 
Lebanon 8.749 9.925 6,304 20,435 105.69 
Qatar 8.773 9.949 6,458 20,931 105.69 
Italy 11.253 12.933 77,142 413,743 137.14 
S/Arabia 10.855 12.535 51,792 277,895 137.16 
Turkey 10.037 11.717 22,857 122,639 137.16 
Spain 10.840 12.525 51,021 275,130 137.43 
India 11.623 14.141 111,636 1,384,708 170.16 
China 10.527 13.047 37,309 463,703 170.21 
Ireland 8.790 11.31 6,568 81,634 170.21 
Malaysia 9.696 12.216 16,252 201,995 170.21 
Switzerland 8.743 11.263 6,267 77,886 170.21 
Canada 10.269 12.785 28,825 356,825 170.10 
Source: Author computation 
 
The results show that the level of growth of traffic in the market depends on the 
current ASA.  For instance, UK and South African traffic could change by 117%, 
because the two countries have similar ASAs with Nigeria (ALI value of 14) as 
shown in Table 6.14. This implies that varying ALI from 14 to 32 could stimulate 
passenger demand by 117% from Nigeria to UK and South Africa. This is determined 
by the percentage increase of Pax2 over Pax1. 
                                   ---------------------------- (6.3) 
Meanwhile, the current USA agreement had liberalised market access as such only 
carrier ownership liberalisation can make up the difference. Therefore, liberalising the 
withholding regulation can stimulate traffic growth by about 33%, as demonstrated by 
USA projected passenger traffic. 
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Moreover, countries whose traffic were regulated by BASA commercial like UAE, 
Qatar, Germany, France, Netherlands, and Lebanon could have a traffic growth of 
about 105% when market access and carrier ownership are liberalised together. The 
combined percentage increase differs with the percentage increase due to market 
access and withholding liberalisation separately, as seen in Table 6.2. This is due to 
the nonlinear relationship between ASA variable and the real value of traffic demand 
that led to transforming the traffic into logarithmic form in the model.   
Similarly, countries whose traffic was administered by restricted BASA when ALI is 
10, the model forecasted the traffic growth by about 137%, if market access and 
airline ownership regulation are liberalised at the same time. The countries that can 
have such increase include Italy, Spain, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.  
However, countries without direct traffic from Nigeria, but with reasonable and 
potential passenger traffic have the greatest impact with a 170% increase if direct 
schedule passenger traffic is initiated with the liberalisation of market access and 
carrier ownership. These countries include India, China, Malaysia, Ireland, 
Switzerland, and Canada. The research discovered that these countries had BASA 
with Nigeria, but were not effective. For instance, China Eastern Airlines was 
operating the route from 2005 to 2007; also, Swiss Air had been in the market for a 
long period up to 2002 when the airline collapsed.    
In summary, the overall impact of liberalisation on traffic of passengers could be 
schematically represented by the diagram in Figure 6.16 below. 
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Figure 6.16 Liberalisation Impacts on Passenger Traffic on Different ASAs 
 
Figure 6.16 shows the level of liberalisation at each point of ASA, indicating that the 
thicker the arrow the more liberal. Also, it shows the impact on traffic growth when 
the ASA is changed to another ASA level. 
Traffic regulated by BASA (restricted) if  deregulated to BASA commercial could 
generate a 48% traffic increase, also further deregulation to Open Skies can increase 
the traffic by 65%, while enhancing the liberalisation level to YD model from Open 
skies could cause additional traffic demand of 33%. The arrow also suggested that 
liberalising BASA restricted to YD directly could cause traffic increase by 137%, 
while direct liberalisation BASA commercial to YD model can cause traffic increase 
by 105%.  
6.4 Impacts on Air Fare and Passengers welfare 
The research has now established that liberalisation could stimulate traffic growth at 
various levels depending on the original ASA as was predicted by accepted theories 
and empirical studies.  However, the resultant increase in traffic has a multiplier effect 
on the market and the airports. For instance according to demand elasticity theory, 
33% Increase 
48% Increase 
65% Increase 
137% Increase 
105% Increase 
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change in passenger traffic could generate a corresponding change in price in the 
opposite direction. Thus, mathematically;                                                                                     -------------------------              (6.4) 
This implies that;                                                             ------------------- (6.5) 
Meanwhile, according to InterVISTAS-ga2 (2006) country pairs without a direct service 
should have;                                                                                    -------------------------           
(6.6) 
It therefore means that the increase in traffic due to liberalisation will likely create a 
reduction in air fare assuming that other factors affecting air fares remain the same. In 
this regard, the research uses the theory to estimate the likely resultant change in air 
fare. However, the reduction in air fare has an impact on passengers by increasing 
their expenditure saving giving rise to consumer welfare or consumer surplus which 
refers to the difference between what consumers are willing to pay and what they 
actually pay (OECD, 1993).   
Furthermore, InterVISTAS-ga2 (2006) suggested that consumer welfare in air 
transport due to liberalisation is a product of average fare saving and the number of 
existing passengers, added to the product of half average fare saving and the number 
of new passengers. Thus;                                                                             -- (6.7) 
In addition, fare reduction estimation assumes that for country-pairs with a direct air 
service prior to liberalisation, traffic stimulation was attributable to fare reductions; 
while for country-pairs that did not previously have a direct service, two-thirds of the 
traffic increase was attributable to fare reductions and one-third was attributable to 
improved service levels – direct service, frequency increase (InterVISTAS-EU 
Consulting, 2009).  
The total consumer welfare is the average savings of the existing passengers in the 
market due to fare reduction, plus half of the savings of additional passengers able to 
access air transport due to liberalisation (see section 3.12.3 for details). 
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With the use of the above theories of elasticity and consumer welfare, the research 
computed all the countries expected air fare reduction and consumer surplus from the 
stimulated traffic. The outcome is provided in Tables 6.17, 6.18 and 6.19. 
Table 6.19 Estimation of Elasticity of demand 
Country Av Fare (09) Av Fare(10) Traffic(09) Traffic(10) %Chg F %Chg T Elasticity 
USA 1,194 1,028 96,599 152,188 -14.87 59.35 -3.99 
France 1,109 944 35,109 34,566 -16.13 -1.56 0.09 
Germany 521 477 39,964 39,376 -8.83 -1.48 0.17 
Italy 598 561 44,843 43,078 -6.31 -4.01 0.64 
Neth’lands 918 880 47,423 35,734 -4.24 -28.11 6.63 
Spain 597 581 11,377 11,796 -2.68 3.62 -1.35 
Switzerland 1,182 1,151 11,660 10,853 -2.72 -7.18 2.64 
UK 677 621 338,576 392,528 -8.55 14.76 -1.73 
S/ Africa 596 557 72,058 107,266 -6.84 39.27 -5.74 
Lebanon 595 602 27,108 27,519 1.23 1.50 1.23 
Qatar 595 573 14,009 26,029 -3.79 60.04 -15.84 
S/Arabia 512 549 16,400 19,530 6.98 17.42 2.49 
UAE 621 603 113,816 109,680 -2.83 -3.70 1.31 
Turkey 522 506 11,803 12,276 -3.06 3.93 -1.28 
China 730 675 42,735 49,424 -7.87 14.51 -1.84 
Malaysia 894 776 12,139 17,855 -14.21 38.11 -2.68 
Ireland 353 323 30,136 26,237 -9.07 -13.83 1.52 
India 578 578 34,833 51,377 -0.15 38.38 -245.71 
Canada 835 853 16,977 16,824 2.12 -0.91 -0.43 
Total 13,629 12,838 1,017,565 1,184,136 -5.97 15.13 -2.53 
Source: IATA PaxIs, Authors computation  
 
Table 6.19 shows the original passenger traffic volume and the average air fare for the 
year 2009 and 2010 on the routes given by IATA PaxIs in column 2 and 3 
respectively. From the two years’ traffic, the research determines the elasticity of each 
country’s traffic and the average for all the routes using equation 6.4. However, since 
elasticity differs significantly on each route per year, because of the difference of life 
cycle for each route, while some routes were just at a developing stage like Qatar, and 
USA. As such there is the are possibility of rapid change in a year which cannot 
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represent another year as a longer period of results is preferable, but in the absence of 
longer period data, the research uses the average elasticity of the market across all the 
routes, so as to reduce mismatch.  
Table 6.19 shows the average price elasticity estimates for the Nigeria air travel 
market to be -2.53, which falls outside the standard air travel elasticity globally 
estimated in some previous studies. For instance, Gillen, Morrison and Stewart (2003) 
ied price elasticity in air transport for different length and purpose of journey globally, 
and developed a standard chart of price elasticity which ranges from -0.26 to -1.7. 
This is the most widely cited value of price elasticity of demand for air travel. But in 
2007, IATA developed another elasticity charts table for all international regional 
countries which addresses the major shortcoming of the earlier figures for 2003. In 
these new elasticity charts, countries are grouped according to their geographical 
location. The table shows that elasticity ranges from 0.36 to 1.96. The study identified 
Sub Saharan Africa and the Transpacific region as having the lowest elasticity while 
the European market has the highest elasticity. 
The research found the elasticity estimates of -2.5, which was the average for all the 
routes in the market, may have been influenced by specific routes regarded as outliers 
in the market trend. As shown in Table 6.19, some notable extreme cases like Qatar, 
India, Netherlands, S/Africa, USA and France routes could be outliers in this market 
trend. Therefore, the research estimated another value of market elasticity from the 
average of the routes without the outliers and was found to be -0.6 which implies that 
the market was inelastic as the proportional change in quantity demanded is less than 
the proportional change in price, and in some cases the demand is independent from 
price changes (Vasign, et al, 2008). 
This estimated value of -0.6 falls within the accepted standard value of elasticity, but 
applying this value to the change of traffic demand forecasted in Table 6.18 in 
evaluating the likely change in air fare based on theory of elasticity may lead to an 
unrealistic significant drop. For instance, change in passenger traffic due to change in 
liberalisation level as shown in Table 6.18 could cause a reduction in air fare of 
between 365% and 1182 % on various routes, which the research considered a flawed 
assumption. Hence, the research assumed that the market was highly inelastic and  has 
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little influence on air fare. This also suggested that passengers are likely to not benefit 
from consumer welfare.  
Using the average market elasticity of -2.5 and applying it to the routes reveals the 
predicted percentage change in air fares as well as reductions in air fare (regarded as 
passengers air fare savings) and these are detailed in Table 6.20 below. 
Table 6.20 Estimation of Air fare saving 
Country % Change 
Traffic 
%chg 
fare 
Orig fare 
($) 
Fare saving 
($) 
Current traffic 
UK 117 -46.29 621 -287.61 392,528 
USA 33 -13.14 1028 -135.16 152,188 
UAE 106 -41.72 603 -251.64 109,680 
S/ Africa 117 -46.29 557 -257.73 107,266 
Germany 106 -41.73 477 -199.10 39,376 
Netherland 106 -41.73 880 -367.18 43,078 
France 106 -41.73 944 -393.79 34,566 
Lebanon 106 -41.73 602 -251.17 27,519 
Qatar 106 -41.73 573 -239.06 26,029 
Italy 137 -54.14 561 -304.00 43,078 
S Arabia 137 -54.15 549 -297.29 19,530 
Turkey 137 -54.15 506 -274.20 12,276 
Spain 137 -54.26 581 -315.39 11,796 
India 170 -44.79 578 -258.65 51,377 
China 170 -44.80 675 -302.32 49,424 
Ireland 170 -44.80 323 -144.52 26,237 
Malaysia 170 -44.80 776 -347.57 17,855 
Swiss 170 -44.80 1151 -515.46 10,853 
Canada 170 -44.77 853 -381.96 16,824 
Source: Authors computation 
 
Table 6.20 indicated that for each country, traffic growth due to full liberalisation to 
YD model represented by % change Traffic (extracted from Table 6.15), there is an 
expected change in air fare (assuming all other variables remain the same) given as % 
change fare. This percentage change of the original air fare (Orig fare) produced the 
average reduction in air fare (fare saving) using equation 6.5 for countries with direct 
traffic, and equation 6.6 for countries without direct traffic. 
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As shown, the highest fare reduction came from routes whose countries had a 
restricted BASA that could enjoy up to 54%, while USA traffic has the lowest price 
reduction of 13%. This implies that the greater the preceding liberalisation level the 
lower the price reductions for passengers when full liberalisation is achieved. But 
countries without direct traffic ideally should have benefits because these country-pair 
liberalisations led to the highest traffic growth (by 170%). However, this might not be 
the case because according to InterVISTAS-EU Consulting (2009) the countries 
without prior direct traffic can only enjoy fare reductions of two thirds of the 
countries with direct traffic. In this regard, the six countries’ travellers benefitted from 
a 44% fare discount, if direct traffic under full liberalisation could be put into effect. 
Therefore, the amount of savings accruing to each passenger (in US $) as derived 
from the original air fare is computed as “Fare” saving. This is regarded as a benefit 
to passengers when the countries’ traffic are governed by full liberalisation policy on 
the assumption that other variables like GDP, trade, inflation and other socio- 
economic factors remain constant as they were before full liberalisation. Also, it is 
assumed after full liberalisation both countries’ airlines are capable of meeting the 
additional traffic demand. 
Furthermore, from the air fare saving of each passenger and number of passengers 
both initial and projected, one can deduct the consumer welfare for the industry using 
equation (6.7). The research establishes consumer welfare from the total fare savings 
of the existing passengers and the total savings of additional passengers. The value 
shows that consumer welfare depends on the route, passenger volume, current price, 
and individual saving (Table 6.21). 
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Table 6.21 Estimation of consumer welfare 
Country Actual 
traffic 
Projected 
Traffic 
Savings for 
Pax ($) 
Savings for New 
Pax ($) 
Consumer 
Welfare ($) 
 
UK 
                   
392,528  
        
1,080,571  
           
112,896,164  
            
98,945,023  
          
211,841,186  
 
USA 
                   
152,188  
          
214,486  
             
20,570,150  
 
4,210,189  
            
24,780,339  
 
UAE 
                   
109,680  
          
301,342  
             
27,600,229  
            
24,115,179  
            
51,715,408  
 
S/Africa 
                   
107,266  
          
469,771  
             
27,646,123  
            
46,714,936  
            
74,361,059  
 
Germany 
                     
39,376  
          
107,689  
               
7,839,719  
 
6,800,493  
            
14,640,212  
 
Nethel’d 
                     
43,078  
            
97,343  
15,817,260   
9,962,505  
            
25,779,765  
 
France 
                     
34,566  
            
94,466  
             
13,611,903  
            
11,794,236  
            
25,406,139  
 
Lebanon 
                     
27,519  
            
75,057  
               
6,911,883  
 
  5,969,974  
            
12,881,857  
 
Qatar 
                     
26,029  
            
71,396  
               
6,222,444  
 
5,422,699  
            
11,645,143  
 
Italy 
                     
43,078  
          
194,075  
             
13,095,609  
            
22,951,365  
            
36,046,974  
 
S/Arabia 
                     
19,530  
          
156,686  
               
5,806,101  
            
20,387,675  
            
26,193,776  
 
Turkey 
                     
12,276  
            
55,603  
               
3,366,034  
 
5,940,109  
              
9,306,143  
 
Spain 
                     
11,796  
            
53,423  
               
3,720,296  
 
 6,564,320  
            
10,284,616  
India                      
51,377  
          
538,208  
             
13,288,917  
            
62,960,601  
            
76,249,517  
 
China 
                     
49,424  
          
517,104  
             
14,941,967  
            
70,695,068  
            
85,637,035  
 
Ireland 
                     
26,237  
          
272,120  
               
3,791,640  
            
17,766,923  
            
21,558,563  
 
Malaysia 
                     
17,855  
          
186,465  
               
6,205,891  
            
29,302,062  
            
35,507,952  
 
Switzerl’d 
                     
10,853  
          
113,097  
               
5,594,288  
            
26,351,315  
            
31,945,603  
 
Canada 
                     
16,824  
          
175,606  
               
6,426,031  
            
30,323,947  
            
36,749,978  
 
Total 
                
1,191,480  
        
4,774,510  
           
315,352,648  
          
507,178,619  
 
 822,531,267  
Source: Authors Computation 
 
Table 6.21 provided the estimates of the consumer welfare of various country routes 
for both the existing passengers and the projected passenger increase due to 
liberalisation using equation 6.7 in the above. For instance, consumer welfare on UK 
route traffic is estimated as: 
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Current Passenger savings = Fare Savings (as in table 6.18) X Current no. of Pax   ------ (6.8)
           =   (287.61)*(392528)     
             = $112,896,163  
New Pax savings = ½(Fare savings)*(additional Pax)  ----------------------- (6.9)
          = ½(287.61) (Projected traffic – original traffic)
            = ½(287.61) (1080571-392528) 
       = $98,945,023 
Consumer welfare = fare savings of current passengers + New Pax Savings ----------- (6.10)
          = $112,896,163.57 + $98,945,023    
           = $ 211,841,186  
Table 6.19 provided all the expected consumer welfare to be derived from full 
liberalisation of all the 19 routes. From the outcome, UK travellers have the highest 
total consumer welfare due to high traffic volume to /from Nigeria and high impact on 
traffic change which if further deregulated could generate additional traffic demand 
by 117%.  As shown in Table 6.16, high welfare impacts on India and China is a 
result of expected high traffic demand change from anticipated direct traffic between 
Nigeria and these countries to be deregulated to full liberalisation (YD model). 
However, countries with an expected low level of consumer welfare benefits like 
Ireland, despite the anticipated high traffic increase by as much as 170%, may be due 
to low value of average air fare between Nigeria and Ireland. But Turkey’s low value 
of consumer welfare is as a result of anticipated low traffic demand increase between 
Nigeria and Turkey even after full liberalisation, may be due to the absence of any 
significant socio-economic relationship between the two countries as suggested by the 
current trade volume.  
However, the total consumer welfare to be enjoyed by the travellers in the market if 
the country will liberalise its ASA with the top 19 traffic destination countries is 
estimated to be US$822 Million. This is made up of current passenger savings of US$315 
Million and expected additional passengers savings of US$507Millions. This is to say the 
current international passengers in country could enjoy an average saving of 
US$264.67 per person if full liberalisation was enforced. 
Therefore, the research has proved that full liberalisation of ASA in Nigeria could 
stimulate total annual traffic growth by about 120% which in turn lowers air fare due 
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to competition from new entrants and additional flight frequency from the existing 
airlines, or the airlines could operate the route with larger aircraft. The lower fare 
could make the existing passengers have some savings of about US$264.67 per 
passenger in a year. 
6.5 Traffic growth and Airport capacity 
In order not to create an imbalance between traffic demand and infrastructural 
capacity management, the research evaluated the possible capacity challenges from 
the significant traffic increase as a result of liberalisation of the industry. This view is 
supported by Yahaya (2006) who reasoned that as traffic demand approaches 
capacity, system congestion and delays increase sharply, a situation that alerts the 
authority to initiate actions to remedy the situation in the intermediate and long term. 
In view of this concern, the research assesses the capacity of the four Nigerian 
International airports based on the three key components, terminals capacity, apron 
capacity, and the runway. In this regard, FAAN (2009) provided the following as the 
designed peak capacity of its airport infrastructure. 
Table 6.22 Nigeria International Airports designed capacity 
Airport Critical A/C TBDC (Pax/H) Apron Capacity Runway 
Lagos 
(MMIA) 
B747 
Concord 
3,675 Tier1- B737-747 (X14)          
Tier2-B737-747 (X 6) 
2
Abuja 
(Int'l) 
B747 1,645 B737(X8) 1 
Kano  B747 520 B747(X11) 1 
Port 
Harcourt 
B747 350 B747(X10) 1 
Source: FAAN (2009)  
Table 6.22 shows that each of the four airports has the capacity to accommodate up to 
B747 aircraft type which used to be the biggest commercial aircraft commonly used. 
In addition, Lagos international airport can accommodate Concorde aircraft type. 
However, in terms of the passenger terminal capacity depicted by Terminal Building 
Design Capacity (TBDC), each of the airports has one terminal with different capacity 
size, Lagos being the largest can accommodate a maximum of 3,675 passengers per 
hour from its D and E pier. This is followed by Abuja international airport that can 
take on 1,645 passengers in Peak hour from C pier. But Kano and Port Harcourt 
Airports can only conveniently handle a maximum of 520 and 350 passengers per 
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hour respectively as per the designed TBDC. On the apron capacity, δagos Int’l 
airport is capable of holding a maximum of 20 aircrafts per hour which can comprise 
fourteen aircraft of B737-B747 type on Tier1 and six of B707 type on Tier2. Also, 
Abuja Airport has the designed capacity to take four of B747 type and eight of B737 
as a maximum limit per hour, while Kano and Port Harcourt Int’l Airports as designed 
could accommodate a maximum number of eleven and ten B747 aircraft per hour 
respectively.  
In view of the above limitation of airport capacity in the country, the research 
assessed the requirements of the projected passenger traffic in order to determine if 
they can be accommodated by the designed capacity of the airport infrastructures in 
the country. 
To evaluate the capability of airport terminal capacity, the research employs the 
standardized ‘Typical Peak Hour Passengers’ recommended by the US Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) as measure of assessing capacity demand. A typical 
peak hour passenger (TPHP) is defined as the peak hour of the average peak day of 
the peak month in a year (Ashford, et al., 1997). To compute the TPHP from annual 
passenger traffic demand, the FAA recommended the relationship as in the Table 6.23 
below. 
Table 6.23 FAA recommended TPHP as % of annual traffic 
Total Annual Passenger TPHP as % of annual traffic 
30 million and Above 0.035 
20Million - 29.99Million 0.04 
10Million - 19.99Million 0.045 
01Million - 9.99 Million 0.05 
0.5Million- 0.999Million 0.08 
0.1Million- 0.499Million 0.13 
Under 0.1 Million 0.2 
Source: Ashford, et al., (1997) 
From the above FAA recommendation, the projected annual traffic of 4,774,510 
passengers should have TPHP of 0.05% of annual total, which is approximated to be 
2,387 passengers. Therefore, the projected traffic is to have TPHP value of 2387, 
which is less than the main airport designed maximum capacity of 3675 passenger per 
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hour alone. This implies that the expected traffic increase will be conveniently 
accommodated by the current capacity of the main country airport alone (Lagos 
International Airport). However, with additional support capacity from the other three 
airports, it means the country maximum TPHP is 6190 passengers (3675 + 1645 
+520+ 350) and as such, there is no concern for infrastructure challenges. This 
evidence suggested that the current airport capacity can accommodate the anticipated 
increase of passenger traffic if full liberalisation of ASA is decided without system 
congestions or delays. 
Also, from the THPH of 2387 passengers which laterally means  an estimate of about 
12 medium size aircrafts capacity of about 220 seats (B737 or A320). Therefore, the 
12 medium size aircrafts are the maximum projected airlines required at the peak hour 
for the conveyance of 2387 passengers. In this case, also the apron capacity of 20 
aircrafts per hour at Lagos International Airport can conveniently accommodate the 
aircraft.  
Therefore, there is strong evidence to suggest that the terminal and holding apron are 
capable for accommodating additional increases of passenger traffic due to full 
liberalisation. 
6.6 Summary of the Chapters findings 
This chapter analysed the origins and destinations of international traffic from Nigeria 
to other countries of the world using 137 traffic values as the number of observations 
in the sample which represent over 95% of Nigerian annual international traffic. The 
model was developed using multiple regressions on cross sectional data of 112 
country pairs with Nigeria in the year 2010. The analysis shows that a relationship 
between international traffic, the liberalisation level of Air Service Agreement (ALI), 
and socio-economic circumstances affect every route, and as a result, each country 
exhibits distinctive traffic demand. From the database a collection of international 
passenger volumes (Pax), aggregate GDP of  country pairs with Nigeria (GDP), trade 
between the two countries (Trade), distance between the countries (Dist), level of 
ASA (ALI), and a dummy variable, the research calibrated the  following model with  
the aid of the SPSS package; 
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                                                                           ______________________________ (6.11) 
 
The model was found to be statistically significant and explained 88.5% of the 
variation of traffic (R2=0.785). Also other statistical parameters that prove the validity 
of the model include Adjusted R2 of 77% and F test of 76.333 (p< 0.000). Also, other 
test values like normality, linearity, multi-collinearity and residual diagnosis 
(normality, heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation) have validated the assumptions of the 
multiple regressions. The model’s arguments were further supported by another 
sample model from 2009 data, which generated almost the same model coefficients 
and confirms the relationship between variables. 
By simulating the model, the research established the impacts of liberalisation of 
market access, and carrier’s ownership separately. 
The chapter concluded that liberalisation of market access could increase the traffic 
by 65%, while liberalisation of carrier ownership could spur traffic by 33%. But in 
total, full liberalisation of ASAs in Nigeria could stimulate total annual traffic growth 
by about 120%. As a result passenger welfare is increased from the expected saving 
by a reduction in air fare as suggested by the theory of elasticity. In this regard, there 
were two possibilities of elasticity in the market. The first elasticity value of -0.6 may 
lead to unrealistic reduction in price, while the second elasticity value of -2.5 could 
realized some reasonable consumer welfare to the travellers in the market if Nigeria 
liberalises its ASAs with the top 19 traffic destination countries. 
The chapter discovered that the increase in traffic could demand a maximum of 2387 
Typical Peak Hour Passengers (TPHP) in a year as recommended by US FAA, while 
the current airport capacity can handle up to 6190 TPHP which suggested that there 
may not be any alarm regarding capacity or inadequacy from anticipated increases 
due to full liberalisation. 
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Chapter Seven: Findings, Conclusion and Recommendation 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the discoveries of the research from the analysis and 
discussion of the last two chapters, which shape the findings of the research based on 
empirical evidences. The chapter reviews the extent to which the research objectives 
have been achieved, and also provides answers to the research questions from the 
findings.  
In addition, with a comprehensive grasp of the liberalisation impact on Nigerian 
international aviation markets, the research has made some contribution to policy, 
theory and practice in the form of recommendations. Furthermore, this chapter 
discusses certain limitations of the research and also identifies opportunities for 
further research in the area of liberalisation in Nigeria. 
7.2 Research findings 
The research found that the reform policy that ushered in some aspect of liberalisation 
started in 1997 where YD was rectified, but serious commitment commenced in 2000 
with the restructuring of the ministry and formulation of the National Aviation policy 
of 2001 which incorporates some of the liberalisation policy. 
The research also observed that, even before full deregulation, the national carrier was 
struggling to meet its financial obligations, but immediately after deregulation, the 
government had no better option than to liquidate it due to the insolvency of the 
carrier. Therefore, the research concludes that deregulation aided the collapse of the 
already comatose national carrier. 
The research found that the collapse of the Nigerian national carrier created a vacuum, 
with no robust carriers to be designated by the Nigerian government in most of the 
ASAs. Instead, the government entered into a commercial agreement with foreign 
airlines to increase flight frequencies, which attracted royalties for the additional 
flights. As a result, the government generated huge revenue from the royalties, while 
the airlines realized additional incomes, and the passengers experienced additional 
service frequency.  
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The research ascertained from the ministry the nature of the ASAs that Nigeria signed 
with over 50 countries throughout the world, of which some countries’ routes have 
direct traffic services, while others routes lack direct traffic due to inadequate airline 
capacities of either one party or both, as in the case of India. However, for the active 
routes, in most cases the foreign carriers provided services where the Nigerian carriers 
were not able to provide services on 26 active international routes. For instance, in 
2010, Nigerian carriers were only able to lift 17.86 per cent of the total international 
passengers in the country’s market. This therefore suggests the dominance of foreign 
carriers that lifted 82.14 per cent of the market passengers as evident in Table 4.5.  
The research reviewed the current Nigerian ASAs where the various levels of 
liberalisation under the main provision of traffic right exchange, airline designation, 
capacity control, tariff regulation, withholding condition on the designated airline, and 
provisions for commercial agreement in each agreement were evaluated. The research 
further discovered that most countries’ ASAs were not fully liberalised but had some 
degree of liberalisation (ALI from 10–32). For a country to attain market access 
liberalisation in Nigeria market, the ASA should grant fifth freedom, free pricing, 
multiple designations, free determination of capacity and frequency. For a country to 
attain full liberalisation carrier ownership, they should have additional permission to 
allow principle place of business of carriers instead of flag carriers. 
The findings show that some countries’ provisions were similar and could be 
categorized into four different types thus: restricted BASA, BASA with commercial 
agreements, YD model, and open skies agreements. The YD signed as a multilateral 
agreement with African countries was the most liberalised ASA that deregulated 
market access and ownership control, and had an air liberalisation index value of 32, 
while restricted BASA was the least liberal with index value of 10. 
The research discovered strong evidence that linked ASA and flight frequency of the 
designated carriers in the agreement, which showed that the more liberal the ASA, the 
higher the frequency of flights. 
The research also discovered that the international traffic trend generated by the 
designated airlines from the four international airports in Nigeria had an average 
growth rate of 8.3 per cent per annum over ten years with a total record of 20.3 
million scheduled passengers. This was higher than the global average growth rate of 
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5.5 per cent provided by ATAG in 2010. However, the market appeared to be both 
cyclical and strongly influenced by external factors, mostly social and economic in 
nature. For instance, it was discovered that an increase in the country’s GDP by 1.γ4 
per cent caused a corresponding increase in international passenger traffic by 1.0 per 
cent from 2001-10. 
The analysis also found that the origin and destination of the country’s market 
indicated direct traffic to 26 countries with mostly the partner countries’ carriers as 
the major operators in the market, while the Nigerian carriers operated only on four 
countries’ routes due to inadequate aircraft resources. Consequently, traffic was 
lopsided to the advantage of foreign carriers. For instance in 2010, foreign carriers 
airlifted about 86 per cent of the international passengers, while Nigerian carriers 
airlifted only about 14 percent, which make the country an importer of airline services 
that caused capital flight. For instance, CBN puts ticket sales’ revenue repatriated in 
2011 by foreign carriers at about $1.23 billion. This suggests that the country was 
losing a lot of foreign exchange in the importation of airline services.  
The research discovered that about 85 per cent of total passenger traffic comes from 
the top ten destination countries while the remaining 15 per cent is from the other 15 
countries. For instance, the UK had the highest direct route and even final destination 
of passengers with about β0 per cent of the country’s total annual passengers in β010.  
Furthermore, an in-depth analysis of the top ten destination countries exposed some 
aspects of liberalisation impacts such as traffic growth, competition, expansion to 
other airports, and frequency of services in most of the routes, which was attributed to 
the various levels of liberalisation in ASAs.  
It is widely acknowledged both in theory and empirical studies that liberalisation 
policy brings about competition in the market; in this regard the research observed 
that only the UK and Ghana routes were found to be competitive, with at least three 
carriers on each route competing for passengers, while the rest of the routes had a 
monopoly situation with the exception of the US and South African routes where a 
duopoly market existed. Hence, the liberalisation promoted competition on only a few 
routes. Notwithstanding, a new paradigm of continental routes traffic competition 
were opened. 
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In addition, the research discovered strong evidence of another level of competition in 
the market by network carriers in respect of the route and traffic type (direct or 
indirect). This competition exists in two segments: east- and north-bound traffic 
segments, which suggested that almost all the routes had alternative operators that 
could be indirect traffic. This suggested Nigeria ASAs have allowed indirect services 
to foreign carriers to any destination.  
The east-bound segment was found to comprise traffic to Asian, Middle East and 
Pacific countries, where passengers have the option to select the airlines whose hubs 
fall on the routes. There were eight carriers in competition for about 30 per cent of the 
country’s market share, including Ethiopia Airlines, Emirates, Qatar Airways, 
EgyptAir and MEA. The segment competition-level entropy value was 0.749, 
suggesting a very high competition level among the carriers which positively affected 
the quality of services, air fares, accessibility and convenience for passengers in 
Nigeria market.  
The second market segment – north-bound traffic – comprises European and North 
American bound routes where passengers choose from the options of airlines whose 
hubs fall within Europe and the USA, namely: BA, Air France, KLM, Lufthansa, 
Iberia, Alitalia, Delta Airlines, Virgin Atlantic and Arik Air. The nine airlines 
compete for about 50 per cent of the annual market traffic with an entropy value of 
about 0.87 as the competition level. The competition among the airlines for east-
bound and north-bound traffic was confirmed by the field survey findings.  
The research also found from the survey of 568 passengers that about 75 per cent of 
them were business travellers, while 25 per cent were leisure and VFR travellers 
which suggests that the majority of the market passengers were price insensitive and 
concerned more with schedule, convenience and accessibility. These findings 
corroborate the analysis of secondary data and the model of traffic demand that shows 
price was not a significant factor in determining passengers demand.  
Also discovered from the research survey, was that 63 per cent of international 
passengers in the market were Nigerian, while other West African nationals on transit 
for intercontinental traffic constituted 13 per cent, and African and European nationals 
comprised about 13.3 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively. 
262 
 
Furthermore, the research revealed that about 60 per cent of passengers were civil 
servants and business entrepreneurs – most of them in top management positions. 
Also, it was discovered that the average annual income of international passengers 
was $31,720.00, while the average age of the passengers was estimated to be about 40 
years, and the mean number of trips by passengers in three years was five.  
The research also discovered from the passenger survey that, due to the level of 
segment competition in the market, passengers had choice for most of their flights; as 
such, passengers selected their airline based on three top priorities, namely: air fare, 
flight convenience and schedule.  
The analysis of passenger journey profiles in the survey was found to have 
strengthened the observations of the secondary data analysis on segment competition, 
routes and destinations of the carriers.  
The research found that the causative factors for international traffic demand between 
Nigeria and other countries include: international trade, aggregate GDP, ALI (a proxy 
of ASA) and historical/cultural link or common language (represented by dummy). 
This is evident from the research model developed by a multiple regression technique. 
The research also discovered that distance between Nigeria and any other country 
affects traffic demand in a negative manner as evident in the model. But the effect is 
relatively insignificant with coefficient value of 0.0001 as it can only have relative 
impacts if the distance is about 1,000 km or more. 
The research discovered from the 112 countries’ international traffic to/from Nigeria, 
that the relationship between international traffic, the level of air service agreement 
(ALI) and socio-economic circumstances affects every route, and as a result each 
country exhibits a distinctive traffic demand. Thus, an average country’s traffic is 
represented by the model:                                                                       ----------------------------------------- (7.1) 
The overall model for the relationships explains 78.4 per cent (R2) of the relationship 
after including all the possible predictor variables with the exception of air fare. 
The coefficients indicate the relationship between passenger traffic demand (Pax) and 
each other predictor, with all the coefficient t-stat values falling within acceptable 
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limits of below –2.00 or above +2.00 at p<0.005, which suggests all coefficients were 
statistically significant.  The model met all the assumptions of multiple regressions 
that validate it. 
The research discovered that liberalisation of international air service is indeed a 
significant factor in the country’s international traffic demand as evident in the model, 
with a positive coefficient value 0.084 (t-stat of 6.410 at p<0.005). This suggested that 
liberalisation is a driver for the demand of traffic which proves the hypothesis that the 
liberalisation of international air transport could stimulate traffic demand. 
Also the research found that air fare is not statistically significant in determining the 
traffic demand in the country’s international market. This is evident by the exclusion 
of air fare in the model with t-stat value of –0.983 at p>0.1, which suggests a typical 
dominance of business travellers in the market. To buttress this argument, the analysis 
of the international passenger survey by the research observed the dominance of 
business travellers against leisure travellers by 70 per cent to 30 per cent. Therefore, 
the field survey had substantiated the assumptions of the secondary data analysis. 
Even though air fare plays a significant role in the choice of airline for the traffic 
when compared with other factors as found in the survey. 
The research discovered that the group of countries where traffic was regulated under 
BASA restricted would, when fully liberalised, have an estimated 137 percentage 
increase in traffic as the impact.  
Also observed, countries where traffic was regulated by BASA (commercial) would, 
when fully liberalised, have an estimated increase in traffic of about 105 per cent. 
Furthermore, it was found that a country with fully liberalised market access such as 
the USA, when carrier ownership was liberalised would have an estimated 33 per cent 
traffic increase.  
The research concluded that liberalisation of market access could increase traffic by 
65 per cent, while liberalisation of carrier ownership could spur traffic by 33 per cent.  
Also, it was found that full liberalisation of the ASA in Nigeria could stimulate total 
annual traffic growth by about 120 per cent which, in turn, would lower air fares due 
to competition from new airline entrants and additional flight frequency from the 
existing airlines. 
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It is believed that lower air fares could increase passenger welfare from the saving of 
the expected reduction in air fare, as suggested by the theory of elasticity. In this 
context, the research realized that total consumer welfare to be enjoyed by travellers 
in the market if the country were to liberalise its ASA with the top 19 traffic 
destination countries is estimated to be US$822 Million. This is made up of current 
passenger savings of US$315 Million, and expected additional passenger savings of 
US$507Million. That is to say the current international passengers in the country could 
enjoy an average saving of US$ 264.67 per person if full liberalisation was enforced. 
Moreover, the forecasted traffic increase is found to be incapable of creating an 
imbalance between demand and airport infrastructure capacity that could create delays 
and congestion, since the current designed capacity of the airport terminal of a 
maximum 6,190 typical peak hour passengers (TPHP) could effectively accommodate 
the projected demand of 2,387 TPHP in a year, based on FAA recommendations.   
7.3 Derivative Findings 
From the research analysis and findings, it is logical to use the following derivatives 
of reasoning as additional observations: 
The country’s abundant air transport infrastructure is grossly underutilized. This is 
evident from the total designed capacity of the terminal buildings of the four 
international airports that can handle 6,190 TPHP, while currently capacity for only 
1,375 TPHP is being utilized. This suggests that about 77 per cent of the capacity is 
underutilized. 
Liberalisation policy could be a strategy for enhancing the country’s international 
traffic as found in the study; full liberalisation of the top ten routes could enhance 
annual passenger traffic by about 120 per cent, which would generate more revenue 
for the government and airports for sustainable development through passenger taxes, 
airport charges, landing and parking fees and fuel surcharges.  
Liberalisation policy could lower air fares to be competitive enough that can attract 
more West African nationals to use Lagos Airport for intercontinental travels, which 
is one of the cardinal policies of Nigerian aviation policy. As at 2011, evidence has 
shown that neighbouring Ghana International Airport was providing lower air fares 
for UK travellers; therefore, there may be a tendency in the near future for Ghana’s 
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international airport to attract other West African nationals that currently constitute 
about 13 per cent of the Nigerian market travellers.  
The research also observed that the growing traffic demand on the UK–Nigeria route 
could be frustrated by inadequate slots at Heathrow Airport. This is evident from the 
cancellation of all Arik flights from Abuja to London due to inadequate airport slots at 
Heathrow, despite the traffic right granted in the ASA. This suggests that lack of slots 
is a constraint to some countries’ liberalisation development.  
It is observed that difficulty in obtaining travel visas to Europe and the US by 
Nigerian citizens, especially for leisure purposes, is affecting the traffic demand to 
such countries; this is evident from the complaints of passengers in the survey, and 
also from the growing number of travellers to UAE, where visas are processed easily 
by the UAE national carrier.  
In addition, the research found that sometimes there are delays in the issuing of visas 
to the prospective travellers and, as such, this affects the choice of carriers. However, 
from the composition of the travellers in the market, it is obvious such a situation 
would be a regular occurrence, because, according to research findings, over 90 per 
cent of the passengers were businessmen, civil servants, and other professionals on 
business trips, which most of the time are planned at short notice. 
Despite the prospect of liberalisation found in the study, some of the negative impacts 
suffered by the market cannot be overlooked. For instance, the policy was not able to 
protect the national carrier which, together with other numerous challenges, led to its 
collapse in 2002. Also, huge revenue realized from international passenger traffic by 
the airlines ended up being repatriated by foreign carriers making the country suffered 
from capital flight. 
7.4 Review of Research hypothesis, Aim and objectives 
The null hypothesis argument of this research as stated in chapter one is that “The 
liberalisation of market access and carrier ownership/control may not bring any meaningful 
increase in passenger traffic in Nigerian international air transport markets”. 
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The aim of the research is to study the impact of liberalisation of some aspects of 
international air transport services, specifically the issue of market access and carriers 
ownership/control on traffic demand in the Nigerian market. 
 Accordingly, the research outlines the following key objectives of the research; 
- To review the country’s ASAs in determining the level of liberalisation with 
the aid of the WTO index of liberalisation.  
- To study how ASA changes affected international air traffic demand in the 
Nigerian market.  
- To determine the socio-economic characteristics of international travellers in 
the market with a view to understanding the market implications of changing 
the liberalisation level.  
- To determine the impacts of liberalisation on traffic demand, passenger 
welfare and airport capacity in the market.  
- To evaluate the impacts of further liberalising market access and carrier 
ownership. 
7.4.1 Testing the hypothesis 
Regarding the hypothesis test detailed in section 1.3 the findings rejected the null 
hypothesis based on the following reasons: 
- The correlation between passenger traffic represented by lnpax and 
liberalisation represented by ALI has a moderately positive value of 0.56 
(p<0.05) as shown in Table 6.3. 
- The ALI coefficient in the model has a t-stat value of 6.41, which is also 
statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level (ȕ=0.084; t = 6.41; 
p<0.05). The coefficient value of 0.084 in this model implies that a unit 
increase of ALI can cause an increase in traffic demand by 8.4 percent in 
Nigerian international air transport market. 
- Also the model application proved that liberalisation of market access induced 
additional passenger traffic by at least 65 percent, while carrier ownership 
liberalisation can trigger passenger demand by 33 percent in Nigerian country-
pair market. 
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7.4.2 Level of Achievement of Research Objectives 
Objective 1: In evaluating the level of achievement of the first objective, which was to 
review the country’s ASA and determine the liberalisation level using the WTO 
index, the research was able to collect documents from the Federal Ministry of 
Aviation (FεOA) in Abuja on each country’s ASA, although the information came in 
lengthy agreements between two countries. The research was able to summarize some 
of the fundamental provisions of the agreements on traffic right exchange, airline 
designation, capacity control, tariff regulation, withholding condition on the 
designated airline, and commercial agreement. However, to ascertain the validity of 
the information supplied by FMOA, the research contacted some countries for 
validation.  
The research was able to review all countries’ agreements, but focused more on the 
countries with active agreements or high traffic demand. The analysis and findings are 
discussed in detail under section 4.2 and 4.3 of the research work. 
Therefore, it is believed the research objective have been achieved completely.  
Objective 2: To study how ASA changes affected international air traffic demand in 
the Nigerian market. Since the research scope was passenger traffic, the research 
collected data on the international passenger traffic volume transported by the 
designated carriers from 2001 to 2010 in the market. The data were only for direct 
traffic from Nigerian airports and provided by NCAA and FAAN. The data were 
analysed using descriptive statistics, tabulation, charts and entropy. The analysis 
towards achievement of objective 2 led to some research findings such as total market 
traffic trend, rate of traffic growth, traffic in relation to the country’s GDP, top β5 
countries’ destinations, route competition, and segment competition by network 
carriers, major airline operators’ market share, and final destination of each route’s 
traffic. The detailed discussion of the analysis is under section 4.4 and 4.5. However, 
there were some limitations for evaluating the impacts; therefore, research objective 
number 2 is achieved within the scope. 
Objective 3: To determine the socio-economic characteristics of international 
travellers in the market with a view to understanding the market implications of 
changing the liberalisation level. This led the research to conduct a field survey where 
international passengers on departure were administered a questionnaire that sought 
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relevant information on the demographic and journey profiles of the passengers. The 
analyses of the data in this case include: descriptive, cross-tabulation and charts (see 
chapter 5). The main findings here reinforced some assumptions of the secondary 
data, as well as the demographic profiles of the passengers. It is therefore observed 
that research objective 3 has been completely achieved. 
Objective 4: This determines the impacts of liberalisation on traffic demand and 
passenger welfare in the market. Due to the shortcomings of the NCAA data, which 
could not identify final country of destination of recent traffic, the research had to 
collect other data on the origin and destinations of all countries to/from Nigeria from 
IATA PaxIS for 2009 and 2010. In addition, data on the other variables such as 
aggregate GDP, international trade, distance, air fare and historical link with other 
countries were collected, together with the air liberalisation index developed for 
objective 1, the research developed a cross-sectional multiple regression model of the 
country’s international traffic demand for passengers in relation to the independent 
variables. The standard model evaluated the impacts of each of the independent 
variables, including the ALI; however, the impacts of liberalisation known from the 
model suggest that an increase in liberalisation index could spur traffic growth. 
Therefore, using elasticity theory, the research estimated that a drop in price could 
lead to consumer welfare. The details of the analysis are discussed in section 6.2 and 
6.3. Thus, the chapter achieves objective number 4 completely within the research 
scope. 
Objective 5: Evaluating further impacts of the liberalisation of market access and 
carrier ownership. In this situation, the research simulated the model and forecasted 
the likely scenario for traffic when market access is liberalised and also when carrier 
ownership is liberalised. This was achieved with application of the model as estimated 
and explained in section 6.3 and 6.4. Hence, objective 5 is completely achieved. 
In general, within the scope and limitation of the research, the aim and objectives are 
completely achieved. However, the impacts of liberalisation are a very wide and 
complex issue.  
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7.5 Research Recommendations 
In view of the above research findings, the research deems it necessary to offer some 
useful suggestions in the form of recommendations to policy makers, industry players 
(airlines and airports, as well as academics). 
Going by the findings of the study, it suggests that liberalisation has a significant 
economic impact on the air transport market and passenger welfare, which if the 
country market is fully liberalised could increase traffic demand by about 120 per 
cent, and augment consumer welfare by up to $822 Million annually, while the major 
cost implication is the potential loss of revenue to home carriers. However, in order to 
maximize this opportunity and mitigate the cost of capital flight, the Nigerian 
government could liaise with multinational investors and the private sector to jointly 
set up a new national carrier that can compete effectively in the market. Such a 
national carrier should be managed independently from the control of government so 
as to avoid a repeat of the collapse of the former national carrier in 2002.  
Alternatively, with the full liberalisation of carrier ownership, the Nigerian 
government should encourage one of the major global network carriers to collaborate 
with private airlines for investment and ownership in the country in the form of airline 
consolidation or equity investment, but with the principle place of business being in 
Nigeria, so as to qualify it as a designated carrier in the ASA. However, care should 
be made to avoid the repeat of Virgin Nigeria’s catastrophic ending. 
The benefits to be derived from ownership/control liberalisation include: access to 
international funding from other countries of the world; technical and managerial 
expatriates could be involved in management of the airlines; and cost efficiency and 
network synergy that could lower air fares (InterVISTAS-EU Consulting, 2009). 
For future ASAs, the Nigerian government should critically examine the air 
transportation system of the other countries, so as to identify some contemporary 
issues that can be of concern to the implementation of the agreement; such concerns 
should be addressed at the beginning, otherwise they could create problems caused by 
international traffic generated by the ASA. For instance, carbon emission charges and 
slot allocation issues applicable to European countries are indeed obstacles to 
achieving the intended outcome of more open ASAs. As noted earlier, a lack of 
airport slots at Heathrow Airport led to the cancellation of traffic by the Nigeria 
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designated carrier (Arik Air) from Abuja–London despite the right granted by the 
ASA.  
There should be a regular periodic review of the ASA for each country every four 
years so as to incorporate new developments and unforeseen challenges arising from 
the implementation of the agreements. Some of the agreements were long overdue for 
a review.  
To strengthen the competition in the industry against possible price collusion by 
carriers most especially where duopoly exist as in some routes in the market, the 
Nigerian government should establish an antitrust law that could regulate the 
competition practice in the country’s market. Otherwise, the case of BA and Virgin 
Atlantic in 2006 where the UK and USA governments penalized the two carriers for 
colluding in fixing the air fares on UK–US routes could be replicated.  
The research findings from the passenger survey that showed that business travellers 
comprised about 75 per cent and 25 per cent were travelling for leisure/VFR purposes 
should be a matter of concern to the government. This suggests a low level of tourism 
activity; either the country is not a tourism centre or the industry is not attracting a 
reasonable number of international tourists.  
The average rate of growth of international traffic from 2001 to 2010 was discovered 
to be about 8.3 per cent per annum, though volatile.  Policy action needs to be taken to 
meet the growing demand that can ensure an increase in the supply of international air 
services. Otherwise, the benefits of liberalisation could be a delusion. This could be 
achieved in several ways: (1) the idea of establishing a new national carrier as 
suggested earlier; (2) liberalisation of the country’s market access where the current 
designated carriers can have the opportunity to increase their supply when the demand 
rises in the market; (3) liberalisation of both market access and ownership where 
foreign carriers can have the opportunity to expand their operation or even establish a 
subsidiary in the country. 
In order to appreciate a more significant impact of liberalisation on air fare 
(significant drop) as in other parts of the world, a low-cost carrier model for business 
has to be involved in the country’s market. The government should encourage other 
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country parties with such capability to designate such a carrier in future agreements or 
reviews.  
7.6 Contribution of the Research to the Theory, Policy and Practice 
The research findings could be an immense contribution to policy makers, academic 
theory and industry operators; in this regard, the researcher believes that the following 
need to be considered. 
7.6.1 Policy makers 
The research findings could provide a guide to Nigerian policy makers in air service 
agreements with other countries considering air liberalisation policy. They inform the 
policy makers of the actual impacts of liberalisation on the country’s market and 
suggest some ways of mitigating the negative impression about liberalisation policy. 
Also, they provide a template for estimation of traffic change when the country’s 
BASA is changed from one stage of ASA to another. 
It may not be necessary to say the research findings should inform the decision but 
they may be of help to instigate further research or for comparison with an existing 
research outcome on a similar issue.  
7.6.2 Air transport industry 
The research findings may benefit major players of the industry such as airlines, 
airports, airspace agency and handling companies. Both national and international 
carriers should be concerned about possible or predicted market situations in the 
country as this will guide them on future investment decisions and prepare them for 
possible liberalisation. 
Also, potential entrants to international service may benefit in getting an in-depth 
study of the Nigerian market, most especially the level of competition among the 
international carriers. 
The airport authority and the handling company can use the travel forecast (in case 
liberalisation policy is further implemented) in determining the demand for their 
services for the purpose of investment planning. 
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7.6.3 Academics 
This research may be useful to academic communities in these areas: 
The research will reinforce the worldwide pool of knowledge on air transport 
liberalisation impacts and contribute to the argument on the country where such 
impacts are relatively unknown, more especially a country that exhibits a unique case, 
having more business travellers than leisure travellers with significant market 
potential and absence of a robust national carrier. 
The discovery of the relationship between Nigerian international traffic and the 
historical link in terms of common language or culture is a new concept, although it is 
generally believed that such factors are highly correlated; however, the research 
further determines the actual value of the relationship.  
In addition, the research added a new concept of using volume of trade between 
country-pairs as an exogenous variable in determining the traffic demand between the 
countries; it explained the quantifiable relationship between international trade and 
traffic demand between Nigeria and other countries.  
The research developed a model that can evaluate the international traffic demand 
to/from Nigeria to any country based on GDP, International trade, ALI, and Distance 
between the 2 countries.  
The research also constructed Air liberalisation index of the Nigeria ASA using WTO 
format, which might be helpful to policy makers and academia.  
Finally, the research contributes towards the health of the academic discipline through 
reference material and citations. 
7.7 Limitations of the Study 
Traditionally, most research studies have some constraints and limitations, this thesis 
is no exception. The limitations of this thesis include the following: 
Determination of liberalisation impacts on longitudinal modelling: this would enable 
the isolation of the exact time for the liberalisation to manifest. This was due to 
absence of data for a longer period, especially the data on O-D traffic to the final 
destination. Also, liberalisation policy is still relatively too new for actual long-term 
impacts to be assessed.  
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However, in view of the limitation of the study scope, the research was not able to 
determine the impacts of liberalisation to the wider economy, which include: the 
contribution to GDP; revenue generated by the market; direct and indirect 
employment provided; established links with tourism; and airline cost efficiency.  
The construction of ALI based on WTO format is an estimation from a group of 
experts that assigned various weighted indices to some of the features of ASA. This 
could be contested by another group.  
Also, the research could not establish the official views of airlines in the study. This 
has to do with ethical issues where such airlines regard as confidential information 
that can only be divulged by approval of their headquarters. 
Moreover, the research findings could not be generalised beyond Nigeria case is 
another limitation. 
7.8 Further Research 
The research concludes by suggesting areas for further research on the liberalisation 
impacts in the countries similar to this study, thus: 
Further research on liberalisation could be extended in determining the impacts of the 
policy to the wider economy of the country which this research was not able to 
achieve due to limitation of the scope. It would be interesting to evaluate the policy 
motivation for the nation’s economy especially GDP, direct and indirect employment 
generation, and effects on tourism development, because many empirical studies 
believe that liberalisation affects the general economy of the country. For instance, 
InterVISTAS-EU Consulting, (2009) claimed that the policy led to the increment of 
Indian GDP (PPP) by $26,598 Million and created 241,200 employment opportunities 
in the Indian Aviation Industry.  
Also, research on how air transport could be enhanced from tourism development in 
the country. The research discovered the ratio of business travellers to leisure 
travellers is 3:1, suggesting the possibility of a low level of tourism activity; either the 
country is not a tourism centre or the industry is not attracting a reasonable number of 
international tourists. Warnock-Smith & Morrell (2008) argued of the existence of 
implied interdependence between tourism and air transport. This suggests that tourism 
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depends on transportation to bring visitors, while the transportation industry depends 
on tourism to generate demand for its services.  
Also, another area for further research is the assessment of the impacts of 
international liberalisation on the domestic traffic in Nigeria. Such research would 
determine how the growth of international traffic provided by mostly foreign carriers 
due to liberalisation has affected the domestic traffic provided by local carriers. 
However, there is the possibility that, because of decentralization of international 
traffic, domestic traffic would probably be affected negatively, but otherwise it is 
generally believed that once international traffic increased, domestic traffic would 
follow suit.  
Another area for research is to determine how liberalisation could reduce air fare 
disparity in West African sub regional traffic. It is a noticeable fact that traffic from 
West African cities to the same destination such as Accra–London, and Lagos–
London has a significant fare disparity even by the same carrier. This was an issue of 
discussion in the aviation committee of the Nigerian parliament sometime in 2012.  
Another possibility for a research area is the impact assessment of centralization of 
international traffic in Nigeria. The present arrangement of multiple designations of 
airports as point of entry and departure has some benefits and demerits, so also the 
centralization of an international hub which some countries practice. However, 
considering the country’s situation of low passenger volume for international traffic 
(about three million passengers per annum), four international airports, and 
international traffic handled mostly by foreign carriers while domestic traffic is 
handled by indigenous carriers, further research is required that could advise the 
government on the best option.  
Also, a study on the impact of implementation of the YD on African Airlines’ 
business could be another research area of interest, since one of the goals of the 
agreement among the African countries is for the development of an African aviation 
business. Already, the programme has gradually been implemented since 1998. 
Therefore, there is a need to examine its impact on the airline business, because many 
believe that within the period more airlines collapsed than those established. But, 
according to some quarters, some airlines that are part of the YD community (such as 
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Ethiopian and Kenya Airways) have success stories which are good examples to be 
appreciated. 
Also, another area for further research on the issue is by changing the methodological 
approach, as this research relied heavily on secondary data which was analysed 
quantitatively. An alternative approach could be adopted by relying on primary data 
through a questionnaire or interview with the industry practitioners, especially 
airlines, airports, civil aviation authority and other stakeholders. The opinion of these 
professionals on the impact of liberalisation could be scientifically analysed as 
another research pathway.  
7.9 Summary of the Conclusion 
The research set out to explore the impact of further liberalisation on international air 
transport in Nigeria and identified the level of liberalisation in the country’s current 
ASAs, resulting international traffic performance, and liberalisation effects on traffic 
demand and market welfare among others. The general theoretical literature on the 
issue and other empirical studies provided an inconclusive discourse on the Nigerian 
liberalisation case, but offered useful directions for the research.  
The research employed both secondary and primary data that were analysed using 
traditional methods of liberalisation analysis which include descriptive, entropy, and 
econometric modelling. 
The empirical findings were able to achieve the objectives of the research within the 
scope. One of the salient research discoveries was that full liberalisation of market 
access and carrier ownership could spur traffic demand by about 120 per cent. The 
impact of the traffic increase could trigger a change in air fare that could increase 
consumer welfare. The expected massive traffic increase could also be conveniently 
accommodated by the current airport infrastructure. 
In spite of the research findings about the impacts there are still some concerns, for 
which the research made some suggestions in the form of recommendations. In 
addition, areas for further research on the liberalisation issue were also suggested.  
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In general, this research is believed to have made a contribution to knowledge, both in 
theory and practice, which academicians, policy makers and industry practitioners 
could utilise.  
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 Appendices 
Appendix 1: Freedoms of the Air (Traffic Rights) 
The freedoms of the air were first established at the Chicago Conference in 1944 in order to 
provide a standardised basis for negotiation of bilateral air service agreements. In 1944 only 
the first five freedoms were identified, however, since that time another four definitions have 
been added. The nine freedoms of the air are: 
First Freedom 
The right to fly and carry traffic over the territory of another country without landing 
Second Freedom 
The right to land in another country for technical reasons, such as refuelling or maintenance 
without boarding or deplaning of passengers or cargo.  
Third Freedom 
The right of a carrier from one country to carry passengers or cargo from its home country to 
another country 
Fourth Freedom 
The right of an airline from one country to land in a different country, and board passengers 
travelling to the airline’s own country  
Fifth Freedom 
The right of an airline from one country to land in a second country, to then pick up 
passengers and fly on to a third country where the passengers then deplane  
Sixth Freedom 
The right to carry traffic from one country through the home country to a third country  
Seventh Freedom 
The right to carry traffic from one country to another state without going through the home 
country  
Eighth Freedom 
The right to carry traffic between two points within a foreign country (i.e. domestic traffic) as 
an extension of a service starting or ending in the airline’s own country (also known as tag-
on or fill up cabotage). 
  
Ninth Freedom 
The right to carry traffic between two points within a foreign country with no requirement to 
start or end the service in the airline’s own country (also known as pure cabotage). 
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Appendix 2: Summary of Literature review on Air Transport liberalisation 
S/n Author/year objectives Approaches Methodology variables Findings Reference 
1 David Gillen, et 
al. (2001) 
The impact of international 
liberalisation to 2nd tier 
airports open for 
international traffic on traffic, 
economy. 
-Evaluate impacts of changes 
in ASA 
Ex poste analysis. 
Questionnaires 
Simulation. 
Air Liberalisation 
Model. 
- Demand /supply 
elasticity model. 
 - I/O model. 
Aggregate model 
-Nature of ASA. 
Passenger 
volume. 
Revenue.  Airport 
Employees 
-International traffic 
level increases. 
-Decrease in local 
traffic within Europe. 
-Increase in LF, 
revenue, employment. 
-Boost tourism 
The impact of 
Liberalising 
international bilateral 
(Case study of 
Northern German 
region) 
  
 Book  
2 Martin Grancay 
(Munich 
personnel Re 
PEC, archive)  
July 2009  
To compare changes in 
demand caused changes in 
fare 
Survey and 
Previous study 
Econometric 
model, 
I/O analysis. 
Elasticity of 
demand 
Income. 
Air fare. 
Travel demand 
Enhance trade 
/tourism. 
Increase competition. 
Save cost. 
Enhance GDP. 
 Job creation 
Economic impact of 
Air Liberalisation. 
 
Research paper 
3 Massino G 
Grosso and Ben 
Shephard. 
 
(Oct. 2009) 
Examine a link between a 
more liberal air cargo and 
increase in bilateral trade in 
APEC  
Secondary data 
analysis from WTO 
Gravity model, Air 
liberalisation 
Model, 
 
Export/import 
expenditure 
-production 
Transport cost. 
Bilateral tariff 
 
More liberal air 
services are  positively  
associated with high 
bilateral trade 
between countries 
Liberalising Air cargo 
services in Asia 
pacific Region. 
 
(working paper) 
4 Kenneth Button  
2001 
Assessment of European Air 
transport market 
Historical data 
analysis 
Comparative data 
analysis of pre  
and post 
liberalisation 
Fare, Traffic 
volume, 
Consolidation of 
airlines 
Lower fare. Structural 
change.  More 
services.  Efficient 
management 
Deregulation & 
liberalisation of 
European Air 
transport market 
(Journal of sci. 
Research.)  
5 Intervistas –ga 
& IATA 
2008/09 
Examine the impact of 
liberalisation  ASA on traffic  
level, employment, economic 
growth, passengers, tourism, 
& airlines 
Secondary data 
from IATA PaxIS, 
WTO 
Regression Model, 
Gravitational Model 
ASA,GDP, Air 
fares, O-D, 
service trade 
Passenger traffic 
increase.    Fare 
reduction. Increase in 
consumer surplus, 
employment, increase 
in GDP, weaken 
domestic carriers 
The impact of 
international air 
service liberalisation 
on Brazil, Peru, 
S’pore and others. 
Report of Intervista 
consultants to IATA 
 
6 Jin-Ru Yen, et, 
al. 
Sept. 2008 
Assess the impact of 
domestic deregulation  after 
period of implementation 
Secondary data 
and field survey 
-Market structure 
measurement, 
(HHI). No. of 
Routes 
Traffic vol. 
Carriers market 
-More competitive 
environment.      
Available alternative 
The change in 
structure of Taiwan’s 
domestic air 
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Effective 
competitors. 
Concentration 
ratio. 
Regression method 
share. flight to consumer.         
Lower airfare 
transport market in 
deregulation 
Journal paper, 
Taiwan university 
7 Sotiriola 
Liasidou 
Americanos 
college, Nicosia, 
Cyprus. 
2004 
Air transport liberalisation  
impact  on economy and the 
tourism 
Triangular 
combination of 
qualitative and 
quantitative 
Field survey. 
Expert interview. 
Secondary data 
Traffic vol. 
No of airlines 
-Competition and new 
entrants. 
-lower fare 
-improve services 
-accessible market 
-increase in revenue 
-Boost in tourism 
Air transport 
Liberalisation and its 
impact on aviation 
and tourism. 
(case Cyprus) 
Paper presentation 
8 David Warnock-
smith 
(2008) 
Evaluate the socio economic 
impact of Air transport 
liberalisation in the Caricon 
region   
-Fixed effect 
regression.  
-Time series 
-Air liberalisation 
Index 
-Correlation 
analysis 
 
-secondary data 
-field survey 
O/D traffic 
GDP 
 
Increase in traffic  
Increase in GDP 
Increase in passenger 
volumes 
Increase in overall 
welfare 
Socio economics 
Impact of air 
transport: Evaluation 
of liberalisation gains 
for  the Caricon 
region 
 
 
9 Boaz Moselle, et 
al. 
(2002) 
To analyse the effect of 
complete EU-US 
liberalisation by removing all 
commercial restrictions. 
Elasticity of 
price/demand 
-comparative 
analysis of pre & 
post liberalisation. 
-Regression to 
forecast 
Historical data  
review 
-Airline 
operational cost. 
-Passenger 
traffics 
-More efficiency in 
airlines. 
-Pricing synergy. 
-Output expansion 
-consumer surplus    
-Cost saving 
-Cross boarder flows 
of capital/labour 
Economics impact of 
US-EU Open Aviation 
Area. 
By BRATTLE GROUP 
Inc. Commissioned 
by European Union 
10 Rauf Gonenc, 
and Giuseppe 
Nicolette 
 
(OECD, 2001) 
The effect of Regulation and 
market structure on the 
performance of Air 
transportation 
Secondary data  
Measurement of 
Air transport 
efficiency 
HHI 
Multivariate model. 
Regression. 
Data Envelop 
Analysis (DEA) 
-No. of carriers 
-Market share of 
carriers 
-Carriers HHI 
-Domestic 
regulation 
-Govt control 
-Productive efficiency 
increase with relax 
regulation 
-LF improves with 
competition 
-fare decline with 
competition 
-Cost efficiency 
-Network optimisation  
Regulation, market 
structure and 
performance in 
passenger air 
transportation. 
 
( Economic study)  
11 Nabuaki Edo 
 
Japan (2007) 
Examine the impact of 
bilateral aviation framework 
on passenger air services 
imports focussing on US - 
Japan 
Historical data. 
Comparative data 
analysis; pre and 
Post open sky era.  
Gravitational 
model. 
OLS 
t-statistics 
-Import of 
passengers. 
- Export of 
passengers. 
- BASA 
-GDP 
-Per capita 
Traffic vol. Increases 
-Economics size has a 
larger impact on 
export than on import 
-US import more 
services from Japan. 
-The policy was 
International trade in 
air transport 
services: penetration 
of foreign airlines in 
to Japan under US-
Japan BASA 
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income 
- Distance 
negative to US export 
promotion. 
-Language has effect 
on travel between 2 
countries pair.   
 
 
Journal of Air trpt 
Mngt  (elservier.com) 
12 Frederic 
Dobruszkes 
 
(2009) 
To analyse both the level and 
geography of air competition 
in order to highlight where 
passengers stand to benefit 
the most from the increase 
the no of airlines 
simultaneously operating on 
the same market. 
-Survey of 
traveller’s market 
competition. 
-Data for Pre and 
post liberalisation. 
- Uses OAG data 
base 
 
Entropy instead of 
HHI 
-Fares 
-yield 
-No of carriers 
-Routes 
-Level of 
competitors 
-Development of new 
routes 
-Competition benefits 
passengers in cities 
and peripheral region. 
-Competition increase 
only on lucrative 
routes, and appears 
geographically limited 
concerning few routes 
 
Does Liberalisation of 
Air transport imply 
increasing 
competition? Lessons 
from European cases 
Journal of transport 
policy 
 
13 Vicente, Belen 
Re, Ana 
Rodrigues-
Alverez, Pablo-
millan 
(Spain 
universities) 
2005 
Compare the economic and 
technical efficiency of 
international air transport 
companies within 
liberalisation framework 
(1996-2000) 
Math prog 
technique( DEA ) 
-Econometric 
techniques   
20 Airlines 
 
Stochastic frontier 
for cost and 
production function 
Input/output 
-LF 
-KM-Pax 
-KM-tonnes 
- Employee 
-Fuel used 
Asian companies are 
more economically 
more efficient. 
-European and 
American firm low 
efficiency index. 
-Technical efficiency 
put Asian airline on 
top. 
 
 
Liberalisation and 
efficiency in 
international air 
transport 
 
 
(Journal trpt) 
Elsevier.com 
14 Youdi Schipper, 
Piet Rietveld, 
Peter Nijkamp 
 
Free University 
Amsterdam 
2006 
Competitive equilibria are 
compared with a regulated 
equilibrium to determine 
welfare implication of 
European liberalisation 
Numerical solution 
using data for 21 
airports in 1990 
Comparative 
statics analysis 
Departure 
frequency 
-Prices 
-Cost/profit 
-route structure 
-LF 
-Pax/route 
 
-Consumer welfare 
significantly increase 
- Frequency increases 
- Fare decreases 
-Profit decreases 
-Environmental costs 
increases 
Frequency, 
competition and 
environmental cost; 
Application to 
European Air 
transport 
liberalisation 
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15 Ian Thompson 
 
Glasgow 
University 
 2002 
To examine the prospect of 
3rd level airport in France 
from the liberalisation policy 
Situational 
analysis 
Theories and 
expert opinion 
analysis 
-No of airports 
-Traffic vol. in 
the airports. 
-passengers 
-Challengers carriers 
collapsed, high 
labour/fuel cost,  
subsidy cancelled, 
-3rd level airports 
future is ambiguous. 
Air transport 
liberalisation and the 
development of 3rd 
level airports in 
France 
 
(Journal of Trpt ) 
Elsevier.com 
16 David Gillen, 
Richards Harris, 
Tae Hoon Oum 
 
(2002)  
Measure the equilibrium 
changes and welfare 
consequences of liberalising 
air fare, entry and service 
levels of a bilateral air 
transport agreement. 
Simulation of 
situation by 
varying the policy 
to forecast future 
output. 
 
Trade policy 
analysis  
Demand/supply 
analysis 
Demand/ cost 
analysis 
Cost/benefit 
analysis 
-Price/fare 
-Cost 
-frequency 
-OD market 
- Demand 
-Pax. Volume 
- no of carriers 
 
-Removing entry 
restriction without 
pricing freedom will 
not have effect on 
consumer welfare and 
provide limited 
benefits to carriers. 
-Aggregate welfare 
gain is greater with 
price competition. 
 
 
 
Measuring the 
economic effect of 
bilateral liberalisation 
in air transport 
 
(Journal of Trpt ) 
 
Elsevier.com 
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Appendix 3: Air Liberalisation Indexing 
According WTO (2006) ALI can be constructed from the  
Grant of rights defines the rights to provide air services between the two countries. In particular, the 
WTO study focuses on the fifth freedom, seventh freedom and cabotage. Fifth freedom is the 
freedom to carry freight/passengers between two countries by an airline of a third country on a 
route with origin or destination in its home country (6 weights). Seventh freedom allows carrying 
freight/passengers between two countries by an airline of a third country on a route with no 
connection with its home country (6 weights).Cabotage is the freedom to carry 
freight/passengers within a country by a n air line of another country on a route with 
or igin/destina tion in its home country (6 weights) (see Appendix 1, Table A1 for  a  
graphica l representation of these freedoms); 
Capacity clause identifies the regime to determine the capacity of an agreed service. The capacity 
regime refers to the volume of traffic, frequency of service and/or aircraft types. Three commonly 
used capacity clauses are: predetermination, Bermuda I and free determina tion. Predetermination 
requires that capacity is agreed prior to the service commencement (0 weight); Bermuda I regime 
gives limited right to the airlines to set their capacities without a prior governmental approval (4 
weight) and free determination finally leaves the capacity determination out of regulatory control 
(8 weight); 
Tariff approval refers to the regime to price air services. The most restrictive regime is that of 
dual approval, whereby both parties have to approve the tariff before this can be applied (0 
weight). The most liberal regime is free pricing, when prices are not subject to approval by any 
party (8 weights). The semi-liberal regimes are country of origin disapproval (where tariffs may be 
disapproved only by the country of origin (3 weights). Dual disapproval (where both countries have to 
disapprove the tariffs in order to make them ineffective (6 weights). Zone pricing (where parties 
agree to approve prices falling within a specific range and meeting certain characteristics, while 
outside the zone one or a combination of the other regimes may apply (4 or 7 weights); 
Withholding defines the conditions required for the designated airline of the foreign country to 
operate in the home country. Restrictive conditions require substantial ownership and effective 
control, meaning that the designated airline is the “flag carrier” of the foreign country (0 weights). 
More liberal regimes are community of interests (4 weights) and principal place of business (6 
weights) regimes, when a foreign airline can be also designated by the foreign country. Community of 
interests regime still requires a vested substantial ownership and effective control of the airline in 
one or more countries that are defined in the agreement, but principal place of business regime 
removes the substantial ownership requirement and is thus more liberal; 
Designation governs the right to designate one (single designation, 0 weights) or more than one 
(multiple designation, 4 weights) airline to operate a service between two countries; 
Cooperative arrangements define the right for the designated airlines to enter into cooperative 
marketing agreements (such as code sharing and alliances). This right is considered as a liberal 
feature because it provides a means to rationalize networks, much in the same way as the 
liberalisation of the ownership clause (3weights).
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Appendix 4: Nigeria – UK Air Service Agreement 
 
According UK CAA (2011) the BASA was signed in 1988, and has been amended by Memoranda of 
Understandings that contains the following provisions:  
  
Designation: The Agreement allows each country to designate up to three airlines (for the UK this is 
currently BA, bmi and Virgin), for Nigeria it is currently Arik Air, Air Nigeria and Kabo Airline (a 
designation exists for Bellview, but this airline has long ceased operating).  
  
Traffic rights:   UK airlines can operate scheduled services on the following route:  
Points in the UK - (intermediate points) Abidjan, Accra - Kano, Lagos and Abuja - (points beyond) 
Abidjan, Accra, Douala, Harare, Lusaka, Libreville 
  
Nigerian designated airlines have the following route available to them:  
Points in Nigeria - (intermediate points) Rome, Paris, Zurich, Frankfurt - London and Manchester - 
(points beyond) Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Moscow 
  
Fifth freedom traffic rights: Nigerian airlines may exercise fifth freedom traffic rights between Rome and 
the UK on three services per week. There are no fifth freedom traffic rights currently available for UK 
airlines.  
  
Capacity: UK designated airlines may operate up to 21 services per week between the UK and named 
points in Nigeria (Abuja, Kano, Lagos), in total.  
  
Nigerian designated airlines up to 21 per week from Nigeria to London Heathrow or any other London 
airport, in total.  
  
(With regard to destinations in Nigeria other than Kano, Abuja, Lagos, airlines might be subject to having 
to pay royalties or subject to commercial agreements under Nigerian guidelines. Frequencies to such 
destinations would be outside the bilateral ASA.)  
  
Tariffs: Airlines are allowed to set tariffs freely and independently (nb the original provisions of the 
bilateral Agreement included ones where tariffs had to be agreed between airlines).  Fares should be 
submitted to authorities at least thirty days prior their proposed effect and authorities have fifteen days in 
which to disapprove.   
  
With regard to corporate or commercial agreements, it is common in Nigeria for airlines to be required 
to enter in to such arrangements, or be subject to demands for ‘royalties’. However, the UK/Nigeria Air 
Services Agreement is silent on such topics.   
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 Appendix 5: International passenger traffic to/from Nigeria (Direct) and designated airlines 
Country Airline/Airport 2001   2002   2003   2004   2005   
 
 
Arrival Depart Total Arrival Depart Total Arrival Depart Total Arrival Depart Total Arrival Depart Total 
UK BA (LOS) 116713 123543 240256 188509 199181 387690 92866 103189 196055 94745 106327 201072  102407  
 BA(ABV) 24111 22999 47110 28694 25813 54507 36173 30790 66963 41439 40161 81600 49952 46617  
 Virgin Atl 32307 29583 61890    84700 84672 169372 91014 91880 182894  71810  
 Virgin (PHC) 0 0 0    0 0 0 14336 17164 31500 17316 18729  
 Nig. Airways 1763 2149 3912    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
 Virgin Nig 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  9194  
 Bellview 25 117 142    0 0 0 0 0 0  4248  
 Arik 0 0 0    0 0 0 0 0 0  0  
 Total 174919 178391 353310 217203 224994 442197 213739 218651 432390 241534 255532 497066  253005 506010 
Netherland KLM (Los) 70392 74315 144707 82820 89838 172658 82752 92126 174878 87234 98753 185987  78537  
 KLM (ABV) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16629 3087 19716 16515 12486  
 KLM (KNO) 19625 0 19625    5920 9111 15031 0 16882 16882  16882  
 Total 90017 74315 164332 82820 89838 172658 88672 101237 189909 103863 118722 222585  107905 215810 
France Air France(Los) 80192 82909 163101 74236 78942 153178 62470 70297 132767 63175 71024 134199  63168  
 Air France(PHC) 13214 13482 26696    15945 15594 31539 18762 19880 38642 28065 28668  
 Total 93406 96391 189797 74236 78942 153178 78415 85891 164306 81937 90904 172841  91836 183672 
Germany Lufthansa(Los) 34210 34837 69047 57635 61906 119541 69697 73895 143592 69523 75206 144729  37001  
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 Lufthansa(ABV) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 790 113  
 Total 34210 34837 69047 57635 61906 119541 69697 73895 143592 69523 75206 144729  37114 74228 
Swiss Swiss Air(Los) 39799 40998 80797 40857 41956 82813 33084 35943 69027 0 0 0  0  
Italy Alitalia (Los) 22144 576 22720 31309 852 32161 30832 1061 31893 37591 1188 38779  19833 39666 
Spain Iberia Air (Los) 139 101 240 2914 2631 5545 0 0 0  0 0  13478 26956 
Turkey Turkey (Los) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  
UAE Emirates(Los) 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 44352 45717 90069  39420  
 Nig. Airways 1287 1127 2414 837 574 1411 16727 19586 36313 0 0 0  0  
 Total 1287 1127 2414 837 574 1411 16727 19586 36313 44352 45717 90069  39420 78840 
Lebanon MEA (Los) 13466 13586 27052 18935 18621 37556 18927 18618 37545 16861 17828 34689  7945  
 MEA (KNO) 7517 8015 15532    8275 7608 15883 9978 10489 20467  11456  
 Total 20983 21601 42584 18935 18621 37556 27202 26226 53428 26839 28317 55156  19401 38802 
S/Arabia Saudi Air(KNO) 7687 4888 12575 6127 5067 11194 15641 8497 24138 19134 8910 28044  14344  
 Nig. Airways 8568 1602 10170    9571 6864 16435 0 0 0  0  
 Total 16255 6490 22745    25212 15361 40573 19134 8910 28044  14344 28688 
Ghana Ghana Airways 27044 27557 54601    13602 12749 26351 10095 9648 19743  374  
 Bellview 0 0 0    9176 8999 18175 20899 24080 44979  15691  
 Ethiopia 20804 22202 43006    1441 11162 12603 5771 9010 14781  565  
 Aero contractor 0 0 0    0 0 0 422 342 764  0  
 Virgin Nig 0 0 0    0 0 0 0 0   16779  
 Arik 0 0 0    0 0 0 0 0   0  
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 Total 47848 49759 97607 90751 118598 209349 24219 32910 57129 37187 43080 80267  33409 66818 
S/Africa SAA 34166 35287 69453 28771 31004 59775 33281 33719 67000 39638 41836 81474  42213  
 Virgin Nig 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  2332  
 Arik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  
 Total 34166 35287 69453 28771 31004 59775 33281 33719 67000 39638 41836 81474  44545 89090 
Ethiopia Ethiopia Airline 47481 46534 94015 60961 59765 120726 69659 66037 135696 74004 64874 138878  58335 116670 
Kenya Kenya Airways 32957 31733 64690 35096 33591 68687 39369 37609 76978 29490 28092 57582  32313 64626 
Egypt Egypt Air(Los) 8441 10096 18537 9330 9535 18865 8962 7813 16775 11925 14804 26729  11588  
 Egypt Air (Abv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  
 Egypt(KNO) 8347 9094 17441       6588 1403 7991  17845  
 Total   35978           29433 58866 
Cote D'Ivoire Bellview 0 0 0    6732 6890 13622 6832 7066 13898  5398  
 Ethiopia Airline 0 0     7279 6417 13696 10480 10121 20601  3875  
 Cameroun Air 17651 16270 33921    18406 16795 35201 9193 8402 17595  904  
 Air Gabon 13931 14063 27994    12668 4886 17554 8622 8602 17224  0  
 Air Afrique 5066 7064 12130    0 0 0 0 0 0  0  
 Total 36648 37397 74045 54061 54760 108821 45085 34988 80073 35127 34191 69318  10177 20354 
Cameroun Cameroun Air 18130 21056 39186    22224 23422 45646 11763 12842 24605  8121  
 Nig. Airways 2286 2164 4450    112 1539 1651 0 0 0  0  
 Bellview 0 0 0    0 0 0 2458 2149 4607  4339  
 Air Nigeria/Virgin 0 0 0    0 0 0 0 0 0  1472  
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 Total 20416 23220 43636 60961 59765 120726 22336 24961 47297 49348 49182 98530  13932 27864 
Sudan Sudan Air (Los) 1180 1400 2580 531 41 572 651 3606 4257 257 2755 3012  660  
 Sudan Air (Kno) 5109 13761 18870    8808 19362 28170 5132 12608 17740  6543  
 Total 6289 15161 21450    9459 22968 32427 5389 15363 20752  7203 14606 
Senegal Air Gabon 1602 2256 3858    1492 6723 8215 801 918 1719  646  
 Cameroun Air              2553  
 Bellview              4400  
 Total 1602 2256 3858 6259 6712 12971 1492 6723 8215 801 918 1719  7599 15198 
S/Leone Bellview 5492 6412 11904 9772 9381 19153 7082 6953 14035 9053 7501 16554  4894  
 Others              425  
 Total 8179 8724 16903 9772 9381 19153 8863 9740 18603 9053 7501 16554  5319 10638 
Gabon Air Gabon 18443 12838 31281    14241 15773 30014 14102 13664 27766  1649  
 Nig. Airways 3282 2694 5976    2335 2335 4670 0 0 0  0  
 Bellview 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  1769  
 Total 21725 15532 37257 16792 14003 30795 16576 18108 34684 14102 13664 27766  3418 6836 
Libya Afrique Air 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 334 439 773  8007 16014 
USA North America air 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 207 65 272  0  
 Arik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  
 Delta (Los) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  
 Delta (Abv) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  
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 Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 207 65 272  0  
 
               157255
2 
   2006- 10 International Passenger Air Traffic  
country Airline/airport 2006   2007   2008   2009   2010   
UK  ARR  DEP  Total ARR  DEP  Total ARR  DEP  Total ARR  DEP  Total ARR  DEP  Total 
 
ARIK(LOS) 0 0 0 NIL  NIL  0 0 0 0 46200 47120 93320 42147 41841 83988 
 
ARIK(ABV) 0 0 0 NIL  NIL  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9820 10152 19972 
 
BELVIEW (LOS) 303 351 654 16173 18258 34431 21159 25468 46627 15968 15104 31072 0 0 0 
 
BA(ABV) 54233 52011 106244 67175 59045 126220 60288 59692 119980 57710 59334 117044 54222 55936 110158 
 
BA(LOS) 71606 74689 146295 84656 94747 179403 87599 101394 188993 92201 89618 181819 86338 85744 172082 
 
VIRG ATL (LOS) 49570 42681 92251 81421 80779 162200 96308 78546 174854 93882 90817 184699 92325 95551 187876 
 
VIRG NIG (ABV) 34891 33590 68481 58482 58915 117397 54413 51478 105891 NIL  NIL  0 NIL  NIL  0 
 
Total 210603 203322 413925 307907 311744 619651 319767 316578 633345 305961 301993 607954 284852 289224 574077 
FRANCE AIR FRANCE(LOS) 49789 47327 97116 72367 75958 148325 68324 60444 128768 62711 69090 131801 66456 67583 134039 
 
AIR FR (PHC 22558 23501 46059 0 0 0 5074 5779 10853 15213 15398 26066 19936 21406 41342 
 
Total 72347 70828 143175 72367 75958 148325 73398 66223 139621 77924 84488 162412 86392 88989 175381 
ITALY ALITALIA 30299 27974 58273 33544 37695 71239 23633 21736 45369 10056 12007 22063 12875 13833 26708 
USA ARIK (LOS)  NIL  0 NIL  NIL  0 NIL  NIL  0 321 371 692 7004 7815 14819 
 
DELTA (ABV) NIL  NIL  0 NIL  NIL  0 NIL  NIL  0 2905 3454 6359 8660 9519 18179 
 
DELTA(LOS) NIL  NIL  0 5471 3000 8471 52468 60178 112646 51126 50057 101183 49289 53372 102661 
 
NORTH AMERIC 5578 3989 9567 22475 25196 47671 5772 6324 12096 NIL  NIL  0 NIL  NIL  0 
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Total 5578 3989 9567 27946 28196 56142 58240 66502 124742 54352 53882 108234 64953 70706 135659 
GERMANY LUFTH(ABV) 7676 5101 12777 16954 18534 35488 19913 19974 39887 20211 19797 40008 31301 32479 63780 
 
LUFTH(LOS) 45734 44662 90396 68425 71191 139616 74704 87635 162339 89330 82990 172320 57128 58297 115425 
 
LUFTH(PHC) 18818 15069 33887 NIL  NIL  0 NIL  NIL   723 1353  16455 16578 33033 
 
Total 72228 64832 137060 85379 89725 175104 94617 107609 202226 110264 104140 214404 104884 107354 212238 
LEBANON MEA(LOS) 4563 5239 9802 1455 939 2394 8992 9259 18251 4204 4178 8382 4941 5205 10146 
 
MEA(KNO) 3672 9727 13399 17975 18279 36254 14886 13892 28778 13312 12262 25574 8444 8866 17310 
 
 8235 14966 23201 19430 19218 38648 23878 23151 47029 17516 16440 33956 13385 14071 27456 
NETHERLAND KLM(ABV) 21996 25250 47246 27609 28336 55945 29774 31297 61071 30372 29914 60286 29512 27898 57410 
 
KLM(LOS) 53849 53207 107056 85546 91553 177099 69078 94526 163604 90507 82990 173497 83623 82113 165736 
 
Total 75845 78457 154302 113155 119889 233044 98852 125823 224675 120879 112904 233783 113135 110011 223146 
UAE EMIRATE 60609 49844 110453 106261 105077 211338 124289 101608 225897 141146 139828 280974 156348 153700 310048 
SPAIN IBERIA 8338 9924 18262 13676 13182 26858 15601 14966 30567 11924 12787 24711 13446 12706 26152 
QATAR QATAR AIR NIL  NIL   24107 24101 48208 49598 40887 90485 59907 58236 118143 63391 65077 128468 
S/ARABIA SAUDI AIR 16668 9840 26508 13434 3566 17000 9876 10014 19890 12353 13936 26289 8914 9403 18317 
TURKEY TURKISH (LOS) 2509 1981 4490 12302 16849 29151 19334 19962 39296 23205 21244 44449 19996 20930 40926 
SOUTH AFRICA ARIK NIL  NIL  0 NIL  NIL   NIL  NIL   12528 13111 25639 24988 24528 49516 
 
BELVIEW NIL  NIL  0 NIL  NIL   88 95  2507 2038 4545 NIL  NIL  0 
 
SA(LOS) 25885 24851 50736 35852 36987 72839 31389 35917 67306 57627 54311 111938 63258 62856 126114 
 
VIRGIN NIG 12723 11932 24655 18985 20666 39651 20208 19199 39407 NIL  NIL  0 NIL  NIL  0 
 
total 38608 36783 75391 54837 57653 112490 51685 55211 106896 72662 69460 142122 88246 87384 96980 
ETHIOPIA ETHIOPIA( ABV) 0 0 0 NIL  NIL  0 4361 4323 8684 13969 13361 27330 19145 17034 36179 
 
ETHIOPIA(LOS) 37767 39522 77289 71338 76970 148308 75564 76153 151717 61001 62556 123557 50220 52130 102350 
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Total 37767 39522 77289 71338 76970 148308 79925 80476 160401 74970 75917 150887 69365 69164 138529 
KENYA KENYA A(LOS) 23015 21866 44881 29698 30394 60092 28323 29141 57464 32096 33097 65193 31154 32524 63678 
EGYPT EGYPT(LOS) 7182 8585 15767 2970 2008 4978 16995 18209 35204 19508 17628 37136 34482 35327 69809 
 
EGYPT(ABV/KNO) 9509 9170 18679 13120 16634 29754 16984 14869 31853 19182 18437 37619 17996 17907 35903 
 
Total 16691 17755 34446 16090 18642 34732 33979 33078 67057 38690 36065 74755 52478 53234 105712 
CAMEROUN BELVIEW 4520 4819 9339 13699 14541 28240 8001 8663 16664 1088 1266 2354 NIL  NIL   
 
CAMERON AIR 6803 6918 13721 5797 5868 11665 NIL  NIL   NIL  NIL   NIL  NIL   
 
VIRGIN 2062 1900 3962 9742 9668 19410 14966 9985 24951 17066 18852 35918  19656  
 
Total 13385 13637 27022 29238 30077 59315 22967 18648 41615 18154 20118 38272    
LIBYA AFRIQUE(LOS) 9265 7709 16974 12012 13313 25325 13466 10600 24066 12789 13964 26753 15004 14217 29221 
SUDAN SUDAN AIR(KNO) 8718 4561 13279 5237 319 5556 NIL  NIL  0 NIL  NIL  0 9258 5496 14754 
GHANA AERO(LOS) 4610 3760 8370 8398 9936 18334 17816 15542 33358 21322 20810 42132 29968 33041 63009 
 
ADC(LOS) 304 359 663 NIL  NIL  0 NIL  NIL  0 NIL  NIL  0 NIL  NIL  0 
 
ARIK(LOS) NIL  NIL  0 232 NIL  0 20688 21860 42548 29923 30056 59979 29693 28796 58489 
 
ARIK(ABV) NIL  NIL  0 NIL  NIL  0 NIL  NIL  0 NIL  NIL  0 8258 7780 16038 
 
BELLVIEW(LOS) 13477 14810 28287 15090 16989 32079 6010 6783 12793 1507 1609 3116 NIL  NIL  0 
 
VIRGIN NIG (LOS) 28668 25555 54223 50935 50038 100973 56241 50584 106825 14685 42313 56998 36248 37846 74094 
 
Total 47059 44484 91543 74655 76963 151618 100755 94769 195524 67437 94788 162225 104167 107463 211630 
SIERRA LEONE ARIK NIL  NIL   NIL  NIL   NIL  NIL   5992 6203 12195 10222 11756 21978 
 
BELVIEW 9358 9696 19054 9733 10314 20047 8707 9040 17747 4102 4716 8818 NIL  NIL  0 
 
Total 9358 9696 19054 9733 10314  8707 9040  10094 10919 21013 10222 11756 21978 
COTE D'IVORE ETHIOPIA NIL  NIL   NIL  NIL   NIL  NIL   NIL  NIL   1025 1388 2413 
 
BELVIEW 4001 5013 9014 6090 6193 12283 4978 5125 10103 1910 1837 3747 NIL  NIL   
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VIRGIN NIL  NIL   NIL  NIL   NIL  NIL   NIL  NIL   2963 2890 5853 
 
Total 4001 5013 9014 6090 6193 12283 4978 5125 10103 1910 1837 3747 3988 4278 8266 
SENEGAL ARIK NIL  NIL   NIL  NIL   NIL  NIL   NIL  NIL   1621 1750 3371 
 
VIRGIN 3440 3107 6547 10193 9763 19956 8071 6310 14381 10202 18228 28430 18258 19971 38229 
 
Total 3440 3107 6547 10193 9763 19956 8071 6310 14381 10202 18228 28430 19879 21721 41600 
BENIN VIRGIN NIL  NIL  0 NIL  NIL  0 4611 5221 9832 5005 5976 10981 7558 7676 15234 
MORROCCO ROYAL AIR M NIL  NIL  0 NIL  NIL  0 886 1337 0 9772 8177 17949 8098 8898 16996 
Source: NCAA (2011) 
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Appendix 6: Passenger Questionnaire                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Please kindly spare a little bit of your time to help in completing the questionnaire for some doctorate research 
on Air transport liberalisation at the University of Huddersfield, UK. 
The questionnaire is aimed at finding out the socio –economic characteristics of air travellers to and from 
Nigeria with a view to determining the impact of liberalisation on passengers. 
Please feel free to provide your view and feedback about the questions, and we assure you that your 
information will only be used for research purpose. 
Thank you for your assistance.  
SOCIO ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR PASSENGERS  
Please complete the blank space or tick the appropriate answers for the questions 
A) Passenger profile 
1 Nationality____________________________________________________ 
2 Country of residence_________________________________________  
3 Age group: 
1 -  15 years (  );        16 -  30 years (  );       31- 45 years      (  )                                                                                                            
46 - 60 years   (  );       61 -  75 years  (  );         Above 75          (  ) 
  
4    Occupation:   
Civil servant (  )                                      Business/entrepreneur (  ) 
Diplomat        (  )                                                                     Retiree (  )                                           
student           (  )                                                                     others (  )  
5 Current positions (Designation/cadre), if Q4 apply: 
Top Management (   )                              Snr/middle cadre management (   )                   
senior officer         (   )                              junior cadre                                      (   ) 
Other                        (   ) 
6 Income level per annum; 
0 – $15,000(0- N2.3m)                           (    )      
 $16,000 - $30,000(N2.4m- N4.5m) (    )   
$31,000- $50,000(N4.6m – N7.5m) (     )    
  $51,000 - $100,000(N7.6 – N15m)      (    )        
Above $100,000(N15m)                      (    ) 
B)  Journey profile 
 1)  Route (E.g. London – Abuja)   _____________________________________Airline_____________________ 
 2) Trip origin _____________________ Trip final destination _____________________ 
  3)  What is the Purpose of the Journey?                                                                                                                                                            
Business/official/education/religion (   );     Vacation/visiting relation (   );                                                                                      
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4) How frequently have you travelled abroad by air in the last 3 years? 
                   1 - 3 times  (  );         4 -  6 times (   );          7  -  9 times (   );        Ten and above (   ),        
                          
5) Select the top three rationales(reasons) for choosing the airline used for your trip by ranking 
1,2,& 3 in order of preference (i.e. 1 top most priority, 2 being 2nd priority, and 3rd  next 
priority). Just tick the top 3 only and leave others. 
  Air fare (ticket price);                                                             (1) or (2)  or (3)  Schedule (airport, timing, frequency, Punctuality);      (1) or (2) or (3)  Convenience (reservation, capacity, seat available);    (1) or (2) or (3)  Safety reputation;                                                                    (1) or (2) or (3)  Frequent Flyer programme;                                                 (1) or (2) or (3)  Brand name;                                                                              (1) or (2) or (3)  Promotion& advertisement;                                                 (1) or (2) or (3)  Comfort (aircraft type, meals, entertainment);               (1) or (2) or (3)     
 
6)   Any other comments/ suggestions 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Thank you and enjoy your trip.  
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Appendix 7: Field Survey Data Summary 
Nationality Resd 
country 
Age 
Group 
Occupatio
n 
Position Income 
level 
Airport Destination Route Traffic Airline Journey 
Purpose 
Trip 
frequenc
y 
Rational
1 
Rational
2 
Rational
3 
Nig Nig 4 CS Top mng 2 Abuja USA Amsterdam Indirect KLM Leisure 5 FFP C'vnce Fare 
Nig Nig 3 BE Top mng 1 Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines 10    
Nig Nig 3 CS Mdl mng 1 Lagos Liberia Liberia Direct Vig Nig Busines 10    
Nig Nig 3 BE Mdl mng  Lagos Dubai Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Leisure 8 C'vnce Comfort  
Middle East Lebanon 2 BE Mdl mng  Lagos Lebanon Cairo Indirect Egypt Leisure 2    
Nig Nig 3 others Top mng 4 Lagos Guinea Cotonou Indirect Asky Busines 10    
Nig Nig 2 stdt other 1 Lagos Malaysia Cairo Indirect Egypt Busines 2    
W/African W/African 3 BE Mdl mng  Lagos Syria Cairo Indirect Egypt Leisure 2 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
Nig W/African 3 BE   Lagos Dubai Doha Indirect Qatar 
Air 
Busines 10    
S/African Ss/Afircan 2 others Snr offcer Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 5    
S/African Ss/Afircan 4 CS other  Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2  ffp  
S/African Ss/Afircan 4 CS Snr offcer Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
Indian India 3 others other  Lagos India Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 2    
Nig Nig 3 BE Mdl mng  Lagos China Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 8    
S/African Ss/Afircan 3 others Snr offcer Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
W/African Nig 3 BE Top mng  Lagos Lebanon Lebanon Direct MEA Busines 10    
Nig Canada 4 others Top mng 5 Lagos China Dubai Indirect Emirate Busines 10 Fare C'vnce comfort 
Nig Nig 2 stdt other 1 Lagos Russia Dubai Indirect Emirate Busines 2 Schedul
e 
Fare C'vnce 
S/African Ss/Afircan 2 CS Mdl mng 2 Lagos Gabon Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2 Fare Schedul
e 
safety 
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Nig Nig 3 BE Top mng 1 Lagos Dubai Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 8 fare C'vnce safety 
W/African W/African 3 BE Top mng  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
Nig Nig 2 stdt other  Lagos Egypt Cairo Direct Egypt Busines 2    
W/African W/African 3 others Snr offcer Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines     
W/African W/African 4 others Snr offcer Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 10    
W/African W/African 3 BE Top mng  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
W/African W/African 3 BE Top mng  Lagos Lebanon Lebanon Direct MEA Leisure 10    
Nig Nig 3 BE other  Lagos Dubai Cairo Indirect Egypt Busines 2    
Nig china 3 BE Mdl mng  Lagos China Dubai Indirect Emirate Busines 10    
W/African W/African 5 Rtre jnr  Lagos S/Arabia Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines     
Nig Korea 3 BE Snr offcer 2 Lagos Korea Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines     
Nig Nig 3 CS Snr offcer 1 Lagos Korea Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 5  fare schedul
e 
W/African W/African 5 Rtre jnr  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines     
W/African W/African 6 others other  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
W/African W/African 3 others other  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
Nig Nig 3 BE   Lagos Dubai Doha Indirect Qatar 
Air 
Busines 10    
Nig Nig 2 BE Mdl mng  Lagos Dubai Doha Indirect Qatar 
Air 
Busines 5    
Nig Nig 3 BE Mdl mng  Lagos Dubai Doha Indirect Qatar 
Air 
Busines 5    
Nig Nig 2 BE jnr  Lagos Dubai Doha Indirect Qatar 
Air 
Busines 2    
Nig Nig  others other  Lagos Dubai Doha Indirect Qatar 
Air 
Busines 5    
W/African W/African 2 others   Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 5    
W/African W/African 5 BE other  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
W/African W/African 4 others other  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
S/African Ss/Afircan 2 stdt jnr  Lagos Burundi Nairobi Indirect Kenya Busines     
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Air 
W/African UK 4 others other 4 Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Arik Leisure 10    
Nig USA 2 stdt other  Lagos USA Doha Indirect Qatar 
Air 
Busines 10    
Nig Nig 2 BE Mdl mng  Lagos China Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 2    
W/African W/African 2 others   Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 5    
W/African W/African 3 others Snr offcer Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 10    
W/African W/African 2 others other  Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 2    
Nig Nig 2 BE other 1 Lagos China Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines     
Nig Nig 4 CS Snr offcer Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Vig Nig Busines     
Lebanese Nig 1 stdt other  Lagos Lebanon Lebanon Direct MEA Leisure 8    
W/African W/African 4 others other  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
Nig Nig 4 others Top mng 3 Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Arik Busines 10 Fare C'vnce  
Nig Nig 3 BE Mdl mng  Lagos S.Africa S.Africa Direct SAA Leisure 2 Fare C'vnce  
Pakistani Pakistan 4 others Snr offcer 1 Lagos Pakistan Dubai Indirect Emirate Busines 5 Schedul
e 
C'vnce safety 
Nig Nig 4 others Top mng 1 Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Air Nig Busines 2 Fare C'vnce  
Nig Nig 4 others Top mng 1 Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Air Nig Busines 2 Fare C'vnce  
W/African W/African 2 BE other  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
Nig Nig 3 BE Top mng  Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Vig Nig Busines 10 Fare C'vnce  
Nig Nig 3 CS jnr 3 Lagos Kenya Nairobi Direct Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
kenyan Kenya 2 BE Mdl mng 1 Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Air Nig Busines 2 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
kenyan Kenya 2 BE Mdl mng 1 Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Air Nig Busines 2 Fare Schedul
e 
ffp 
Nig Nig 3 CS Snr offcer Lagos S.Africa Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Leisure 2 Fare Schedul
e 
ffp 
Nig Nig 3 BE Top mng 1 Lagos China Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 5 Fare C'vnce safety 
W/African W/African 2 others   Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 5    
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W/African W/African 4 BE Top mng  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
S/African Ss/Afircan 2 BE Snr offcer 1 Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2 safety Comfort C'vnce 
Nig Nig 3 others other  Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Arik Busines 5 C'vnce Schedul
e 
Fare 
Lebanese Lebanon 4 BE Top mng  Lagos Lebanon Lebanon Direct MEA Busines 5    
Lebanese Lebanon 3 BE Top mng  Lagos Lebanon Lebanon Direct MEA Leisure 8    
Lebanese Nig 3 CS Snr offcer Lagos Lebanon Lebanon Direct MEA Leisure 5    
Lebanese Lebanon 4 BE other  Lagos Lebanon Lebanon Direct MEA Busines 10    
Nig Nig 3 others Mdl mng  Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Air Nig Busines 10 Fare   
W/African Portugal 4 others Top mng  Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Air Nig Busines 10    
W/African W/African 3 BE Top mng  Lagos S/Arabia Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 2    
W/African W/African  CS jnr  Lagos S/Arabia Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines     
W/African W/African 3 BE other  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
Lebanese Nig 4 BE Top mng  Lagos Lebanon Lebanon Direct MEA Leisure 8    
W/African W/African 4 BE other  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
Nig Nig 4 CS Snr offcer 5 Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Air Nig Busines 5 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
W/African W/African 6 Rtre Snr offcer Lagos S/Arabia Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
Lebanese Lebanon 3 CS Snr offcer Lagos Lebanon Lebanon Direct MEA Leisure 5    
Burundise Burundi 4 others other  Lagos Burundi Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines     
W/African W/African 3 BE Top mng  Lagos Lebanon Lebanon Direct MEA Leisure 10    
Zimbabwe Zimbabwe 2 others other 3 Lagos Zimbabwe Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Leisure 8 C'vnce Fare ffp 
Nig Nig 3 others Top mng  Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Air Nig Busines 10 Fare C'vnce  
Nig W/African 3 others other  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
W/African W/African 3 BE Top mng  Lagos S/Arabia Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 10 Fare C'vnce comfort 
W/African Nig 2 others   Lagos Lebanon Lebanon Direct MEA Leisure 5    
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Nig W/African 3 BE Top mng 2 Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Arik Leisure 10    
W/African W/African 4 others other  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
W/African Nig 2 others   Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 8    
W/African W/African 3 BE Mdl mng  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
W/African W/African 3 BE Top mng  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines     
Nig Nig 5 BE Mdl mng 4 Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines 2 Schedul
e 
C'vnce ffp 
Nig Nig 3 BE Top mng 2 Lagos Adis Ababa Adis Ababa Direct Ethiopia Busines 8    
Nig Nig 4 BE Top mng 1 Lagos China Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 5 C'vnce safety ffp 
C/African C/African 3 others Top mng  Lagos Congo Cameron Indirect Asky Busines 2    
C/African C/African 3 others   Lagos Congo Cameron Indirect Asky Busines 2    
C/African C/African 2 others   Lagos Congo Cameron Indirect Asky Busines 2    
C/African C/African 3 others   Lagos Congo Cameron Indirect Asky Busines 2    
C/African C/African 2 others   Lagos Congo Cameron Indirect Asky Busines 2    
Nig Nig 2 BE other 3 Lagos Abidjan Abidjan Direct Air Nig Busines 10 Schedul
e 
  
Nig Nig 3 BE   Lagos Dubai Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
Nig Nig 3 CS Snr offcer 2 Lagos  Dubai  Emirate Busines 2 Fare C'vnce safety 
Nig UK 2 others other 1 Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 3 Fare p&p comfort 
W/African W/African 4 BE Top mng  Lagos S/Arabia Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
W/African W/African 5 others Top mng  Lagos S/Arabia Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
S/African Ss/Afircan 3 CS Snr offcer 1 Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2 Schedul
e 
safety comfort 
S/African Ss/Afircan 3 others other  Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
S/African Ss/Afircan 3 BE jnr 1 Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2 Fare Comfort  
C/African C/African 3 others   Lagos Congo Cameron Indirect Asky Busines 2    
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C/African C/African 4 CS Snr offcer 1 Lagos Congo Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Leisure 5 Fare ffp C'vnce 
Nig Nig 2 BE other  Lagos    Kenya 
Air 
     
Nig Nig 2 stdt   Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 2    
Nig Nig 2 stdt   Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 2    
W/African W/African 3 others   Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
W/African W/African 3 others Snr offcer Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 10    
W/African W/African 3 others Snr offcer Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 8    
W/African W/African 4 others Snr offcer Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 10    
W/African W/African 2 others   Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 2    
W/African W/African 3 others   Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 8    
W/African W/African 2 others   Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 2    
W/African W/African  others   Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 8    
Nig Nig 3 CS Snr offcer 1 Lagos Dubai Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 5    
Nig Nig 2 stdt   Lagos Cairo Cairo Direct Egypt Busines 2    
Nig Dubai 2 BE Mdl mng  Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Leisure 10    
Nig Nig 3 CS jnr  Lagos Dubai Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Leisure 2    
Nig Nig 3 BE Mdl mng  Lagos India Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 5    
W/African W/African 2 CS other  Lagos Gambia Gambia Direct Air Nig Busines     
Nig Nig 3 stdt  2 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 8 Fare Schedul
e 
safety 
Nig UK 3 BE Top mng 3 Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 8 Fare C'vnce schedul
e 
British UK 4 CS Mdl mng 4 Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 2 Fare   
Nig Nig 3 CS Top mng 2 Lagos HongKong Dubai Indirect Emirate Busines 10 Schedul
e 
C'vnce safety 
W/African W/African 4 Diplomat Snr offcer 1 Lagos Gambia Gambia Direct Air Nig Busines 10 Fare Schedul
e 
comfort 
Nig UK 3 CS Snr offcer 2 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 5 Fare Schedul
e 
safety 
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Nig Nig 4 others Top mng       Busines 2 Fare C'vnce safety 
Nig Nig 2 others Snr offcer 1 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 2 Schedul
e 
C'vnce safety 
Nig Nig 3 others Snr offcer 1 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 2 Schedul
e 
safety comfort 
Nig Nig 2 stdt other 1 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 2 comfort   
Nig Nig 2 stdt other 2 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 2 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
Nig Nig 3 CS Mdl mng 3 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 5 Fare Schedul
e 
safety 
Nig Nig 2 stdt other  Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 2    
Nig Nig 3 CS Snr offcer 3 Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 2 Fare safety comfort 
Nig Nig 2 others jnr 2 Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 3 safety Fare C'vnce 
Nig Nig 2 others Mdl mng 2 Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 10 Fare C'vnce promo 
Nig Nig 2 stdt   Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 2 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
Nig Nig 4 CS Snr offcer Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 2 Schedul
e 
  
Nig UK 2 stdt other 2 Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 2 Fare safety schedul
e 
Nig UK 4 others other 2 Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 2 Fare C'vnce  
Nig UK 4 others other 2 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 3 Fare safety comfort 
Nig UK 2 cs Mdl mng 2 Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 4 Fare Brandn
me 
C'vnce 
British Nig 4 CS Mdl mng 3 Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 4 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
Nig UK 2 others other 2 Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 2 Fare safety ffp 
Nig UK 3 others  2 Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 2 Fare C'vnce schedul
e 
W/African W/African 3 BE jnr 3 Lagos Gambia Gambia Direct Air Nig Busines 2    
Nig Nig 3 Diplomat Mdl mng 2 Lagos Togo Togo Direct Asky Busines 4 safety Fare C'vnce 
Nig Nig 3 BE Mdl mng 2 Lagos London London Direct Vig Atl Busines 6 Schedul
e 
safety comfort 
Nig Nig 3 BE Mdl mng 3 Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines 9 Schedul safety comfort 
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e 
W/African W/African 2 CS Mdl mng 1 Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Arik Busines 5 safety ffp comfort 
W/African W/African 4 CS Snr offcer 1 Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Vig Nig Busines 4 Fare safety comfort 
Nig Nig 3 CS Snr offcer 1 Lagos Cotonou Cotonou Direct Arik Busines 4 C'vnce safety comfort 
W/African W/African 3 stdt jnr  Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Asky Busines 6 Schedul
e 
C'vnce safety 
Nig Nig 3 BE Mdl mng 1 Lagos London London Direct BA Leisure 6 Fare C'vnce Brand 
nm 
W/African W/African 3 CS Mdl mng 1 Lagos London London Direct BA Busines 4 Fare C'vnce comfort 
Nig Nig 3 CS Snr offcer 2 Lagos London London Direct BA Busines 3 Fare C'vnce comfort 
Nig W/African 4 BE   Lagos London London Direct Vig Atl Busines 5 Fare safety comfort 
Nig Nig 4 others   Lagos London London Direct BA Leisure 4 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
British Italy 4 BE Top mng 1 Lagos Frankfurt Frankfurt Direct Lufthans
a 
Busines 4 Schedul
e 
Brandn
me 
Fare 
Nig Nig 3 others jnr 1 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 10 Fare safety Brand 
nm 
Indian India 4 BE Top mng  Lagos Kenya India Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 4 C'vnce Brandn
me 
comfort 
Nig Nig 3 others other  Lagos China Dubai Indirect Emirate Busines 2 Fare C'vnce schedul
e 
Nig Nig 5 BE Top mng 4 Lagos Manchester Amsterdam Indirect KLM Busines 2 C'vnce   
Nig Nig 4 CS Snr offcer Lagos Dubai London Indirect BA Leisure 3 Fare   
Nig Nig 2 stdt other  Lagos Paris Paris Direct Air 
France 
Busines 6 P&A   
Indian Dubai 3 BE Mdl mng  Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines 10 Schedul
e 
C'vnce safety 
Nig Nig 3 BE Top mng 2 Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines 6 Schedul
e 
  
Nig USA 3 BE other 3 Lagos USA USA Direct Delta Busines 5 Fare safety schedul
e 
Nig Nig 4 others Top mng 1 Lagos USA Amsterdam Indirect KLM Leisure 5 Fare   
Nig Nig 5 Rtre Top mng 1 Lagos USA USA Direct Delta Leisure 10 Fare safety schedul
e 
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Nig Nig 1 others other 1 Lagos Malysia Turkey Indirect Turkish Busines     
Nig Norway 3 BE other 3 Lagos Norway Turkey Indirect Turkish Busines 10 Fare safety comfort 
Nig Nig 4 BE Top mng  Lagos USA Turkey Indirect Turkish Leisure 2 Fare safety comfort 
Nig Nig 2 others other 2 Lagos     Busines 2    
Nig Nig 3 CS Snr offcer 2 Lagos London Turkey Indirect Turkish Busines 2 Fare   
Nig Nig 3 others Mdl mng 2 Lagos Turkey Turkey Direct Turkish Busines 10 ffp safety comfort 
Nig Nig 3 BE other 2 Lagos Turkey Turkey Direct Turkish Busines 10 Fare safety C'vnce 
Nig Nig 4 CS Top mng 2 Lagos Spain Spain Direct Iberia Busines 2 C'vnce safety promo 
Nig Nig 4 CS Top mng 4 Lagos S/Africa S/Africa Direct SAA Busines 6 ffp   
British Nig 5 BE Mdl mng 6 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 8 Schedul
e 
Fare Brand 
nm 
USA USA 2 BE other 3 Abuja USA Frankfurt Indirect Lufthans
a 
Busines 5 Fare Schedul
e 
ffp 
British Nig 5 others Top mng 5 Abuja London Amsterdam Indirect KLM Leisure 10 Fare ffp comfort 
Dutch Netherlan
ds 
2 BE jnr 2 Abuja Amsterdam Frankfurt Indirect Lufthans
a 
Busines 5 Fare Schedul
e 
promo 
Nig Nig 4 CS Snr offcer 1 Abuja China Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 2    
Danish Denmark 3 BE other  Abuja Denmark Amsterdam Indirect KLM Busines 10 Schedul
e 
C'vnce safety 
Nig Nig 2 stdt  1 Abuja USA Amsterdam Indirect KLM Busines 5 safety Fare C'vnce 
Nig Nig 4 CS Snr offcer 5 Abuja Italy Amsterdam Indirect KLM Leisure 2 Schedul
e 
C'vnce safety 
German Germany 4 Diplomat Snr offcer Abuja Frankfurt Frankfurt Direct Lufthans
a 
Leisure 5 C'vnce   
Nig Nig 2 stdt other  Abuja London Frankfurt Indirect Lufthans
a 
Leisure     
Nig Nig 2 stdt   Abuja USA Amsterdam Indirect KLM Busines 2    
Nig Swis’land 4 CS Snr offcer 1 Abuja Swis’land Amsterdam Indirect KLM Busines 2 Fare   
Nig USA 4 BE Top mng 4 Abuja USA Amsterdam Indirect KLM Busines 8 Schedul
e 
C'vnce comfort 
Nig Italy 2 BE   Abuja Italy Amsterdam Indirect KLM Busines 2    
Denmark Denmark 3 BE Top mng 5 Abuja Denmark Amsterdam Indirect KLM Busines 10 Schedul
e 
Fare ffp 
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USA Nig 4 BE Snr offcer 2 Abuja USA Amsterdam Indirect KLM Busines 5 safety Fare ffp 
Nig Nig 3 BE other 2 Abuja USA Amsterdam Indirect KLM Leisure 2 Fare promo comfort 
Nig Nig 4 CS Mdl mng  Abuja USA Amsterdam Indirect KLM Leisure 5 safety Fare comfort 
Nig UK 5 Rtre other  Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 8 Fare   
Nig Nig 4 BE   Abuja Dubai Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 2 Schedul
e 
C'vnce safety 
Nig Nig 4 CS Top mng 1 Abuja S/Arabia Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 5 Fare   
Nig Nig 3 CS Snr offcer 1 Abuja China Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 5    
Nig Nig 4 BE other 1 Abuja S/Arabia Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 2 Fare Schedul
e 
safety 
Nig Nig 3 CS Snr offcer 1 Abuja  Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines     
Nig Nig 4 CS Top mng 2 Abuja Dubai Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 5 C'vnce Fare comfort 
Nig Nig 4 CS Top mng 2 Abuja China Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines     
W/African S/Africa 4 CS Mdl mng  Abuja S/Africa Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 10 P&A   
Nig USA 3 CS Snr offcer 3 Abuja USA Amsterdam Indirect KLM Leisure 5 Fare Schedul
e 
ffp 
Nig Nig 3 stdt other 1 Abuja USA Amsterdam Indirect KLM Busines 10 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
Indian India 3 others Snr offcer 1 Lagos India Dubai Indirect Emirate Busines 2 Schedul
e 
safety Brand 
nm 
Nig Germany 3 cs other 1 Lagos Frankfurt Frankfurt Direct Lufthans
a 
Busines 10 Fare C'vnce safety 
Nig Nig 1 others other 1 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 2 C'vnce Brandn
me 
comfort 
Nig UK 3 others Snr offcer 2 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 10 Schedul
e 
C'vnce Fare 
Nig UK 3 CS other 3 Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 4 Fare safety C'vnce 
Nig UK 2 others other 2 Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 1 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
Nig Nig 5 BE Top mng 3 Lagos Togo Togo Direct Air Nig Busines 8 Schedul
e 
C'vnce safety 
W/African Nig 4 BE Mdl mng 2 Lagos London London Direct Vig Atl Busines 10 Fare Schedul
e 
safety 
Nig Nig 3 BE Top mng 4 Lagos Senegal Senegal Direct Air Nig Busines 10 Fare Comfort  
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Canadian Canada 4 CS Snr offcer 4 Abuja Canada Frankfurt Indirect Lufthans
a 
Busines 5 Fare Comfort C'vnce 
USA USA 2 others Snr offcer 4 Abuja USA USA Direct Delta Leisure 5 Fare promo schedul
e 
Nig Nig 3 others Snr offcer 3 Abuja USA USA Direct Delta Leisure 2 Fare Schedul
e 
safety 
Nig Nig 4 CS Mdl mng 1 Abuja USA USA Direct Delta Busines 5 Fare Schedul
e 
safety 
USA USA 3 BE Mdl mng 4 Abuja USA USA Direct Delta Busines 5 Schedul
e 
ffp Brand 
nm 
Nig Nig 4 CS other 1 Abuja USA USA Direct Delta Busines 8 Fare   
Nig Nig 4 CS Snr offcer 2 Abuja USA USA Direct Delta Leisure 2 C'vnce   
USA USA 3 others other  Abuja USA USA Direct Delta Busines 10 ffp Fare comfort 
Nig Nig 3 CS Mdl mng 1 Abuja USA Amsterdam Indirect KLM Busines 2 Fare Schedul
e 
safety 
Nig Nig 4 BE Top mng 4 Abuja USA USA Direct Delta Busines 2 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
USA USA 4 BE Top mng 6 Abuja USA USA Direct Delta Busines 8 C'vnce safety schedul
e 
Nig Nig 3 BE Top mng 3 Abuja USA USA Direct Delta Leisure 5 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
Nig Nig 4 others   Abuja USA USA Direct Delta Busines 2 C'vnce safety Fare 
Nig Nig 2 stdt other 1 Abuja Frankfurt Frankfurt Direct Lufthans
a 
Busines     
Nig Nig 4 CS Snr offcer 2 Abuja Ireland Frankfurt Indirect Lufthans
a 
Leisure 2 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
Canadian Canada 2 CS other 4 Abuja Canada Frankfurt Indirect Lufthans
a 
Busines 10 Brandn
m 
Comfort schedul
e 
Nig Nig 2 others jnr 1 Abuja London Frankfurt Indirect Lufthans
a 
Leisure 2 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
Nig Nig 3 BE Top mng 3 Abuja China Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 10 Schedul
e 
C'vnce ffp 
Nig USA 3 BE Top mng 4 Abuja USA Amsterdam Indirect KLM Leisure 10 Fare safety promo 
Nig Nig 4 CS Top mng 1           
Nig Nig 2 others other 1 Abuja London Amsterdam Indirect KLM Leisure 8 Fare Schedul
e 
safety 
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USA USA 4 others other 4 Abuja USA Frankfurt Indirect Lufthans
a 
Leisure 2 C'vnce Schedul
e 
Fare 
Nig Nig 2 stdt  1 Abuja London Frankfurt Indirect Lufthans
a 
Leisure 2 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
Nig UK 3 CS Mdl mng 2 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 8 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
Nig Nig 4 BE Top mng  Abuja London Amsterdam Indirect KLM Busines 8 C'vnce   
British UK 2 BE other 3 Abuja London Amsterdam Indirect KLM Leisure 8 safety Comfort ffp 
Nig Nig 3 others Mdl mng 2 Abuja Italy Amsterdam Indirect KLM Leisure 2 Brandn
m 
Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
Nig USA 3 others other 1 Abuja USA Amsterdam Indirect KLM Leisure 2    
Nig Ukraine 3 Diplomat Mdl mng 1 Abuja Ukraine Frankfurt Indirect Lufthans
a 
Leisure 8 Fare Schedul
e 
safety 
Nig Nig 3 CS Snr offcer 1 Abuja Poland Amsterdam Indirect KLM Leisure     
Nig Nig 3 CS other 3 Abuja Scotland Amsterdam Indirect KLM Leisure 5 Schedul
e 
Fare safety 
Nig USA 3 others   Abuja USA Amsterdam Indirect KLM Busines 8 Schedul
e 
safety comfort 
Ukrainian Ukraine 3 others Snr offcer 1 Abuja Ukraine Amsterdam Indirect KLM Leisure 2 Schedul
e 
Fare comfort 
Nig UK 3 CS  3 Abuja London Frankfurt Indirect Lufthans
a 
Leisure 2 Fare   
Nig Nig 4 CS Snr offcer Abuja Ukraine Amsterdam Indirect KLM Leisure 2 Fare   
Nig Nig 4 CS Top mng 2 Abuja China Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 2 safety Comfort Fare 
Irish UK 4 BE Top mng 4 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 10 Fare Schedul
e 
safety 
Nig Nig 4 BE Top mng 3 Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines 7 Schedul
e 
C'vnce Fare 
Nig Nig 2 stdt other 1 Lagos USA USA Direct Delta Leisure 2 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
Nig Nig 4 BE Top mng 3 Lagos Senegal Senegal Direct Air Nig Busines 2 Fare Brandn
me 
comfort 
Nig Nig 3 BE Mdl mng 2 Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines 7 Schedul
e 
safety comfort 
Nig Nig 3 others Mdl mng 1 Lagos USA USA Direct Delta Leisure 5 Schedul
e 
Fare  
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Nig Nig 2 CS  1 Lagos London London Direct Vig Atl Leisure  Fare   
Nig Nig 3 BE Snr offcer 1 Lagos Togo Togo Direct Arik Busines 4 Schedul
e 
safety comfort 
Nig Nig 3 Diplomat Top mng 3 Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines 6 Fare Schedul
e 
safety 
Nig Nig 3 BE  1 Lagos London London Direct BA Leisure 5 Fare C'vnce comfort 
Nig Nig 4 CS Mdl mng 1 Lagos London Turkey Indirect Turkish Leisure 3 Fare Schedul
e 
comfort 
Nig Nig 3 CS Snr offcer 1 Lagos USA Dubai Indirect Emirate Leisure 5 Fare Schedul
e 
safety 
Nig Nig 4 Diplomat Top mng 2 Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Air Nig Leisure 7 Fare C'vnce safety 
Nig Nig 3 BE other 2 Lagos London London Direct Vig Atl Leisure  Fare C'vnce schedul
e 
W/African Nig 4 BE Mdl mng 1 Lagos Abidjan Abidjan Direct Asky Leisure 8 Schedul
e 
C'vnce Fare 
British UK 2 stdt  1 Lagos London London Direct Vig Atl Leisure 4 Brandn
m 
Comfort Fare 
Nig UK 4 Rtre Mdl mng 1 Lagos London London Direct Vig Atl Leisure 4 safety ffp Brand 
nm 
Nig Nig 4 CS Mdl mng 2 Lagos Amsterdam Amsterdam Direct KLM Leisure 4 Schedul
e 
Fare C'vnce 
Nig Nig 4 CS Mdl mng 1 Lagos London Frankfurt Indirect Lufthans
a 
Leisure 2 Schedul
e 
C'vnce safety 
Nig Nig 3 others other 3 Lagos London Dubai Indirect Emirate Busines 10 Fare C'vnce ffp 
Nig Nig 3 Diplomat Top mng 3 Lagos London London Direct Vig Atl Leisure 8 Fare C'vnce Brand 
nm 
Nig Nig 2 stdt other  Lagos London London Direct Vig Atl Busines 1 Brandn
m 
ffp comfort 
Nig Nig 2 stdt   Lagos Italy Amsterdam Indirect KLM Busines 1 Schedul
e 
C'vnce Fare 
Nig Nig 2 others Snr offcer 1 Lagos London London Direct Vig Atl Leisure 3 Fare C'vnce schedul
e 
Nig Nig 3 CS Top mng 2 Lagos London Turkey Indirect Turkish Leisure 2 Fare Schedul
e 
promo 
Nig Spain 4 BE Mdl mng 1 Lagos Spain Spain Direct Iberia Busines 3 safety Fare comfort 
Nig UK 4 others Mdl mng 3 Lagos London Paris Indirect Air 
France 
Busines 2 Fare safety C'vnce 
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Nig Russia 2 others other 1 Lagos Egypt Cairo Direct Egypt Leisure 10    
Nig Nig 3 CS Mdl mng 1 Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Leisure 1 Fare safety Brand 
nm 
Nig Nig 5 CS Top mng 2 Lagos S/Arabia Doha Indirect Qatar 
Air 
Busines 10 P&A Comfort schedul
e 
W/African W/African 3 BE other 1 Lagos Gambia Gambia Direct Air Nig Busines 2 Fare   
Nig Nig 4 be Top mng 2 Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Leisure 5 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
Nig Nig 4 CS Snr offcer 1 Lagos Paris Paris Direct Air 
France 
Busines 1 ffp C'vnce comfort 
Nig Nig 2 BE other  Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines 2 Fare safety Brand 
nm 
Nig Nig 3 CS Snr offcer Lagos London Dubai Indirect Emirate Leisure 2 safety   
Nig Nig 2 stdt other 1 Lagos Malysia Doha Indirect Qatar 
Air 
Busines 10 safety   
Nig Nig 3 BE jnr 1 Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines 10 Schedul
e 
  
Nig Nig 4 CS Mdl mng 2 Lagos Singapore Doha Indirect Qatar 
Air 
Busines 6 safety Comfort Fare 
Nig Nig 2 stdt Top mng 2 Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines     
Nig Nig 3 CS Snr offcer 2 Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines 5 Schedul
e 
safety comfort 
Nig Nig 3 BE jnr  Lagos India Dubai Indirect Emirate Busines 10    
Nig Nig 4 BE Top mng 2 Lagos Senegal Senegal Direct Air Nig Busines 10 Schedul
e 
safety comfort 
Nig Nig 4 CS Mdl mng 1 Lagos USA USA Direct United 
A 
Leisure 3 Schedul
e 
safety comfort 
Nig Nig 3 others Top mng 3 Lagos USA USA Direct Delta Leisure 6 Schedul
e 
C'vnce Fare 
Chinese Nig 3 BE Top mng 3 Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Leisure 10 Fare safety schedul
e 
S/African Ss/Afircan 2 stdt other 1 Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 5 Schedul
e 
C'vnce promo 
S/African Ss/Afircan 3 CS Mdl mng  Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Leisure 2 C'vnce safety Brand 
nm 
S/African Ss/Afircan 3 others other 1 Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
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Nig Dubai 2 BE Mdl mng  Lagos Dubai Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2 C'vnce safety comfort 
S/African Ss/Afircan 1 stdt other  Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines     
Sri Lankan W/African 2 BE Mdl mng  Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Vig Nig Busines 5 Fare C'vnce safety 
W/African W/African 3 BE Top mng  Lagos Lebanon Lebanon Direct MEA Busines 10    
Nig W/African 4 BE Top mng  Lagos Cotonou Cotonou Direct Ethiopia Busines 2    
Nig Nig 2 stdt   Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 2 Fare Schedul
e 
safety 
Nig Nig 2 stdt   Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 2 Schedul
e 
safety C'vnce 
W/African Nig 3 cs other  Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines 4 safety Brandn
me 
comfort 
USA USA 4 BE Top mng 4 Abuja USA USA Direct Delta Busines 10 Schedul
e 
ffp Fare 
Nig Nig 3 cs Snr offcer 2 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 2 Fare C'vnce Brand 
nm 
Nig Nig 3 stdt Mdl mng 1 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 2 Fare safety comfort 
Nig Nig 4 CS Mdl mng 1 Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 6 Fare C'vnce safety 
Nig uk 3 others Snr offcer 3 Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 2 C'vnce Fare promo 
Nig UK 2 CS jnr 2 Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 2 Fare C'vnce comfort 
Nig Nig 3 CS Snr offcer Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 2    
Nig Nig 3 CS Snr offcer Abuja Scotland London Indirect Arik Busines 2 Fare   
Nig Nig 3 others Snr offcer Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 5 Fare C'vnce promo 
Nig Nig 3 BE   Abuja USA Amsterdam Indirect KLM Leisure 5 C'vnce   
Nig Nig 4 CS Snr offcer 2 Abuja London Amsterdam Indirect KLM Leisure 10 ffp safety  
Nig Nig 2 stdt  1 Abuja Scotland Amsterdam Indirect KLM Busines 3 C'vnce Schedul
e 
Fare 
Nig Nig 4 BE Top mng 3 Abuja London Frankfurt Indirect Lufthans
a 
Leisure 3 Fare C'vnce schedul
e 
Nig Nig 2 stdt other  Abuja London Frankfurt Indirect Lufthans
a 
Leisure 3 C'vnce safety Fare 
Nig Thailand 3 BE Top mng 1 Abuja Thailand Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines     
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Nig Nig 3 BE Top mng 4 Abuja China Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 10    
Nig Nig 3 others Top mng 2 Abuja India Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 3 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
Nig Nig 4 CS Top mng 3 Abuja China Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 8 comfort   
Nig Nig 4 CS Top mng 3 Abuja China Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines     
Nig Nig 3 CS Snr offcer Abuja China Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 3 Fare   
Nig Nig 3 CS Snr offcer 2 Abuja China Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines  Fare Schedul
e 
 
British UK 5 BE  4 Abuja London Amsterdam Indirect KLM Busines 10 Schedul
e 
Fare C'vnce 
Swiss Swis’land 5 others Top mng  Abuja Swis’land Amsterdam Indirect KLM Busines 10 Schedul
e 
safety ffp 
British UK 3 BE Mdl mng 3 Abuja London Amsterdam Indirect KLM Busines 10 ffp Fare C'vnce 
Nig Nig 3 CS Mdl mng 2 Abuja China Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 5 Fare C'vnce Brand 
nm 
Nig Nig 3 CS Mdl mng 1 Abuja China Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 3 Fare C'vnce Schedul
e 
Nig Nig 4 CS Snr offcer 1 Abuja China Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 2    
Nig Nig 4 CS Snr offcer 1 Abuja China Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines     
Nig Nig 4 BE  1 Lagos USA Dubai Indirect Emirate Leisure 10 ffp C'vnce Schedul
e 
Nig Dubai 4 others Snr offcer 4 Lagos Dubai Doha Indirect Qatar 
Air 
Busines 10 Fare C'vnce Safety 
Nig Nig 2 stdt other  Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 5    
Nig Nig 2 stdt   Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 2 Schedul
e 
  
Barbadose Barbadose 4 CS Snr offcer 2 Abuja Barbadose London Indirect Arik Leisure 5 P&A   
Nig uk 2 stdt  1 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 2 Fare Schedul
e 
Safety 
Nig Nig 2 stdt   Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 2 Fare C'vnce Brand 
nm 
Nig Nig 5 Rtre  2 Lagos London Dubai Indirect Emirate Leisure 4 Fare Schedul
e 
Ffp 
Nig Nig 2 BE Mdl mng 1 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 2 Fare   
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Nig Nig 3 BE Top mng 4 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 10 Fare   
Nig Nig 2 others other  Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 2 Brandn
m 
Schedul
e 
Fare 
Nig Nig 4 CS Top mng 1 Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 2 Fare C'vnce Safety 
Nig uk 3 CS Snr offcer 2 Abuja London London Direct Arik Leisure 8    
Nig Nig 5 Rtre   Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines     
Nig Nig 4 CS Top mng 2 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 5 Fare safety Comfort 
Nig Nig 3 others Snr offcer 2 Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 2 Fare   
Nig Nig 2 BE other 1 Lagos Dubai Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Leisure 2 Fare   
Nig Nig 2 stdt   Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 2 Fare C'vnce Ffp 
Nig Nig 3 stdt   Abuja London London Direct Arik Busines 5 Fare   
Nig Nig 3 BE Top mng 1 Lagos Dubai Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2 Fare C'vnce Safety 
Nig Nig 2 BE jnr 1 Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines 10 Schedul
e 
  
W/African W/African 4 BE Mdl mng  Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines 10 Schedul
e 
  
W/African W/African 3 BE Top mng  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
Indian Nig 3 others Mdl mng 2 Lagos India Dubai Indirect Emirate Leisure 5 C'vnce Schedul
e 
Fare 
W/African W/African 5 Rtre Top mng  Lagos S/Arabia Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines     
W/African W/African 5 others Top mng  Lagos S/Arabia Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
S/African Ss/Afircan 4 others other  Lagos Gabon Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
S/African Ss/Afircan 3 BE Top mng  Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 10    
Nig Nig 2 stdt   Lagos Kenya Nairobi Direct Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
S/African Ss/Afircan 3 others   Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Leisure     
S/African Ss/Afircan 4 CS Snr offcer 2 Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines  Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
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S/African Ss/Afircan 4 CS Snr offcer Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines     
Nig Nig 4 BE Top mng 3 Lagos China Doha Indirect Qatar 
Air 
Busines 10 ffp   
Nig Nig 3 others other  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
W/African W/African 5 others   Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
Nig Nig 4 CS Snr offcer 4 Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines 2 Fare C'vnce safety 
Nig Nig 4 others Top mng 2 Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines 2 C'vnce   
Nig uk 3 BE Top mng 3 Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Arik Busines 19 safety Fare comfort 
W/African W/African 3 others Snr offcer Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 10    
W/African W/African 4 Rtre jnr  Lagos S/Arabia Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
W/African W/African 3 BE Top mng  Lagos S/Arabia Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 2    
W/African W/African 3 BE Top mng  Lagos S/Arabia Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines     
W/African W/African 4 BE Top mng  Lagos S/Arabia Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 2    
W/African W/African 6 others Snr offcer 2 Lagos S/Arabia Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
W/African W/African 5 others Top mng 1 Lagos S/Arabia Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
W/African W/African 3 others Snr offcer Lagos S/Arabia Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
W/African W/African 4 others other  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
W/African W/African 2 others   Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 2    
Sri Lankan W/African 2 BE Mdl mng  Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Vig Nig Leisure 10 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
Chinese china 2 BE Top mng  Lagos Adis Ababa Adis Ababa Direct Ethiopia Busines 5    
Nig Nig 5 others Top mng  Lagos India Dubai Indirect Emirate Leisure 2    
Lebanese Lebanon 4 others Top mng  Lagos Lebanon Lebanon Direct MEA Leisure 10    
Nig Nig 5 others Top mng 2 Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Air Nig Busines 10 Fare Schedul
e 
promo 
Nig Nig 5 Rtre Snr offcer Lagos India Dubai Indirect Emirate Leisure 5    
S/African Ss/Afircan 4 CS Snr offcer 4 Lagos Gabon Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2 Fare C'vnce ffp 
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S/African Ss/Afircan 2 stdt other  Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
British Hongkong 3 CS Mdl mng 4 Lagos HongKong Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 8 Fare C'vnce safety 
Norway Hongkong 4 BE Top mng 5 Lagos HongKong Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 5 Fare C'vnce safety 
S/African Ss/Afircan 2 stdt other  Lagos Gabon Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
S/African Ss/Afircan 2 BE Mdl mng  Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
S/African Ss/Afircan 3 CS Mdl mng  Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 8 Schedul
e 
C'vnce Fare 
S/African Ss/Afircan 3 BE jnr 1 Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2 Fare ffp schedul
e 
Nig Nig 3 others   Lagos S/Arabia Dubai Indirect Emirate Busines 2    
Indian India 3 others   Lagos India Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Leisure 5    
Nig Nig 3 BE Top mng  Lagos India Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Leisure 2    
Indian India 3 others   Lagos India Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Leisure 2    
Nig Nig 3 stdt   Lagos Egypt Cairo Direct Egypt Busines 2    
Nig Nig 3 BE   Lagos Abidjan Abidjan Direct Ethiopia Busines 2    
Nig Nig 4 BE Mdl mng  Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Arik Busines 10    
W/African Nig 3 others Mdl mng 1 Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines 5    
W/African W/African 4 others   Lagos S/Arabia Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
Nig S/Africa 3 stdt Mdl mng  Lagos S/Africa S/Africa Direct SAA Busines 8    
W/African W/African 4 others   Lagos S/Arabia Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
Nig Nig 3 others   Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
Chinese china 2 BE Top mng  Lagos Adis Ababa Adis Ababa Direct Ethiopia Busines 10 C'vnce ffp Fare 
Nig UK 3 others Top mng 2 Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Arik Leisure 10 Schedul
e 
C'vnce Fare 
W/African W/African 4 others other  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
Angola Angola 2    Lagos Adis Ababa Adis Ababa Direct Ethiopia Busines 8    
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Congolese Congo 3 others   Lagos Congo Congo Direct Asky Busines 2    
Nig Nig  stdt   Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines 2 C'vnce Fare schedul
e 
Nig Nig 2 BE Top mng  Lagos Cairo Cairo Direct Egypt Busines 2    
Lebanese Nig 3 others other  Lagos Lebanon Lebanon Direct MEA Leisure 10    
Nig Nig 2 stdt   Lagos S/Africa Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 10 comfort   
Lebanese Nig 4 BE other  Lagos Lebanon Lebanon Direct MEA Leisure 10    
Nig Nig 2 others Snr offcer Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Air Nig Busines 10 Schedul
e 
  
Nig Nig 3 others other  Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Arik Busines 10 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
W/African W/African 3 others other  Lagos Lebanon Lebanon Direct MEA Leisure 10    
W/African W/African 3 others other  Lagos Lebanon Lebanon Direct MEA Leisure 10    
W/African W/African 4 BE Top mng  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
Cameroun Cameroun  others   Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 5    
Nig UK 3 BE Mdl mng 4 Lagos London Dubai Indirect Emirate Leisure 10    
W/African W/African 2 others   Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Air Nig Busines 2    
W/African W/African 2    Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Air Nig Busines 2    
Nig Ethiopia 3 Diplomat Snr offcer 4 Lagos Adis Ababa Adis Ababa Direct Ethiopia Busines 10 C'vnce   
Pakistani Nig 3 CS other  Lagos Pakistan Cairo Indirect Egypt Leisure 2    
Nig Nig 3 CS Mdl mng  Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines 10    
Nig W/African 4 Diplomat Snr offcer Lagos Cotonou Cotonou Direct Egypt Busines 8    
W/African W/African 2 stdt   Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Air Nig Busines 5    
Angola Angola 2 stdt   Lagos Dubai Cairo Indirect Egypt Busines 5    
Nig Nig 3 others Top mng 3 Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Arik Busines 10 Fare   
Nig W/African 4 others other  Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 2    
W/African W/African 2 others other  Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Air Nig Leisure 2    
W/African W/African 2 others   Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Air Nig Busines 2    
Nig Nig 2 stdt   Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 2    
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W/African W/African 5 others other  Lagos S/Arabia Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
W/African W/African 2 stdt   Lagos Ghana Accra Direct Air Nig Busines 5    
Nig Nig 4 BE Top mng  Lagos China Doha Indirect Qatar 
Air 
Busines 10    
Nig Dubai 2 others jnr  Lagos Dubai Dubai Direct Emirate Busines 10    
Cameroun Cameroun 2 others   Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 5    
Cameroun Cameroun 2 others   Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 5    
Cameroun Cameroun 2 others   Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 5    
Congolese Congo 3 others   Lagos Congo Congo Direct Asky Busines 2    
Nig Nig 2 stdt   Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 2    
Nig Nig 2 stdt   Lagos Egypt Cairo Direct Egypt Busines 2    
Cameroun Cameroun 4 others Snr offcer Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 8    
Cameroun Cameroun 2 others   Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 2    
Cameroun Cameroun 2 others   Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 5    
Cameroun Cameroun 2 others   Lagos Cameron Cameron Direct Asky Busines 5    
Nig Nig 4 others other 2 Lagos Uganda Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 5 safety Brandn
me 
comfort 
British uk 4 BE Top mng 5 Lagos London London Direct Arik Busines 10 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
Nig Nig 2 stdt other 1 Lagos Mozambiqu Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
Nig Nig 2 BE Mdl mng 1 Lagos China Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 5    
Indian India 3 BE   Lagos India Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 10    
Nig Nig 3 BE Mdl mng  Lagos Dubai Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 10    
Nig Nig 3 others Mdl mng 5 Lagos Uganda Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Leisure 10    
Nig Nig 2 BE   Lagos HongKong Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
Brundi Brundi 3 BE  2 Lagos Burundi      comfort safety schedul
e 
Nig Nig 2 stdt   Lagos China Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 2    
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Nig Dubai 3 BE Mdl mng 1 Lagos Dubai Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 5 Fare safety  
Nig Nig 3 BE Top mng  Lagos HongKong Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 10 P&A   
Indian India 3 others Mdl mng 1 Lagos India Doha Indirect Qatar 
Air 
Busines 5 Fare C'vnce  
Nig Nig 3 others other  Lagos Zambia Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Leisure 2    
Nig Nig 4 BE other  Lagos S/Africa Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Leisure 2    
Nig Nig 2 BE Top mng  Lagos China Doha Indirect Qatar 
Air 
Busines 8 safety Comfort  
Nig Nig 3 BE Mdl mng 5 Lagos Dubai Doha Indirect Qatar 
Air 
Busines 10 Fare promo  
Nig Nig 2 stdt   Lagos Kenya Nairobi Direct Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
Nig Nig 3 BE other  Lagos Dubai Doha Indirect Qatar 
Air 
Busines 5    
Nig Nig 3 BE Mdl mng  Lagos Dubai Doha Indirect Qatar 
Air 
Busines 2    
W/African W/African 3 others other  Lagos Kenya Nairobi Direct Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
S/African Ss/Afircan 3 others Top mng  Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2 Fare safety  
Nig Nig 2 stdt   Lagos Kenya Nairobi Direct Kenya 
Air 
Busines     
S/African Ss/Afircan 4 CS Snr offcer Lagos Gabon Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2    
W/African W/African 4 BE   Lagos S/Arabia Jeddah Direct Max Busines 3    
S/African Ss/Afircan 3 BE other 1 Lagos Gabon Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2 Schedul
e 
safety Fare 
S/African Ss/Afircan 3 cs jnr  Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
S/African Ss/Afircan 2 BE other  Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 8 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
S/African Ss/Afircan 3 BE Top mng 1 Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 8 Fare Schedul
e 
C'vnce 
S/African Ss/Afircan 3 others other  Lagos Botswana Nairobi Indirect Kenya Busines 2    
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Air 
S/African Ss/Afircan 4 CS jnr 1 Lagos Gabon Nairobi Indirect Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2 ffp   
Nig Nig 3 Diplomat Snr offcer Lagos Kenya Nairobi Direct Kenya 
Air 
Busines 2 Schedul
e 
Fare C'vnce 
Nig Nig 3 CS Snr offcer Lagos Dubai Adis Ababa Indirect Ethiopia Busines 10 Fare Schedul
e 
safety 
Nig Nig 2    Lagos Egypt Cairo Direct Egypt Busines 2    
Congolese Congo 2 others   Lagos Congo Congo Direct Asky Busines 2    
Nig Nig 2 stdt   Lagos Turkey Cairo Indirect Egypt Busines 5    
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Appendix 8: Pax final destinations and Airline used 
 
 
 
Airline used 
Total   
Air 
Franc 
Air 
Nig Arik Asky BA Delta Egypt Emirate Ethiopia Iberia 
Kenya 
Air KLM Lufthansa Max MEA 
Qatar 
Air SAA Turkish 
United 
A 
Vig 
Atl 
Vig 
Nig 
Final 
destination 
country 
  3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Abidjan 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Adis Aba 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Amsterda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Barbados 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Botswana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 
Burundi 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Cairo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Cameron 0 0 0 0 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
China 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 19 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 27 
Congo 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Congo 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Cotonou 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Dubai 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 25 7 0 6 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 51 
Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Frankfur 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Gabon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Gambia 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Gabon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Ghana 0 0 17 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 33 
Guinea 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
HongKong 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
India 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 13 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Kenya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Lebanon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 
Liberia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
London 0 1 0 56 0 5 0 0 4 0 0 0 7 7 0 0 0 0 3 0 10 0 93 
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Malysia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 
Manchest 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Mozambiq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Pakistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Paris 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
S.Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
S/Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 5 
S/Arabia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 0 16 0 0 24 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 49 
Scotland 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Senegal 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Singapor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Swis’land 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Syria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Togo 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 
Uganda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
USA 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 0 2 0 0 0 15 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 39 
Zambia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Zimbabwe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 4 3 26 70 42 6 17 15 44 51 2 80 37 18 24 17 18 3 8 1 10 6 502 
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Final destination country * Journey purpose Cross tabulation 
Count 
 
Journey purpose 
Total   Business Leisure 
Final destination country Abidjan 0 2 1 3 
Addis Ababa 0 5 0 5 
Amsterdam 0 1 1 2 
Barbados 0 0 1 1 
Botswana 0 23 2 25 
Burundi 1 2 0 3 
Cameroon 0 29 0 29 
Canada 0 2 0 2 
China 0 27 0 27 
Congo 0 9 1 10 
Cotonou 0 3 0 3 
Denmark 0 2 0 2 
Dubai 0 43 8 51 
Egypt 0 6 1 7 
Frankfurt 0 3 1 4 
Gabon 0 7 0 7 
Gambia 0 4 0 4 
Ghana 0 27 6 33 
Hong Kong 0 5 0 5 
India 0 7 6 13 
Ireland 0 0 1 1 
Italy 0 2 2 4 
Kenya 0 7 0 7 
Korea 0 2 0 2 
Lebanon 0 4 14 18 
Liberia 0 1 0 1 
London 0 43 50 93 
Malaysia 0 3 0 3 
Manchester 0 1 0 1 
Mozambique 0 1 0 1 
Norway 0 1 0 1 
Pakistan 0 1 1 2 
Paris 0 2 0 2 
Poland 0 0 1 1 
Russia 0 1 0 1 
S/Africa 0 4 3 7 
S/Arabia 0 49 0 49 
Scotland 0 2 1 3 
Senegal 0 3 0 3 
Singapore 0 1 0 1 
Spain 0 2 0 2 
Swis’land 0 2 0 2 
Syria 0 0 1 1 
Thailand 0 1 0 1 
Togo 0 3 0 3 
Turkey 0 3 0 3 
Uganda 0 1 1 2 
Ukraine 0 0 3 3 
USA 0 18 21 39 
Zambia 0 0 1 1 
Zimbabwe 0 0 1 1 
3 370 129 502  
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Appendix 9: Database used in calibration of the model with ALI 
 
Country Pax traffic AggGDP($) Trade($) Fare($) Dist (KM) ALI Dummy lnPax lnGDP lnTrade 
UK 392528 2.44E+12 2.1E+09 845 5168 14 1 12.88 28.52 21.46 
Ghana 152754 2.25E+11 3E+08 149 517 30 1 11.94 26.14 19.52 
United States 152188 1.48E+13 2.34E+10 1100 10701 26 1 11.93 30.32 23.88 
United Arab Emi 109680 4.91E+11 1.13E+09 611 5969 14 1 11.61 26.92 20.84 
South Africa 107266 5.57E+11 1.77E+09 570 4715 14 1 11.58 27.05 21.29 
India 51377 1.92E+12 7.97E+09 876 8174 0 1 10.85 28.28 22.8 
China 49424 6.12E+12 6.24E+09 1500 11935 0 0 10.81 29.44 22.55 
Italy 43078 2.25E+12 3.35E+09 581 5137 10 0 10.67 28.44 21.93 
Germany 39376 3.47E+12 6.41E+08 799 5212 14 0 10.58 28.88 20.28 
Netherlands 35734 9.73E+11 2.6E+09 899 5029 14 0 10.48 27.6 21.68 
Cameroon 35090 2.16E+11 4.58E+08 179 785 30 1 10.47 26.1 19.94 
France 34566 2.75E+12 4.12E+09 1021 4965 14 0 10.45 28.64 22.14 
Egypt 34184 4.13E+11 72198792 535 3700 30 0 10.44 26.75 18.09 
Ethiopia 30623 2.23E+11 969039 548 3838 30 0 10.33 26.13 13.78 
Lebanon 27519 2.33E+11 47616811 596 4471 14 0 10.22 26.17 17.68 
Ireland 26237 4.05E+11 1.29E+08 834 5774 0 1 10.17 26.73 18.68 
Qatar 26029 2.92E+11 16033644 578 5544 10 0 10.17 26.4 16.59 
Benin 20805 2E+11 56438401 94 154 30 0 9.94 26.02 17.85 
Saudi Arabia 19530 6.28E+11 4.89E+08 551 4612 10 1 9.88 27.17 20.01 
Kenya 19176 2.25E+11  594 3915 30 1 9.86 26.14  
Senegal 18142 2.07E+11 1.73E+08 433 2573 30 0 9.81 26.05 18.97 
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Malaysia 17855 4.31E+11 6.36E+08 1311 11590 0 1 9.79 26.79 20.27 
Sierra Leone 17556 1.96E+11 4179054 363 1849 30 1 9.77 26 15.25 
Canada 16824 1.77E+12 1.81E+09 1337 11582 0 1 9.73 28.2 21.32 
Ivory Coast (Co 14426 2.16E+11 1.28E+09 214 890 30 0 9.58 26.1 20.97 
Turkey 12276 9.28E+11 4.6E+08 611 5033 10 0 9.42 27.56 19.95 
Spain 11796 1.6E+12 2.25E+09 592 4843 10 0 9.38 28.1 21.54 
Switzerland 10853 7.22E+11 2.11E+08 1164 5405 0 0 9.29 27.3 19.17 
Israel 10008 4.11E+11 1.1E+08 745 7262 0 1 9.21 26.74 18.52 
Hong Kong 8033 4.18E+11 3.22E+08 1365 12036 0 1 8.99 26.76 19.59 
South Korea 6147 1.21E+12 3.35E+08 1671 12874 0 0 8.72 27.82 19.63 
Belgium 5403 6.63E+11 2.56E+09 886 5302 0 0 8.59 27.22 21.66 
Gambia 4949 1.94E+11 1382910 408 2357 0 1 8.51 25.99 14.14 
Brazil 4600 2.28E+12 5.32E+09 1114 14056 0 0 8.43 28.46 22.39 
Philippines 4578 3.93E+11 6620162 1576 13015 0 1 8.43 26.7 15.71 
Equatorial Guin 4514 2.08E+11 2.3E+09 165 742 0 0 8.41 26.06 21.56 
Singapore 4331 4.02E+11 5.22E+08 1426 11903 0 1 8.37 26.72 20.07 
Liberia 4174 1.95E+11 2868759 299 1537 0 1 8.34 25.99 14.87 
Austria 3994 5.73E+11 82044600 880 5743 0 0 8.29 27.07 18.22 
Russian Federat 3527 1.67E+12 40016965 1274 8281 0 0 8.17 28.15 17.5 
Sweden 3421 6.53E+11 2.97E+08 1010 6604 0 0 8.14 27.2 19.51 
Greece 3297 4.95E+11 1.39E+08 784 6741 0 0 8.1 26.93 18.75 
Gabon 3033 2.07E+11 11589131 220 984 0 0 8.02 26.05 16.27 
Morocco 2984 2.84E+11  533 3390 10 0 8 26.37  
Australia 2909 1.12E+12 7.28E+08 1595 17153 0 1 7.98 27.74 20.41 
Uganda 2644 2.11E+11 2127020 537 4540 0 1 7.88 26.07 14.57 
Denmark 2546 5.04E+11  846 5758 0 0 7.84 26.94  
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Poland 2533 6.63E+11 1.3E+08 876 5911 0 0 7.84 27.22 18.68 
Pakistan 2466 3.71E+11 63238936 892 7469 0 1 7.81 26.64 17.96 
Ukraine 2462 3.32E+11 67860058 954 5858 0 0 7.81 26.53 18.03 
Indonesia 2376 9E+11 7.37E+08 1157 12609 0 1 7.77 27.53 20.42 
Tanzania 2329 2.17E+11 8696706 651 5068 0 1 7.75 26.1 15.98 
Japan 2253 5.65E+12 1.03E+09 2434 13927 0 0 7.72 29.36 20.76 
Romania 2080 3.55E+11 13948120 750 6434 0 0 7.64 26.6 16.45 
Norway 2016 6.07E+11 2.14E+08 966 6110 0 0 7.61 27.13 19.18 
Zambia 1692 2.1E+11 58044 591 5874 0 1 7.43 26.07 10.97 
Cyprus 1549 2.17E+11 25351616 584 6365 0 0 7.35 26.1 17.05 
Zimbabwe 1515 2.01E+11 703135 541 5755 0 1 7.32 26.03 13.46 
Mexico 1506 1.23E+12  1266 12400 0 0 7.32 27.84  
Botswana 1482 2.09E+11 1.29E+09 516 4855 0 0 7.3 26.06 20.98 
Portugal 1383 4.23E+11 1.34E+09 711 5911 0 0 7.23 26.77 21.01 
Chad 1216 2.01E+11 1.72E+08 278 5319 0 1 7.1 26.03 18.96 
Togo 1159 1.97E+11 1442269 123 481 0 1 7.06 26.01 14.18 
Hungary 1145 3.22E+11 8858633 711 5775 0 0 7.04 26.5 16 
Congo Democrati 1065 2.06E+11  368 2814 0 0 6.97 26.05  
Finland 991 4.32E+11  601 6522 0 0 6.9 26.79  
Bulgaria 974 2.41E+11 31192296 833 6242 0 0 6.88 26.21 17.26 
Bahrain 933 2.14E+11 1.02E+08 712 5989 0 0 6.84 26.09 18.44 
Tunisia 913 2.38E+11 14734981 908 6947 0 0 6.82 26.2 16.51 
Czech Republic 889 3.86E+11  880 5683 0 0 6.79 26.68  
Bangladesh 885 2.94E+11 2.33E+08 777 9530 0 1 6.79 26.41 19.27 
Oman 883 2.41E+11 33244327 772 6321 0 0 6.78 26.21 17.32 
Congo 793 2.07E+11 1.26E+08 307 3607 0 0 6.68 26.06 18.65 
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Sudan 743 2.56E+11 10619098 468 3929 10 1 6.61 26.27 16.18 
Jamaica 736 2.08E+11 1465609 1426 11700 0 1 6.6 26.06 14.2 
Angola 684 2.78E+11 1.63E+08 672 7125 0 0 6.53 26.35 18.91 
Croatia 683 2.55E+11 14651882 609 5808 0 0 6.53 26.26 16.5 
Serbia 674 2.32E+11 733047 921 5802 0 0 6.51 26.17 13.5 
Kuwait 635 3.03E+11 1298174 678 6187 0 0 6.45 26.44 14.08 
Mauritius 617 2.03E+11  957 9505 0 1 6.42 26.04  
Jordan 604 2.21E+11  985 5873 0 0 6.4 26.12  
Mozambique 602 2.03E+11  587 5373 0 0 6.4 26.04  
Syria 591 2.53E+11 69835535 557 5871 0 0 6.38 26.26 18.06 
Algeria 578 3.53E+11 9.27E+08 821 6113 0 0 6.36 26.59 20.65 
Costa Rica 558 2.3E+11 1190988 1261 12037 0 0 6.32 26.16 13.99 
Vietnam 557 3E+11 1.23E+08 1090 11802 0 0 6.32 26.43 18.63 
Iran 535 5.25E+11  679 6955 0 0 6.28 26.99  
Malawi 534 1.99E+11 14957 532 6034 0 0 6.28 26.02 9.61 
Taiwan 521 2.38E+11 4.55E+08 1085 13135 0 0 6.26 26.19 19.94 
Namibia 465 2.06E+11 6583074 545 5756 0 1 6.14 26.05 15.7 
Honduras 436 2.09E+11 647158 1349 11615 0 0 6.08 26.07 13.38 
Sri Lanka 425 2.43E+11 3163399 778 9173 0 1 6.05 26.22 14.97 
Libya 395 2.56E+11 1014620 560 3175 10 0 5.98 26.27 13.83 
New Zealand 388 3.2E+11 1.43E+08 1671 20288 0 1 5.96 26.49 18.78 
Rwanda 388 1.99E+11  551 4937 0 0 5.96 26.02  
Bahamas 360 2.01E+11 7419526 1236 10719 0 0 5.89 26.03 15.82 
Colombia 352 4.82E+11 3013311 1380 12059 0 0 5.86 26.9 14.92 
Luxembourg 340 2.47E+11 4026868 666 5073 0 0 5.83 26.23 15.21 
El Salvador 307 2.15E+11 202314 1319 11780 0  5.73 26.09 12.22 
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Venezuela 306 5.86E+11 1033026 1377 12718 0 0 5.72 27.1 13.85 
Argentina 292 5.62E+11 1.18E+08 1257 13907 0 0 5.68 27.06 18.59 
Latvia 286 2.18E+11 21268624 953 6298 0 0 5.66 26.11 16.87 
Guatemala 282 2.35E+11  1314 11648 0 0 5.64 26.18  
Yemen 229 2.2E+11 21814 731 6004 0 0 5.43 26.12 9.99 
Belarus 219 2.48E+11  642 6048 0 0 5.39 26.24  
Georgia 213 2.05E+11 20447876 966 5773 0 0 5.36 26.05 16.83 
Mali 205 2.03E+11 1079325 363 3192 0 0 5.32 26.04 13.89 
Malta 194 2.02E+11 1304986 693 6415 0 1 5.27 26.03 14.08 
Lesotho 177 1.96E+11  645 4931 0 0 5.18 26  
Swaziland 148 1.97E+11 28593323 630 4870 0 0 5 26.01 17.17 
Panama 141 2.2E+11 44919386 1490 12771 0 0 4.95 26.12 17.62 
Maldives 139 1.96E+11  1160 8869 0 1 4.93 26  
Burkina Faso 135 2.02E+11 62153353 213 1358 0 0 4.91 26.03 17.95 
Kazakhstan 135 3.43E+11 899004 916 9272 0 0 4.91 26.56 13.71 
Azerbaijan 134 2.45E+11 5950 974 6512 0 0 4.9 26.23 8.69 
Niger 124 1.99E+11  193 1431 0 1 4.82 26.02  
Trinidad and To 122 2.14E+11 6497297 2146 14116 0 1 4.8 26.09 15.69 
Belize 118 1.95E+11 1.11E+09 1192 11310 0 0 4.77 26 20.83 
Moldova 116 1.99E+11  589 5356 0 0 4.75 26.02  
Burundi 107 1.95E+11 2703 526 4838 0 0 4.67 26 7.9 
Nepal 107 2.07E+11 8108 804 8926 0 0 4.67 26.05 9 
Peru 103 3.51E+11 3.21E+08 1686 14123 0 0 4.63 26.58 19.59 
Seychelles 93 1.95E+11 5666 793 7968 0 0 4.53 25.99 8.64 
Cambodia 77 2.05E+11  1393 11360 0 0 4.34 26.05  
Dominican Repub 75 2.45E+11 128203 1803 12290 0 0 4.32 26.23 11.76 
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Slovenia 75 2.41E+11 4548960 605 5618 0 0 4.32 26.21 15.33 
Lithuania 74 2.3E+11 868210 982 5963 0 0 4.3 26.16 13.67 
Brunei Darussal 67 2.04E+11 3297801 3170 12859 0 1 4.2 26.04 15.01 
Guinea 61 1.98E+11 1266223 366 1961 0 0 4.11 26.01 14.05 
Madagascar 56 2.02E+11 8849 818 6552 0 0 4.03 26.03 9.09 
Estonia 39 2.13E+11 718916 725 6264 0 0 3.66 26.08 13.49 
Ecuador 36 2.52E+11 118290 1111 13482 0 0 3.58 26.25 11.68 
Sources: (IATA PaxIs, 2011; World Bank, 2011; FMOA, 2011; and NBS 2011) 
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Appendix 10: Database used in calibration of the model with ASA variables as dummies 
Country Passenger AggGDP($) Trade($) Fare($) Distance($) Dmy 
Lang 
lnPax lnGDP lnTrade Basa(rstrt) Basa(com) OSA YD 
UK 392528 2.44E+12 2.1E+09 845 5168 1 12.88 28.524 21.464 0 1 0 0 
Ghana 152754 2.25E+11 3E+08 149 517 1 11.937 26.139 19.52 0 0 0 1 
United States 152188 1.48E+13 2.34E+10 1100 10701 1 11.933 30.324 23.878 0 0 1 0 
United Arab Emi 109680 4.91E+11 1.13E+09 611 5969 1 11.605 26.92 20.843 0 1 0 0 
South Africa 107266 5.57E+11 1.77E+09 570 4715 1 11.583 27.047 21.293 0 1 0 0 
India 51377 1.92E+12 7.97E+09 876 8174 1 10.847 28.284 22.798 0 0 0 0 
China 49424 6.12E+12 6.24E+09 1500 11935 0 10.808 29.443 22.554 0 0 0 0 
Italy 43078 2.25E+12 3.35E+09 581 5137 0 10.671 28.44 21.931 1 0 0 0 
Germany 39376 3.47E+12 6.41E+08 799 5212 0 10.581 28.876 20.278 0 1 0 0 
Netherlands 35734 9.73E+11 2.6E+09 899 5029 0 10.484 27.604 21.68 0 1 0 0 
Cameroon 35090 2.16E+11 4.58E+08 179 785 1 10.466 26.099 19.942 0 0 0 1 
France 34566 2.75E+12 4.12E+09 1021 4965 0 10.451 28.644 22.139 0 1 0 0 
Egypt 34184 4.13E+11 72198792 535 3700 0 10.44 26.746 18.095 0 0 0 1 
Ethiopia 30623 2.23E+11 969039 548 3838 0 10.33 26.132 13.784 0 0 0 1 
Lebanon 27519 2.33E+11 47616811 596 4471 0 10.223 26.173 17.679 0 1 0 0 
Ireland 26237 4.05E+11 1.29E+08 834 5774 1 10.175 26.727 18.677 0 0 0 0 
  
344 
 
Qatar 26029 2.92E+11 16033644 578 5544 0 10.167 26.4 16.59 1 0 0 0 
Benin 20805 2E+11 56438401 94 154 0 9.943 26.023 17.849 0 0 0 1 
Saudi Arabia 19530 6.28E+11 4.89E+08 551 4612 1 9.88 27.166 20.008 1 0 0 0 
Kenya 19176 2.25E+11  594 3915 1 9.861 26.14  0 0 0 1 
Senegal 18142 2.07E+11 1.73E+08 433 2573 0 9.806 26.054 18.969 0 0 0 1 
Malaysia 17855 4.31E+11 6.36E+08 1311 11590 1 9.79 26.79 20.271 0 0 0 0 
Sierra Leone 17556 1.96E+11 4179054 363 1849 1 9.773 25.999 15.246 0 0 0 1 
Canada 16824 1.77E+12 1.81E+09 1337 11582 1 9.731 28.202 21.315 0 0 0 0 
Ivory Coast (Co 14426 2.16E+11 1.28E+09 214 890 0 9.577 26.101 20.974 0 0 0 1 
Turkey 12276 9.28E+11 4.6E+08 611 5033 0 9.415 27.556 19.948 1 0 0 0 
Spain 11796 1.6E+12 2.25E+09 592 4843 0 9.376 28.102 21.535 1 0 0 0 
Switzerland 10853 7.22E+11 2.11E+08 1164 5405 0 9.292 27.305 19.168 0 0 0 0 
Israel 10008 4.11E+11 1.1E+08 745 7262 1 9.211 26.742 18.516 0 0 0 0 
Hong Kong 8033 4.18E+11 3.22E+08 1365 12036 1 8.991 26.759 19.59 0 0 0 0 
South Korea 6147 1.21E+12 3.35E+08 1671 12874 0 8.724 27.82 19.629 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 5403 6.63E+11 2.56E+09 886 5302 0 8.595 27.22 21.664 0 0 0 0 
Gambia 4949 1.94E+11 1382910 408 2357 1 8.507 25.994 14.14 0 0 0 0 
Brazil 4600 2.28E+12 5.32E+09 1114 14056 0 8.434 28.456 22.394 0 0 0 0 
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Philippines 4578 3.93E+11 6620162 1576 13015 1 8.429 26.698 15.706 0 0 0 0 
Equatorial Guin 4514 2.08E+11 2.3E+09 165 742 0 8.415 26.059 21.556 0 0 0 0 
Singapore 4331 4.02E+11 5.22E+08 1426 11903 1 8.374 26.721 20.074 0 0 0 0 
Liberia 4174 1.95E+11 2868759 299 1537 1 8.337 25.994 14.869 0 0 0 1 
Austria 3994 5.73E+11 82044600 880 5743 0 8.293 27.074 18.223 0 0 0 0 
Russian Federat 3527 1.67E+12 40016965 1274 8281 0 8.168 28.146 17.505 0 0 0 0 
Sweden 3421 6.53E+11 2.97E+08 1010 6604 0 8.138 27.204 19.508 0 0 0 0 
Greece 3297 4.95E+11 1.39E+08 784 6741 0 8.101 26.927 18.749 0 0 0 0 
Gabon 3033 2.07E+11 11589131 220 984 0 8.017 26.054 16.266 1 0 0 0 
Morocco 2984 2.84E+11  533 3390 0 8.001 26.374  1 0 0 0 
Australia 2909 1.12E+12 7.28E+08 1595 17153 1 7.976 27.743 20.406 0 0 0 0 
Uganda 2644 2.11E+11 2127020 537 4540 1 7.88 26.074 14.57 0 0 0 0 
Denmark 2546 5.04E+11  846 5758 0 7.842 26.945  0 0 0 0 
Poland 2533 6.63E+11 1.3E+08 876 5911 0 7.837 27.22 18.682 0 0 0 0 
Pakistan 2466 3.71E+11 63238936 892 7469 1 7.81 26.638 17.962 0 0 0 0 
Ukraine 2462 3.32E+11 67860058 954 5858 0 7.809 26.527 18.033 0 0 0 0 
Indonesia 2376 9E+11 7.37E+08 1157 12609 1 7.773 27.526 20.418 0 0 0 0 
Tanzania 2329 2.17E+11 8696706 651 5068 1 7.753 26.102 15.978 0 0 0 0 
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Japan 2253 5.65E+12 1.03E+09 2434 13927 0 7.72 29.363 20.757 0 0 0 0 
Romania 2080 3.55E+11 13948120 750 6434 0 7.64 26.596 16.451 0 0 0 0 
Norway 2016 6.07E+11 2.14E+08 966 6110 0 7.609 27.131 19.18 0 0 0 0 
Zambia 1692 2.1E+11 58044 591 5874 1 7.434 26.07 10.969 0 0 0 0 
Cyprus 1549 2.17E+11 25351616 584 6365 0 7.345 26.102 17.048 0 0 0 0 
Zimbabwe 1515 2.01E+11 703135 541 5755 1 7.323 26.027 13.463 0 0 0 0 
Mexico 1506 1.23E+12  1266 12400 0 7.317 27.837  0 0 0 0 
Botswana 1482 2.09E+11 1.29E+09 516 4855 0 7.301 26.063 20.977 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 1383 4.23E+11 1.34E+09 711 5911 0 7.232 26.77 21.015 0 0 0 0 
Chad 1216 2.01E+11 1.72E+08 278 5319 1 7.103 26.028 18.962 0 0 0 0 
Togo 1159 1.97E+11 1442269 123 481 1 7.055 26.006 14.182 0 0 0 0 
Hungary 1145 3.22E+11 8858633 711 5775 0 7.043 26.499 15.997 0 0 0 0 
Congo Democrati 1065 2.06E+11  368 2814 0 6.971 26.049  0 0 0 0 
Finland 991 4.32E+11  601 6522 0 6.899 26.793  0 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 974 2.41E+11 31192296 833 6242 0 6.881 26.21 17.256 0 0 0 0 
Bahrain 933 2.14E+11 1.02E+08 712 5989 0 6.838 26.09 18.439 0 0 0 0 
Tunisia 913 2.38E+11 14734981 908 6947 0 6.817 26.195 16.506 0 0 0 0 
Czech Republic 889 3.86E+11  880 5683 0 6.79 26.678  0 0 0 0 
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Bangladesh 885 2.94E+11 2.33E+08 777 9530 1 6.786 26.407 19.268 0 0 0 0 
Oman 883 2.41E+11 33244327 772 6321 0 6.783 26.206 17.319 0 0 0 0 
Congo 793 2.07E+11 1.26E+08 307 3607 0 6.676 26.055 18.651 0 0 0 0 
Sudan 743 2.56E+11 10619098 468 3929 1 6.611 26.267 16.178 1 0 0 0 
Jamaica 736 2.08E+11 1465609 1426 11700 1 6.601 26.06 14.198 0 0 0 0 
Angola 684 2.78E+11 1.63E+08 672 7125 0 6.528 26.351 18.909 0 0 0 0 
Croatia 683 2.55E+11 14651882 609 5808 0 6.526 26.263 16.5 0 0 0 0 
Serbia 674 2.32E+11 733047 921 5802 0 6.513 26.17 13.505 0 0 0 0 
Kuwait 635 3.03E+11 1298174 678 6187 0 6.454 26.437 14.076 0 0 0 0 
Mauritius 617 2.03E+11  957 9505 1 6.425 26.038  0 0 0 0 
Jordan 604 2.21E+11  985 5873 0 6.404 26.123  0 0 0 0 
Mozambique 602 2.03E+11  587 5373 0 6.4 26.038  0 0 0 0 
Syria 591 2.53E+11 69835535 557 5871 0 6.382 26.256 18.062 0 0 0 0 
Algeria 578 3.53E+11 9.27E+08 821 6113 0 6.36 26.59 20.647 0 0 0 0 
Costa Rica 558 2.3E+11 1190988 1261 12037 0 6.324 26.159 13.99 0 0 0 0 
Vietnam 557 3E+11 1.23E+08 1090 11802 0 6.323 26.427 18.628 0 0 0 0 
Iran 535 5.25E+11  679 6955 0 6.282 26.986  0 0 0 0 
Malawi 534 1.99E+11 14957 532 6034 0 6.28 26.015 9.613 0 0 0 0 
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Taiwan 521 2.38E+11 4.55E+08 1085 13135 0 6.256 26.194 19.935 0 0 0 0 
Namibia 465 2.06E+11 6583074 545 5756 1 6.142 26.05 15.7 0 0 0 0 
Honduras 436 2.09E+11 647158 1349 11615 0 6.078 26.066 13.38 0 0 0 0 
Sri Lanka 425 2.43E+11 3163399 778 9173 1 6.052 26.217 14.967 0 0 0 0 
Libya 395 2.56E+11 1014620 560 3175 0 5.979 26.269 13.83 1 0 0 0 
New Zealand 388 3.2E+11 1.43E+08 1671 20288 1 5.961 26.493 18.78 0 0 0 0 
Rwanda 388 1.99E+11  551 4937 0 5.961 26.018  0 0 0 0 
Bahamas 360 2.01E+11 7419526 1236 10719 0 5.886 26.028 15.82 0 0 0 0 
Colombia 352 4.82E+11 3013311 1380 12059 0 5.864 26.901 14.919 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 340 2.47E+11 4026868 666 5073 0 5.829 26.233 15.208 0 0 0 0 
El Salvador 307 2.15E+11 202314 1319 11780  5.727 26.093 12.218 0 0 0 0 
Venezuela 306 5.86E+11 1033026 1377 12718 0 5.724 27.096 13.848 0 0 0 0 
Argentina 292 5.62E+11 1.18E+08 1257 13907 0 5.677 27.055 18.588 0 0 0 0 
Latvia 286 2.18E+11 21268624 953 6298 0 5.656 26.106 16.873 0 0 0 0 
Guatemala 282 2.35E+11  1314 11648 0 5.642 26.182  0 0 0 0 
Yemen 229 2.2E+11 21814 731 6004 0 5.434 26.117 9.99 0 0 0 0 
Belarus 219 2.48E+11  642 6048 0 5.389 26.238  0 0 0 0 
Georgia 213 2.05E+11 20447876 966 5773 0 5.361 26.048 16.833 0 0 0 0 
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Mali 205 2.03E+11 1079325 363 3192 0 5.323 26.036 13.892 0 0 0 0 
Malta 194 2.02E+11 1304986 693 6415 1 5.268 26.031 14.082 0 0 0 0 
Lesotho 177 1.96E+11  645 4931 0 5.176 26  0 0 0 0 
Swaziland 148 1.97E+11 28593323 630 4870 0 4.997 26.008 17.169 0 0 0 0 
Panama 141 2.2E+11 44919386 1490 12771 0 4.949 26.119 17.62 0 0 0 0 
Maldives 139 1.96E+11  1160 8869 1 4.934 25.999  0 0 0 0 
Burkina Faso 135 2.02E+11 62153353 213 1358 0 4.905 26.034 17.945 0 0 0 0 
Kazakhstan 135 3.43E+11 899004 916 9272 0 4.905 26.56 13.709 0 0 0 0 
Azerbaijan 134 2.45E+11 5950 974 6512 0 4.898 26.226 8.691 0 0 0 0 
Niger 124 1.99E+11  193 1431 1 4.82 26.018  0 0 0 0 
Trinidad and To 122 2.14E+11 6497297 2146 14116 1 4.804 26.091 15.687 0 0 0 0 
Belize 118 1.95E+11 1.11E+09 1192 11310 0 4.771 25.997 20.829 0 0 0 0 
Moldova 116 1.99E+11  589 5356 0 4.754 26.019  0 0 0 0 
Burundi 107 1.95E+11 2703 526 4838 0 4.673 25.998 7.902 0 0 0 0 
Nepal 107 2.07E+11 8108 804 8926 0 4.673 26.054 9.001 0 0 0 0 
Peru 103 3.51E+11 3.21E+08 1686 14123 0 4.635 26.583 19.586 0 0 0 0 
Seychelles 93 1.95E+11 5666 793 7968 0 4.533 25.994 8.642 0 0 0 0 
Cambodia 77 2.05E+11  1393 11360 0 4.344 26.046  0 0 0 0 
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Dominican Repub 75 2.45E+11 128203 1803 12290 0 4.317 26.226 11.761 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia 75 2.41E+11 4548960 605 5618 0 4.317 26.206 15.33 0 0 0 0 
Lithuania 74 2.3E+11 868210 982 5963 0 4.304 26.161 13.674 0 0 0 0 
Brunei Darussal 67 2.04E+11 3297801 3170 12859 1 4.205 26.043 15.009 0 0 0 0 
Guinea 61 1.98E+11 1266223 366 1961 0 4.111 26.012 14.052 1 0 0 0 
Madagascar 56 2.02E+11 8849 818 6552 0 4.025 26.033 9.088 0 0 0 0 
Estonia 39 2.13E+11 718916 725 6264 0 3.664 26.084 13.485 0 0 0 0 
Ecuador 36 2.52E+11 118290 1111 13482 0 3.584 26.251 11.681 0 0 0 0 
 Sources: (IATA PaxIs, 2011; World Bank, 2011; FMOA, 2011; and NBS 2011) 
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Appendix 11: Regression Output for 2010 data 
GET 
  FILE='K:\DATA FROM OLD PC\My Documents\137(2010).sav'. 
DATASET NAME DataSet1 WINDOW=FRONT. 
REGRESSION 
  /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT lnPax 
  /METHOD=STEPWISE lnGDP LnTrade Fare Distance ALI Dummy 
  /PARTIALPLOT ALL 
  /SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID ,*ZPRED) 
  /RESIDUALS DURBIN HISTOGRAM(ZRESID) NORMPROB(ZRESID) 
  /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3). 
 
Regression 
[DataSet1] K:\DATA FROM OLD PC\My Documents\137(2010).sav 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
lnPax 7.43102 2.142816 113 
lnGDP 26.65531 .868196 113 
LnTrade 17.10917 3.533296 113 
Air Fare($) 874.37 483.820 113 
Distance(KM) 7205.25 3986.131 113 
Air Lib Index 4.21 8.898 113 
Lang/Culture Link .31 .464 113 
 
Correlations 
 lnPax lnGDP LnTrade Air Fare ($) Distance (KM) Air Lib Index 
Lang/Culture 
Link 
Pearson Correlation lnPax 1.000 .554 .640 -.223 -.271 .637 .347 
lnGDP .554 1.000 .603 .312 .273 .164 .046 
LnTrade .640 .603 1.000 .055 .053 .269 .135 
Air Fare($) -.223 .312 .055 1.000 .846 -.341 .067 
Distance(KM) -.271 .273 .053 .846 1.000 -.425 .095 
Air Lib Index .637 .164 .269 -.341 -.425 1.000 .148 
Lang/Culture Link .347 .046 .135 .067 .095 .148 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) lnPax . .000 .000 .009 .002 .000 .000 
lnGDP .000 . .000 .000 .002 .042 .316 
LnTrade .000 .000 . .282 .287 .002 .077 
Air Fare($) .009 .000 .282 . .000 .000 .242 
Distance(KM) .002 .002 .287 .000 . .000 .158 
Air Lib Index .000 .042 .002 .000 .000 . .059 
Lang/Culture Link .000 .316 .077 .242 .158 .059 . 
N lnPax 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 
lnGDP 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 
LnTrade 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 
Air Fare($) 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 
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Distance(KM) 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 
Air Lib Index 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 
Lang/Culture Link 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
0
1 LnTrade . Stepwise (Criteria: 
Probability-of-F-to-
enter <= .050, 
Probability-of-F-to-
remove >= .100). 
2 Air Lib Index . Stepwise (Criteria: 
Probability-of-F-to-
enter <= .050, 
Probability-of-F-to-
remove >= .100). 
3 lnGDP . Stepwise (Criteria: 
Probability-of-F-to-
enter <= .050, 
Probability-of-F-to-
remove >= .100). 
4 Lang/Culture Link . Stepwise (Criteria: 
Probability-of-F-to-
enter <= .050, 
Probability-of-F-to-
remove >= .100). 
5 Distance(KM) . Stepwise (Criteria: 
Probability-of-F-to-
enter <= .050, 
Probability-of-F-to-
remove >= .100). 
a. Dependent Variable: lnPax 
 
 
 
Model Summaryf 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson R Square Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .640a .410 .405 1.653077 .410 77.192 1 111 .000 
 
2 .802b .643 .636 1.292179 .233 71.662 1 110 .000 
 
3 .829c .687 .678 1.215490 .044 15.318 1 109 .000 
 
4 .857d .734 .724 1.124836 .047 19.277 1 108 .000 
 
5 .885e .784 .774 1.018948 .050 24.613 1 107 .000 1.350 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade 
b. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index 
c. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index, lnGDP 
d. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index, lnGDP, Lang/Culture Link 
e. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index, lnGDP, Lang/Culture Link, Distance(KM) 
f. Dependent Variable: lnPax 
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ANOVAf 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 210.941 1 210.941 77.192 .000a 
Residual 303.326 111 2.733 
  
Total 514.266 112 
   
2 Regression 330.596 2 165.298 98.997 .000b 
Residual 183.670 110 1.670 
  
Total 514.266 112 
   
3 Regression 353.228 3 117.743 79.695 .000c 
Residual 161.038 109 1.477 
  
Total 514.266 112 
   
4 Regression 377.618 4 94.405 74.613 .000d 
Residual 136.648 108 1.265 
  
Total 514.266 112 
   
5 Regression 403.173 5 80.635 77.664 .000e 
Residual 111.093 107 1.038 
  
Total 514.266 112 
   
a. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade 
b. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index 
c. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index, lnGDP 
d. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index, lnGDP, Lang/Culture Link 
e. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index, lnGDP, Lang/Culture Link, Distance(KM) 
f. Dependent Variable: lnPax 
 
Coefficients 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .786 .772 
 
1.017 .311 
     
LnTrade .388 .044 .640 8.786 .000 .640 .640 .640 1.000 1.000 
2 (Constant) 1.677 .613 
 
2.737 .007 
     
LnTrade .307 .036 .506 8.545 .000 .640 .632 .487 .927 1.078 
Air Lib Index .121 .014 .501 8.465 .000 .637 .628 .482 .927 1.078 
3 (Constant) -13.984 4.043 
 
-3.459 .001 
     
LnTrade .210 .042 .347 5.038 .000 .640 .435 .270 .606 1.650 
Air Lib Index .121 .013 .501 8.994 .000 .637 .653 .482 .927 1.078 
lnGDP .649 .166 .263 3.914 .000 .554 .351 .210 .636 1.573 
4 (Constant) -14.785 3.746 
 
-3.947 .000 
     
LnTrade .192 .039 .317 4.939 .000 .640 .429 .245 .599 1.670 
Air Lib Index .114 .012 .474 9.137 .000 .637 .660 .453 .915 1.093 
lnGDP .680 .154 .276 4.426 .000 .554 .392 .220 .634 1.576 
Lang/Culture 
Link 
1.022 .233 .222 4.391 .000 .347 .389 .218 .966 1.035 
5 (Constant) -20.399 3.577 
 
-5.703 .000 
     
LnTrade .181 .035 .298 5.117 .000 .640 .443 .230 .596 1.677 
Air Lib Index .082 .013 .340 6.267 .000 .637 .518 .282 .687 1.455 
lnGDP .941 .149 .381 6.322 .000 .554 .521 .284 .556 1.800 
Lang/Culture 
Link 
1.223 .215 .265 5.695 .000 .347 .482 .256 .932 1.073 
Distance(KM) .000 .000 -.272 -4.961 .000 -.271 -.432 -.223 .673 1.486 
a. Dependent Variable: lnPax 
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Excluded Variables 
Model 
Beta In t Sig. Partial Correlation 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF Minimum Tolerance 
1 lnGDP .264a 2.988 .003 .274 .636 1.573 .636 
Air Fare($) -.259a -3.751 .000 -.337 .997 1.003 .997 
Distance(KM) -.306a -4.552 .000 -.398 .997 1.003 .997 
Air Lib Index .501a 8.465 .000 .628 .927 1.078 .927 
Lang/Culture 
Link 
.265a 3.823 .000 .342 .982 1.019 .982 
2 lnGDP .263b 3.914 .000 .351 .636 1.573 .606 
Air Fare($) -.093b -1.527 .130 -.145 .861 1.162 .801 
Distance(KM) -.108b -1.698 .092 -.161 .789 1.268 .734 
Lang/Culture 
Link 
.211b 3.874 .000 .348 .968 1.033 .915 
3 Air Fare($) -.208c -3.508 .001 -.320 .738 1.355 .545 
Distance(KM) -.213c -3.484 .001 -.318 .698 1.434 .562 
Lang/Culture 
Link 
.222c 4.391 .000 .389 .966 1.035 .599 
4 Air Fare($) -.249d -4.651 .000 -.410 .724 1.382 .540 
Distance(KM) -.272d -4.961 .000 -.432 .673 1.486 .556 
5 Air Fare($) -.111e -1.299 .197 -.125 .275 3.640 .255 
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), LnTrade 
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index 
c. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index, lnGDP 
d. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index, lnGDP, Lang/Culture Link 
e. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), LnTrade, Air Lib Index, lnGDP, Lang/Culture Link, Distance(KM) 
f. Dependent Variable: lnPax 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnostics 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) LnTrade Air Lib Index lnGDP 
Lang/Cultur
e Link 
Distance 
(KM) 
1 dim
ensi
on1 
1 1.980 1.000 .01 .01 
    
2 .020 9.829 .99 .99 
    
2 dim
ensi
on1 
1 2.292 1.000 .01 .01 .06    
2 .688 1.825 .01 .00 .88    
3 .019 10.857 .99 .99 .05    
3 
dim
ensi
on1 
1 3.239 1.000 .00 .00 .02 .00   
2 .737 2.097 .00 .00 .92 .00   
3 .024 11.724 .01 .70 .06 .00   
4 .000 94.299 .99 .29 .00 1.00   
4 
dim
ensi
on1 
1 3.642 1.000 .00 .00 .02 .00 .02  
2 .738 2.221 .00 .00 .87 .00 .01  
3 .595 2.473 .00 .00 .06 .00 .96  
4 .023 12.455 .01 .70 .05 .00 .00  
5 .000 100.110 .99 .30 .00 1.00 .00  
5 
dim
ensi
on1 
1 4.386 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 .02 .01 
2 .870 2.245 .00 .00 .52 .00 .03 .03 
3 .596 2.713 .00 .00 .06 .00 .92 .00 
4 .124 5.937 .00 .01 .34 .00 .02 .85 
5 .023 13.669 .01 .70 .04 .00 .00 .00 
6 .000 116.663 .99 .28 .03 1.00 .01 .11 
a. Dependent Variable: lnPax 
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Residuals Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 4.42653 14.21984 7.43102 1.897303 113 
Residual -2.286971 2.241496 .000000 .995944 113 
Std. Predicted Value -1.584 3.578 .000 1.000 113 
Std. Residual -2.244 2.200 .000 .977 113 
a. Dependent Variable: lnPax 
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Case wise Diagnostics 
Case Number Std. Residual lnPax Predicted Value Residual Status 
dimensi
on0 
1 .784 12.880 12.08100 .799360  
2 .613 11.937 11.31197 .624611  
3 -2.244 11.933 14.21984 -2.286971  
4 1.238 11.605 10.34353 1.261790  
5 1.001 11.583 10.56305 1.020016  
6 .490 10.847 10.34778 .499162  
7 1.165 10.808 9.62121 1.186978  
8 .128 10.671 10.54051 .130260  
9 -.381 10.581 10.96900 -.388093  
10 .424 10.484 10.05190 .431960  
11 -.830 10.466 11.31091 -.845235  
12 -.659 10.451 11.12248 -.671850  
13 .493 10.440 9.93708 .502431  
14 1.735 10.330 8.56157 1.767936  
15 2.117 10.223 8.06522 2.157413  
16 1.653 10.175 8.49041 1.684519  
17 2.200 10.167 7.92547 2.241496  
18 -.992 9.943 10.95396 -1.011014  
19 -.408 9.880 10.29512 -.415410  
20 . 9.861 . . Ma 
21 .193 9.806 9.60919 .196797  
22 1.769 9.790 7.98798 1.802057  
23 -.433 9.773 10.21387 -.440720  
24 .221 9.731 9.50564 .224923  
25 -.671 9.577 10.26071 -.683926  
26 .048 9.415 9.36668 .048723  
27 -.803 9.376 10.19399 -.818476  
28 .351 9.292 8.93484 .357358  
29 .936 9.211 8.25767 .953469  
30 1.198 8.991 7.77027 1.221041  
31 1.270 8.724 7.42995 1.293768  
32 .251 8.595 8.33925 .255458  
33 1.008 8.507 7.48026 1.026680  
34 .078 8.434 8.35444 .079367  
35 1.532 8.429 6.86823 1.560785  
36 .511 8.415 7.89421 .520731  
37 .523 8.374 7.84105 .532502  
38 .593 8.337 7.73267 .603959  
39 .762 8.293 7.51580 .776745  
40 .142 8.168 8.02385 .144355  
41 .385 8.138 7.74491 .392773  
42 .759 8.101 7.32729 .773476  
43 1.097 8.017 6.89904 1.118267  
44 . 8.001 . . Ma 
45 -.118 7.976 8.09542 -.119852  
46 .555 7.880 7.31435 .565697  
47 . 7.842 . . Ma 
48 .123 7.837 7.71196 .125199  
49 -.216 7.810 8.02997 -.219613  
50 .842 7.809 6.95074 .857994  
51 -.770 7.773 8.55738 -.784209  
52 .231 7.753 7.51809 .235105  
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53 -1.188 7.720 8.93097 -1.210949  
54 .976 7.640 6.64584 .994282  
55 -.079 7.609 7.68914 -.080273  
56 .950 7.434 6.46557 .968095  
57 1.027 7.345 6.29923 1.046140  
58 .422 7.323 6.89342 .429752  
59 . 7.317 . . Ma 
60 .107 7.301 7.19248 .108665  
61 -.468 7.232 7.70932 -.477308  
62 .369 7.103 6.72766 .375663  
63 .496 7.055 6.55031 .505006  
64 .466 7.043 6.56849 .474669  
65 . 6.971 . . Ma 
66 . 6.899 . . Ma 
67 .418 6.881 6.45564 .425767  
68 .240 6.838 6.59414 .244263  
69 .602 6.817 6.20381 .612926  
70 . 6.790 . . Ma 
71 -.944 6.786 7.74716 -.961570  
72 .325 6.783 6.45230 .331028  
73 -.266 6.676 6.94707 -.271248  
74 -2.205 6.611 8.85790 -2.247208  
75 .405 6.601 6.18869 .412536  
76 -.226 6.528 6.75821 -.230250  
77 .092 6.526 6.43246 .094030  
78 .694 6.513 5.80579 .707439  
79 .343 6.454 6.10388 .349741  
80 . 6.425 . . Ma 
81 . 6.404 . . Ma 
82 . 6.400 . . Ma 
83 -.311 6.382 6.69889 -.317076  
84 -1.065 6.360 7.44461 -1.085039  
85 1.327 6.324 4.97198 1.352378  
86 .222 6.323 6.09601 .226556  
87 . 6.282 . . Ma 
88 1.332 6.280 4.92343 1.356968  
89 .332 6.256 5.91785 .337901  
90 -1.155 6.142 7.31883 -1.176793  
91 1.219 6.078 4.83581 1.241833  
92 -.777 6.052 6.84427 -.792176  
93 -1.318 5.979 7.32235 -1.343465  
94 -.203 5.961 6.16791 -.206900  
95 . 5.961 . . Ma 
96 .505 5.886 5.37109 .515019  
97 .029 5.864 5.83399 .029639  
98 -.441 5.829 6.27844 -.449493  
99 1.079 5.727 4.62756 1.099287  
100 -.004 5.724 5.72768 -.004092  
101 -.682 5.677 6.37202 -.695268  
102 -.613 5.656 6.28111 -.625115  
103 . 5.642 . . Ma 
104 .336 5.434 5.09151 .342211  
105 . 5.389 . . Ma 
106 -.917 5.361 6.29580 -.934506  
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107 -.793 5.323 6.13061 -.807601  
108 -1.614 5.268 6.91230 -1.644446  
109 . 5.176 . . Ma 
110 -1.427 4.997 6.45078 -1.453565  
111 -.523 4.949 5.48196 -.533196  
112 . 4.934 . . Ma 
113 -2.182 4.905 7.12839 -2.223112  
114 -.782 4.905 5.70232 -.797043  
115 .012 4.898 4.88549 .012349  
116 . 4.820 . . Ma 
117 -1.304 4.804 6.13291 -1.328890  
118 -1.364 4.771 6.16017 -1.389481  
119 . 4.754 . . Ma 
120 -.098 4.673 4.77254 -.099716  
121 .242 4.673 4.42653 .246299  
122 -1.415 4.635 6.07635 -1.441625  
123 .085 4.533 4.44569 .086905  
124 . 4.344 . . Ma 
125 -.273 4.317 4.59571 -.278220  
126 -1.844 4.317 6.19604 -1.878550  
127 -1.472 4.304 5.80421 -1.500142  
128 -1.909 4.205 6.14974 -1.945052  
129 -2.165 4.111 6.31705 -2.206180  
130 -.731 4.025 4.76994 -.744584  
131 -1.953 3.664 5.65354 -1.989982  
132 -.831 3.584 4.43055 -.847027  
a. Missing Case 
b. Dependent Variable: lnPax 
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Appendix 12: Regression Output with ASAs as Dummies 
 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet5. 
SAVE OUTFILE='K:\Post VIVA analysis.sav' 
 /COMPRESSED. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
DATASET CLOSE DataSet5. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
SAVE OUTFILE='C:\Users\u0976229\Documents\OLD PC documents\137(2010)_2.sav' 
 /COMPRESSED. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet2. 
DATASET CLOSE DataSet1. 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet4. 
GET 
  FILE='K:\Post VIVA analysis.sav'. 
DATASET NAME DataSet6 WINDOW=FRONT. 
REGRESSION 
  /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA CHANGE 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT LnPax 
  /METHOD=STEPWISE LnGDP LnTrade Distance Fare DummLang BASArst BASAcom OSA YD 
  /PARTIALPLOT ALL 
  /SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID ,*ZPRED). 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Log passenger 7.44624 2.146306 112 
Log agg GDP 26.66033 .870450 112 
Log trade 17.15285 3.518403 112 
Distance 7164.40 3980.221 112 
Cultural/language .32 .469 112 
Dummy ALI1(BASA rest) .16 .369 112 
DummyALI2(BASA comm) .06 .243 112 
DummyALI3(OSA) .01 .094 112 
DummyALI4(YD) .08 .273 112 
Average Air fare 870.40 484.143 112 
 
Correlations 
 LnPax LnGDP LnTrade Distance Fare DummLang BASArst BASAcom OSA YD 
Pearson 
Correlation 
LnPax 1.000 .552 .637 -.265 -.218 .312 .206 .443 .199 .363 
LnGDP .552 1.000 .602 .282 .320 .027 .146 .305 .401 -.177 
LnTrade .637 .602 1.000 .069 .068 .116 .114 .266 .182 .045 
Distance -.265 .282 .069 1.000 .844 .095 -.169 -.136 .085 -.403 
Fare -.218 .320 .068 .844 1.000 .050 -.157 -.058 .045 -.342 
DummLang .312 .027 .116 .095 .050 1.000 .032 .059 .138 .078 
BASArst .206 .146 .114 -.169 -.157 .032 1.000 -.072 -.026 -.082 
BASAcom .443 .305 .266 -.136 -.058 .059 -.072 1.000 -.025 -.076 
OSA .199 .401 .182 .085 .045 .138 -.026 -.025 1.000 -.028 
YD .363 -.177 .045 -.403 -.342 .078 -.082 -.076 -.028 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
LnPax . .000 .000 .002 .010 .000 .015 .000 .018 .000 
LnGDP .000 . .000 .001 .000 .389 .063 .001 .000 .031 
LnTrade .000 .000 . .235 .239 .112 .116 .002 .028 .319 
Distance .002 .001 .235 . .000 .160 .038 .076 .187 .000 
Fare .010 .000 .239 .000 . .302 .049 .273 .318 .000 
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DummLang .000 .389 .112 .160 .302 . .370 .267 .074 .207 
BASArst .015 .063 .116 .038 .049 .370 . .227 .391 .195 
BASAcom .000 .001 .002 .076 .273 .267 .227 . .399 .212 
OSA .018 .000 .028 .187 .318 .074 .391 .399 . .385 
YD .000 .031 .319 .000 .000 .207 .195 .212 .385 . 
N 
LnPax 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
LnGDP 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
LnTrade 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
Distance 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
Fare 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
DummLang 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
BASArst 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
BASAcom 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
OSA 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
YD 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
 
 
Model Summaryh 
Mod
el 
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
1 .637a .406 .401 1.661 .406 75.236 1 110 .000 
2 .720b .518 .509 1.503 .112 25.291 1 109 .000 
3 .786c .618 .607 1.344 .100 28.264 1 108 .000 
4 .827d .684 .672 1.229 .066 22.152 1 107 .000 
5 .855e .730 .717 1.140 .047 18.358 1 106 .000 
6 .887f .787 .775 1.018 .057 28.088 1 105 .000 
7 .893g .797 .783 .998 .010 5.077 1 104 .026 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade 
b. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, YD 
c. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, YD, BASAcom 
d. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, YD, BASAcom, LnGDP 
e. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, YD, BASAcom, LnGDP, DummLang 
f. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, YD, BASAcom, LnGDP, DummLang, Distance 
g. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, YD, BASAcom, LnGDP, DummLang, Distance, BASArst 
h. Dependent Variable: LnPax 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 207.519 1 207.519 75.236 .000b 
Residual 303.406 110 2.758 
  
Total 510.925 111 
   
2 
Regression 264.660 2 132.330 58.571 .000c 
Residual 246.265 109 2.259 
  
Total 510.925 111 
   
3 
Regression 315.741 3 105.247 58.236 .000d 
Residual 195.184 108 1.807 
  
Total 510.925 111 
   
4 
Regression 349.218 4 87.304 57.769 .000e 
Residual 161.707 107 1.511 
  
Total 510.925 111 
   
5 
Regression 373.090 5 74.618 57.384 .000f 
Residual 137.835 106 1.300 
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Total 510.925 111 
   
6 
Regression 402.180 6 67.030 64.721 .000g 
Residual 108.745 105 1.036 
  
Total 510.925 111 
   
7 
Regression 407.241 7 58.177 58.355 .000h 
Residual 103.684 104 .997 
  
Total 510.925 111 
   
a. Dependent Variable: LnPax 
b. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade 
c. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, YD 
d. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, YD, BASAcom 
e. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, YD, BASAcom, LnGDP 
f. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, YD, BASAcom, LnGDP, DummLang 
g. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, YD, BASAcom, LnGDP, DummLang, Distance 
h. Predictors: (Constant), LnTrade, YD, BASAcom, LnGDP, DummLang, Distance, BASArst 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) .787 .784 
 
1.005 .317 
LnTrade .389 .045 .637 8.674 .000 
2 
(Constant) .733 .709 
 
1.033 .304 
LnTrade .380 .041 .622 9.349 .000 
YD 2.630 .523 .335 5.029 .000 
3 
(Constant) 1.461 .649 
 
2.251 .026 
LnTrade .326 .038 .533 8.628 .000 
YD 2.859 .470 .364 6.086 .000 
BASAcom 2.906 .547 .329 5.316 .000 
4 
(Constant) -18.644 4.313 
 
-4.323 .000 
LnTrade .208 .043 .340 4.866 .000 
YD 3.367 .443 .428 7.602 .000 
BASAcom 2.497 .507 .283 4.921 .000 
LnGDP .829 .176 .337 4.707 .000 
5 
(Constant) -19.456 4.005 
 
-4.858 .000 
LnTrade .190 .040 .311 4.764 .000 
YD 3.255 .412 .414 7.906 .000 
BASAcom 2.409 .471 .273 5.114 .000 
LnGDP .860 .164 .349 5.256 .000 
DummLang 1.000 .233 .219 4.285 .000 
6 
(Constant) -24.175 3.683 
 
-6.563 .000 
LnTrade .180 .036 .294 5.050 .000 
YD 2.426 .399 .309 6.077 .000 
BASAcom 1.770 .437 .201 4.046 .000 
LnGDP 1.086 .152 .441 7.140 .000 
DummLang 1.177 .211 .257 5.580 .000 
Distance .000 .000 -.282 -5.300 .000 
7 
(Constant) -22.585 3.682 
 
-6.134 .000 
LnTrade .176 .035 .289 5.049 .000 
YD 2.606 .400 .332 6.519 .000 
BASAcom 1.990 .440 .226 4.522 .000 
LnGDP 1.020 .152 .414 6.705 .000 
DummLang 1.135 .208 .248 5.465 .000 
Distance .000 .000 -.243 -4.405 .000 
BASArst .891 .395 .107 2.253 .026 
a. Dependent Variable: LnPax 
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Excluded Variablesa 
Model Beta In t Sig. Partial 
Correlation 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Tolerance 
1 
LnGDP .264b 2.969 .004 .274 .637 
Distance -.311b -4.587 .000 -.402 .995 
Fare -.262b -3.770 .000 -.340 .995 
DummLang .242b 3.424 .001 .312 .987 
BASArst .135b 1.849 .067 .174 .987 
BASAcom .295b 4.143 .000 .369 .929 
OSA .086b 1.156 .250 .110 .967 
YD .335b 5.029 .000 .434 .998 
2 
LnGDP .397c 5.111 .000 .441 .596 
Distance -.209c -2.960 .004 -.274 .830 
Fare -.166c -2.389 .019 -.224 .876 
DummLang .218c 3.407 .001 .311 .981 
BASArst .166c 2.533 .013 .237 .979 
BASAcom .329c 5.316 .000 .455 .922 
OSA .099c 1.470 .145 .140 .966 
3 
LnGDP .337d 4.707 .000 .414 .578 
Distance -.140d -2.124 .036 -.201 .791 
Fare -.128d -2.031 .045 -.193 .864 
DummLang .207d 3.633 .000 .331 .980 
BASArst .206d 3.581 .001 .327 .966 
OSA .126d 2.102 .038 .199 .959 
4 
Distance -.235e -3.947 .000 -.358 .732 
Fare -.239e -4.157 .000 -.374 .778 
DummLang .219e 4.285 .000 .384 .978 
BASArst .182e 3.425 .001 .316 .957 
OSA .026e .435 .665 .042 .809 
5 
Distance -.282f -5.300 .000 -.459 .714 
Fare -.265f -5.126 .000 -.447 .771 
BASArst .174f 3.555 .001 .328 .956 
OSA -.011f -.201 .841 -.020 .789 
6 
Fare -.131g -1.534 .128 -.149 .275 
BASArst .107g 2.253 .026 .216 .859 
OSA -.037g -.728 .468 -.071 .782 
7 
Fare -.123h -1.468 .145 -.143 .274 
OSA -.020h -.395 .693 -.039 .763 
a. Dependent Variable: LnPax 
b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), LnTrade 
c. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), LnTrade, YD 
d. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), LnTrade, YD, BASAcom 
e. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), LnTrade, YD, BASAcom, LnGDP 
f. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), LnTrade, YD, BASAcom, LnGDP, DummLang 
g. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), LnTrade, YD, BASAcom, LnGDP, DummLang, Distance 
h. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), LnTrade, YD, BASAcom, LnGDP, DummLang, Distance, BASArst 
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THE END 
